Lee v. Andrychowicz

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN JEFFREY L. LEE, Plaintiff, v. Case No. 24-CV-287-JPS CANDICE ANDRYCHOWICZ, MICHELLE BURTON, J. SCHWIZSO, ORDER and JENNIFER KROGH, Defendants. Plaintiff Jeffrey L. Lee, an inmate confined at the John C. Burke Correctional Center, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights. ECF No. 1. This Order resolves Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and motion to appoint counsel, as well as screens his complaint. 1. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) applies to this case because Plaintiff was a prisoner when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (h). The PLRA allows the Court to give a prisoner plaintiff the ability to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. Id. § 1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (b)(1). He must then pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On April 1, 2024, the Court ordered Plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $19.70. ECF No. 7. Plaintiff paid that fee on May 2, 2024. The Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. ECF No. 2. He must pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this Order. 2. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT 2.1 Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 ). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). 2.2 Plaintiff’s Allegations On June 23, 2023, Defendant Candice Andrychowicz (“Andrychowicz”) was aware of Plaintiff’s medical condition and decided to write him a conduct report for using the restroom when it was closed. ECF No. 1 at 4. Plaintiff’s ticket was eventually appealed. Id. On June 24, 2023, Plaintiff was called to HSU for a routine check, and he alerted them about his issue on the unit where he resided. Id. On June 26, 2023, HSU sent a memo to the unit asking them to use common sense and about the seriousness of Plaintiff’s medical condition if not properly attended. Id. Andrychowicz was defiant with following HSU orders when she received the information that the conduct report she wrote had been reversed. Id. Andrychowicz acted with malice against Plaintiff, and she did not want to follow orders from HSU to issue Plaintiff an extra pillow. Id. Andrychowicz was determined to find a way to get Plaintiff’s information in the system changed. Id. at 5. On June 28, 2023, Plaintiff was sent a memo saying that he should not be waiting to use the bathroom when it is closed or during the count. Id. These were the same words that Andrychowicz constantly used, and it was obvious where the memo came from. Id. On June 29, 2023, Plaintiff sent a request to HSU asking for the name of the staffer or officer who contacted them with the false information about the bathroom. Id. Plaintiff was told that security asked for clarification regarding his restriction and how HSU would not interfere with security performing their duties on the unit. Id. After Andrychowicz’s ticket got dismissed, her harassment of Plaintiff intensified. Id. On July 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint against her for being rude and disrespectful in retaliation for trying to get him moved out of Unit #15. Id. Plaintiff also sent a request to Security Director Pollard, asking him to notify HSU to remove the “security discretion” off of his W.I.C.S. because it was still showing up. Id. Pollard wrote Plaintiff back stating that he did not direct HSU on medical matters. Id. On July 5, 2023, Plaintiff’s complaint got dismissed and was not accepted. Id. He was told to talk to security regarding staff actions. Id. On August 25, 2023, Plaintiff was on his way to the bathroom, and he overheard Andrychowicz tell Defendant Sgt. Schwizso (“Schwizso “) that Plaintiff thinks he can do what he wants to do. Id. at 6. Later that day, Andrychowicz was passing out mail and Plaintiff received a memo from HSU staff saying that he was brought to their attention that Plaintiff had been misusing the bathroom pass. Id. The memo also provided that Plaintiff’s bathroom pass was discontinued and that he must plan accordingly. Id. This change to his bathroom pass was not the result of a medical diagnosis and was based on false information. Id. Plaintiff asked Andrychowicz why she called HSU with false information. Id. Andrychowicz responded that Schwizso did it, so Plaintiff filed a complaint against them both. Id. Plaintiff wrote to HSU to tell them his pass had been removed based on false information. Id. Plaintiff also asked HSU where he could get a bathroom pass. Id. On June 26, 2023, Plaintiff sent another request to HSU, telling them about his medical condition and asking to have his bathroom pass reinstated. Id. The HSU Manager, Defendant Michelle Burton (“Burton”) told Plaintiff that HSU does not renew or give bathroom passes. Id. As a result of these incidents, Plaintiff filled out a psychological request because his mental health was affected by his bathroom situation. Id. at 7. Plaintiff fell into a state of deep depression with suicidal thoughts driving him crazy. Id. Plaintiff was not seen until September 15, 2023, due to the doctor being away from the institution. Id. On August 27, 2023, Plaintiff wrote Pollard again explaining what happened with his bathroom pass. Id. On August 28, 