(PS) Davis v. Jacques

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 EARON DREVON DAVIS, No. 2:23-cv-01230-DAD-JDP (PS) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS AND DISMISSING 14 MICHAEL A. JACQUES, et al., PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 15 Defendants. MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER [16] (Doc. Nos. 21, 27, 29, 30, 31) [18] 19 Plaintiff Earon Drevon Davis, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated this civil 20 action on June 27, 2023. (Doc. No. 1.) The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate 21 Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. 22 On August 2, 2024, the assigned magistrate judge issued findings and recommendations 23 recommending that plaintiff’s second amended complaint (“SAC”) (Doc. No. 20) be dismissed 24 for failure to state a claim and plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) (Doc. 25 No. 21) be denied. (Doc. No. 27.) In the findings and recommendations, the magistrate judge 26 first found that plaintiff’s allegations challenging a state court child support order fall squarely 27 within the scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Id. at 3) (citing Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148 , 28 1154 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Under Rooker-Feldman, a federal district court does not have subject 1 matter jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from the final judgment of a state court.”)). The 2 magistrate judge next concluded that plaintiff had not stated a claim against defendants Jacques 3 and the Placer County Department of Child Services in particular. (Doc. No. 27 at 3–4) (citing 4 Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 62 (9th Cir. 1974) (“The general rule . . . is that judges are 5 immune from suit for judicial acts within and even in excess of their jurisdiction even if those acts 6 were done maliciously or corruptly; the only exception to this sweeping cloak of immunity exists 7 for acts done in ‘the clear absence of all jurisdiction.’”); Lawrie v. Garcia, No. 11-cv-2237-DMS8 BLM, 2011 WL 5036861 , at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2011) (holding that the Department of Child 9 Support Services for the County of San Diego was “not a proper defendant under § 1983”).) For 10 these reasons, the magistrate judge concluded that the SAC should be dismissed, without further 11 leave to amend, because the claims are fundamentally deficient and that plaintiff’s motion for a 12 TRO should be denied as he has made no showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits. 13 (Doc. No. 27 at 4.) Those pending findings and recommendations were served on plaintiff and 14 contained notice that any objections thereto were to be filed within fourteen (14) days after 15 service. (Id.) On August 5, 2024, plaintiff filed objections to the pending findings and 16 recommendations. (Doc. No. 28.) 17 In his objections, plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge misapplied the Rooker18 Feldman doctrine. (Doc. No. 28 at 2.) He argues that he is not seeking federal review of a state 19 decision and instead asserts “independent federal claims based on violations . . . that occurred 20 during the state court proceedings.” (Id.) However, the court has reviewed the allegations of 21 plaintiff’s SAC and notes that he alleges numerous times that the support order issued against him 22 in the Placer County Superior Court is jurisdictionally invalid and that there has been fraud in the 23 issuance and enforcement of the invalid support order. (Doc. No. 20-2 at 1–3.) Based on these 24 allegations, the court concurs with the magistrate judge’s analysis that plaintiff’s challenge is 25 “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s ruling, and thus under the Rooker-Feldman 26 doctrine, this court is prohibited from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de 27 facto appeal from a state court judgment. (Doc. No. 27 at 3) (citing Rucker v. Cnty. of Santa 28 Clara, State of California, 2003 WL 21440151 , at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2003) (finding that the 1 plaintiff’s claims were “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s rulings where the plaintiff 2 “challenge[d] his original child support order on jurisdictional grounds, dispute[d] his total child 3 support arrearages, and allege[d] that Santa Clara County’s garnishment order against his 4 disability benefits payments is invalid”)). 5 Plaintiff also argues in his objections that the actions of defendant Placer County 6 Department of Child Services, defendant Placer County Superior Court, and defendant Jacques 7 are “null and void” because of their “failure to communicate the voluntary nature of their 8 programs.” (Doc. No. 28 at 5.) Plaintiff does not specify the programs he is referring to in this 9 regard, but the undersigned observes that this argument appears to be yet another in support of a 10 de facto appeal for relief from plaintiff’s state court child support judgment, and thus does not 11 support any basis upon which to reject the pending findings and recommendations. 12 Next, plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge erred in finding that defendant Jacques is 13 entitled to judicial immunity because plaintiff never gave consent “for Commissioner Jacques to 14 act in the capacity of a judge over the support order.” (Doc. No. 28 at 3.) In support of this 15 contention, plaintiff relies only on unrelated authority suggesting that a criminal defendant may 16 waive their right to a jury trial or a bench trial by a Superior Court judge and instead have their 17 matter heard by a commissioner. (Id.) (citing People v. Tijerina, 1 Cal. 3d 41, 46, n.3 (1969)). 18 Accordingly, the court is not persuaded that plaintiff’s objection presents a basis upon which to 19 reject the magistrate judge’s finding of judicial immunity. 20 Plaintiff further argues that the magistrate judge erred in finding that the Placer County 21 Department of Child Services is not a proper defendant under § 1983 because plaintiff intended to 22 bring a Monell claim. (Doc. No. 28 at 4.) Plaintiff contends that his SAC “sufficiently alleges 23 that the violations were a result of established practices and policies.” (Id.) However, this 24 argument does not address the magistrate judge’s conclusion that “municipalities such as cities 25 and counties are amenable to suit” but “departments or bureaus of municipalities” are “not 26 generally considered ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983.” (Doc. No. 27 at 3) (citing United 27 States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, 1240 (9th Cir. 2005)); see also Vance v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 928 28 F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (“Naming a municipal department as a defendant is not an 1 appropriate means of pleading a § 1983 action against a municipality. . . . While the parties do 2 not raise an objection, the Court finds, sua sponte, that suing the Santa Clara Department of 3 Corrections is improper. The Department of Corrections is an agency of the County of Santa 4 Clara. The County is a proper defendant in a § 1983 claim, an agency of the County is not.”). 5 Accordingly, plaintiff presents no basis upon which to reject the magistrate judge’s finding that 6 the Placer County Department of Child Services is not a proper defendant. 7 Plaintiff’s other objections are conclusory and do not meaningfully address the pending 8 findings and recommendations. He argues that his SAC should not be dismissed because he 9 “articulated [his] claims and legal precedents clearly and receive [sic] no rebuttal” and his TRO 10 should be granted because “the magistrate judge did not adequately consider the likelihood of 11 success on the merits.” (Doc. No. 28 at 1–2.) The court finds that the claims plaintiff brings in 12 his SAC have been adequately considered, and thus, these arguments do not present a basis upon 13 which to reject the magistrate judge’s recommendations. 14 In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C), this court has conducted a 15 de novo review of the case. Having carefully reviewed the entire file, the court concludes that the 16 findings and recommendations are supported by the record and by proper analysis. 17 Accordingly, 18 1. The findings and recommendations issued on August 2, 2024 (Doc. No. 27) are 19 adopted in full; 20 2. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint (Doc. No. 20) is dismissed, without leave to 21 amend; 22 3. Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order (Doc. No. 21) is denied; 23 4. Plaintiff’s motion for the court to review his objections (Doc. No. 29) is denied as 24 moot, his objections having already been considered in this order; 25 ///// 26 ///// 27 ///// 28 ///// 1 5. Plaintiff's motions to disqualify the assigned magistrate judge (Doc. No. 30) and 2 for default judgment (Doc. No. 31) are also denied as rendered moot by this order; 3 and 4 6. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. ° | Dated: _ November 7, 2024 Dal A. 2, sxe 7 DALE A. DROZD 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE