Stuart Robinson v. City of Seattle

[5] UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE [7] BARBARA STUART ROBINSON, CASE NO. 24-cv-377 [8] Plaintiff, DISMISSAL ORDER [9] v. [10] CITY OF SEATTLE, [11] Defendant. [13] 1. INTRODUCTION [14] Pro se Plaintiff Barbara Stuart Robinson brings this action against the City [15] of Seattle. Dkt. No. 1. On March 21, 2024, U.S. Magistrate Judge S. Kate Vaughn [16] granted Robinson leave to proceed in forma pauperis and recommended review of [17] Robinson’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B). Dkt. No. 4. After reviewing [18] Robinson’s complaint, see Dkt. No. 7, this Court found that Robinson failed to state [19] a claim upon which relief may be granted. Dkt. No. 11. Rather than dismissing the [20] case outright, the Court explained why Robinson’s complaint failed to state a claim [21] upon which relief may be granted and instructed Robinson to submit a written [23] 1 response, no longer than five pages, as to why her complaint should not be 2 dismissed. Id. 3 Robinson has since submitted three responses to the Court’s Order to Show 4 Cause, each seven pages or longer. Dkt. Nos. 12, 14, 16. Robinson has also 5 submitted two additional amended complaints. Dkt. Nos. 13, 15. Having reviewed 6 these submissions, the record, and the law, the Court concludes that none of 7 Robinson’s responses or amended complaints resolve the problems the Court 8 identified in its Order to Show Cause. Robinson has failed to state a claim upon 9 which relief may be granted. The Court therefore DISMISSES this case without 10 prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B). 11 2. BACKGROUND 12 On May 25, 2024, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause, summarizing 13 the allegations in Robinson’s complaint and explaining why Robinson failed to state 14 a claim on which relief may be granted. Dkt. No. 11. In that Order, the Court 15 explained four critical defects in Robinson’s complaint. Id. First, the complaint 16 alleged a violation of Washington’s constitution, but not the federal constitution; 17 consequently, it failed to make a federal law claim sufficient to establish federal 18 court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 . Id. at 3 . Second, even construing 19 Robinson’s complaint liberally as one asserting a federal constitutional claim under 20 Section 1983, her Section 1983 claim nonetheless failed because a “claim under 21 Monell is the only means of asserting a § 1983 claim against a municipality.” Id. 22 (quoting Segura v. City of La Mesa, 647 F. Supp. 3d 926 , 941 (S.D. Cal. 2022)). 23 Third, Robinson’s only allegations against the City of Seattle were that the Seattle 1 Police and Fire Departments failed to respond to her requests for protection against 2 private violence; but “a State’s failure to protect an individual against private 3 violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 4 4 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 , 197 5 (1989)). And fourth, absent a federal claim over which the Court has subject-matter 6 jurisdiction, Robinson provided no reason for the Court to exert supplemental 7 jurisdiction over her state-law negligence claim. Id. Rather than dismissing her 8 claims outright under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B), the Court ordered Robinson to 9 “provide a written response within 21 days of entry of this order, limited to 5 pages, 10 as to why her complaint should not be dismissed.” Id. at 4-5 . 11 Robinson proceeded to submit three responses to the Court’s Order to Show 12 Cause, each seven pages or longer. Dkt. Nos. 12, 14, 16. In these responses, 13 Robinson reiterates the factual allegations from her earlier complaint, asserting 14 that she was the victim of private acts of violence and that Seattle Police officers 15 ignored her requests for assistance and failed to protect her. See generally id. In her 16 responses, she also appears to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 17 constitution, albeit in a confusing manner that seems to conflate state and federal 18 law. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 12 at 1 (asserting a violation of “State Due Process Rights in 19 violation of 14th Amendment”). 20 Robinson also submitted two additional amended complaints, Dkt. Nos. 13, 21 15, both of which are largely identical to her previous complaint, see Dkt. No. 7, but 22 with two key changes, apparently in response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause. 23 First, the amended complaints expressly invoke Section 1983 as the statutory 1 vehicle for Robinson’s cause of action. See Dkt. Nos. 13, 15. And second, the 2 amended complaints assert causes of action under 18 U.S.C. § 242 , a federal statute 3 that creates criminal liability for law enforcement officers who engage in certain 4 willful violations of constitutional rights. See generally id. 5 Considering Judge Vaughn’s recommendation that the complaint be reviewed 6 under Section 1915(e)(2)(B) before issuance of summons, as well as Robinson’s 7 failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, this Court still has not 8 issued a signed, sealed summons to facilitate service of process. See Dkt. Nos. 9, 17. 9 3. DISCUSSION 10 When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the court must dismiss the 11 action if the court determines the plaintiff fails to state a claim on which relief may 12 be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B). When reviewing cases under Section 1915, 13 courts consider only the operative complaint. Here, the operative complaint is the 14 third amended complaint that Robinson filed on July 12, 2024. Dkt. No. 15; see 15 Valadez-Lopez v. Chertoff, 656 F.3d 851, 857 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that amended 16 complaint supersedes original and renders original of no legal effect). 17 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[p]leadings must be construed 18 so as to do justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). Therefore, a “document filed pro se is to be 19 liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held 20 to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. 