State of Texas v. Harris County, Texas

ACCEPTED 15-24-00120-CV FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 1/14/2025 6:14 PM No. 15-24-00120-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK FILED IN In the Fifteenth Court of Appeals 15th COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS Austin, Texas 1/14/2025 6:14:55 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk State of Texas, Appellant, v. Harris County, Texas, et al., Appellees. On Appeal from the 165th District Court, Harris County, Texas Cause No. 2024-63919, Hon. Ursula Hall, Presiding Judge Brief of Appellees Of Counsel: Christian D. Menefee Harris County Attorney Grant B. Martinez Justin P. Tschoepe Jonathan G. C. Fombonne Lily E. Hann Deputy County Attorney & First Assistant Yetter Coleman LLP State Bar No. 24102702 811 Main Street, Suite 4100 Jonathan.Fombonne@harriscountytx.gov Houston, Texas 77002 Phone: (713) 632-8000 Office of the Harris County Attorney 1019 Congress, 15th Floor Houston, Texas 77002 Phone: (713) 274-5101 Attorneys for Appellees Identity of Parties & Counsel Appellant State of Texas Trial and Appellate Counsel Ken Paxton Brent Webster Ralph Molina James Lloyd Kimberly Gdula William D. Wassdorf William H. Farrell (lead counsel) Office of the Attorney General P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059) Austin, Texas 78711 Phone: (512) 936-1700 Fax: (512) 474-269 Biff.Farrell@oag.texas.gov - ii - Appellees (“Harris County”) Harris County, Texas Harris County Commissioners Court Harris County Public Health Lina Hidalgo, in her official capacity as Harris County Judge Rodney Ellis, in his official capacity as Commissioner of Harris County Precinct 1 Adrian Garcia, in his official capacity as Commissioner of Harris County Precinct 2 Tom Ramsey, in his official capacity as Commissioner of Harris County Precinct 3 Lesley Briones, in her official Capacity as Commissioner of Harris County Precinct 4 Leah Barton, in her official capacity as Interim Executive Director of Harris County Public Health Trial and Appellate Counsel Christian D. Menefee Jonathan G.C. Fombonne Tiffany S. Bingham Christopher Garza Eleanor Matheson Ryan Cooper Edward D. Swidriski III Office of the Harris County Attorney 1019 Congress Plaza, 15th Floor Houston, Texas 77002 Phone: (713) 274-5101 Fax: (713) 755-8924 Grant B. Martinez Justin P. Tschoepe Lily E. Hann Yetter Coleman LLP 811 Main Street, Suite 4100 Houston, Texas 77002 Phone: (713) 632-8000 Fax: (713) 632-8002 - iii - Table of Contents Identity of Parties & Counsel ................................................................................. ii Index of Authorities ..............................................................................................vii Record References ................................................................................................ xv Statement of the Case .......................................................................................... xvi Issues Presented ..................................................................................................... 1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 2 Statement of Facts ..................................................................................................3 Statement of Procedural History ............................................................................ 8 Standard of Review ............................................................................................... 11 Summary of the Argument .................................................................................... 13 Argument.............................................................................................................. 15 I. The Final Judgment Mooted the Temporary Injunction Order, which this Court Need Not and Should Not Review. ............................................ 15 II. The Attorney General Lacked Authority to Represent the State in this Case in the Trial Court. .............................................................................. 16 A. Texas law did not authorize the Attorney General to represent the State in the district court in this case. .......................................... 17 1. The text of the Constitution specifies and limits the Attorney General’s authority to represent the State in district courts. ......................................................................... 18 2. The Supreme Court confirmed the Attorney General’s lack of authority in the trial courts absent a clear statute. ........ 19 3. No statute authorizes the Attorney General to represent the State in this case in the trial court...................................... 21 B. The Attorney General has argued Harris County’s position before, successfully. ......................................................................... 22 - iv - C. The Attorney General’s arguments lack merit. ................................ 24 1. The Attorney General has no inherent or common-law authority to represent the State in the trial courts. ................. 24 2. The Attorney General’s limited authority results from a deliberate reduction in his powers in 1876. ..............................26 3. The Attorney General’s cases do not substitute for authority. ............................................................................... 28 4. The Harris County Attorney’s authority is not the issue before the Court. .....................................................................29 5. This Court should reject the Attorney General’s invitation to engage in judicial lawmaking. ..............................29 III. The State Did Not Affirmatively Establish the Trial Court’s Jurisdiction. ................................................................................................30 A. Ultra vires claims did not overcome the governmental entities’ immunity. ......................................................................................... 31 B. For the government officials, the State did not plead the essential standing element of traceability. ......................................... 33 IV. The State Lacks a Viable Ultra Vires Claim Because the Program Is Constitutional. ............................................................................................ 36 A. The Program is presumptively constitutional. ................................... 37 B. The Gift Clauses do not apply to relief for the poor. ......................... 39 1. In 1876, care for the poor was understood to be the exercise of a local government duty to the community, not a gift to those helped. ....................................................... 40 2. In 1876, Texans ratified the Gift Clauses to stop corporate welfare to railroads and similar commercial enterprises. ............................................................................ 42 3. Section 52(a)’s text does not support extending a ban on corporate welfare assistance to the needy. .............................. 44 4. Contemporaneous interpretations refute the State’s position. .................................................................................. 47 -v- C. Even if the Gift Clauses apply, the Community Prosperity Program satisfies the Supreme Court’s test. .....................................49 1. Harris County received return consideration. ......................... 51 2. The Community Prosperity Program serves many public purposes. ................................................................................ 54 3. Harris County retains control over the funds. ........................ 60 4. The State’s arguments about other constitutional provisions do not apply. .......................................................... 66 D. The Community Prosperity Program is authorized by § 52-a. ...........68 E. The Community Prosperity Program does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. .............................................................................70 F. The Court Must Affirm the Trial Court’s Conclusion that the Community Prosperity Program Is Statutorily Authorized................ 72 Conclusion and Prayer .......................................................................................... 73 Certificate of Service............................................................................................. 75 Certificate of Compliance ..................................................................................... 76 Appendix - vi - Index of Authorities Cases Page(s) Abbott v. Mex. Am. Legislative Caucus, 647 S.W.3d 681 (Tex. 2022)....................................................................... 33, 34 Agey v. Am. Lib. Pipe Line Co., 172 S.W.2d 972 (Tex. 1943) ............................................................................. 25 Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755 (Tex. 2018) ............................................................................. 11 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm’rs, 21 Kan. 309 (1878) ........................................................................................... 43 Bell County v. Alexander, 22 Tex. 350 (1858) ...........................................................................................42 Bexar County v. Linden, 220 S.W. 761 (Tex. 1920)...........................................................................passim Bonsmara Nat. Beef Co., LLC v. Hart of Tex. Cattle Feeders, LLC, 603 S.W.3d 385 (Tex. 2020) ....................................................................... 15, 16 Borgelt v. Austin Firefighters Ass’n, IAFF Local 975, 692 S.W.3d 288 (Tex. 2024) ......................................................................passim Brady v. Brooks, 89 S.W. 1052 (Tex. 1905) ........................................................................... 19, 20 Brown v. De La Cruz, 156 S.W.3d 560 (Tex. 2004)............................................................................. 29 Campbell v. Bd. of Educ., 310 F. Supp. 94 (E.D.N.Y. 1970)...................................................................... 71 Chambers-Liberty Cntys. Navigation Dist. v. State, 575 S.W.3d 339 (Tex. 2019) ............................................................................. 32 City of Aransas Pass v. Keeling, 247 S.W. 818 (Tex. 1923) ................................................................................. 57 - vii - City of Dallas v. Albert, 354 S.W.3d 368 (Tex. 2011) ............................................................................. 35 City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009) ............................................................................ 31 City of Elsa v. M.A.L., 226 S.W.3d 390 (Tex. 2007) ............................................................................ 32 City of Galveston v. State, 217 S.W.3d 466 (Tex. 2007) .......................................................................passim City of San Antonio v. Maspero, 640 S.W.3d 523 (Tex. 2022) ..............................................................................9 Commissioners Ct. of Titus Cnty. v. Agan, 940 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1997) ......................................................................... 37, 38 Cook County v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 208 (7th Cir. 2020) (Barrett, J. dissenting) ..................................passim Davis v. City of Lubbock, 326 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. 1959) ............................................................................. 55 Davis v. City of Taylor, 67 S.W.2d 1033 (Tex. 1934) ............................................................................. 54 Day Land & Cattle Co. v. State, 4 S.W. 865 (Tex. 1887) .........................................................................21, 24, 25 Dohlen v. City of San Antonio, 643 S.W.3d 387 (Tex. 2022) ............................................................................ 35 Downs v. United States, 113 F. 144 (4th Cir. 1902), aff’d, 187 U.S. 496 (1903) .......................................44 El Paso Elec. Co. v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins., 937 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. 1996) ........................................................................18, 21 Ex Parte City of Irving, 2024 WL 5172273 (Tex. App. [15th Dist.] 2024, no pet h.) .............................. 12 - viii - Ex parte City of Irving, 343 S.W.3d 850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, judgment vacated w.r.m.) ....................................................................................................... 68, 69 Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1976)............................................................................. 26 Friedman v. Am. Sur. Co. of N.Y., 151 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. 1941) .............................................................................. 67 Garcia v. Laughlin, 285 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. 1955)........................................................................ 22, 24 Gardner v. Children’s Med. Ctr. of Dall., 402 S.W.3d 888 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.) ................................... 70, 72 Hall v. McRaven, 508 S.W.3d 232 (Tex. 2017) ............................................................................. 36 Harley Channelview Props., LLC v. Harley Marine Gulf, LLC, 690 S.W.3d 32 (Tex. 2024) .............................................................................. 15 Hebert v. Hopkins, 395 S.W.3d 884 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.) ......................................... 71 Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. 2012) ........................................................................ 11, 36 Heller v. Doe ex rel Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) .......................................................................................... 70 Hill v. Lower Colorado River Auth., 568 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. App.—Austin 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.) ...................... 24, 28 Hogan v. S. Methodist Univ., 688 S.W.3d 852 (Tex. 2024) ...................................................................... 39, 42 Hous. Auth. of City of Dallas v. Higginbotham, 143 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. 1940) ............................................................................... 56 In re Abbott, 628 S.W.3d 288 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding) ............................................... 66 - ix - In re Abbott, 628 S.W.3d 288 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding) ............................................... 