2023, Plaintiff again wrote HSU to tell them that he was not going to be able to “plan accordingly” for his bathroom usage due to emergency situations. Id. Burton told him that the issue was previously addressed and that they do not give bathroom passes. Id. Plaintiff wrote out a health service request for a medical alert bracelet after reading the inmate handbook. Id. Plaintiff received an appointment for August 31, 2023. Id. On September 1, 2023, Plaintiff received a memo from Burton stating that his request for a medical alert bracelet was denied because his medical condition, ulcerative colitis, did not qualify. Id. at 8. Plaintiff wrote back later that day about what the rule book said about medical bracelets. Id. Burton again responded that his condition did not qualify. Id. On September 16, 2023, Captain Wiltzius called Plaintiff into his office and stated that his officers were going to work with him but that if he goes to the bathroom often, he would be accountable for violating institution policy and procedure. Id. He further told Plaintiff that he did not want to hear anything more about it. Id. On October 10, 2023, Plaintiff received a conduct report from Defendant Lt. Jennifer Krogh (“Krogh”) for using the bathroom during the 4:00 a.m. count. Id. 2.3 Analysis The Court finds that Plaintiff may proceed on an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against Andrychowicz, Schwizso, Burton, and Krogh. A prisoner’s claim of unconstitutional conditions of confinement is analyzed under the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 832 , 834 (1994). A prisoner is entitled to live in conditions that do not amount to “punishment.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Detainees are entitled to be confined under humane conditions that provide for their “basic human needs.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). “The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit inhumane ones[.]” Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 1996). To establish a constitutional violation with respect to an inmate’s living conditions, he must be able to demonstrate both: (1) the conditions were objectively so adverse that they deprived him “of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” and (2) the defendants acted with deliberate indifference with respect to the conditions. Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 773 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). “Life’s necessities include shelter, heat, clothing, sanitation, and hygiene items.” Woods v. Schmeltz, No. 14-CV-1336, 2014 WL 7005094 , at *1 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 2014) (citing Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2006)); see also Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840 , 842–43 (7th Cir. 2013). Here, Plaintiff alleges that his medical condition requires emergency-access to the bathroom. Plaintiff alleges that these defendants participated, in some fashion, in denying him access to a medical bathroom pass or punishing him for using the bathroom when medically necessary. Given Plaintiff’s condition, at the screening stage, he has sufficiently pled that these defendants are denying him life’s necessities by denying him adequate access to a bathroom. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff may proceed on an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against Andrychowicz, Schwizso, Burton, and Krogh. Second, the Court finds that Plaintiff may proceed against Burton on an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim for her indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical need. The Eighth Amendment secures an inmate’s right to medical care. Prison officials violate this right when they “display deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation omitted). Deliberate indifference claims contain both an objective and a subjective component: the inmate “must first establish that his medical condition is objectively, ‘sufficiently serious,’; and second, that prison officials acted with a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind,’ i.e., that they both knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health.” Lewis v. McLean, 864 F.3d 556 , 562–63 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal citations omitted)). “A delay in treating nonlife-threatening but painful conditions may constitute deliberate indifference if the delay exacerbated the injury or unnecessarily prolonged an inmate’s pain.” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 753 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2010)). The length of delay that is tolerable “‘depends on the seriousness of the condition and the ease of providing treatment.’” Id. (quoting McGowan, 612 F.3d at 640 ). At the screening stage, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to proceed against Burton. Plaintiff alleges that his medical condition requires emergency-access to the bathroom. Burton denied Plaintiff’s medical requests for the bathroom pass he needed to treat his condition. Although the Court acknowledges that this claim is different than the run-of-the-mill Eighth Amendment medical clam, it nonetheless finds at the pleading stage that Plaintiff may proceed against Burton for her indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Third, the Court finds that Plaintiff may proceed on a First Amendment retaliation claim against Andrychowicz. To prevail on a retaliation claim, Plaintiff must ultimately show that: “(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation likely to deter such activity; and (3) the First Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the decision to impose the deprivation.” Hawkins v. Mitchell, 756 F.3d 983, 996 (7th Cir. 2014). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Andrychowicz retaliated against him for challenging the conduct report against him. It is well established that a prisoner’s ability to file complaints is protected by the First Amendment. See Hughes v. Scott, 816 F.3d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 2016). As for the second element, Plaintiff alleges suffering deprivations—having his medical bathroom pass taken away—that, we can infer, would likely dissuade a person of ordinary firmness from exercising further First Amendment activity. See Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012) (prison transfer likely to deter. At the pleadings stage, the Court therefore finds these allegations sufficient to state a First Amendment retaliation claim against Andrychowicz. 3. MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL As a civil litigant, Plaintiff has “neither a constitutional nor statutory right to a court-appointed attorney.” James v. Eli, 889 F.3d 320, 326 (7th Cir. 2018). However, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(1), a “court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” A court should seek counsel to represent a plaintiff if: (1) he has made reasonable attempts to secure counsel; and (2) “‘the difficulty of the case—factually and legally—exceeds the particular plaintiff’s capacity as a layperson to coherently present it.’” Navejar v. Iyiola, 718 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 655 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc)). Whether to appoint counsel in a particular case is left to a court’s discretion. James, 889 F.3d at 326 ; McCaa v. Hamilton, 893 F.3d 1027, 1031 (7th Cir. 2018). The first element of Pruitt is fairly easy to satisfy, but it is not toothless, and it is not a mere technical condition of submitting a certain number of rejection letters. If it was, then a Wisconsin prisoner litigating a § 1983 action could submit rejection letters from ten randomly selected criminal defense lawyers from Nevada and call his work complete. This cannot be. The purpose of the reasonable-efforts requirement is to ensure that if a court and private lawyers must expend scarce resources to provide counsel for a prisoner, he has at least made a good-faith effort to avoid those costs by getting a lawyer himself. To fulfill this duty, a pro se prisoner should reach out to lawyers whose areas of practice suggest that they might consider taking his case. If he learns that some of the lawyers he has contacted do not, he should reach out to others before he concludes that no one will help him. Here, Plaintiff provides evidence showing that he contacted attorneys to represent him in this matter. ECF No. 4-1. The Court finds that Plaintiff satisfies the first Pruitt question. Plaintiff’s request must also succeed on the second Pruitt question: whether the difficulty of the case exceeds his capacity to coherently present it. This assessment must be made in light of the particular capabilities and circumstances presented by each pro se litigant. James, 889 F.3d at 326–27. The Court of Appeals explains: The second step is itself grounded in a two-fold inquiry into both the difficulty of the plaintiff’s claims and the plaintiff’s competence to litigate those claims himself. The inquiries are necessarily intertwined; the difficulty of the case is considered against the plaintiff’s litigation capabilities, and those capabilities are examined in light of the challenges specific to the case at hand. Ultimately, the question is not whether a lawyer would present the case more effectively than the pro se plaintiff; if that were the test, district judges would be required to request counsel for every indigent litigant. Rather, the question is whether the difficulty of the case—factually and legally—exceeds the particular plaintiff’s capacity as a layperson to coherently present it to the judge or jury himself. Notably, this inquiry extends beyond the trial stage of the proceedings. The relevant concern is whether the plaintiff appears competent to litigate his own claims, given their degree of difficulty. This includes all of the tasks that normally attend litigation: evidence gathering, preparing and responding to motions and other court filings, and trial. Id. (citations and quotations omitted). While a court need not address every concern raised in a motion for appointment of counsel, it must address “those that bear directly” on the individual’s capacity to litigate his case. McCaa, 893 F.3d at 1032 . The balancing contemplated in the second Pruitt step must be done against the backdrop that district courts cannot be expected to appoint counsel in circumstances which are common to all or many prisoners. See Bracey v. Grondin, 712 F.3d 1012 , 1017–18 (7th Cir. 2013); Pruitt, 503 F.3d 