21 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted). Courts are not to “dismiss a pro 22 se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the 23 deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’” Rosati v. Igbinoso, [1] 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th 2 Cir. 2012) (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir.1988) (per 3 curiam))). But even so, the duties imposed on the Court by § 1915(e) are 4 unwavering. When an IFP plaintiff fails to state a claim on which relief may be 5 granted, the action must be dismissed. 6 In its May 25 Order to Show Cause, the Court identified four critical defects 7 in Robinson’s complaint. Dkt. No. 11 (summarized above). The Court now addresses 8 each of those four defects, in turn, to determine whether Robinson has cured them 9 through her Responses, Dkt. Nos. 12, 14, 16, and amended complaint, Dkt. No. 15. 10 First, the Court previously found that Robinson failed to adequately plead 11 federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 . Dkt. No. 11 at 3. As to this 12 defect, the Court now finds—construing Robinson’s complaint liberally—that 13 Robinson has met the minimal threshold necessary to satisfy jurisdiction. In its 14 previous Order, the Court explained that Robinson had alleged only violations of 15 the Washington State Constitution, not the United States Constitution, and had 16 failed to make a Section 1983 claim. Id. Since then, Robinson has invoked Section 17 1983 as the basis for her claims. See Dkt. No. 15 at 1. And in her responses to the 18 Court’s Order, she does, though unclearly, invoke her due process rights under the 19 Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 12 at 1. And while she does not invoke 20 any federal constitutional rights in her actual operative complaint, she does assert 21 that “[a] right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 22 violated.” Dkt. No. 15 at 2. Construing the complaint liberally, the Court finds that [23] 1 Robinson has adequately invoked Section 1983 and her federal constitutional rights 2 such that jurisdictional considerations are not preclusive.1 3 However, despite her successful invocation of Section 1983, Robinson still 4 fails to rectify the second defect the Court identified in her complaint: her failure to 5 plead a Monell violation. Robinson sues the City of Seattle as the sole defendant, 6 and she repeatedly passes on naming any individual officers as defendants in her 7 assorted pleadings. As the Court noted in its previous Order, Dkt. No. 11 at 3, a 8 “claim under Monell is the only means of asserting a § 1983 claim against a 9 municipality.” Segura v. City of La Mesa, 647 F. Supp. 3d 926 , 941 (S.D. Cal. 2022); 10 City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (“[A] municipality can be 11 found liable under § 1983 only where the municipality itself causes the 12 constitutional violation at issue.”) (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. 13 Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). Through her various responses to the Court’s Order 14 and her amended complaints, Robinson has neither added a Monell claim nor 15 additional defendants. As a result, she has failed to state a claim upon which relief 16 may be granted.2 [17] 1 Presumably to establish federal question jurisdiction, Robinson also attempts to 18 add a cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 242 . See Dkt. No. 15 at 2. This attempt is unavailing. Section 242 is a federal statute that creates criminal liability for law 19 enforcement officers who engage in certain willful violations of constitutional rights. This statute does not provide Robinson with a private cause of action against the 20 City of Seattle. 21 2 While this failure would generally be fatal in a non-pro se case, it is not decisive here, as the Court looked past any technical pleading deficiencies to give Robinson 22 “the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, Robinson has failed to allege a plausible factual basis for a claim on which relief [23] 1 Third, in its previous Order, the Court noted that “a State’s failure to protect 2 an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the 3 Due Process Clause.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 4 189, 197 (1989). Ultimately, this is the most decisive issue. The entire factual basis 5 for Robinson’s claims is that the Seattle Fire and Police Departments failed to 6 intervene to protect her from acts of violence at the hands of private individuals. As 7 the Court previously noted, “[t]he City’s alleged failure to protect Robinson from any 8 of these individuals does not constitute a constitutional violation under Section 9 1983.” Dkt. No. 11 at 4. Through her responses to the Court’s Order to Show Cause 10 and her amended complaints, Robinson has provided no additional factual basis to 11 support her claims. This failure is critical. Robinson’s inability to provide a factual 12 basis for her claim—even after submitting three separate amended complaints— 13 shows that this defect cannot be cured through further amendments to Robinson’s 14 pleadings. In short, Robinson has not plausibly alleged facts to support a violation 15 of her constitutional rights by the City of Seattle. 16 Fourth and finally, the Court’s previous Order noted that—given Robinson’s 17 failure to state a federal law claim upon which relief may be granted—Robinson had 18 provided the Court with no reason to exert supplemental jurisdiction over her state19 law negligence claim. Dkt. No. 11 at 4; see 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3) (court can decline 20 to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state claim if the district court dismisses 21 all claims over which it has original jurisdiction). This defect persists. As discussed [22] may be granted. Thus, the Court dismisses this case on substance, not mere 23 pleading technicalities. 1 above, Robinson has not plausibly stated a federal claim upon which relief may be 2 granted. As such, the Court will not exert supplemental jurisdiction over her state 3 law claim. 4 4. CONCLUSION 5 The Court finds that Robinson has failed to state a claim on which relief may 6 be granted. The Court therefore DISMISSES this case without prejudice under [7] 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B). 8 It is so ORDERED. 9 Dated this 21st day of October, 2024. 10 a Jamal N. Whitehead [11] United States District Judge