67 In re Abbott, 645 S.W.3d 276 (Tex. 2022) (orig. proceeding) ............................................... 34 In re Gee, 941 F.3d 153 (5th Cir. 2019) ............................................................................. 34 In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2013) ............................................................................. 69 In re State, 2024 WL 2983176 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding) .....................................passim Isuani v. Manske-Sheffield Radiology Grp., P.A., 802 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. 1991) ........................................................................ 16, 19 Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015) ...................................................................... 11, 36, 37 Lewright v. Bell, 63 S.W. 623 (1901) ..................................................................................... 25, 28 Longoria v. Paxton, 2022 WL 2208519 (5th Cir. 2022) ................................................................... 23 Matzen v. McLane, 659 S.W.3d 381 (Tex. 2021) ............................................................................. 36 Monghon v. Van Zandt County, 1886 WL 4550 (Tex. Ct. App. 1886, no writ) ............................................. 47, 49 Mosaic Baybrook One, L.P. v. Simien, 674 S.W.3d 234 (Tex. 2023) .......................................................................33, 35 Owens v. Alexander, 2019 WL 3334626 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, no pet.) ...................................... 72 Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2015) .................................................................... 31, 32, 33 -x- Paxton v. Longoria, 646 S.W.3d 532 (Tex. 2022) ............................................................................ 23 Paxton v. Simmons, 640 S.W.3d 588 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2022, no pet.) ......................................... 34 Perry v. Del Rio, 67 S.W.3d 85 (Tex. 2001) ................................................................................ 26 Queen Ins. Co. v. State, 22 S.W. 1048, 1052 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893) rev’d, 24 S.W. 397 (1893) .................................................................................28 Roswell v. Cleaver-Brooks Sales & Serv., Inc., 2020 WL 897101 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.)................. 15 Smith v. State, 328 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. 1959) .............................................................................20 State ex rel. Downs v. Harney, 164 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1942, writ ref’d w.o.m.) ............ 22, 24 State ex rel. Durden v. Shahan, 658 S.W.3d 300 (Tex. 2022) ............................................................................20 State v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 17 S.W. 60, 66 (Tex. 1891) ................................28 State v. Hollins, 620 S.W.3d 400 (Tex. 2020)...................................................................... 29, 33 State v. Moore, 57 Tex. 307 (1882) ................................................................................ 19, 24, 27 State v. Stephens, 664 S.W.3d 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) .................................................... 27, 28 Sullivan v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 616 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. 1981).............................................................................. 70 Tex. Mun. League Intergovernmental Risk Pool v. Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 74 S.W.3d 377 (Tex. 2002) .................................................................... 4, 50, 60 - xi - Univ. of Tex. v. Garner, 595 S.W.3d 645 (Tex. 2019) ............................................................................. 69 WCJ Assets, Ltd. v. US Trinity Bridgeport, LLC, 2023 WL 4115398 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2023, no pet.) .............................. 15 Webster v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 2024 WL 5249494 (Tex. Dec. 31, 2024) .................................... 16, 17, 18, 25, 26 Yett v. Cook, 281 S.W. 837 (Tex. 1926) .................................................................................28 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES & REGULATIONS 50 U.S.C. §3805.................................................................................................... 71 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 35.11 .......................................................................... 71 Tex. Gov’t Code § 402.021 .................................................................................. 21 Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 81.027 ............................................................................. 72 Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 381.003(a)....................................................................... 69 Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 381.004 ........................................................................... 69 Tex. Const. art. III, § 50 ....................................................................................... 39 Tex. Const. art. III, § 51 ........................................................................................ 39 Tex. Const. art. III, § 52(a) .............................................................................passim Tex. Const. art. III, § 52-a..........................................................................57, 69, 70 Tex. Const. art. IV, § 22 .................................................................................passim Tex. Const. art. V, § 21 ................................................................................ 18, 25, 1 Tex. Const. art. XI, § 2 ......................................................................................... 46 Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 6(a) .................................................................................. 39 Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 8....................................................................................... 46 - xii -Tex. Const. of 1869, art. IV, § 23 .......................................................................... 27 Tex. R. Civ. P. 12 ............................................................................................passim 31 C.F.R. § 35.6(b)(3)(ii)(A)(1) ............................................................................... 3 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 5.5(g) ............................................................................... 71 Act approved July 22, 1876, 15th Leg., R.S., ch. 55, § 4, 1876 Tex. Gen. Laws 51, reprinted in 8 H.P.N. Gammel, The Laws of Texas 1822-1897 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898) .................................................... 47 Act approved Mar. 16, 1848, 2d Leg., R.S., ch. 98, § 3, 1848 Tex. Gen. Laws 113, reprinted in 3 H.P.N. Gammel, The Laws of Texas 1822- 1897 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898) ............................................................42 Act of Dec. 20, 1836, § 25, reprinted in 1 H.P.N. Gammel, The Laws of Texas 1822-1897 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898) .................................... 41, 42 Other Authorities Aid, Dr. Webster’s Complete Dictionary of the English Language (1864 ed.) .................................................................................................................. 45 Aid, Oxford English Dictionary ............................................................................... 45 Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 164 (2012) ........................... 47, 69 ATTENTION, PAUPERS!, The Dallas Daily Herald (June 15, 1877) ...................48 Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The History of the Judicial Impairment ‘Doctrine’ and Its Lessons for the Contract Clause, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1373, 1405 (1992) ............................................................................................. 43 Brenham Weekly Banner (July 12, 1878) ...............................................................48 Commissioners Court, Brenham Weekly Banner (June 1, 1882) ..............................48 Convention Proceedings, Austin Weekly Statesman (Oct. 7, 1875) ..................... 43, 44 George D. Braden et al., The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis 352 (1977) ..........................................passim - xiii - Grant, Dr. Webster’s Complete Dictionary of the English Language (1864 ed.) .................................................................................................................. 45 Grant, Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) ...................................................... 45 Jill S. Quadagno, From Poor Laws to Pensions, 62 Milbank Mem’l Fund Q. 417 (1984)....................................................................................................40 Local Intelligence, Brenham Weekly Banner (Jan. 4, 1878) .....................................48 Martha Doty Freeman, Indigent Care in Texas, 20 Index of Tex. Archeology 1 (2008) ........................................................................................42 Relief, Black’s Law Dictionary (1st ed. 1891) .......................................................... 46 TDHCA announces Housing Choice Voucher Program pre-application for wait-list to open May 2 (April 28, 2022), https://www.tdhca.texas.gov/news/tdhca-announces-housing- choice-voucher-program-pre-applications-wait-list-open-may-2 ...................... 70 Texas—Facts and Fancies, Austin American-Statesman (Aug. 16, 1878) ................48 Tex. Legis. Council, Analyses of Proposed Constitutional Amendments and Referenda 14 (Sept. 1987) ........................................................................... 67 Texas Health and Human Services, SNAP Food Benefits, available at https://www.hhs.texas.gov/services/food/snap-food-benefits; 2.RR.21 .............................................................................................................. 5 Texas Health and Human Services, TANF Cash Help, available at https://www.hhs.texas.gov/services/financial/cash/tanf-cash- help;................................................................................................................... 5 U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Coronavirus State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds, 87 Fed. Reg. 4338 (Jan. 27, 2022) ......................................................... 58 U.S. Dep’t Treasury, Coronavirus State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds: Interim Final Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. 64986 (Sep. 20, 2023) ..................... 3, 58 - xiv - Record References In this brief, citations to “App.” refer to the tabs in the Appendix to this Petition. Citations to “CR.__” refer to pages of the clerk’s record. The reporter’s record is cited as “[Volume].RR.[Page Number].” Because the exhibits in the reporter’s record are not separately paginated, this brief cites to the specific page of the PDF in the relevant volume. For example, page 111 of the PDF for Volume 5 is cited as 5.RR.111. Citations to “Br.” refer to the appellant’s brief. - xv - Statement of the Case Nature of the Case In In re State, 2024 WL 2983176 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding), the Supreme Court expressed constitutional concerns about a Harris County pilot program to distribute federal funds to poor people. Following that decision, Harris County created a new program specifically designed to address those concerns. The State sued to stop this new program to provide relief to the poor. Its ultra vires suit seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. Trial Court 165th Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas Course of Proceedings The State applied for a temporary injunction. CR.7-26. Harris County filed a plea to the jurisdiction. CR.80-123. It also filed a Motion to Show Authority Under Rule 12, contending that the Attorney General lacks authority to represent the State in the district court in this case. CR.489-500. Disposition After hearings, the trial court denied the State’s application for a temporary injunction, CR.471-72, and signed an Amended Final Judgment, granting the plea to the jurisdiction and the Rule 12 motion. App. 1. Because no person with authority to represent the State appeared, the Attorney General’s trial-court pleadings have been struck. App. 1. - xvi - Issues Presented 1. Whether the trial court erred in granting the plea to the jurisdiction and the Rule 12 motion. This issue includes the following sub-issues: a. Lack of Authority: Whether the Attorney General and attorneys from his office showed their authority to represent the State in the district court in this case. b. Ultra Vires Claims Against Entities: Whether the State affirmatively demonstrated that the Harris County governmental entities are not protected by governmental immunity in this ultra vires suit. c. Traceability to Specific Officials: Whether the State pleaded the traceability element of standing, when its petition lacks any allegations tying the challenged conduct to any specific government official. d. Constitutionality: Whether the State failed to affirmatively demonstrate a viable ultra vires claim because the Community Prosperity Program is constitutional. 