(PC) Matthews v. Pinchback

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 DEREK MATTHEWS, No. 2:22-cv-1329-DJC-CSK-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 PINCHBACK, et al., 15 Defendants. [16] 17 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding through counsel, filed this civil rights 18 action on July 27, 2022. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge 19 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. 20 On August 26, 2024, the Magistrate Judge filed findings and recommendations 21 herein which were served on all Parties and which contained notice to all Parties that 22 any objections to the findings and recommendations were to be filed within fourteen 23 days. (ECF No. 83.) Plaintiff filed timely objections. (ECF No. 84.) 24 In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 304, the Court has 25 conducted a de novo review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the filings, the 26 Court finds the majority of the findings and recommendations are supported by the 27 record and by proper analysis. Accordingly, the Court will adopt the findings and 28 recommendations in part. 1 However, the Court declines to adopt the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation 2 that Plaintiff’s state law claims for sexual assault and battery and intentional infliction of 3 emotional distress against Defendants Sysmobath, Tout, and Does 1–10 be dismissed. 4 In relevant part, Plaintiff alleges that, from May 2015 through October 2015, he was 5 sexually harassed and assaulted by Defendant Pinchback. (ECF No. 64 ¶¶ 5, 26–30.) 6 Plaintiff alleges that, on or about October 15, 2015, the sexual misconduct was 7 discovered by a prison employee and reported to prison authorities. (Id. ¶ 31.) That 8 same day, Plaintiff alleges he was detained and questioned concerning the sexual 9 misconduct. (Id. ¶¶ 32–36.) During the questioning, Plaintiff alleges the investigators 10 implied that, instead of Plaintiff being the victim, Plaintiff may have been the one who 11 raped Defendant Pinchback. (Id. ¶ 33.) 12 Following the interrogation, Plaintiff alleges he was taken to a room where he 13 was handcuffed and shackled. (Id. ¶ 36.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Sysmobath and 14 Does 1-10 “forcefully pulled down [Plaintiff’s] underwear and administered a 15 procedure on [his] penis.” (Id.) Defendant Sysmobath “inserted an object into 16 [Plaintiff’s] penis, causing [him] immense pain.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants 17 purportedly performed this ”non-consensual penetration of [Plaintiff’s] penis” in order 18 to obtain Defendant Pinchback’s DNA from Plaintiff’s body. (Id. ¶ 37.) However, 19 Plaintiff alleges that the procedure served “no investigatory purpose,” but instead 20 “was intended solely to humiliate, degrade, and intimidate [Plaintiff] and cause cruel 21 and extreme pain and suffering for retaliatory and sadistic purposes.” (Id.) Plaintiff 22 claims Defendant Sysmobath performed this procedure in the presence of Defendant 23 Tout and while Defendant Tout held down Plaintiff’s arms. (Id. ¶ 38.) Based on these 24 allegations, Plaintiff asserts claims for sexual assault and battery and intentional 25 infliction of emotional distress against Defendants Sysmobath, Tout, and Does 1-10.1 26 (Id. ¶¶ 135–60.) [27] 1 Although Plaintiff brings causes of action for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress 28 against all Defendants, his allegations as to these causes of action pertain only to Defendant Price. (See 1 The Magistrate Judge recommends these claims be dismissed for two reasons: 2 (1) the claims are time-barred and (2) Plaintiff failed to file a government tort claim 3 before bringing this case. (ECF No. 83 at 34–37, 40–43, 50–51.) For the reasons set 4 forth below, the Court disagrees, and finds that Plaintiff’s claims for sexual assault and 5 battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress are timely and Plaintiff is 6 excused from filing a government tort claim as to these claims. Thus, the claims will 7 not be dismissed. 8 I. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims Against Defendants Sysmobath, Tout, and 9 Does 1–10 Are Subject to a Ten-Year Statute of Limitations 10 California’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims is two years. Cal. Civ. 11 Proc. Code § 335.1. California tolls the statute of limitations during imprisonment for 12 up to two years under certain conditions, including when a person is “imprisoned on a 13 criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court for a term of 14 less than for life.” Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a). Because Plaintiff was incarcerated at all 15 relevant times, Plaintiff had at least four years to bring his state law claims. 16 However, Plaintiff contends that his state law claims are subject to a ten-year, 17 not four-year, statute of limitations because they fall under the revival provisions of 18 California Civil Procedure Code section 340.16. (See ECF No. 81 at 14–15.) Section 19 340.16 provides, in relevant part, “any civil action for recovery of damages suffered as 20 a result of sexual assault” shall be commenced within “10 years from the date of the 21 last act, attempted act, or assault,” and that any action seeking to recover damages 22 suffered as a result of a sexual assault “based upon conduct that occurred on or after 23 January 1, 2009, and is commenced on or after January 1, 2019 . . . [is] hereby revived 24 and may be commenced until December 31, 2026.” Civ. Proc. Code § 340.16(a), 25 (b)(3). Plaintiff brought his state law claims against Defendants Sysmobath, Tout, and 26 Does 1–10 on July 27, 2022, based on allegations they sexually assaulted him on [27] ECF No. 64 ¶¶ 161–168.) Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff has not asserted claims for negligence and 28 negligent infliction of emotional distress against Defendants Sysmobath and Tout. 1 October 15, 2015. Thus, Plaintiff argues these claims are timely because they were 2 filed after January 1, 2019, and were brought within ten years of the October 15, 3 2015, accrual date. (ECF No. 81 at 13.) 4 Further, Plaintiff argues his allegations meet the definition of sexual assault in 5 the statute. Section 340.16 defines “sexual assault” as any of the crimes described in 6 California Penal Code sections 243.4, 261, 264.1, 286, 287, or 289. Civ. Proc. Code 7 § 340.16(b)(1). Penal Code section 243.4(a) defines sexual battery as touching the 8 intimate part of another person, while unlawfully restrained,2 against their will for the 9 specific purpose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse. The California 10 Court of Appeal has held that sexual abuse, as used in Penal Code section 243.4, 11 includes non-consensual touching of a person’s intimate body part “for the purpose of 12 insulting, humiliating, or intimidating” that person. In re Shannon T., 144 Cal. App. 4th 13 618, 622 (2006) (“Shannon T.”). Thus, Plaintiff argues his allegations against 14 Defendants Sysmobath, Tout, and Does 1–10 qualify as sexual battery under Penal 15 Code section 243.4(a) because the procedure on his penis served no investigatory 16 purposes and was sadistic sexual contact intended solely to humiliate, degrade, and 17 intimidate him. (ECF No. 81 at 15 (citing ECF No. 64 ¶¶ 37, 64, 93, 116, 143, 152).) 18 The Magistrate Judge disagreed with Plaintiff, finding that Plaintiff had not 19 alleged sexual battery as defined in section 243.4 because there was no sexual 20 purpose for Defendants Sysmobath, Tout, and Does 1–10’s actions. (See ECF No. 83 21 at 36–37.) Rather, the Magistrate Judge found that Defendants had performed the 22 procedure on Plaintiff’s penis for a non-sexual, investigatory purpose—to obtain DNA 23 from Plaintiff’s body. (Id.) In particular, the Magistrate Judge contrasted the facts of [24] 25 2 Although Penal Code section 243.4(a) refers to unlawful restraint, lawful restraint can become unlawful when the original lawful purpose is replaced with or supplemented by an unlawful purpose. See 26 People v. Alford, 235 Cal. App. 3d 799 , 802–4 (1991) (holding a correctional officer who sexually assaulted two female inmates on different occasions while the women were physically restrained and 27 being transported from one correctional facility to another was properly convicted of sexual battery under section 243.4 given that the correctional officer restrained the women not solely for the purpose 28 of transporting them but also to enable him to commit sexual batteries against them). 1 this case with Shannon T., reasoning “[P]laintiff’s allegations regarding [D]efendants 2 Sysmobath and Tout do not involve a sexual touching or provide a sexual context like 3 that found in the surrounding circumstances cited in Shannon T., 144 Cal. App. 4th at 4 622-23.” (Id. at 36.) Thus, the Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff’s claims were 5 subject to a four-year, not ten-year, statute of limitations. (Id. at 37.) 