Goldup v. The City of San Diego

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 GARRETT MICHAEL GOLDUP, Case No.: 24-cv-602-RSH-AHG 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 13 v. MOTION TO DISMISS 14 THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO, [ECF No. 21] 15 Defendant. [17] 18 Pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss by defendant City of San Diego (the 19 “City” or “Defendant”), directed to the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) of plaintiff 20 Garrett Michael Goldup. ECF No. 21. As set forth below, the motion is granted. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 A. This Lawsuit 23 On March 28, 2024, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed his complaint in this action 24 along with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). ECF No. 1. The Court granted 25 the IFP motion but determined that the complaint failed to state a claim, and dismissed the 26 complaint with leave to amend. ECF No. 3. 27 // 1 On May 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed the FAC, his operative complaint. ECF No. 4. The 2 FAC’s single claim is brought under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 3 (“ADA”). Id. The FAC alleges that Plaintiff is a person with a qualified disability, who on 4 three occasions in 2021 and 2022 attempted to enter a branch of the San Diego Public 5 Library accompanied by a trained medical service dog, but was unlawfully denied access. 6 Id. at 2. The incidents occurred at the University Heights and Hillcrest branches. Id. As a 7 result of those incidents, he has been suspended from entering any San Diego Public 8 Library location. Id. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 3. 9 On August 1, 2024, Defendant filed its motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 10 ECF No. 21. Defendant contends that the FAC fails to plead sufficient facts under a 11 cognizable theory, and that the FAC is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiff has 12 filed an opposition. ECF No. 22.1 13 B. The State Case 14 This is Plaintiff’s second lawsuit against the City alleging an ADA violation based 15 on refusing to admit Plaintiff, accompanied by his service dog, to public library branches. 16 The first lawsuit was Goldup v. City of San Diego, Case No. 23SC05163C, filed in San 17 Diego Superior Court’s Small Claims unit on November 21, 2023 (the “State Case”). ECF [20] 21 1 Plaintiff also filed a statement alleging that Defendant misled Plaintiff into agreeing 22 to extend the time for Defendant to respond to the FAC. ECF No. 22. In seeking the extension, Defendant represented to the Court that “the parties are attempting to reach an [23] early resolution of this matter,” and “are also engaging in meet and confer discussion 24 regarding the merits of Plaintiff’s claims.” Id. at 1. According to Plaintiff, after Defendant was granted this extension, Defendant ceased communicating with Plaintiff and failed to [25] respond to Plaintiff’s emails and voice messages. Id. at 2. Plaintiff asks the Court to 26 “consider this … in any proceedings related to the motion to dismiss.” Id. Defendant has not responded to these allegations. The Court considers Plaintiff’s allegations, although [27] 1 No. 21-3.2 In the State Case, Plaintiff brought a claim against the City of San Diego for 2 violating Titles II and III of the ADA. Plaintiff’s complaint in the State Case sought 3 damages in the amount of $10,000, the maximum allowable in Small Claims Court at the 4 time. 5 Although Plaintiff’s complaint in the State Case lacked specificity, in advance of 6 trial he filed a statement outlining his position for trial. ECF No. 21-4. That statement 7 explained that on November 1, 2021, he arrived at the University Heights branch of the 8 San Diego Public Library accompanied by his service dog. Id. at 2. The guard questioned 9 Plaintiff about his service dog, leading to an exchange, during which Plaintiff was 10 prevented from entering the library. Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff alleged that the guard asked 11 Plaintiff questions about the service dog that Plaintiff was uncomfortable answering and 12 that he was not obligated to answer. Id. at 2-3, 5. The parties disputed the nature of 13 Plaintiff’s conduct during the exchange with the guard. Id. at 4. Plaintiff’s statement also 14 referred to a second attempt to enter the library on November 9, 2021, followed by a third 15 attempt at the Hillcrest branch. Id. Plaintiff further alleged that he had been suspended from 16 entering the library. Id. at 4-5. 17 The Register of Actions in the State Case reflects that the case proceeded to trial on 18 February 15, 2024. ECF No. 21-6 at 1. On February 20, 2024, the court entered judgment 19 for the City. Id. The Notice of Entry of Judgment, dated February 28, 2024, determined 20 that “Defendant does not owe plaintiff any money on plaintiff’s claims.” ECF No. 21-5 at 21 1. 22 II. LEGAL STANDARD 23 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the 24 sufficiency of the complaint. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Rule 12(b)(6) [26] 2 The Court takes judicial notice of the court filings in the State Case, attached as [27] 1 is read in conjunction with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires only “a 2 short and plain statement of the claim showing that pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. 3 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, at a minimum, 4 a complaint must allege enough facts to provide “fair notice” of both the particular claims 5 being asserted and “the grounds upon which [those claims] rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 6 Twombly, 556 U.S. 544 , 555 & n.3 (2007). 7 In deciding a motion to dismiss, all material factual allegations of the complaint are 8 accepted as true, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. Cahill v. 9 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 338 (9th Cir. 1996). A court, however, need not accept 10 all conclusory allegations as true. Rather it must “examine whether conclusory allegations 11 follow from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff.” Holden v. Hagopian, 978 12 F.2d 115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992). A motion to dismiss should be granted if a plaintiff’s 13 complaint fails to contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 14 face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 15 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 16 liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 17 556). 18 Pro se complaints are “held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted 19 by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A pro se plaintiff’s 20 complaint must be construed liberally to determine whether a claim has been stated. See 21 Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001). However, a pro se litigant’s 22 pleadings still must meet some minimum threshold in providing the defendants with notice 23 of what it is that they allegedly did wrong. See Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 66 F.3d 193 , 24 199 (9th Cir. 1995). 25 // 26 // 27 // 1 III. ANALYSIS 2 Defendant argues that this action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, based on 3 the State Case.3 4 “The preclusive effect of a state court judgment in a subsequent federal lawsuit 5 generally is determined by the full faith and credit statute.” Marrese v. American Acad. of 6 Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985). That statute provides that a state’s 7 judicial proceedings “have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United 8 States . . . as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State . . . from which they are 9 taken.” 28 U.S.C. § 1738 . To decide whether preclusion applies in a federal case, a federal 10 court looks to the preclusion law of the state in which the state court judgment was 11 rendered. Marrese, 470 U.S. at 380 . Because the State Case took place in California 12 Superior Court, this Court looks to California law to determine whether claim preclusion 13 applies here. 14 Under California law, the doctrine of claim preclusion “prevents relitigation of the 15 same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with 16 them.” Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 28 Cal. 4th 888, 896 (2002). There are three 17 elements: (1) the claim raised in the present action must be “identical to a claim or issue 18 litigated in a prior proceeding”; (2) the prior proceeding must have resulted in a “final 19 judgment on the merits”; and (3) the parties in the two proceedings must be the same or in 20 privity. Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 48 Cal. 4th 788, 797 (2010). “Res judicata 21 precludes piecemeal litigation by splitting a single cause of action or relitigation of the 22 same cause of action on a different legal theory or for different relief.” Mycogen Corp., 28 23 Cal. 4th at 897 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 24 // [26] 3 The Court does not reach Defendant’s alternative argument challenging the [27] 1 1. Identical Claims 2 To determine whether the first element is met, California uses the “primary right 3 theory.” Mycogen Corp., 28 Cal. 4th at 904 . Under this theory, “a ‘cause of action’ . . . 4 comprise[s] . . . a ‘primary right’ of the plaintiff, a corresponding ‘primary duty’ of the 5 defendant, and a wrongful act by the defendant constituting a breach of that duty.” Id. 6 (quoting Crowley v. Katleman, 8 Cal. 4th 666 , 681–82 (1994)). There is only one cause of 7 action for the violation of a given primary right, “regardless of the specific remedy sought 8 or the legal theory (common law or statutory) advanced.” Boeken, 48 Cal. 4th at 798 . In 9 Boeken, for example, the California Supreme Court determined that the primary right was 10 the right to not be wrongfully deprived of spousal companionship, the primary duty was to 11 not wrongfully deprive the plaintiff of her spouse’s companionship, and the wrongful act 12 was the defendant’s wrongful inducement of plaintiff’s husband to smoke