2. Whether the trial court’s order denying a temporary injunction was mooted by the final judgment. -1- Introduction Any honest reading of the 1876 Constitution requires dismissal of this lawsuit, the Attorney General’s latest unsanctioned attempt to halt Harris County’s poverty-alleviation work. First, the 1876 Constitution deliberately reduced and expressly limited the Attorney General’s representation of the State in the trial courts and the Legislature has never enlarged that authority to include ultra vires suits against political subdivisions. In fact, the Attorney General has previously agreed that his authority to institute lawsuits in trial courts on behalf of the State is so limited. His brief cites no constitutional provision or statute authorizing him to represent the State in this case. So, the trial court properly struck his pleadings. Second, and in any event, Harris County’s Community Prosperity Program does not violate the Gift Clause—either under its original understanding when the 1876 Constitution was drafted, or under the Supreme Court’s recently reaffirmed precedent. Following that court’s constitutional concerns with a prior poverty-alleviation program based on a perceived lack of “public control over the funds,” In re State, 2024 WL 2983176, at *3, the County’s new program includes additional controls and public benefits throughout. The State’s arguments against the new program rely primarily on bald assertions and fail to reckon with the record. For these reasons and several others, the Court should affirm. -2- Statement of Facts State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds The federal government has provided Harris County with nearly $1 billion in pandemic-relief funds. Federal regulations expressly allow Harris County to use those funds for “cash assistance” to “households and individuals” at or below 300% of the poverty limit as part of “[r]esponding to the negative economic impacts” of the pandemic. 31 C.F.R. § 35.6(b)(3)(ii)(A)(1). As recently as September 2023, the federal government reiterated that it “[r]ecogniz[es] that low-income households often experience deeper challenges recovering financially from a natural disaster.”1 Uplift Harris In 2023, after considerable study, the Harris County Commissioners Court approved the Uplift Harris program “to address economic inequality and insecurity for low-income households most affected by the pandemic.” 3.RR.6; see 3.RR.5-22, 24-25. Under Uplift Harris, selected Harris County residents would receive $500 monthly cash payments with few strings attached for 18 months. In re State, 2024 WL 2983176, at *1. Recipients would be chosen by lottery from among 1 U.S. Dep’t Treasury, Coronavirus State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds: Interim Final Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. 64986, 64994 (Sep. 20, 2023). -3-applicants with income below 200% of the federal poverty line who either live in the top 10 poorest zip codes or participate in a particular Harris County public health program called ACCESS. Id.; 2.RR.10-11; 3.RR.6, 8, 24. Throughout 2023, Harris County and its contractors worked to implement Uplift Harris. Participants expected the first round of assistance in April 2024. The Supreme Court Weighs in on Uplift Harris In April 2024, the Attorney General sued. Having failed to obtain relief in the trial court or the Fourteenth Court, he petitioned the Supreme Court for relief. The Supreme Court, exercising its authority under Rule 52.10, granted the motion for temporary relief and prohibited all Uplift Harris payments until further order of that Court. In re State, 2024 WL 2983176, at *1. The Supreme Court’s order granting a stay offered a “preliminary” assessment of the merits but conspicuously focused on one issue. Id. at *3. The Court reasoned that the State “raised serious doubt that the Uplift Harris program can satisfy the ‘public control’ requirement of this Court’s Gift Clause precedent.” Id. at *4. That precedent requires that “a government in Texas that desires to dole out public funds must, among other things, ‘retain public control over the funds to ensure that the public purpose is accomplished and to protect the public’s investment.’” Id. at *3 (relying on Tex. Mun. League Intergovernmental Risk Pool v. -4-Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 74 S.W.3d 377, 384 (Tex. 2002)); see id. at *4 (“It appears there will be no public control over the funds after they are disbursed.”). Harris County Creates the Community Prosperity Program Harris County was eager to ensure its poor residents received relief, so, instead of awaiting a final resolution of the Uplift Harris litigation, it developed a new program with tighter controls to address the Supreme Court’s concerns: the Community Prosperity Program (the “Program”). 2.RR.10, 5.RR.84, 88, 99. The Program is modeled on public benefits programs such as TANF and SNAP.2 2.RR.20-21, 43, 57. It uses federal funds to deliver $500 a month for 18 months to 1,850 participants; and, unlike Uplift Harris, it significantly restricts where and on what participants may spend the funds. 2.RR.11, 30, 41; 5.RR.84, 88, 99. The Community Prosperity Program achieves the same goals as Uplift Harris, and the participants remain the same, but it functions differently. 5.RR.84, 99; 2.RR.9-10. It has three new, strict controls. These limit “what the funds can be spent on,” restrict “the way that the funds are administered,” and provide increased “insight” into how the funds are spent to guarantee more oversight. 2.RR.19. The 2 “TANF provides cash payments to help families pay for food, clothing, housing and other essentials.” Texas Health and Human Services, TANF Cash Help, available at https://www.hhs.texas.gov/services/financial/cash/tanf-cash-help; 2.RR.21. SNAP gives low- income households funds to buy food. Texas Health and Human Services, SNAP Food Benefits, available at https://www.hhs.texas.gov/services/food/snap-food-benefits; 2.RR.21. -5-controls differentiate the Program from Uplift Harris and address the Supreme Court’s concerns. First, participants agree that they will only use the funds for “basic needs” in a signed contract. 2.RR.20; 5.RR.111. Second, to enforce that contractual restriction, participants must make purchases with a reloadable debit card that functions only at vendors serving basic needs. 2.RR.19-20, 30, 56-57; 5.RR.99, 106-07, 111. Harris County mandated these restrictions in its amended contract with its vendor GiveDirectly.3 2.RR. 24-26; 5.RR.88, 99. Third, participants’ account data is shared with GiveDirectly and the County, which have authority to audit by requesting additional documents from participants. 2.RR.20, 31, 35-37, 54; 5.RR.99, 111 (“Recipients will also consent to . . . [s]hare transaction-level spending data with GiveDirectly and Harris County Public Health.”). These audit procedures are being designed “in response to the State of Texas’ concerns over a lack of controls in the previous program.” 2.RR.66. In addition, the Community Prosperity Program retains three important controls from Uplift Harris. It exercises control on the front end by setting and 3 GiveDirectly is the day-to-day administrator of the program operating under the County’s supervision. 2.RR.16; 3.RR.65. -6-enforcing eligibility criteria. 2.RR.10-11, 35, 37-40; 5.RR.99,105, 111; see also 4.RR.85-86.4 Additionally, Harris County releases funds to GiveDirectly in $5 million increments to “ensure that the program is being implemented with fidelity.” 2.RR.17-18, 28; 5.RR.93. Finally, a participant who does not comply with the Program’s terms will be removed. 2.RR.36, 81; 5.RR.99, 108. Payments under the Program were originally expected to begin in January 2025. 2.RR.34, 36. Due to this litigation—and the injunction issued by this Court—the start date will be delayed. 2.RR.42-43. 4 The County will invite those enrolled in Uplift Harris plus some individuals on the waitlist to apply for the Community Development Program. 2.RR.38-39, 41-42. -7- Statement of Procedural History Although Harris County specifically designed the Community Prosperity Program to ameliorate this Court’s constitutional concerns, the Attorney General continues to object to Harris County helping the poor. He sued to enjoin the Program. In September 2024, the State filed a petition alleging that the Program runs afoul of article III, § 52(a) (the “Gift Clause”) and the Equal Protection Clause of the Texas Constitution. CR.7-26. It requested injunctive and declaratory relief. CR.24. Harris County responded to the petition, opposing the request for injunctive relief and filing a plea to the jurisdiction. CR.80-469. Harris County showed that the trial court lacked jurisdiction: (1) because the program is constitutional and the State has no viable ultra vires claim; (2) because the State failed to connect any prospective, allegedly illegal acts to any particular defendant; and (3) because the Attorney General is not lawfully authorized to represent the State in the district court in this case. CR.95-122. The trial court denied the motion for a temporary injunction and granted the plea to the jurisdiction. CR.471-74. -8- While the trial court maintained plenary jurisdiction, Harris County filed a motion to show authority under Rule 12.5 The motion argued that the Attorney General lacked constitutional or statutory authority to prosecute this case in the district court and requested that the trial court strike the Attorney General’s pleadings. CR.489-500; see Tex. R. Civ. P. 12. After another hearing, the trial court granted the Rule 12 motion and signed an Amended Final Judgment, which replaced its prior order on the plea to the jurisdiction. App. 1 (CR.539-40). In the Amended Final Judgment, the Court ordered: “Unless a person who is authorized to prosecute this case on behalf of the State appears by November 25, 2024, . . . all pleadings filed in this action by the Attorney General purportedly on behalf of the State are stricken.” App. 1. It also granted the plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed all claims and all parties for lack of jurisdiction. App. 1. No person authorized to prosecute this case on behalf of the State appeared, so the Attorney General’s pleadings have been struck. The Amended Final Judgment is the judgment on appeal. Br. 13. 5 Harris County filed a Rule 12 motion in addition to its plea to the jurisdiction because a successful motion and successful plea have different remedies. Rule 12 obligates the trial court to “strike the pleadings if no person who is authorized to prosecute . . . appears.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 12. The proper remedy for a plea to the jurisdiction is dismissal of the case. See, e.g., City of San Antonio v. Maspero, 640 S.W.3d 523, 533 (Tex. 2022) (dismissing claims for lack of jurisdiction). -9- On December 6, this Court entered an order enjoining Harris County “from distributing funds under the Program during the pendency of this appeal or until further order.” Harris County’s motion to vacate the injunction remains pending. - 10 - Standard of Review The “burden is on the plaintiff to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction.” Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012). “A jurisdictional plea may challenge the pleadings, the existence of jurisdictional facts, or both.” Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 770 (Tex. 2018). “When a jurisdictional plea challenges the pleadings, we determine if the plaintiff has alleged facts affirmatively demonstrating subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. The “analysis begins with the live pleadings.” Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150. “If, however, the plea challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we must move beyond the pleadings and consider evidence when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues, even if the evidence implicates . . . the merits of a claim.” Alamo, 544 S.W.3d at 770-71. For such pleas, “the standard of review mirrors that of a traditional summary judgment: ‘[I]f the plaintiffs’ factual allegations are challenged with supporting evidence necessary to consideration of the plea to the jurisdiction, to avoid dismissal plaintiffs must raise at least a genuine issue of material fact to overcome the challenge to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.’” Id. at 771 (footnote omitted). The “trial court must rule on the plea as a matter of law if the evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question.” Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 458 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2015). - 11 - “Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law, and we review a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo.” Ex Parte City of Irving, 2024 WL 5172273, at *3 (Tex. App. [15th Dist.] 2024, no pet. h.) (citations omitted). - 12 - Summary of the Argument As a threshold issue, the State is focused on the wrong order: the final judgment mooted the temporary injunction order, so it is not before the Court. For all—or even one—of the reasons outlined below, the Court should affirm the final judgment. First, the Attorney General lacked the authority to represent the State in the district court. The 1876 Constitution expressly limited the Attorney General’s authority in the district courts to specific cases not relevant here. Although the Legislature can create new causes of action in favor of the State and authorize the Attorney General to prosecute such cases in the trial courts, it has not done so for ultra vires claims. The Attorney General cannot point to any constitutional or statutory authority to bring this suit for the State in the district court, so that court properly struck the pleadings and dismissed the suit. Second, the State failed to carry its burden to establish the trial court’s jurisdiction over any appellee. The Harris County governmental entities retain their governmental immunity against ultra vires claims. For the remaining appellees, government officials, the State did not plead the essential standing element of traceability. The trial court’s lack of jurisdiction over any appellee independently required it to dismiss the suit. - 13 - Third, the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the State has no viable ultra vires claim that the Community Prosperity Program is unconstitutional. The Program complies with the Gift Clauses for three reasons: (1) the Gift Clauses do not apply to relief to the poor; (2) even if they did, the Program satisfies the Gift Clauses under the controlling test set out by the Supreme Court last year; and (3) the Program is independently authorized by another constitutional provision (art. III, § 52-a). The Program additionally complies with the Equal Protection Clause because Harris County acted rationally in distributing funds to achieve multiple rational public purposes. Finally, on appeal, the State has abandoned its allegation in the trial court that the Program lacked statutory authorization, so the issue is not before the Court. The State’s lack of a viable ultra vires claim independently required the trial court to dismiss all claims. For all these reasons, the Court should affirm. - 14 - Argument I. The Final Judgment Mooted the Temporary Injunction Order, which this Court Need Not and Should Not Review. The State presents two issues for appellate review, but only one is properly before the Court. The trial court’s order denying the temporary injunction was mooted by the entry of final judgment, so it is not reviewable on appeal. Thus, the only issue appropriate for this Court’s consideration is whether the trial court correctly