(PC) Smith v. Uzma

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 DONALD JOSHUA SMITH, Case No. 2:24-cv-0683-TLN-JDP (P) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 CHAUDHRY UZMA, et al., 15 Defendants. [17] 18 Plaintiff, a state prisoner, brings this action alleging that defendants violated his Eighth 19 Amendment rights by failing to provide him with adequate medical care. I found that his first 20 complaint failed to state a cognizable claim because it did not allege that defendants acted with 21 deliberate indifference. ECF No. 7. He has filed an amended complaint, ECF No. 10, that, for 22 screening purposes, states cognizable Eighth Amendment medical care claims against defendants 23 Uzma and Gill. It fails, however, to state a cognizable claim against Warden Gena Jones. 24 Plaintiff may either proceed only with the claims deemed viable or delay service and file another 25 amended complaint. [28] 1 Screening Order 2 I. Screening and Pleading Requirements 3 A federal court must screen a prisoner’s complaint that seeks relief against a governmental 4 entity, officer, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify any cognizable 5 claims and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a 6 claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 7 immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). 8 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 10 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 11 require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 12 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 13 possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 14 identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024 , 15 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 16 give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257 , 1264 17 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 18 The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 19 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it 20 appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 21 would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). 22 However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 23 of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251 , 24 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 25 II. Analysis 26 Plaintiff alleges that defendants Uzma and Gill have focused on pursuing unsuccessful 27 cancer treatments rather than addressing his other health issues. ECF No. 10 at 3-4, 7-8. He 28 claims that defendant Gena Jones, the warden of the California Health Care Facility, is also liable 1 | because she is responsible for all prison operations, including inmates’ medical care. Id. at 5-6. 2 | Plaintiffs allegations against Uzma and Gill are suitable to proceed; his allegations against Jones 3 | are not. 4 Plaintiff claims that defendant Uzma violated his rights by following a course of treatment 5 | that has been unsuccessful in treating his cancer. Id. at 3. The specifics are difficult to follow, 6 | but plaintiff appears to allege that Uzma focused on failed cancer treatments to the exclusion of 7 | treating his Hepatitis-C and certain abdominal issues. /d. at 4. Similarly, he alleges that 8 | defendant Gill insisted that he undergo a third unsuccessful liver cancer treatment rather than 9 | treating his “abdomen disease” and Hepatitis-C. Jd. at 7-8. Though plaintiff's allegations are 10 | roughly articulated, these allegations are sufficient at this stage to proceed. 11 By contrast, plaintiff's claims against Warden Jones are nonviable. He alleges that, as 12 | warden, she is responsible for safeguarding inmates’ rights, including healthcare. Id. at 5. There 13 | is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983, however. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040 , 14 | 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, Warden Jones can be held liable only for her own personal 15 | involvement, and plaintiff has not alleged that she was directly involved in or aware of his 16 | medical treatment. 17 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that: 18 1. Within thirty days from the service of this order, plaintiff must file a written indication 19 | of his intent to pursue only with the viable claims described in this order, OR file another 20 | amended complaint. If he selects the latter, no defendants will be served until the new complaint 21 | is screened. 22 2. The Clerk of Court is directed to send plaintiff a section 1983 complaint form with this 23 || order. IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 ( q oy — Dated: _ November 13, 2024 Q_-——_ 26 JEREMY D. PETERSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE