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In Re Jaime Javier Guerra v. the State of Texas
NUMBER 13-24-00638-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
IN RE JAIME JAVIER GUERRA
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Tijerina, Silva, and Peña Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva1
Jaime Javier Guerra filed a pro se pleading in this Court contending that his conviction was based on “false testimony” and that he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel. In 2002, this Court affirmed Guerra’s conviction for the felony offense of aggravated kidnapping. See Guerra v. State, No. 13-01-00451-CR, 2002 WL 34230959, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 27, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for *2 publication). In the pleading at issue, Guerra asks whether his conviction is currently under review and requests that we provide him with appointed counsel. Guerra does not have a pending appeal in this Court and he does not reference a different final judgment that is subject to appeal or a separately appealable interlocutory order. Accordingly, we liberally construe his pro se pleading as a petition for writ of mandamus. See generally TEX. R. APP. P. 19.1 (delineating the plenary power of the appellate courts), 25.2 (governing the perfection of appeal in criminal cases), 52 (describing the requirements for filing original proceedings); In re Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd. P’ship, 189 S.W.3d 400, 403 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2006, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (“The function of the writ of mandamus is to compel action by those who by virtue of their official or quasi-official positions are charged with a positive duty to act.”).
In a criminal case, to be entitled to mandamus relief, the relator must establish both that the act sought to be compelled is a ministerial act not involving a discretionary or judicial decision and that there is no adequate remedy at law to redress the alleged harm. See In re Meza, 611 S.W.3d 383, 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (orig. proceeding); In re Harris, 491 S.W.3d 332, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re McCann, 422 S.W.3d 701, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (orig. proceeding). If the relator fails to meet both requirements, then the petition for writ of mandamus should be denied. See State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Apps. at Texarkana, 236 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (orig. proceeding). It is the relator’s burden to properly request and show entitlement to mandamus relief. See id.; In re Pena, 619 S.W.3d 837, 839 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, orig. proceeding); see also Barnes v. State, *3 832 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (“Even a pro se applicant for a writ of mandamus must show himself entitled to the extraordinary relief he seeks.”). This burden includes providing a sufficient record to establish the right to mandamus relief. In re Schreck, 642 S.W.3d 925, 927 (Tex. App.— Amarillo 2022, orig. proceeding); In re Pena, 619 S.W.3d at 839; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(k)(1)(A) (delineating the required form and content for a petition in an original proceeding), 52.7(a) (providing that the relator “must file” a record including specific matters).
The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus, is of the opinion that relator has not met his burden to obtain mandamus relief. Further, we note that the exclusive method for a collateral attack on a final felony conviction is through a writ of habeas corpus filed with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07; Ater v. Eighth Ct. of Apps., 802 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (orig. proceeding) (“We are the only court with jurisdiction in final postconviction felony proceedings.”); see also Calton v. Schiller, 498 S.W.3d 247, 252 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, pet. denied). Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus. We likewise deny Guerra’s request for the appointment of counsel. See Carroll v. State, 176 S.W.3d 249, 255 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 1.051(d), 26.04(j)(2) (providing that the trial court has the responsibility for appointing counsel to represent indigent defendants in criminal cases, as well as the authority to relieve or replace appointed counsel); Falcon *4 v. State, No. 07-22-00301-CR, 2023 WL 5604514, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 29, 2023, no pet.) (per curiam) (order) (not designated for publication).
CLARISSA SILVA Justice
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).
Delivered and filed on the 17th day of December, 2024.
Footnotes
[1] See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).