granted Harris County’s plea to the jurisdiction and sworn motion to show authority under Rule 12. A temporary injunction provides interim relief prior to a final judgment. See Harley Channelview Props., LLC v. Harley Marine Gulf, LLC, 690 S.W.3d 32, 37 (Tex. 2024) (a temporary injunction is “intended to preserve the status quo until final judgment”). Once a final judgment is entered, no live controversy remains about the decision to grant or refuse such interim relief. See Roswell v. Cleaver-Brooks Sales & Serv., Inc., 2020 WL 897101, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.). So, when “a trial court renders a final judgment . . . the temporary[-]injunction order becomes moot.” WCJ Assets, Ltd. v. US Trinity Bridgeport, LLC, 2023 WL 4115398, at *11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2023, no pet.); see also Bonsmara Nat. Beef Co., LLC v. Hart of Tex. Cattle Feeders, LLC, 603 S.W.3d 385 (Tex. 2020). In - 15 -Bonsmara, the Supreme Court observed that, at the end of the case, “appeals of some interlocutory orders—such as temporary injunctions—become moot because the orders have been rendered moot by subsequent orders,” i.e., the final judgment. Id. at 395 (cleaned up). As a result, “temporary injunctions . . . can be the subject of interlocutory appeals but not of appeals from final judgments.” Id.; see also Isuani v. Manske-Sheffield Radiology Grp., P.A., 802 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex. 1991) (discussing temporary injunctions and mootness). Because the order on the temporary injunction is moot and cannot be the subject of this appeal from a final judgment, Harris County’s brief focuses on why the trial court correctly struck the Attorney General’s petition and granted the plea to the jurisdiction. II. The Attorney General Lacked Authority to Represent the State in this Case in the Trial Court. The Attorney General “exercises only those powers authorized by the Constitution or statute.” City of Galveston v. State, 217 S.W.3d 466, 470 & n.25 (Tex. 2007) (Brister, J.); accord Webster v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 2024 WL 5249494, at *10 (Tex. Dec. 31, 2024) (recognizing attorney general’s “authority comes from the Constitution and from statutes”). No statute or constitutional provision authorized the Attorney General to represent the State in this case in the district court. The appellant’s brief does not cite any. That is dispositive. - 16 - Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 12 provides a mechanism (a sworn motion) for challenging attorneys’ authority to represent a party in court. The burden is on the challenged attorney: “At the hearing on the motion, the burden of proof shall be upon the challenged attorney to show sufficient authority to prosecute or defend the suit on behalf of the other party.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 12. When the attorney fails to meet that burden, the trial court must strike the pleadings: “Upon his failure to show such authority, the court shall refuse to permit the attorney to appear in the cause, and shall strike the pleadings if no person who is authorized to prosecute or defend appears.” Id. That is what happened here. CR.489-501, 507-09, 537-40.6 This Court should affirm the final judgment’s striking the petition and dismissing the claims brought by the Attorney General. A. Texas law did not authorize the Attorney General to represent the State in the district court in this case. The Attorney General’s lack of authority is evident from the plain text and history of the Constitution, Supreme Court decisions, and statutes. 6 The appellant’s brief does not contend that lawyers working for the Attorney General could somehow appear when the Attorney General himself cannot. See Webster, 2024 WL 5249494, at *11 (noting that such attorneys’ “exercise of power is intertwined with and can never exceed the attorney general’s” and that they “have no constitutional or statutory authority that is not derived directly from the Attorney General himself” (citation omitted)). - 17 - 1. The text of the Constitution specifies and limits the Attorney General’s authority to represent the State in district courts. When it comes to representing the State in court, the 1876 Constitution limits the Attorney General’s powers. The Attorney General is charged with “represent[ing] the State in all suits and pleas in the Supreme Court[.]” Tex. Const. art. IV, § 22. The Constitution gives him no authority to represent the State in the district courts, save for one narrow exception (inapplicable here) involving corporations and charters. Id. By contrast, the Constitution assigns county attorneys the duty to “represent the State in all cases in the District and inferior courts in their respective counties.” Tex. Const. art. V, § 21. Thus, the express text of the Constitution divides the authority to represent the State and does not provide the Attorney General such authority in the district courts in cases like this one. Commentators and courts have confirmed this basic division and limitation of authority. “Presumably, the draftsmen intended the local state’s attorneys to handle trials and the attorney general to handle appellate work.” George D. Braden et al., The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis 352 (1977) (App. 6); see also El Paso Elec. Co. v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins., 937 S.W.2d 432, 438 (Tex. 1996) (recognizing this constitutional division of authority); City of Galveston, 217 S.W.3d at 470 n.25 (same). - 18 - 2. The Supreme Court confirmed the Attorney General’s lack of authority in the trial courts absent a clear statute. The Supreme Court contemporaneously confirmed the Attorney General’s limited authority in the trial courts.7 “Shortly after adoption of the constitution, Justice Stayton, who had been a delegate to the 1875 Convention, stated for the supreme court that indeed the constitution divided responsibility for representing the state with the attorney general to appear before the supreme court and county and district attorneys to appear in trial courts.” Id. at 353. “This constitutional division of authority was mandatory, and a statute could not authorize the attorney general to file suit in behalf of the state without express constitutional authorization.” Id. (citing State v. Moore, 57 Tex. 307 (1882)). The Supreme Court later partially overruled Moore regarding the Legislature’s ability to expand the Attorney General’s authority via statute. The Court held that the Constitution permitted the Legislature “to create causes of action in favor of the state, and to make it the exclusive duty [of the attorney general] to prosecute such suits” in trial and appellate courts. Brady v. Brooks, 89 S.W. 1052, 7 The Attorney General misleadingly says he “has been representing the State of Texas in its district courts in civil matters” “[f]or well over a century.” Br. 25 (citing Braden, supra, at 354). The Braden source cited makes it clear that this was not undisputed, but rather led to “a century of jurisdictional clashes with local state’s attorneys.” Braden, supra, at 355. - 19 -1054-57 (Tex. 1905).8 Since Brady, “when the Legislature creates a new or additional cause of action in favor of the State it may also constitutionally authorize the Attorney General to prosecute such cause of action in both the trial and appellate courts of the State.” Smith v. State, 328 S.W.2d 294, 295 (Tex. 1959). The Supreme Court’s recent decision in State ex rel. Durden v. Shahan, 658 S.W.3d 300 (Tex. 2022), further confirms the necessity of a statute authorizing the Attorney General to institute a suit in the trial court. The “authority to represent the state, however, does not necessarily include the authority to independently decide whether to institute a suit on the state’s behalf. The Legislature must provide that authority by statute.” Id. at 303 (citation omitted). In both Brady and Smith, the statute providing the Attorney General authority to file suit in the name of the State in the trial courts was express and clear. See Brady, 89 S.W. at 1053 (“The Attorney General is authorized and required . . . to bring suit in the name of the state, in Travis county”); Smith, 328 S.W.2d at 294-95 (“The statute created a new cause of action in favor of the State and expressly authorized the Attorney General . . . to institute and prosecute the statutory suit thus created.”). 8 Brady emphasized that the Legislature is not empowered “to authorize him . . . to represent the state in any case in any court.” Id. at 1055-56. - 20 - Conversely, absent clear legislative authority, the Supreme Court has rejected the authority of the Attorney General to bring suit for the State in the district court. See, e.g., Day Land & Cattle Co. v. State, 4 S.W. 865, 867-88 (Tex. 1887). 3. No statute authorizes the Attorney General to represent the State in this case in the trial court. Given these precedents, the question is: has the Legislature created a “new or additional cause of action in favor of the State” for ultra vires claims and authorized the Attorney General to institute and prosecute such a cause of action in the trial courts? Not here. The appellant’s brief cites nothing of the sort. The Attorney General mistakenly relies on a statute permitting him to “prosecute and defend all actions in which the state is interested before the supreme court and courts of appeals.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 402.021; Br. 26. But that statute conspicuously does not mention the district courts at all. Further, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected the Attorney General’s claim to “general authority to pursue civil claims on behalf of the State” (at 25) when it recognized that “there is no general statute authorizing the Attorney General to represent the State and its agencies in district court.” El Paso Elec., 937 S.W.2d at 438. Rather, “the Legislature has provided for such representation in particular types of cases” by enacting appropriate statutes. Id. But the Legislature has never passed a law giving the Attorney General the power to bring, or represent the State - 21 -in, ultra vires suits against counties and county officials. Cf. City of Galveston, 217 S.W.3d at 470 (“Nor does any statute specifically authorize such suits by the Attorney General,” in the context of the State’s suing political subdivisions.). Because the Attorney General had no constitutional or statutory authority to represent the State in this case, or even to institute the suit in the first place, the district court correctly granted Harris County’s Rule 12 motion, refused to permit the Attorney General and attorneys working in his office from appearing in the case, and struck the pleadings. CR.539-40; Tex. R. Civ. P. 12. It also properly granted the plea to the jurisdiction. See Garcia v. Laughlin, 285 S.W.2d 191, 194–95 (Tex. 1955) (indicating that Attorney General’s lack of authority would deprive trial court of jurisdiction); State ex rel. Downs v. Harney, 164 S.W.2d 55, 56-59 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1942, writ ref’d w.o.m.) (dismissing cause due to Attorney General’s lack of authority to institute suit). B. The Attorney General has argued Harris County’s position before, successfully. The Attorney General has successfully argued Harris County’s exact points before. In the Fifth Circuit and the Texas Supreme Court, he argued: “Under the Texas Constitution, the Attorney General requires legislative authorization to represent the State in a trial court.” Br. for Atty. Gen. of Tex. 37-42, Paxton v. Longoria, No. 22-0224 (Tex. Apr. 7, 2022) (excerpt in App. 7). He was right. - 22 - The Attorney General presented a thoroughly developed argument relying on many of the same authorities, reaching the same conclusion: Under this precedent, when the Legislature wants the Attorney General to be able bring a cause of action on behalf of the State, it typically must explicitly authorize the Attorney General to do so. . . . [The Supreme] Court has generally required a clear statement that expressly authorize the Attorney General . . . to institute and prosecute [a suit]. . . . Absent such clear evidence of legislative authorization, [the Supreme] Court has typically found that such authorization was lacking. . . . This silence is telling as the Legislature has demonstrated that it is well aware of how to assign a duty to the Attorney General. Id. (quotation marks omitted). The parties eventually agreed on this point, the Texas Supreme Court relied on their agreement to answer a certified question, and the Fifth Circuit ultimately held that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by sovereign immunity because of it. Paxton v. Longoria, 646 S.W.3d 532, 541-42 (Tex. 2022); Longoria v. Paxton, 2022 WL 2208519, at *1 (5th Cir. 2022). The Court should embrace the Attorney General’s clear, successful position: “Under the Texas Constitution, the Attorney General requires legislative authorization to represent the State in a trial court.” App. 7 at 37. - 23 - C. The Attorney General’s arguments lack merit. 1. The Attorney General has no inherent or common-law authority to represent the State in the trial courts. The Attorney General mistakenly maintains that he had the authority to represent the State in the district court based on some vaguely defined, inherent, extra-constitutional power derived from the common-law attorney general of England’s power to represent the king in the courts of that country. Br. 25. For nearly a century and a half, Texas courts have rejected the notion that the Attorney General has the power to bring suit on behalf of the State without an express constitutional or statutory basis for doing so. See Moore, 57 Tex. at 315–16. Justice Stayton, the delegate to the 1875 Convention, wrote for the Supreme Court: “Finding no express law which authorized [the attorney general] to institute and maintain the suit, it would be difficult to hold that [he] had the implied power resulting from the general grants of power or imposition of duties. . . . [I]n a government in which the duties of all officers, as well as their powers, are defined by written law, no power ought to be exercised for which warrant is not there found.” Day Land & Cattle, 4 S.W. at 867; see also Garcia, 285 S.W.2d at 194–95; Harney, 164 S.W.2d at 56–59; Hill v. Lower Colorado River Auth., 568 S.W.2d 473, 479-80 (Tex. App.