647, 656 (observing that the Seventh Circuit has “resisted laying down categorical rules regarding recruitment of counsel in particular types of cases”); Harper v. Bolton, 57 F. Supp. 3d 889, 893 (N.D. Ill. 2014). Doing so would place untenable burdens on court resources. It would also turn the discretion of § 1915(e)(2) on its head, making appointment of counsel the rule rather than the exception. Several pronouncements from the Court of Appeals appear to be in tension with this principle. First, the Seventh Circuit notes that “complexity increases and competence decreases as a case proceeds to the advanced phases of litigation.” James, 889 F.3d at 327 . It deems the “[a]dvanced phases” to include those from discovery onward. Id.; McCaa, 893 F.3d at 1032 . But nearly every prisoner case proceeds to discovery, as the district court applies exceedingly lenient review during initial screening. Second, the Seventh Circuit instructs that district courts should evaluate a prisoner’s competency irrespective of the involvement of a “jailhouse lawyer.” McCaa, 893 F.3d at 1033 ; Walker v. Price, No. 17-1345, 2018 WL 3967298 , at *5 (7th Cir. Aug. 20, 2018). How courts should do this is not clear. A court rarely knows whether a filing was prepared by the plaintiff or someone helping him. And if a court does know that the plaintiff is receiving help, how can it assess his ability to litigate without knowing which portions of the filings are his work, and which come from the jailhouse lawyer? In Walker, the court determined that the inmate’s work product decreased in quality after his jailhouse lawyer was transferred to another prison. 2018 WL 3967298 , at *6. Yet a savvy prisoner, looking to secure counsel for himself, could do this on purpose, crafting his filings to downplay his own litigation capabilities. A court would have no way to assess whether the inmate is sandbagging it. Finally, the Court of Appeals indicates that claims involving the state of mind of the defendant, such as those involving deliberate indifference, are particularly complex. James, 889 F.3d at 327–28; McCaa, 893 F.3d at 1032 . Yet a government official’s culpable mental state is the foundation for most constitutional claims. Indeed, it is often the defining characteristic that sets § 1983 claims apart from their state-law tort analogues. Deliberate indifference is essential to nearly all claims of cruel and unusual punishment, excessive force, mistreatment of medical needs, and First Amendment and due process violations. See Kingsley v. Henderson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Hambright v. Kemper, 705 F. App’x 461, 462 (7th Cir. 2017); Milton v. Slota, 697 F. App’x 462, 464 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[N]egligently inflicted harm does not amount to a constitutional violation.”) (emphasis in original). Taken together, these claims comprise the vast majority of prisoner litigation in this District. If state-of-mind issues are generally beyond the ability of most pro se litigants to prove, then a court likely would need to appoint counsel in nearly every prisoner case. This is plainly impossible. The guiding rule has always been that appointment of counsel is the exception rather than the rule in pro se prisoner litigation. Yet a confluence of all-too-common circumstances—discovery, jailhouse lawyers, and claims concerning state of mind—militate in favor of the appointment of counsel. As the list of reasons to appoint counsel grows, the reasons not to do so shrink. This District’s resources have not kept pace. Against this backdrop, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence and argument showing that he cannot litigate or try this matter competently on his own. Plaintiff indicates that he has minimal access to legal decisions and regulations. ECF No. 4. Plaintiff also lacks funds and resources to serve papers on Defendants and to hire an investigator if needed. Id. It is true, as Plaintiff intuits, that a lawyer would be helpful in navigating the legal system; trained attorneys are of course better positioned to successfully litigate cases. But Plaintiff’s lack of legal training brings him in line with practically every other prisoner or former prisoner litigating in this Court. Plaintiff has clearly presented his claims to the Court. Further, the Court will assist Plaintiff in this regard (as it does with all prisoner litigants) by providing copies of the most pertinent federal and local procedural rules along with its scheduling order. Thus, ignorance of the law or court procedure is generally not a qualifying reason for appointment of counsel. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that his case is exceptional to require counsel. As such, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel without prejudice. Plaintiff may renew his motion at a later time in the case if needed. 