Bonilla v. Samartino

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA, Case No.: 3:24-cv-01961-WQH-KSC CDCR #J-48500, [12] ORDER DENYING MOTION TO Plaintiff, 13 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS vs. AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (g) [14] AND DISMISSING CIVIL 15 ACTION WITHOUT LEAVE JANIS L. SAMMARTINO, TO AMEND PURSUANT 16 Defendant. TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2) [17] [ECF No. 2] [19] 20 HAYES, Judge: 21 Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla, currently incarcerated at the California Medical 22 Facility in Vacaville, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint 23 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . (ECF No. 1.) Bonilla is a serial vexatious litigant, and he 24 again contends that a judge of this Court has erred by failing to invalidate his Alameda 25 County criminal judgment and sentence in Case No. C-02-0636 MHP. (See id. at 2‒3.)1 [27] 1 In fact, Bonilla has filed so many cases attacking the validity of his 1995 conviction, the San Francisco [28] 1 Bonilla contends Defendant conspired with unnamed public officials and has “refuse[d] to 2 perform [her] duty to enforce the law” by failing to declare his conviction void and by 3 refusing to release him from “false imprisonment.” (Id. at 3.) Bonilla has not paid the $405 4 civil filing fee, but instead has filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant 5 to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a) (ECF No. 2).2 6 Because Bonilla is barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (g) from proceeding IFP, does not 7 allege imminent danger, and seeks damages from a defendant who is absolutely immune, 8 the Court denies his motion and dismisses his complaint without leave to amend both for 9 failing to state a claim and as frivolous. 10 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 11 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 12 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 13 $405, consisting of a $350 statutory fee plus an additional administrative fee of $55, 14 although the administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed in forma 15 pauperis (“IFP”). See 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District [17] 18 Swan, ‘Method to his madness’: This man may be California’s most litigious person, S.F. Chron., May 27, 2024, available at https://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/vexatious-litigant-death-row19 19424807.php (last visited Nov. 18, 2024). [20] 2 Bonilla has since filed additional documents entitled: (1) “Request for Judicial Notice” and (2) 21 “Disqualification of Judges; Conflict of Interest.” (ECF Nos. 3, 4.) The first document repeats the claims of malicious prosecution Bonilla asserts in his complaint, and the second states simply that the undersigned 22 and United States Magistrate Judge Karen S. Crawford are disqualified due to an unidentified conflict of interest. (ECF No. 4 at 1.) The Court liberally construes the second document to be a motion for recusal 23 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. However, the standard for recusal is “‘whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be [24] questioned.’” Mayes v. Leipziger, 729 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Nelson, 718 25 F.2d 315, 321 (9th Cir. 1983)); see also United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986). A judge’s previous adverse ruling alone is not sufficient for recusal. Nelson, 718 F.2d at 321. And while 26 consideration of a motion for recusal must take all facts provided as true for the purpose of ruling on their legal sufficiency, the court need not accept “conclusory allegations [that] are baseless and without any 27 factual support.” United States v. Bell, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1173 (E.D. Cal. 1999). Bonilla offers no evidence of judicial bias other than his conclusory statement which lacks any factual support whatsoever. [28] 1 Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The action may proceed despite a 2 plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant 3 to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a). See Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 73 F.4th 763, 765 (9th Cir. 4 2023), cert. denied sub nom. Hymas v. Dep’t of the Interior, 144 S. Ct. 2604 (2024). 5 “To help staunch a ‘flood of non-meritorious’ prisoner litigation, the Prison 6 Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) established what has become known as the 7 three-strikes rule.” Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 1721, 1723 (2020) (quoting Jones 8 v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007)). “That rule generally prevents a prisoner from bringing 9 suit in forma pauperis (IFP)—that is, without first paying the filing fee—if he has had three 10 or more prior suits ‘dismissed on the grounds that [they were] frivolous, malicious, or 11 fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. 12 § 1915(g)); see also Ray v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692, 697 (9th Cir. 2022). “A negative 13 consequence that may impact a prisoner who files a frivolous complaint is a restriction on 14 his ability to file future cases without prepaying filing fees.” Harris v. Mangum, 863 F.3d 15 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 2017). Thus, under § 1915(g), a prisoner with three or more strikes 16 “cannot proceed IFP” absent plausible allegations of ongoing or “imminent danger of 17 serious physical injury” at the time of filing. Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047 , 1055 18 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (g)). That danger must also “stem[] from the 19 violations of law alleged in [the] complaint.” Ray, 31 F.4th at 701 . 20 Bonilla has a long history of strikes, and he makes no plausible allegations of 21 imminent danger at the time he filed his complaint. See Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1055 ; In re 22 Steven Bonilla, 2012 WL 216401 , at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2012) (noting Bonilla’s 23 litigation history in the Northern District of California, including the dismissal of 34 pro se 24 § 1983 civil rights actions between June 1 and October 31, 2011, alone, which were 25 dismissed “because the allegations in the complaints do not state a claim for relief under 26 § 1983.”); id. at *3 n.1 (“The Court recently informed Plaintiff that, in accordance with 28 27 U.S.C. § 1915 (g), he no longer qualifies to proceed in forma pauperis in any civil rights 28 action.”). 