—Austin 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (discussing the Attorney General’s concession that his older authorities have been “interrupted” by Garcia and Harney). - 24 - Citing Day Land & Cattle and the constitutional provisions dividing power to represent the State in court, now-Chief Justice Brister wrote for the Supreme Court that the “Attorney General . . . exercises only those powers authorized by the Constitution or statute.” City of Galveston, 217 S.W.3d at 470 & n.25 (quoting Tex. Const. art. IV, § 22; id. art. V, § 21). At the end of 2024, the Supreme Court reiterated that the Attorney General’s “authority comes from the Constitution and from statutes.” Webster, 2024 WL 5249494, at *10. This decision helps cut through most of the Attorney General’s out-of-context, uninformative quotations and musings here. In Webster, the Court considered many of the same cases, discussed the ancient English origins of the “common-law attorney general,” and noted that the Attorney General is the “chief law officer of the State.” Id. at *11-12 (discussing Charles Scribner’s Sons v. Marrs, 262 S.W. 722 (Tex. 1924); Agey v. Am. Lib. Pipe Line Co., 172 S.W.2d 972 (Tex. 1943); Lewright v. Bell, 63 S.W. 623 (1901)); see Br. 26. Notwithstanding all the general rumination about discretion and chiefs and England, Webster concluded its discussion of the Attorney General’s authority with a reaffirmation that it is limited and defined by the Constitution and statutes: - 25 - At the same time, of course, the “powers of the office of Attorney General are limited.” Though he has “broad discretionary power in carrying out his responsibility to represent the State,” “the Attorney General can only act within the limits of the Texas Constitution and statutes.” Id. at *12 (quoting, in second sentence, Perry v. Del Rio, 67 S.W.3d 85, 92 (Tex. 2001)) (citation omitted). “[W]hile a state attorney general is the chief law officer of the realm, he does not exercise his authority as an unlimited monarch, governed only by his own judgment.” Id. (quoting Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 276 (5th Cir. 1976) (Coleman, J., dissenting) (majority cited at Br. 25)). Courts cannot and should not, through resort to the common law, “enlarge” “the coordinate departments.” Id. Texas does not have a “common-law attorney general” like England, but rather a position whose powers are specified in detail by a written constitution. This Court should affirm the trial court’s application of those limits. 2. The Attorney General’s limited authority results from a deliberate reduction in his powers in 1876. The Court should also reject the Attorney General’s claim to inherent or common-law authority because the Attorney General’s limited authority in trial courts is not accidental, but the result of deliberate, express reduction of his powers. “The 1869 Constitution directed the attorney general to represent the state before the appellate court, but it also gave him supervisory power over local state’s - 26 -attorneys in most civil cases.” Braden, supra, at 355; see Tex. Const. of 1869, art. IV, § 23 (requiring him to “superintend, instruct and direct the official action of the District Attorneys”). The 1876 Constitution stripped this supervisory power away. See Tex. Const. art. IV, § 22 (omitting any such power). The committee responsible for this change “probably was displeased with the theoretical subordination of local state’s attorneys to the attorney general,” and they retained “the 1869 Constitution’s division of authority without any central supervision over the local trial attorneys.” Braden, supra, at 355. This express reduction in central, executive authority was consistent with the convention’s approach to the 1876 Constitution. “The experience of Reconstruction prompted provisions to decentralize the state government. . . . To assure that the government would be responsive to public will, the constitutional convention precisely defined the rights, powers, and prerogatives of the various governmental departments and agencies.” State v. Stephens, 664 S.W.3d 293, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (Walker, J., concurring in denial of rehearing) (cleaned up). Thus, those reformers decentralizing the government expressly reduced the Attorney General’s power to control litigation for the State in the trial courts. In Texas, the People are sovereign, and their deliberate choice to limit the Attorney - 27 -General’s authority in the trial courts should not be discarded by resorting to vague notions of inherent or common-law power. 3. The Attorney General’s cases do not substitute for authority. The Attorney General’s out-of-context discussion of cases does not provide the requisite authority. Many are unilluminating because they involved the Attorney General’s express constitutional power (art. IV, § 22) to bring suit in trial courts against the unlawful actions of “private corporations,” a power not at issue in this case. See Lewright, 63 S.W. at 623; State v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 17 S.W. 60, 66 (Tex. 1891); Queen Ins. Co. v. State, 22 S.W. 1048, 1052 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893), rev’d, 24 S.W. 397 (1893). Multiple authorities have recognized that early cases’ broad pronouncements about the Attorney General’s hypothetical inherent powers are “gratuitous statements and dicta.” Hill, 568 S.W.2d at 479 (discussing Queen, Yett v. Cook, 281 S.W. 837 (Tex. 1926), and Agey); see also Braden, supra, at 354 (discussing “gratuitous statements in a few early cases” and citing Queen). Several of the cites were immediately undermined by the Supreme Court. Queen was reversed, and the cited discussion in Marrs was deliberately omitted from the modified opinion on rehearing. Marrs, 262 S.W. at 729. - 28 - Finally, In re State and State v. Hollins, 620 S.W.3d 400, 410 (Tex. 2020) do not support the Attorney General’s authority because in neither case was the issue of the Attorney General’s lack of authority raised, discussed, or adjudicated. Indeed, the Attorney General argues that his authority was not challenged in Hollins. Br. 29. Obviously, that prior litigation strategy cannot substitute for the constitutional and statutory authority the Attorney General lacks. 4. The Harris County Attorney’s authority is not the issue before the Court. Similarly, the Attorney General confuses the real issue here—his own lack of authority to represent the State in the district court—by arguing that the Harris County Attorney did not have the authority to independently “institute” this suit. Br. 25-26. But the Harris County Attorney did not file this suit, and his authority is not at issue here; the Attorney General’s lack of authority is the issue on appeal. 5. This Court should reject the Attorney General’s invitation to engage in judicial lawmaking. Indeed, it is “possible” that the present suit could not have been brought “by any public official, attorney, or agency” because the Legislature has not unmistakably specified who could “institute” such a suit. See Brown v. De La Cruz, 156 S.W.3d 560, 566 (Tex. 2004). Such an omission by the Legislature “does not give [this Court] the power . . . to legislate . . . to fill any hiatus [the Legislature] has left.” Id. (citation omitted). - 29 - The Attorney General’s assertion that this “simply cannot be right” is not a legal argument. Br. 30. His plea that he alone “should” be given the authority to “seek redress” on behalf of the State in this case, Br. 27, 30, is a policy argument properly addressed to the Legislature or to the voters of the State. It is not this Court’s role to create an authority that the Legislature has never seen fit to grant him and that would contravene the 1876 Constitution’s decentralizing power and expressly reducing the authority of the Attorney General in the trial courts. • * * Because the Attorney General was not authorized to represent the State in the trial court by the Constitution or by statute, the trial court properly granted the Rule 12 motion and the plea to the jurisdiction. III. The State Did Not Affirmatively Establish the Trial Court’s Jurisdiction. Another reason exists to affirm dismissal of the State’s claims. The State’s shotgun pleading names Harris County, its Commissioners Court, its health department, and various officials. CR.8-9. The entities have immunity, and the State has failed to show any connection between the officials it sued and the forthcoming payments the State seeks to enjoin. Together, the State has not shown jurisdiction over claims against any defendant. - 30 - A. Ultra vires claims did not overcome the governmental entities’ immunity. Governmental immunity protects governmental entities even in suits by the State against political subdivisions. See City of Galveston, 217 S.W.3d at 468-69, 474; City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 369–70 (Tex. 2009). The State does not identify any legislative waiver of governmental immunity. When claims are properly characterized as ultra vires claims, governmental entities retain their immunity. Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 76 (Tex. 2015). As the State recognizes, the “Supreme Court has distinguished between claims that an officer has exceeded his authority under a constitutional statute”—ultra vires claims—“and a claim that a statute is unconstitutional.” Br. 18 (citing Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 76-77). In Patel, the Supreme Court held that “suits complaining of ultra vires actions may not be brought against a governmental unit, but must be brought against the allegedly responsible government actor in his official capacity.” 469 S.W.3d at 76. So, “the State’s ultra vires claim cannot proceed against the [County] itself. An ultra vires claim may name a government official in his official capacity, but the underlying governmental entity - 31 -remains immune from suit.” Chambers-Liberty Cntys. Navigation Dist. v. State, 575 S.W.3d 339, 348 (Tex. 2019).9 The State’s petition and appellate brief show that its suit is properly characterized as an ultra vires suit. In its petition, the State explicitly uses the term “ultra vires” or otherwise describes its claims as being for actions taken without legal authority. See CR. 16 (Count 1 alleging Program “is an unlawful ultra vires act and should be enjoined”); CR.17 (Count 2 alleging “Harris County is without authority to carry out the program”); CR.17 (Count 3 alleging appellees “lack any legal authority” to create and implement the Program). The State’s appellate brief, in turn, accurately characterizes these claims as ultra vires. Br. xiii (“The State of Texas brought an ultra vires suit against Harris County and certain county officials and entities[.]”); Br. 18 (“the State has a cause of action because County officials have acted ultra vires”). The State summarizes: “[T]he State has a cause of action against the County and its officials because they have exceeded their authority under state law.” Br. 19. 9 In Patel, the Supreme Court addressed City of Elsa v. M.A.L., 226 S.W.3d 390 (Tex. 2007), on which the State relies (at 24), before reaffirming that ultra vires claims may not be brought against governmental entities. Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 76. The later-decided Patel and Chambers-Liberty Counties control, not City of Elsa. - 32 - The State’s pleadings and appellate brief give away the game: the State brings ultra vires claims. The governmental entities retain immunity from such claims. Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 76. B. For the government officials, the State did not plead the essential standing element of traceability. With respect to the remaining appellees—all county officials—the State has not met its burden to establish the traceability element of standing by tying the challenged action to any particular government official. 10 “[T]o establish standing, a plaintiff must plead facts demonstrating that the plaintiff suffered an injury, this injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct, and this injury is likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Mosaic Baybrook One, L.P. v. Simien, 674 S.W.3d 234, 250–51 (Tex. 2023) (emphasis added). “[T]he party who invokes the courts’ jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements of standing; it is not the duty of the other side, or of the courts, to negate them.” Abbott v. Mex. Am. Legislative Caucus, 647 S.W.3d 681, 693 (Tex. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). 10 In re State did not address traceability; it briefly touched on the injury-in-fact component of standing: “the State has a justiciable interest in assuring that its political subdivisions comply with Texas law.” 2024 WL 2983176, at *4 & n.4; see Hollins, 620 S.W.3d at 409-10 (equating “justiciable interest” with injury). The Supreme Court alone can and should correct its erroneous conclusion that the State satisfies the injury element when it sues to enforce its own laws. - 33 - “[P]laintiffs who want the courts to pass judgment on the legality of government action must seek relief against the particular government official or agency responsible for the challenged action.” In re Abbott, 645 S.W.3d 276, 280 (Tex. 2022) (orig. proceeding); see also Mex. Am. Legislative Caucus, 647 S.W.3d at 697-98 (citing Paxton v. Simmons, 640 S.W.3d 588, 602-03 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2022, no pet.)). The Attorney General is adamant that courts must enforce this traceability requirement—including in litigation involving Harris County. See, e.g., State’s Resp. to Motion for Temporary Relief at 8-16, State of Texas v. Harris County, No. 23-0656 (Tex. Aug. 18, 2023). He argues: “standing is not dispensed ‘in gross’ and must be established for each defendant for each claim.” Id. at 9 (quoting In re Gee, 941 F.3d 153, 161-62 (5th Cir. 2019)). Paxton is in accord; it rejected an indiscriminate, dragnet approach to pleading. There, the plaintiff “joined all three possible government defendants and [took] no categorical position on which must remain but only that at least one must.” 640 S.W.3d at 603-04 (quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff had not demonstrated the required connection between the challenged law and the defendants, so she had not “alleged sufficient facts to show the necessary standing element of traceability.” Id. - 34 - Here, the State’s petition lacks any allegations that any particular official is responsible for implementing the Program or making payments under it. It does not differentiate among officials. This failure means the State has not satisfied the traceability requirement of standing. It disposes of the State’s claims against the various county officials. The State’s arguments on traceability fail many times over. First, the appellant’s brief only addresses traceability for two of the six officials it sued. See Br. 22-23. It offers no justification for suing the remaining four officials. Second, on County Judge Hidalgo and Ms. Barton, the State only discusses evidence—some not even in the record here—of past actions; it does not tie them to any challenged future actions. Complaints about past actions do not suffice because “only prospective, not retrospective, relief is available in an ultra vires claim.” City of Dallas v. Albert, 354 S.W.3d 368, 379 (Tex. 2011). Finally, and most importantly, the State says nothing about the focus of this analysis—its live pleading. See Mosaic Baybrook, 674 S.W.3d at 250-51 (“a plaintiff must plead facts demonstrating that . . . injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct”). “[A]nalysis of whether a party has standing begins with the plaintiff’s live pleadings.” Dohlen v. City of San Antonio, 643 S.W.3d 387, 398 (Tex. 2022) - 35 -(citation omitted). The appellant’s brief does not discuss or cite the live pleading. Br. 21-23. Thus, the State has not showed that it met its burden to plead traceability. • * * Because the State has not met its burden to plead traceability, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims against the government officials. Together with the governmental entities’ immunity, the State has not met its burden to affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court had jurisdiction for its claims against any defendant, and the trial court had to dismiss the whole suit for want of jurisdiction. See Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150-51. The judgment should be affirmed. IV. The State Lacks a Viable Ultra Vires Claim Because the Program Is Constitutional. “Ultra vires claims depend on the scope of a state official’s authority.” Hall v. McRaven, 508 S.W.3d 232, 234 (Tex. 2017). They do not turn on “the quality of the official’s decisions” within that authority. Id. at 234, 242. If “the actions alleged to be ultra vires were not truly outside the officer’s authority or in conflict with the law, the plaintiff has not stated a valid ultra vires claim and therefore has not bypassed sovereign immunity.” Matzen v. McLane, 659 S.W.3d 381, 388 (Tex. 2021). In determining whether official acted ultra vires, such that immunity is waived, courts “consider the pleadings and factual assertions, as well as any evidence in the record that is relevant to the jurisdictional issue.” Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Employees - 36 -Pension Sys., 458 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2015). If the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court must rule on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law. Id. Here, because Harris County has authority to pursue the Community Prosperity Program “[n]o waiver of immunity is alleged or supported on the record.” Id. at 12 (affirming dismissal of ultra vires claims). Even though the Attorney General dislikes Harris County’s policy decisions, the County acted consistently with the Constitution—and within its authority—for multiple reasons: (1) the Gift Clauses do not apply to relief for the poor; (2) even if they do apply, the Community Prosperity Program passes muster under Borgelt v. Austin Firefighters Ass’n, IAFF Local 975, 692 S.W.3d 288, 299 (Tex. 2024); and (3) Article III, § 52-a independently authorizes the Program. Additionally, the Program does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. A. The Program is presumptively constitutional. Courts’ review of decisions by a county’s Commissioners Court is deferential. “A party can invoke the district court’s constitutional supervisory control over a Commissioners Court judgment only when the Commissioners Court acts beyond its jurisdiction or clearly abuses the discretion conferred upon the Commissioners Court by law.” Commissioners Ct. of Titus Cnty. v. Agan, 940 S.W.2d 77, 80 (Tex. - 37 -1997); see also Br. 31 (relying on same case). “If the Commissioners Court acts illegally, unreasonably, or arbitrarily, a district court may so adjudge.” Commissioners Ct., 940 S.W.2d at 80. But in “reviewing a Commissioners Court judgment for abuse of discretion, the district court has no right to substitute its judgment and discretion for that of the Commissioners Court.” Id. This deference helps courts fulfill their duty, emphasized last year by the Supreme Court in the leading case on the Gift Clauses, to “rigorously distinguish between policy conflicts and legal questions.” Borgelt, 692 S.W.3d at 301. “Under our Constitution, policy choices belong to the other branches, and the judiciary may not second-guess them.” Id. “Consistent resolution of cases in light of those precedents” interpreting the Gift Clauses “ensures that the courts’ decisions flow from settled rules rather than ad hoc reactions to various governmental actions.” Id. A crucial part of Borgelt, on which the Supreme Court relied heavily, is the presumption that local governments’ actions are constitutional and that local governments intend to comply with the constitution. Id. at 301, 302, 303 & n.17 , 304, 308. This presumption has special force in this case: Harris County’s express goal in designing the Program was to ensure its compliance with the Constitution by following the Supreme Court’s guidance. 2.RR.9-10, 19-20, 66; 5.RR.84, 106. Under the presumption, the “burden is on the party attacking the expenditure to show that - 38 -it is unconstitutional.” Id. at 301 (brackets omitted). To meet that burden, the State “must show, and not ask the judiciary to assume, that the policy-making branches have” not followed the law and served the public. Id. So, when Harris County Commissioners Court makes a reasonable legislative determination—based on months of analysis and study—about the benefits of a program, the purposes it serves, or the controls necessary to achieve those purposes, that legislative determination is entitled to deference from this Court. “The Gift Clause is important, but it was not intended as a tool for the judiciary to elevate itself above the other branches.” Id. at 308. B. The Gift Clauses do not apply to relief for the poor. Relief to the needy is not “grant[ing] public money or thing of value in aid of, or to” as those terms were used by the Constitution’s framers and understood by the Texans who ratified it. The Gift Clauses do not apply to, and do not bar, relief to the poor.11 In constitutional interpretation, courts’ “bottom-line task is to identify what the constitutional provision would have meant to those who ratified [and framed] it.” Hogan v. S. Methodist Univ., 688 S.W.3d 852, 857-59 (Tex. 2024). Courts 11 The Gift Clauses include multiple constitutional provisions (Tex. Const. art. III, §§ 50, 51, 52(a); id. art. XVI, § 6(a)) but the State only alleged a violation of § 52(a), so that is the only provision at issue in this case. CR.15-16; see Borgelt, 692 S.W.3d at 298. - 39 -therefore “read the constitutional text not in a vacuum but also through the lenses of history and precedent.” Borgelt, 692 S.W.3d at 299. In Borgelt, the Supreme Court recited some of that history and precedent but noted that “further analysis of the Gift Clauses’ original public meaning . . . could assist the courts and the public in understanding their contours.” Id. at 300. So, Harris County starts with historical context, and then turns to text. Both reinforce the conclusion that the Community Prosperity Program is constitutional. 1. In 1876, care for the poor was understood to be the exercise of a local government duty to the community, not a gift to those helped. Since the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601, the Anglo-American legal tradition has included government responsibility for the indigent.12 Br. 4. And that government responsibility was traditionally carried out through local institutions: “The hallmark of the poor law was local autonomy.” Jill S. Quadagno, From Poor Laws to Pensions, 62 Milbank Mem’l Fund Q. 417, 419-23 (1984) (App. 9). In an opinion tracing the original meaning of “public charge,” now-Justice Amy Coney Barrett showed that “state ‘poor laws’ . . . were in turn modeled on their English counterparts.” Cook County v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 208, 239 (7th Cir. 2020) 12 43 Eliz. 1. c. 2 (App. 8). - 40 -(Barrett, J., dissenting).13 Reflecting the inherited virtue of local autonomy, “towns and counties . . . made their own choices about how to” assist the needy. Cook County, 962 F.3d at 241. Providing relief was universally acknowledged to be a government function serving a public purpose, and not a private gift. “Thus, when someone sought assistance from a city or county overseer of the poor, the cost of the relief provided was entered on the overseer’s books as a public charge—that is, an expense properly chargeable to, and therefore funded by, the public.” Id. at 239 (emphasis added). As in the rest of the country, care for the Texas needy has been a local government function no different from any other. See Br. 5-6. In its first year, the Congress of the Republic of Texas enacted a law providing for: [A] board of commissioners for their respective counties; which board shall have the entire superintendence and control of roads, highways, ferries, and bridges, and of the poor within said counties Act of Dec. 20, 1836, § 25, reprinted in 1 H.P.N. Gammel, The Laws of Texas 1822-1897 at 1201, 1205-06 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898) (emphasis added) (App. 10). That same law imposed “the duty of said board of commissioners to provide, at the 13 All Cook County cites are to then-Judge Barrett’s dissent. - 41 -expense of the county, for the support of indigent, lame, and blind persons, who are unable to support themselves.” Id. at 1206, § 28. Texas counties’ duty to care for the poor was reaffirmed by the Legislature and Supreme Court prior to 1876. See Act approved Mar. 16, 1848, 2d Leg., R.S., ch. 98, § 3, 1848 Tex. Gen. Laws 113, reprinted in 3 H.P.N. Gammel, The Laws of Texas 1822-1897, at 113 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898) (App. 11); Bell County v. Alexander, 22 Tex. 350, 364 (1858) (“The counties are entrusted with the duty, to provide for the support of indigent persons, resident in the county.”). As the State agrees, local autonomy and experimentation reigned. See Br. 5-6. In broad strokes, localities employed differing combinations of “‘indoor’ relief in the form of poorhouses” and “‘outdoor relief’—in-kind and cash support without institutionalization.” Cook County, 962 F.3d at 241. Traditionally, “Texas laws regarding the care of indigents were permissive”; and, “The population served by outdoor relief may have exceeded that served by institutions at all times.” Martha Doty Freeman, Indigent Care in Texas, 20 Index of Tex. Archeology 1, 53 (2008) (cited at Br. 4). 2. In 1876, Texans ratified the Gift Clauses to stop corporate welfare to railroads and similar commercial enterprises. The purpose of the Gift Clauses reinforces that they allow aid to the poor. As the Supreme Court observed, the Gift Clauses “were not merely abstract - 42 -enactments to pursue a concept of good government, but also responded to concrete issues.” Borgelt, 692 S.W.3d at 299. The State agrees that § 52(a) was aimed at monied interests, not the needy, correctly noting that the provision was ratified in “response to the political patronage and corruption that ran rampant in the period following the Civil War.” Br. 7. “The basic reason” for the Gift Clauses in the 1876 Constitution was “to prevent the government from aiding private parties in their grandiose schemes to build railroads and other internal improvements.” Braden, supra, at 226. This assistance to commercial enterprises was known as “aid bonds.” E.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm’rs, 21 Kan. 309, 314 (1878). “Most often governments issued ‘railroad aid’ bonds and then used the money to buy stock in the proposed railroad.” Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The History of the Judicial Impairment ‘Doctrine’ and Its Lessons for the Contract Clause, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1373, 1405 (1992). “These giveaways had usually been obtained by gross corruption of legislatures.” Id. at 232; see generally Borgelt, 692 S.W.3d at 299-300 (citing Braden and discussing “financial and political troubles” that motivated the gift clauses). Indeed, the debate over the Gift Clauses focused entirely on the (un)desirability of corporate welfare for railroads. See Convention Proceedings, Austin Weekly Statesman, Oct. 7, 1875, at 2 (discussing amendment and railroads) (App. - 43 -12). Nowhere did the framers of the provision remotely raise the issue of poor relief or suggest that the provision was designed to prevent it. Id. 3. Section 52(a)’s text does not support extending a ban on corporate welfare assistance to the needy. The language the 1876 framers chose, and ratifying Texans endorsed, for § 52(a) tracks the widespread concern about corporate welfare; it does not reject centuries’ worth of precedent that care for the poor was a standard local government function. See Borgelt, 692 S.W.3d at 299. Section 52(a)’s text aims at commercial undertakings, not care for the poor. That commercial aim is made clear in §52(a)’s last clause: prohibiting local governments from “becom[ing] a stockholder in such corporation, association or company” reveals a focus on commercial and monied interests, not the poor. See Thompson, supra, at 1405 (discussing the common practice of aid bonds and stock purchases). The framers’ use of “grant” and “aid” supports the County’s position. In 1875-1876, neither the Constitution’s framers nor its ratifiers would likely have understood the verb “grant” to include providing assistance to the poor. At the time, the verb grant was commonly employed to describe the act of a government bestowing benefits in response to a formal request, usually from an enterprise or individual engaged in commerce. See, e.g., Downs v. United States, 113 F. 144, 147 - 44 -(4th Cir. 1902) (“The word ‘grant’ . . . implies the conferring by the sovereign power of some valuable privilege, franchise, or other right of like character, upon a corporation, person, or class of persons.”), aff’d, 187 U.S. 496 (1903); Grant, Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (noting long use of “grant” as “To bestow or confer (a possession, right, etc.) by a formal act”) (App. 13); Grant, Dr. Webster’s Complete Dictionary of the English Language 585 (1864 ed.) (“Webster’s 1864”) (“. . . usually in answer to petition”) (App. 14). Providing assistance to the poor would not have been understood to be granting anything because that assistance was a government duty, not some privilege bestowed on the poor. See Section IV.B.1. Thus, “grant” fits more naturally with an interpretation that does not reach assistance for the needy. Similarly, when it comes to money, “aid” has long been associated with