6 However, the Court finds this reading of Shannon T. too narrow. In Shannon T., 7 a 14-year-old boy approached a 16-year-old girl at school, directed that she get off 8 the phone, called her “[his] ho,” and then after the girl walked away from him, saying 9 “whatever,” slapped her face, grabbed her arm, and pinched her breast, causing her 10 to cry and leaving a large bruise. 144 Cal. App. 4th at 620 . The boy challenged the 11 juvenile court’s subsequent sexual battery finding, arguing there was no specific intent 12 because he and the victim had simply been “engaged in ‘playful hitting’ of each 13 other.” Id. at 621. After observing that the statute, Penal Code section 243.4, did not 14 define “sexual abuse” and that no published case had addressed the issue, the 15 appellate court concluded that “‘sexual abuse’ includes the touching of a woman’s 16 breast, without consent, for the purpose of insulting, humiliating, or intimidating the 17 woman, even if the touching does not result in actual physical injury.” Id. at 622. The 18 court affirmed the juvenile court’s finding, concluding that “the minor’s purpose in 19 pinching the victim’s breast [could] be inferred from the act itself together with its 20 surrounding circumstances” and that the “circumstances support[ed] a conclusion that 21 the minor pinched the girl’s breast for the specific purpose of insulting, humiliating, 22 intimidating, and even physically hurting her.” Id. at 622–23. Thus, Shannon T. does 23 not hold that a “sexual context” is required to establish sexual abuse. Touching 24 another’s intimate body part without their consent for the purpose of insulting, 25 humiliating, and intimidating them is enough. 26 Here, Plaintiff alleges his penis was penetrated without his consent, purportedly 27 to obtain Defendant Pinchback’s DNA from Plaintiff’s body. (ECF No. 64 ¶ 37.) 28 However, Plaintiff alleges this procedure was unnecessary because the DNA could 1 have been obtained in less intrusive ways and Defendants had other evidence a 2 sexual encounter had taken place between Plaintiff and Defendant Pinchback, 3 including an eyewitness account. (Id.) Further, the procedure was conducted 4 immediately after Plaintiff was questioned about the sexual misconduct, during which 5 the investigators implied that Plaintiff may have raped Defendant Pinchback. (Id. 6 ¶ 33.) Thus, Plaintiff contends there was no investigatory purpose served by the 7 penetration of his penis; rather, the procedure was conducted “solely to humiliate, 8 degrade, and intimidate him” in order to penalize him for the suspected rape. (Id. 9 ¶ 37.) Based on the standard set forth in Shannon T., the Court finds these allegations 10 plausibly support a claim for sexual battery under Penal Code section 243.4(a). The 11 statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s sexual assault and battery claim is ten years. 12 Plaintiff’s other state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is 13 also premised upon his sexual assault and battery allegations against Defendants 14 Sysmobath, Tout, and Does 1–10. (See id. ¶¶ 155–160). Thus, this claim benefits from 15 the ten-year statute of limitations as well. See Acevedo v. eXp Realty, LLC, 713 F. 16 Supp. 3d 740, 790–92 (C.D. Cal. 2024) (finding that section 340.16, by its terms, is not 17 limited to claims of sexual assault, but applies to any action seeking damages as a 18 result of sexual assault, and holding an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim 19 was revived under section 340.16(b)(3) along with a sexual battery claim because 20 plaintiffs alleged defendants caused plaintiffs emotional distress by “subjecting them 21 to forceful sexual touching and assault,” meaning plaintiffs sought to “recover 22 damages that [they] would not have suffered, but for their sexual assault”). 23 Accordingly, the Court holds Plaintiff’s claims for sexual assault and battery and 24 intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendants Sysmobath, Tout, and 25 Does 1–10 are timely as they were filed within the ten-year statute of limitations under 26 California Civil Procedure Code section 340.16. 