1 Thus, because Bonilla has abused the privilege so often in the past and does not 2 qualify for an imminent danger exception, his motion to proceed IFP in this case [ECF No. 3 2] is DENIED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (g). See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221 , 4 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[P]ermission to proceed in forma pauperis is itself a matter of 5 privilege and not right[.]”), abrogated on other grounds by Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 6 319 (1989). 7 II. SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. § 1915A 8 Moreover, even if Bonilla were to pay the full filing fee, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, also 9 enacted as part of the PLRA, requires sua sponte review and dismissal of prisoner 10 complaints like his, or any portions of them, which are frivolous, malicious or fail to state 11 a claim upon which relief may be granted, and those that seek monetary relief from a 12 governmental defendant who is immune. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b)(1)–(2); Coleman v. 13 Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532 , 538‒39 (2015). “The purpose of § 1915A is to ensure that the 14 targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.” Nordstrom 15 v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903 , 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quote marks omitted). As noted 16 above, Bonilla seeks to vacate an Alameda County criminal judgment and to sue a United 17 States District Judge pursuant to § 1983 for failing to declare his long-standing conviction 18 “void.” (See ECF No. 1 at 3.) He may do neither. 19 First, to the extent Bonilla challenges the validity of his criminal case, and asks the 20 Court to “order his discharge from false imprisonment,” a habeas corpus action is his sole 21 federal remedy, and a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is inappropriate. See id.; Preiser v. 22 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 479 (1973) (“Release from penal custody is not an available 23 remedy under the Civil Rights Act.”); Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 933 (9th Cir. 2016) 24 (en banc) (“[H]abeas corpus is the exclusive remedy to attack the legality of [a] conviction 25 or sentence.”). For this reason alone, Bonilla’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which 26 § 1983 relief can be granted and is subject to sua sponte dismissal without leave to amend 27 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). See Washington v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 28 F.3d 1048 , 1055 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding that a § 1983 complaint barred by Heck may be 1 dismissed for failure to state a claim when the pleading as a whole “present[s] an ‘obvious 2 bar to securing relief.’”). “[T]he PLRA expressly authorize[s] the district court to dismiss 3 [a] complaint [barred by Heck] for failure to state a claim at any time even when … the 4 legal basis for the dismissal [is raised] o[n] its own accord.” Hebrard v. Nofziger, 90 F.4th 5 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 2024). 6 Second, Bonilla seeks damages against United States District Judge Janis L. 7 Sammartino for failing to declare his conviction and sentence void in Bonilla v. Imperial 8 Cnty. Superior Ct., No. 24-CV-980 JLS (VET), 2024 WL 3610975 , at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 9 31, 2024). (See ECF No. 1 at 4‒28.) In fact, Judge Sammartino denied Bonilla’s IFP motion 10 and dismissed that case for the same reasons this case requires dismissal. See id. Judges 11 are absolutely immune from damage liability for acts which are judicial in nature. Forrester 12 v. White, 484 U.S. 219 , 227‒29 (1988). Judicial immunity applies to cases brought under [13] 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for acts committed within the scope of judicial duties, “even when such 14 acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or 15 corruptly.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). “Ruling on a motion is a normal 16 judicial function, as is exercising control over the courtroom while court is in session.” 17 Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended on denial of 18 reh’g (Oct. 11, 2001). “[A] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action [s]he 19 took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of [her] authority; rather, [s]he 20 will be subject to liability only when [s]he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all 21 jurisdiction.’” Stump, 435 U.S. at 356‒57. 22 When absolute immunity applies, claims for damages are frivolous. See Baker v. 23 King Cnty. Prosecutor’s Off., 981 F.2d 1257, at *1 (9th Cir. 1992) (unpublished); see also 24 Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889 , 892 n.1 (9th Cir. 2011) (“At the screening stage, the 25 court must dismiss the complaint or any portion thereof that is “frivolous, malicious, or 26 fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a 27 defendant who is immune from such relief.”) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). And if an 28 action is frivolous, “there is by definition no merit to the underlying action and so no reason 1 ||to grant leave to amend.” See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 , 1127 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 2 || banc). 3 CONCLUSION 4 Accordingly, the Court: 5 (1) DENIES Bonilla’s Motion to Proceed IFP [ECF No. 2] as barred by 28 U.S.C. 6 1915(g); 7 (2) DISMISSES Bonilla’s Complaint without leave to amend both for failing to 8 || state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted and as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 9 || § 1915A(b)(1) and (2); and 10 (3) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to close the case and accept no further 11 || filings in this matter except a timely-filed Notice of Appeal, which the Court CERTIFIES 12 || would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a)(3). 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 || Dated: November 22, 2024 BE: eg Ze. A a 15 Hon, William Q. Hayes 16 United States District Court [28] 6 oe