subsidies to those who are already well off. See Aid, Webster’s 1864 at 32 (“(Eng. Law.) An extraordinary grant of a subsidy or tax to the king by Parliament.”) (App. 14); Aid, Oxford English Dictionary (noting historical use a subsidy to the crown and monetary contribution from feudal vassal to lord) (App. 15). And “aid” in that sense tracks perfectly the scourge of “aid bonds” Texans sought to stamp out with § 52(a). For nineteenth century Texans, on the other hand, government assistance to the poor was not generally referred as “aid,” but as “relief,” a term of art in use since - 45 -at least 1601,14 meaning, “The assistance or support, pecuniary or otherwise, granted to indigent persons by the proper administrators of the poor-laws.” Relief, Black’s Law Dictionary (1st ed. 1891) (App. 16); see Cook County, 962 F.3d at 241. The Gift Clauses were adopted in 1876 as part of a constitution that recognized care for the needy as a traditional local government function for the public—not some private gratuity. The same Constitution that prohibited the Legislature from “authoriz[ing] any county . . . to lend its credit or to grant public money or thing of value in aid of, or to any individual,” Tex. Const. art. III, § 52(a), also provided that “[t]he construction of jails, court-houses and bridges, and the establishment of county poor houses and farms, and the laying out, construction and repairing of county roads shall be provided for by general laws,” id. art. XI, § 2 (emphases added); id. art. XVI, § 8. This list in art. XI reinforces that the framers and ratifiers of the constitution recognized care for the poor as a general government service like building courthouses, roads, and bridges—not a private gratuity. Interpreting § 52(a) as the 1876 framers and ratifiers would have understood it—as not reaching poor relief—has the additional benefit of reconciling otherwise contradictory provisions framed and ratified at the same time. If § 52(a) prohibited 14 43 Eliz. 1. c. 2 (App. 8). - 46 -counties from using public resources to help any individual without limitation, including the poor, it would contradict the original article XI, § 2 and article XVI, § 8. The provisions can (and so must) be harmonized by reading § 52(a) not to apply to the traditional local government functions enumerated in the other amendments. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 164 (2012). 4. Contemporaneous interpretations refute the State’s position. Just a few months after ratification of the 1876 Constitution, the Legislature reinforced that relief to the poor was not covered by the Gift Clauses. It provided that county commissioners “shall have power, and it shall be their duty . . . To provide for the support of paupers.” Act approved July 22, 1876, 15th Leg., R.S., ch. 55, § 4, 1876 Tex. Gen. Laws 51, 52, reprinted in 8 H.P.N. Gammel, The Laws of Texas 1822-1897, at 887, 888 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898) (App. 17). Courts understood that counties’ “support” for the poor included many forms of direct relief: “Counties are required to provide for the ‘support’ of their paupers. ‘Support,’ as here used, means more than supplying them with food and clothing and a house to stay in. It means all that is necessary to bodily health and comfort.” Monghon v. Van Zandt County, 1886 WL 4550, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. 1886, no writ). - 47 - And in the years immediately following ratification of § 52(a), counties openly provided direct financial relief to paupers. Newspapers from the era consistently report on these efforts. See, e.g., Local Intelligence, Brenham Weekly Banner, Jan. 4, 1878, at 3 (App. 18) (“Meanwhile the thirty-five or forty paupers will continue to draw their regular allowance from the county.”); ATTENTION, PAUPERS!, The Dallas Daily Herald, June 15, 1877, at 2 (App. 19) (“all allowances to the poor outside of the poor farm will cease from this date”); Texas—Facts and Fancies, Austin American-Statesman, Aug. 16, 1878, at 3 (App. 20) (“Waller county pays out $2100 a year for supporting paupers” because the county lacked “a poor farm”); Commissioners Court, Brenham Weekly Banner, June 1, 1882, at 3 (App. 21) (“G.B. Cassels placed on pauper roll and allowed $7 per month from May 1st.”) (“Charles McClellan . . . was declared a pauper and allowed $7 per month from May 1st.”); Brenham Weekly Banner, July 12, 1878, at 2 (App. 22) (“Washington county needs a poor farm very much . . . We are now paying about $3600 a year for the support of the fifty paupers on the rolls.”). Thus, the framers and ratifiers did not understand the Gift Clauses to apply to poor relief. Mere months after ratification of those clauses, the Legislature required counties to provide “food and clothing” and “all that is necessary to bodily - 48 -health and comfort” to their poor residents. See Monghon, 1886 WL 4550, at *1. And counties paid the poor cash allowances. • * * Although it resists the outcome, the State concedes or does not dispute every step of the analysis leading to the inexorable conclusion that the Gift Clauses do not apply to relief to the poor. At step one, it agrees that local governments have long helped the poor. Br. 4-6. At step two, the State agrees that Texas ratified § 52(a) to address “political patronage and corruption”—not to prohibit relief to the poor. Br. 7. Finally, at step three, the State has no response to the well-established fact that, in line with an originalist reading of the text, counties continued to aid the poor—and indeed were obligated to—after the Gift Clauses were ratified. See CR.95-99 (making similar arguments in the trial court); see Sections IV.B.3-4. In sum, the State is right that there is no “specific constitutional exception” to the Gift Clauses for assistance to the poor. Br. 32-33. For the reasons stated above, the Gift Clauses have never applied to poor relief at all. C. Even if the Gift Clauses apply, the Community Prosperity Program satisfies the Supreme Court’s test. Even if § 52(a) applies to relief to the poor, the Community Prosperity Program complies with the provision. - 49 - In Borgelt, the Supreme Court reiterated a three-part test to determine whether an expenditure satisfies § 52(a). 692 S.W.3d at 301 (relying on Tex. Mun. League, 74 S.W.3d at 383-84). The Program clears that test: (1) the assistance under the Community Prosperity Program “is not gratuitous but instead brings a public benefit”; (2) the Program’s “predominant objective is to accomplish a legitimate public purpose, not to provide a benefit to a private party”; and (3) “the government retains control over the funds to ensure that the public purpose is in fact accomplished.” Borgelt, 692 S.W.3d at 301; see Tex. Mun. League, 74 S.W.3d at 383-84. As the dissent in Borgelt recognized, the State’s “strict” approach to the Gift Clauses has been superseded by “multi-factor tests,” first in Texas Municipal League and then in Borgelt. Borgelt, 692 S.W.3d at 316 (Busby, J., dissenting) (discussing Bexar County v. Linden, 220 S.W. 761 (Tex. 1920)).15 Thus, the State’s repeated exhortations that aid to individuals is strictly prohibited, and most of its citations to Linden, are distractions that should be ignored. 15 In Borgelt, the State initially argued that Linden required the Supreme Court to hold that the expenditure of public funds must be limited to “strictly governmental purposes.” Br. 9, 20-29, Borgelt, No. 22-1149 (Tex. Sept. 7, 2023). It abandoned that contention at oral argument. Borgelt, 692 S.W.3d at 300 n.12. The Court therefore reaffirmed the Texas Municipal League test. Id. at 301. - 50 - Instead, the Court should begin with the presumption that the Program is constitutional and conduct its analysis through that lens. See Section IV.A. Applying that presumption and considering all of the evidence before the trial court—not just the cherry-picked fragments the State has selected for its brief—it is clear that the trial court correctly granted the plea to the jurisdiction because the officials acted within their authority. 1. Harris County received return consideration. A “political subdivision’s paying public money is not ‘gratuitous’ if the political subdivision receives return consideration.” Borgelt, 692 S.W.3d at 301. “There need be only sufficient—not equal—return consideration to render a political subdivision’s paying public funds constitutional.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). As the State observes, “consideration can take many forms.” Br. 24. Here, the program provides two primary return benefits to the County. Together, this consideration is “presumably proper and provide[s] sufficient return consideration” for Harris County. Borgelt, 692 S.W.3d at 302. Most notably, Brandon Maddox, the Director of Planning and Innovation for Harris County Public Health, testified that the program “of course” benefits the County by “reducing poverty.” 2.RR.9, 11. Harris County Commissioners Court - 51 -understood that there was “a significant risk that the working poor population will increase, . . . contributing to income inequality in the region.” 4.RR.114. Economic inequity, in turn, “negatively impacts families and undermines our region’s overall well-being and financial health.” 5.RR.105. By reducing poverty, the Community Prosperity Program would forestall that communal downward trajectory, benefiting the County. Additionally, Community Prosperity Program payments are not gratuitous because participants give the County illuminating data in return. Participants are contractually required to share their account data directly with GiveDirectly and with the County. 2.RR.31, 35, 37, 54; 5.RR.99, 111. They are also encouraged to participate in a survey of their financial status and spending habits. 4.RR.81. This corpus of detailed information is valuable. It allows Harris County to further refine the best way for the County to spend money on economic development and poverty alleviation in the future. Indeed, because the information is valuable, the County has hired a contractor to assess the impact of the program on participants and develop a model for scaling it if additional funding becomes available. 3.RR.6, 28, 38, 99-100; 5.RR.5, 12, 15. The State downplays the consideration Harris County receives by making bald assertions unsupported by the record. Without citation, it says “Harris County gets - 52 -nothing for paying Program funds.” The explicit, unrebutted evidence before the trial court shows that Harris County does receive return consideration: poverty reduction benefits the County; and the County uses the data participants must share it for its own ends. RR.31, 35, 37, 54; 5.RR.99, 111; 3.RR.28, 38, 99-100; 5.RR.5, 12, 15. The State also incorrectly says the “Program’s own website” shows the program has minimal requirements, but it cites the website for Uplift Harris—not the Community Prosperity Program. Br. 35. Wrong program. The State fairs no better when it attempts to tackle one-by-one the benefits Harris County established. It contends that it is “no answer to simply say the program reduces poverty” (no citation). Br. 25. But the State’s policy beliefs and ipse dixit cannot overcome evidence presented to the trial court. The County studied the issue and determined that poverty reduction returned a meaningful benefit. See 2.RR.11; 3.RR.5-16; 5.RR.105. That is a classic legislative determination warranting deference. The State’s contention that the study and the data sharing do not count because they are “mere participation in a giveaway” is also unsupported. Br. 36. The County showed that such information is helpful to it and demanded that participants - 53 -provide it. 2.RR.31, 35, 37, 54; 5.RR.99, 111; 3.RR.28, 38, 99-100; 5.RR.5, 12, 15. That evidence is uncontradicted. The first element of the Borgelt test is satisfied. 2. The Community Prosperity Program serves many public purposes. The Community Prosperity Program’s “predominant objective” is to accomplish multiple “legitimate public purpose[s].” Borgelt, 692 S.W.3d at 301. Mr. Maddox testified that the Community Prosperity Program will: “reduce unemployment, reduce poverty, boost self-sufficiency and improve general health and educational outcomes for those participating in the program.” 2.RR.10; see 2.RR.10, 12, 15, 17; 3.RR.24-25 (discussing return benefits); 4.RR.114. This testimony was not contradicted. See Br. 39-40 (citing no conflicting evidence).16 The Program therefore satisfies the second element of the Borgelt test. The Court must “presume that” the Community Prosperity Program’s “predominant purpose is to accomplish a legitimate public purpose unless” the State shows “that it clearly is not.” Borgelt, 692 S.W.3d at 304. Accordingly, “if an object is beneficial to the inhabitants and directly connected with the local government it will be considered a public purpose.” Id. (quoting Davis v. City of 16 Harris County has not abandoned any of the public purposes supported by the record. Contra Br. 37-38. - 54 -Taylor, 67 S.W.2d 1033, 1034 (Tex. 1934)). So “unless a court can say that the purposes for which public funds are expended are clearly not public purposes, it would not be justified in holding invalid a legislative act providing funds for such purposes.” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Davis v. City of Lubbock, 326 S.W.2d 699, 709 (Tex. 1959)). “These standards protect the separation of powers and advance the principle of self-government.” Id. Ignoring that presumption, the State erroneously contends that the eligibility requirements are not tied to the public purposes. Br. 39. But the County determined that poverty and location-based eligibility criteria were the best way to achieve its purposes. Those criteria specifically targeted residents “adversely impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and corresponding economic crisis.” 3.RR.6. And the evidence shows that, “when you congregate those resources in the areas that need them the most,” there are “community-level benefits.” 2.RR.46, 89. The Program is grounded in research showing that financial assistance can increase employment and lead to “better physical health outcomes.” 