27 //// 28 //// 1 II. Plaintiff is Excused from Filing a Government Tort Claim for his State Law 2 Causes of Action against Defendants Sysmobath, Tout, and Does 1–10 3 Under the California Government Claims Act, California Government Code 4 sections 810 et seq., a plaintiff may not bring a suit for monetary damages against a 5 public employee or entity unless the plaintiff first presents the claim to the California 6 Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board, and the Board acts on the 7 claim, or the time for doing so expires. Compliance with this “claim presentation 8 requirement” constitutes an element of a cause of action for damages against a public 9 entity or official. State v. Superior Ct., 32 Cal. 4th 1234 , 1244 (2004). However, under 10 Government Code section 945.9(a), “[a] claim arising out of an alleged sexual assault 11 by a law enforcement officer” is exempt from the requirement to file a government tort 12 claim “if the alleged assault occurred while the officer was employed by a law 13 enforcement agency.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.9(a). 14 Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Sysmobath, Tout, and Does 1–10 sexually 15 assaulted him while employed as law enforcement officers with the California 16 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and/or California Prison Industry 17 Authority. (ECF No. 64 ¶¶ 7–10, 36–38.) Thus, Plaintiff argues he is exempt from the 18 government tort claim presentation requirement for his claims arising out of 19 Defendants’ alleged sexual assault. (ECF No. 81 at 16–17.) 20 The Magistrate Judge found that “the alleged actions or omissions of 21 [D]efendants Sysmobath and Tout did not take place in a sexual context, and 22 therefore [P]laintiff’s state law claims against Sysmobath and Tout are not exempt 23 under § 945.9(a) from the claim presentation requirement of the California 24 Government Claims Act.” (ECF No. 83 at 43.) However, as held in Section I supra, 25 Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a timely sexual assault and battery claim against 26 Defendants Sysmobath, Tout, and Does 1–10. 27 Accordingly, the Court finds that section 945.9(a) applies and excuses Plaintiff 28 from the claim presentation requirement imposed by the Government Claims Act. 1 CONCLUSION 2 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 3 1. The findings and recommendations (ECF No. 83) are ADOPTED in part. 4 2. CDCR Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 80) is GRANTED in part as 5 follows: 6 a. Plaintiff’s Fourth and Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants 7 Price, Sysmobath, Tout, and Does 1–10 are dismissed based on Plaintiff’s 8 concession that such claims are time-barred; 9 b. Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims against Defendants Price, Sysmobath, 10 Tout, and Does 1–10 are dismissed as time barred; 11 c. Plaintiff’s claims for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional 12 distress against Defendants Price and Does 1–10 are dismissed as barred 13 by the statute of limitations and based on Plaintiff’s failure to file a 14 government tort claim as required by California Government Code 15 section 911.2 and failure to submit a request to file a late government 16 tort claim as required under California Government Code section 911.4; 17 and 18 d. Dismissal of these claims is without leave to amend because amendment 19 would be futile. 20 3. CDCR Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 80) is DENIED in part as follows: 21 a. Plaintiff’s claims for sexual assault and battery and intentional infliction of 22 emotional distress against Defendants Sysmobath, Tout, and Does 1–10 23 will not be dismissed as they are timely and Plaintiff’s failure to file a 24 government tort claim as required by California Government Code 25 section 911.2 is excused under California Government Code section 26 945.9(a). 27 //// 28 //// 1 4. Defendant Pinchback’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 69) is GRANTED as follows: 2 a. Plaintiff's state law claims against Defendant Pinchback are dismissed 3 due to Plaintiff's failure to file a government tort claim as required by 4 California Government Code section 911.2 and failure to submit a 5 request to file a late government tort claim as required under California 6 Government Code section 911.4; and 7 b. Dismissal of these claims is without leave to amend because amendment 8 would be futile. 9 5. This case shall proceed on Plaintiff's claims for sexual assault and battery and 10 intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendants Sysmobath, Tout, 11 and Does 1-10 only. [12] 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 | Dated: _December 20, 2024 “Daal J CoO □□□□ Hon. Daniel alabretta 1s UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE [17] 18 | psca- Matthews22cv1329