4. CONCLUSION In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff may proceed on the following claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b): Claim One: Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against Andrychowicz, Burton, Schwizso, and Krogh for their deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s living conditions. Claim Two: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Burton for her indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical need. Claim Three: First Amendment retaliation claim against Andrychowicz. Defendants should take note that, within forty-five (45) days of service of this Order, they are to file a summary judgment motion that raises all exhaustion-related challenges. The Court will issue a scheduling order at a later date that embodies other relevant deadlines. IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, ECF No. 2, be and the same is hereby GRANTED; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel, ECF No. 4, be and the same is hereby DENIED without prejudice; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that under an informal service agreement between the Wisconsin Department of Justice and this Court, a copy of the complaint and this Order have been electronically transmitted to the Wisconsin Department of Justice for service on Defendants Andrychowicz, Burton, Schwizso, and Krogh; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that under the informal service agreement, those Defendants shall file a responsive pleading to the complaint within sixty (60) days; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants raise any exhaustionrelated challenges by filing a motion for summary judgment within fortyfive (45) days of service; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED if Defendants contemplate a motion to dismiss, the parties must meet and confer before the motion is filed. Defendants should take care to explain the reasons why they intend to move to dismiss the complaint, and Plaintiff should strongly consider filing an amended complaint. The Court expects this exercise in efficiency will obviate the need to file most motions to dismiss. Indeed, when the Court grants a motion to dismiss, it typically grants leave to amend unless it is “certain from the face of the complaint that any amendment would be futile or otherwise unwarranted.” Harris v. Meisner, No. 20-2650, 2021 WL 5563942 , at *2 (7th Cir. Nov. 29, 2021) (quoting Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chi. & Nw. Ind., 786 F.3d 510, 524 (7th Cir. 2015)). Therefore, it is in both parties’ interest to discuss the matter prior to motion submissions. Briefs in support of, or opposition to, motions to dismiss should cite no more than ten (10) cases per claim. No string citations will be accepted. If Defendants file a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff is hereby warned that he must file a response, in accordance with Civil Local Rule 7 (E.D. Wis.), or he may be deemed to have waived any argument against dismissal and face dismissal of this matter with prejudice; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk’s Office mail Plaintiff a copy of the guides entitled “Answers to Prisoner Litigants’ Common Questions” and “Answers to Pro Se Litigants’ Common Questions,” along with this Order; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the agency having custody of Plaintiff shall collect from his institution trust account the $330.30 balance of the filing fee by collecting monthly payments from Plaintiff’s prison trust account in an amount equal to 20% of the preceding month’s income credited to Plaintiff’s trust account and forwarding payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (b)(2). The payments shall be clearly identified by the case name and number assigned to this case. If Plaintiff is transferred to another county, state, or federal institution, the transferring institution shall forward a copy of this Order along with his remaining balance to the receiving institution; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this Order be sent to the officer in charge of the agency where Plaintiff is confined. Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 15th day of July, 2024. H np PLY fh Love JAP. Stadtsaqueller U.5. District Judge Plaintiffs who are inmates at Prisoner E-Filing Program institutions shall submit all correspondence and case filings to institution staff, who will scan and e-mail documents to the Court. Prisoner E-Filing is mandatory for all inmates at Columbia Correctional Institution, Dodge Correctional Institution, Green Bay Correctional Institution, Oshkosh Correctional Institution, Waupun Correctional Institution, and Wisconsin Secure Program Facility. Plaintiffs who are inmates at all other prison facilities, or who have been released from custody, will be required to submit all correspondence and legal material to: Office of the Clerk United States District Court Eastern District of Wisconsin 362 United States Courthouse 517 E. Wisconsin Avenue Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202 DO NOT MAIL ANYTHING DIRECTLY TO THE COURT’S CHAMBERS. If mail is received directly to the Court’s chambers, IT WILL BE RETURNED TO SENDER AND WILL NOT BE FILED IN THE CASE. Plaintiff is further advised that failure to timely file any brief, motion, response, or reply may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. In addition, the parties must notify the Clerk of Court of any change of address. IF PLAINTIFF FAILS TO PROVIDE AN UPDATED ADDRESS TO THE COURT AND MAIL IS RETURNED TO THE COURT AS UNDELIVERABLE, THE COURT WILL DISMISS THIS ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Page 16 of 16