Nintendo of America Inc v. Williams

— 1 — — 2 — — 3 — — 4 — — 5 — — 6 — — 7 — UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT — 8 — WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE — 9 — — 10 — NINTENDO OF AMERICA INC., CASE NO. 2:24-cv-00960-LK — 11 — Plaintiff, ORDER REQUESTING 12 v. SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING 13 JAMES C. WILLIAMS, 14 Defendant. — 15 — 16 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Nintendo of America Inc.’s Request for 17 Clerk’s Entry of Default. Dkt. No. 12. Nintendo requests that the Clerk enter the default of 18 Defendant James C. Williams (a/k/a “Archbox”), whom Nintendo avers to have served in 19 accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but who has not appeared in this action, filed 20 an answer, or otherwise responded to Nintendo’s complaint. Id. at 1. For the following reasons, 21 the Court requests supplemental briefing from Nintendo. 22 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a), “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment 23 for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by 24 affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.” This District’s Local Civil Rules 1 also require that the moving party submit an affidavit “specifically show[ing] that the defaulting 2 party was served in a manner authorized by [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 4.” LCR 55(a); see 3 also Quinteros v. InnoGames, No. C19-1402-RSM, 2020 WL 995854 , at *2 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 2, 4 2020). Absent such a showing, the Clerk cannot “enter the default of any party against whom a 5 judgment for affirmative relief is sought but who has failed to plead or otherwise defend.” LCR 6 55(a). 7 Nintendo states that Williams “was duly served pursuant to [Federal Rule of Civil 8 Procedure] 4(e)(2)(B).” Dkt. No. 13 at 1–2. Rule 4(e)(2)(B) provides that “an individual . . . may 9 be served in a judicial district of the United States by . . . leaving a copy of [the summons and the 10 complaint] at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and 11 discretion who resides there[.]” The plaintiff bears the burden of proving service of process. 12 Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Barajas, No. 22-cv-0041813 JSC, 2022 WL 6251017 , at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2022) (“[P]laintiff must demonstrate it has met 14 its burden of demonstrating legally sufficient service of process in accordance with the 15 requirements of Rule 4.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 16 Here, Nintendo represents that it provided the summons and its complaint “to a licensed 17 process server with instructions to personally serve [Williams] at his last known residence.” Dkt. 18 No. 13 at 1. The process server declared in an affidavit that he “left the summons . . . with Jane 19 Doe, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides at 17557 West Villa Chula Lane, Surprise, 20 AZ 85387” on August 13, 2024, and also mailed a copy to that address. Id. at 4. Specifically, the 21 process server “delivered the documents to an individual who refused to give their name who 22 identified themsel[f] as the co-resident.” Id. The process server represents that Jane Doe “stated 23 she was planning to move out soon but confirmed living with [Williams]” and “indicated she 24 would accept documents and give them to [him].” Id. 1 This, however, does not sufficiently demonstrate why Nintendo believes that 17557 West 2 Villa Chula Lane is Williams’ “dwelling or usual place of abode.” “Whether a place is a person’s 3 dwelling or usual place of abode for purposes of Rule 4(e)(2)(B) is a highly fact-specific inquiry.” 4 S.S. v. Ali, No. 3:23-cv-05074-JSC, 2024 WL 150728 , at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2024) (citation 5 omitted). “Although a person can have more than one dwelling house or usual place of abode for 6 purposes of Rule 4, a dwelling or usual place of abode must be a place where that person lives or 7 resides.” Bank of N.Y. Mellon as Tr. for Reg. Holders of CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certs., Series 8 2005-13 v. Loyo-Morales, No. 21-16041, 2022 WL 1616980 , at *2 (9th Cir. May 23, 2022) 9 (cleaned up); see also Stars’ Desert Inn Hotel & Country Club, Inc. v. Hwang, 105 F.3d 521 , 524 10 (9th Cir. 1997). Nintendo does not reference the 17557 West Villa Chula Lane address in its 11 complaint and does not otherwise provide facts in supporting declarations showing why it believes 12 this address is where Williams lives or resides. See generally Dkt. Nos. 1, 13. The process server’s 13 statements regarding Jane Doe’s confirmations are not enough on their own to confirm Williams’ 14 residency. Compare Dkt. No. 13 at 1–2, 4, with Green Trading Co., 2021 WL 3135944 , at *4 15 (finding plaintiff satisfied Rule 4(e)(2)(B) when counsel “stated on the record that she discovered 16 the defendant’s address using a Lexis Nex[i]s public records search, and she verified it by finding 17 local news reports mentioning the defendant’s business dealings in the Los Ang[e]les, California 18 area”). 19 “Proper service of process is particularly important in the default judgment context” 20 because “‘[a] default judgment entered when there has been no proper service of the complaint is, 21 a fortiori, void, and should be set aside.’” In re Iskric, 496 B.R. 355, 359 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2013) 22 (quoting Gold Kist, Inc. v. Laurinburg Oil Co., Inc., 756 F.2d 14, 19 (3d Cir. 1985)). And 23 “[b]ecause default judgments generally are disfavored, courts have required strict compliance with — 24 — 1 the legal prerequisites establishing the court’s power to render the judgment.” Johnson v. Salas, 2 No. 2:11-CV-02153 MCE KJN, 2012 WL 1158856 , at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2012) (cleaned up). 3 Accordingly, Nintendo is ORDERED to submit supplemental briefing within 14 days of 4 this Order addressing the basis for Nintendo’s belief that 17557 West Villa Chula Lane is 5 Williams’ dwelling or usual place of abode. 6 Dated this 24th day of October, 2024. 7 A 8 Lauren King United States District Judge — 9 — — 10 — — 11 — — 12 — — 13 — — 14 — — 15 — — 16 — — 17 — — 18 — — 19 — — 20 — — 21 — — 22 — — 23 — — 24 —