cigarettes. Id. 13 The plaintiff there, having brought a first case based on a theory of loss of consortium, 14 could not bring a second case under a different legal theory (wrongful death) for the 15 violation of the same primary right. Id. 16 Here, this lawsuit and the State Case both involve an identical cause of action, 17 primary right, and primary duty. Both lawsuits were brought under Title II of the ADA, 18 although the State Case also invoked Title III. Both lawsuits allege the infringement of 19 Plaintiff’s right to enter branches of the San Diego Public Library with his service dog, as 20 well as his right not to be excluded due to those incidents. Both lawsuits seek the same 21 remedy of money damages. Both lawsuits involve three incidents, at the same two library 22 branches, during the same period of time. 23 Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that the instant lawsuit, although brought in 24 federal court, is identical in its claim to his State Case. Indeed, after receiving notice of the 25 adverse judgment in the State Case—with the Notice of Entry of Judgment dated February 26 28, 2024—Plaintiff promptly filed this federal lawsuit less than a month later, on March 27 28, 2024. The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claim in this lawsuit is identical to that in 1 his State Case. This element of res judicata is satisfied. 2 2. Final Judgment on the Merits 3 In order for claim preclusion to apply, the prior decision must have been on the 4 merits. Boeken, 48 Cal. 4th at 797 . The California Court of Appeal has stated that “[i]t is 5 well established that the claim preclusion aspect of the doctrine of res judicata applies to 6 small claims judgments.” Pitzen v. Super. Ct., 120 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1381 (Ct. App. 7 2004). “The judgment of the small claims court bars a subsequent proceeding on the same 8 cause of action.” Allstate Inc. Co. v. Mel Rapton, Inc., 77 Cal. App. 4th 901, 914 (Ct. App. 9 2000). Indeed, “a judgment of any court whether of high or low jurisdiction, and of record 10 or not, constitutes a complete bar against a second suit on the same cause of action.” 11 Sanderson v. Niemann, 17 Cal.2d 563, 573 (1941). 12 Here, after presiding over a trial, the state court entered a judgment that “Defendant 13 does not owe plaintiff any money on plaintiff’s claims.” ECF No. 21-5 at 1. Although 14 Plaintiff argues that the state court’s judgment addressed unspecified procedural issues 15 rather than the merits, ECF No. 23 at 3-4, the post-trial judgment by its terms adjudicated 16 Plaintiff’s claim in the State Case, identical to the claim he asserts here. See also Joyce v. 17 Bassir, No. G057169, 2020 WL 1982235 , at *4 (Apr. 27, 2020) (unpublished) (rejecting 18 the plaintiff’s argument that claim preclusion was inapplicable because small claims court 19 did not address merits of claim as “belied by the record, which shows [the plaintiff] alleged 20 malpractice and breach of contract claims against defendants, a trial was held on these 21 claims, and judgment was entered following trial. While [the plaintiff] generally complains 22 of the summary nature of small claims court, she accepted these procedural limitations 23 when she filed her action there”); Buycks v. Schneider, No. B223857, 2011 WL 2936805 , 24 at *4 (Ct. App. July 19, 2011) (unpublished) (“[T]he small claims action resulted in a final 25 judgment on the merits. The small claims court rendered judgments in favor of defendants 26 after conducting a trial.”). The Notice of Entry of Judgment did not indicate that the state 27 court dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, or even that it dismissed the lawsuit with 1 || prejudice, either of which would have entailed checking different boxes on the notice form. 2 This element is satisfied as well. 3 3. Same Parties or Parties in Privity 4 Finally, claim preclusion applies only where the parties in each case are identical or 5 privity with each other. Mycogen Corp., 28 Cal.4th at 896 . Here, both this lawsuit and 6 State Case involve identical parties. This element is satisfied. 7 Because all three elements of res judicata are satisfied, the Court grants Defendant’s 8 motion to dismiss and dismisses the action without leave to amend. See Glaude v. Deutsche 9 || Bank, No. 23-cv-5429-RS, 2024 WL 664806 , at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2024) (claims “‘must 10 || be dismissed without leave to amend, as res judicata would render any amendment futile”); 11 || Prezio v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 14-cv-2778-CBM, 2015 WL 12745800 , at *5 (C.D. Cal. 12 ||Mar. 12, 2015) (“Because the Court resolves the instant action on res judicata grounds, 13 || Plaintiff's ... claim is dismissed without leave to amend.”). 14 |]TV. CONCLUSION 15 For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF 16 || No. 21) and DISMISSES the action without leave to amend. 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. ‘ 18 Dated: September 12, 2024 feck 7 ‘ Howe 19 Hon. Robert S. Huie United States District Judge