Faison v. Alameda County

— 1 — — 2 — — 3 — 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA — 6 — 7 DEONTAE CHARLES FAISON, et al., Case No. 24-cv-06059-JSC 8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 9 v. MOTION TO DISMISS 10 ALAMEDA COUNTY, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 27 Defendants. — 11 — — 12 — 13 Plaintiffs bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against individual officers, Alameda 14 County, and The East Bay Regional Park District (the “District”), alleging District Officer Knea 15 tased Plaintiff Deontae Charles Faison while he was in the estuary at Martin Luther King Jr. 16 Regional Shoreline Park, causing life-threatening injuries. (Dkt. No. 20.)1 Plaintiffs originally 17 filed their complaint bringing Monell claims against both the County and the District (Dkt. No. 1), 18 but later amended their complaint to allege Monell liability only against the District. (Dkt. No. 19 20.) The District and Officer Knea now move to dismiss the Monell claims against the District. 20 (Dkt. No. 27.) After carefully considering the parties’ written submissions, the Court concludes 21 oral argument is unnecessary, see Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), and GRANTS Defendants’ motion with leave 22 to amend. 23 The Court must accept all plausibly alleged factual allegations as true but “[t]hreadbare 24 recitals of a cause of action’s elements, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 25 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 , 555 26 (2007); see also Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 27 1 163, 164 (1993) (holding Rule 8 notice pleading requirements apply to Monell claims). “A 2 || government entity may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , unless a policy, practice, or 3 custom of the entity can be shown to be a moving force behind a violation of constitutional 4 || rights.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of 5 Soc. Servs. Of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). 6 Plaintiffs allege individual Defendants “acted pursuant to an expressly adopted official 7 policy or a widespread or longstanding practice or custom of Defendants[sic] DISTRICT” but do 8 not identify in their complaint any such policy, practice, or custom. (Dkt. No. 20 4 90.) The Court 9 therefore dismisses Plaintiffs’ claim because they do not identify what policy or practice is the 10 basis for their Monell claim. See Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 900-901 (upholding dismissal of Monell 11 claims because the plaintiff failed to allege factual allegations beyond a “formulaic recitation of a 12 cause of action’s elements.”); compare Henderson yv. Cnty. of Santa Cruz, 14-cv-03544-RMW, 5 13 || 2015 WL 225429 at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2015) (denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss 14 || because the plaintiffs plead factual allegations that specific policies violated the plaintiffs’ rights), 3 15 with Armstead v. Cnty. of Alameda, No. 21-cv-05257-LB, 2022 WL 888660 , at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. a 16 || Mar. 26, 2022) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint because the plaintiffs did not allege the 3 17 specific policy or practice that caused their injuries). The complaint’s allegations do not support 18 || an inference as to what policy, “the plaintiffs must allege the policy or practice specifically.” 19 Armstead, 2022 WL 888660 , at *7. 20 For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ Monell claim against the District is DISMISSED with leave 21 to amend. Any amended complaint shall be filed no later than February 13, 2025. 22 This Order disposes of Docket No. 27. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 || Dated: January 13, 2025 — 25 — CQYELINE SCOTT CORLEY nited States District Judge — 28 —