3.RR.7. The State offered no reasoned basis to second guess the County’s policy decisions, and there is no single way to address complex issues. The State wishes that Harris County had invested the funds in a different program and quibbles over the primacy of the public purposes, Br. 37-40, but it does - 55 -not meaningfully dispute that the purposes identified by Mr. Maddox are valid public purposes. Reducing poverty has been an established public purpose for centuries. See Section V.B. And although the Attorney General thinks assistance to the needy confers primarily a private benefit, Br. 37, the Supreme Court has long recognized that assisting the poor provides a clear benefit to “the entire community.” See Hous. Auth. of City of Dallas v. Higginbotham, 143 S.W.2d 79, 85 (Tex. 1940) (low-income housing); see also Linden, 220 S.W. at 763. (“[T]he care of the poor . . . intimately affect[s] all the people.”). Even the State “recognize[s] the importance of providing for the less fortunate.” Br. 37; id. (“The State does not dispute that poverty relief is a laudable goal[.]”). Still, it contends that the Program’s predominant purpose “seems to be to give away ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ money the County has lying around.” Br. 39. It offers no citation to support that conjecture, which contradicts the record evidence. The State also objects that “the Gift Clauses do not contain an implicit carveout for assisting the poor,” Br. 38, but that quip does not grapple with (a) whether the Gift Clauses’ original public meaning applies to relief for the poor at all; or (b) whether poverty reduction is an important public purpose under the Borgelt test. - 56 - Encouraging economic development by boosting self-sufficiency and reducing unemployment, is another indisputably public purpose. See Tex. Const. art III, § 52-a. Undisputed testimony explained that the program was “expected” to achieve a number of goals associated with economic development, including reducing poverty and unemployment, and offering incentives to work. 2.RR.15; 3.RR.6-7 (“[A] monthly transfer of $500 will provide essential economic opportunities for households in poverty.”). The State says the economic benefits are “too attenuated,” Br. 38, but the informed judgment of the County receives deference, not the State’s unsupported assertion. Offering relief to recover from a public calamity (here, the COVID pandemic) is yet another well-established public purpose. Article III, § 51 (the Gift Clause applying to the Legislature) carves out disaster-relief spending from the prohibition on gifts: “[T]he provisions of this Section shall not be construed so as to prevent the grant of aid in cases of public calamity.” Likewise, “[t]he use of . . . counties as agents of the state in the discharge of the state’s duty is in no wise inhibited by the Constitution.” City of Aransas Pass v. Keeling, 247 S.W. 818, 820 (Tex. 1923). A county program granting aid in response to a public calamity serves a proper public purpose. - 57 - The State does not dispute that COVID is a public calamity or that recovering from a calamity is a proper public purpose. Br. 38. It likewise does not dispute that “the poor were disproportionately impacted by COVID’s consequences.” 2.RR.123. Its only argument is that the Program is not “link[ed]” to COVID relief. Br. 38. That is easily rebutted by the record. Mr. Maddox testified that the payments were “to address disparities caused by COVID-19.” 2.RR.11. Harris County noted in the trial court the rules implementing ARPA recognized that “the people that were most likely to be impacted by the COVID pandemic were poor people.” 2.RR.102. 17 And the exhibits presented during the hearing echoed the “link” between the Program and COVID recovery. 3.RR.5-6; 4.RR.29-30, 113-14, 116; 5.RR.92, 105. In response, the State says only that “COVID is over.” Br. 38. But that is no response at all. • * * The fact that the recipients receive some private benefit does not defeat the overwhelming public purposes of the Community Prosperity Program. “Some private benefit will almost inevitably arise from government payments to non-government entities or individuals; the Gift Clause does not treat such an inevitability as a poison pill that dooms a much larger public objective.” Borgelt, 692 See U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Coronavirus State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds, 87 Fed. Reg. 4338, 17 4388, 430-41 (Jan. 27, 2022); U.S. Dep’t Treasury, Coronavirus State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds: Interim Final Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. 64986, 64994 (Sep. 20, 2023); see also 5.RR.105. - 58 -S.W.3d at 304. Thus, because the Community Prosperity Program advances “important public purposes,” it is no matter that “accomplishing those purposes also leads to some collateral private benefit.” Id. at 304. To the extent the State’s argument turns on potential misuse of the funds, its concerns are unfounded and not constitutionally significant. Participants are contractually bound to spend the money in ways that facilitate the program’s public purposes. 5.RR.111. Misuses “would constitute potential violations, not manifestations” of the contract and the Program. Id. at 308. “Not all contractual violations (indeed, very few) are of constitutional significance. If it were otherwise, all aspects of government functioning would become constitutionalized under the Gift Clause, effectively turning Texas courts into full-time hall monitors who oversee the minute operations of the rest of the government. The Gift Clause is important, but it was not intended as a tool for the judiciary to elevate itself above the other branches.” Id. The Community Prosperity Program ensures that the program’s clear public benefits predominate by exercising the controls described in the next section. See id. at 304-05, 309 (examining same provision in public purpose and controls analyses). - 59 - 3. Harris County retains control over the funds. The Community Prosperity Program employs controls “to ensure that the public purpose” of providing relief to the poor is “accomplished.” Borgelt, 692 S.W.3d at 301, 308-10; Tex. Mun. League, 74 S.W.3d at 384. Indeed, among the most significant differences between Uplift Harris and the Community Prosperity Program is the County’s heightened level of control over the funds.18 See 5.RR.106 (noting that CPP “has introduced more controls with stricter guidelines and spending restrictions”). The County tightly controls where, how, and on what participants may spend their funds. See 5.RR.99, 106, 111. These controls “ensure that funds are used responsibly and align with the program’s focus on supporting basic needs.” 5.RR.106. Overview of the Controls There are six principal controls. The first three are new and significantly differentiate this program from Uplift Harris. First, participants agree to restrict their purchases to “basic needs” in a signed contract. 5.RR.106. Each participant must sign an attestation accepting the 18 The State suggests that the controls must be “‘specifically tailored’ to link the expenditures to the predominately public purpose they purport to serve.” Br. 40. Neither Borgelt nor Texas Municipal League uses such language. - 60 -“terms and restrictions” of the Program, including that the “financial assistance provided must be used for basic needs, including housing-related expenses, utilities, transportation, groceries, medical care, education, clothing, and other goods and services.” 5.RR.111 (emphasis added). Courts must assume that recipients will “comply with these requirements.” Borgelt, 692 S.W.3d at 310; id. at 293 (“We assume . . . the parties will adhere to their agreement.”). And as Mr. Maddox testified, in programs like SNAP and TANF “the vast majority of participants” do “follow whatever rules or guidelines are in place.” 2.RR.92. Second, to enforce that contractual restriction, participants must make purchases with a reloadable debit card. 5.RR.99, 111. They cannot make cash withdrawals. 5.RR.99, 106; 2.RR.31. The debit card functions only at vendors with a qualifying Merchant Category Code (MCC).19 2.RR.19-21, 30, 56-57, 64; 5.RR.99, 106-07. Harris County carefully generated the list of acceptable MCCs—those supporting basic needs—by referring to constitutionally sound programs such as TANF and SNAP. 2.RR.20-21, 56-57, 60-62; 5.RR.107; 6.RR.5-53. The State does not dispute that the debit card functions only at qualifying vendors. Br. 41. 19 An MCC is a number assigned by the payment processor based on the goods or services the business provides. 2.RR.20-21; 5.RR.99, 107. - 61 - Third, the County monitors participants spending in two ways. Participants’ account data is shared automatically with GiveDirectly and the County. 2.RR.20, 31, 36-37, 54; 5.RR.99, 111. And Program participants consent to having their transactions “audited for compliance purposes” to “ensure that the funds are being used in alignment with the program’s goals and requirements[.]” 5.RR.111; 2.RR.35-37. They contractually agree to “provid[e] necessary documentation if requested.” 5.RR.111. These procedures were designed “in response to the State of Texas concerns over a lack of controls in the previous program.” 2.RR.66. Fourth, in addition to these new controls, the Community Prosperity Program, like Uplift Harris, exercises control on the front end: it restricts who may participate to ensure it is effective at achieving its stated goals. Each participant must have a household income below 200% of the federal poverty line and either be a member of the ACCESS Harris County Initiative or, alternatively, live in one of the top-10 poorest zip codes in Harris County. 5.RR.105, 108, 111; see 2.RR.10-11, 40; see also 4.RR.85-86. When enrolling in the Community Prosperity Program, participants must sign an attestation confirming that they still meet the eligibility requirements. 2.RR.35; 5.RR.107, 108, 111. Fifth, Harris County releases funds to GiveDirectly in $5 million increments. 2.RR.17-18, 28; 5.RR.93. By dispensing only a limited amount of money at a time, - 62 -Harris County “ensure[s] that the program is being implemented with fidelity.” 2.RR.18. The State ignores this aspect of why Harris County dispenses payments incrementally. See Br. 44. Finally, if a participant somehow evades these controls and does not qualify or misspends funds, he or she will be removed from the program for non-compliance. 2.RR.36, 81; 5.RR.99, 108. Harris County has an effective auditors’ office that would inform the process for the Community Prosperity Program. 2.RR.93-94; see 3.RR.86 (requiring GiveDirectly to report fraud, waste, and abuse). As part of its contract with the County, GiveDirectly is required to “take appropriate actions” if it becomes aware of “any violations of the program’s restrictions.” 5.RR.99. Together, these controls ensure that the public purposes are accomplished. By restricting the items that participants may purchase, the County ensures that participants “basic needs” are met—lifting communities out of poverty, resolving the inequities exacerbated by the pandemic, and providing a secure floor from which participants can support the economy by seeking work and spending money. The Community Prosperity Program’s controls satisfy the deferential review applicable here. - 63 - The State’s Arguments Are Wrong The State’s arguments that the Program lacks sufficient controls are wrong. Br. 40-45. The State’s overarching critique is that the County will not automatically receive information showing item-by-item purchases. It conflates that with the County remaining “completely unaware of what may be purchased with the funds as long as the purchases are made at a vendor with an approved merchant category code.” Br. 41-43. There are several problems with this argument. From the outset, the State inherently downplays the significance of requiring participants to make purchases at only a sliver of all existing vendors, which necessarily restricts how funds are spent and limits them to vendors primarily satisfying basic needs. This is an about face from its position in the trial court, where the State agreed that, if an approved vendor sells a product, the purchase is “presumably acceptable.” 2.RR.60. Moreover, the County does have insight into what participants do with the funds. Participants are contractually bound to limit their purchases to discrete “basic needs,” and they must provide additional information about their specific purchases if requested. This latter control is a “mechanism for ascertaining whether participants adhere to that promise.” Br. 42. Independently and together, these - 64 -controls contradict the State’s unfounded assertion that the County has no mechanism to “verify[] how the money is spent.” Br. 12.20 Exercising item-level control via the reloadable debit card, as the State would prefer, “just isn’t feasible for this type of program,” nor is it necessary for the Program to be constitutional. 2.RR.55. “If the legislature concludes that greater restraints are necessary to ensure obedience to the Gift Clause, it can create new mechanisms to hold local governments accountable.” Borgelt, 692 S.W.3d at 310. But making that policy decision is beyond the scope of this Court’s authority. The State also mischaracterizes the controls by arguing that the County is merely “asking recipients to comply with the Program requirements.” Br. 42-43. The County is not asking recipients to comply; it requires that they do. Participants must sign a contract pledging to adhere to the spending limitations. 5.RR.111. They can be audited, and they will be removed for non-compliance. 5.RR.99, 108, 111. In Borgelt, the Supreme Court confronted a similar critique—that recipients of funds might spend them improperly and outside the contractual bounds. Rejecting it, the Supreme Court opined that the challenged conduct was “not authorized by or the necessary fruit of the agreement; it would breach that agreement. Under ordinary 20 The State mischaracterizes the controls, stating that “the County relies on chance and word of mouth to ensure that the funds are not used in a way the Community Prosperity program disallows.” Br. 12. As described above, it relies on contractual controls and audit rights. - 65 -contract-interpretation principles, . . . we must read the agreement to authorize only lawful conduct.” Borgelt, 692 S.W.3d at 294 (holding contractual provision did not violate the Gift Clauses). Violations of the Gift Clauses “require far more than occasional breaches of [an] agreement.” Id. Until the State presents evidence that these controls do not work, they are sufficient to pass constitutional muster. The State finally notes that Harris County has not finalized its audit procedures, but it is not a knock on the Program that its constitutionally sufficient controls might be subsequently enhanced. See Br. 44. • * * This case is similar to Borgelt. There, the Supreme Court concluded: “We do not and are not asked to endorse [the program]; we simply conclude that, whether [it] is wise or foolish, the agreement’s text constrains [payments] to uses that satisfy our ‘public purpose’ jurisprudence.” Id. at 307. So too here. 4. The State’s arguments about other constitutional provisions do not apply. The State makes the confusing argument that “no other constitutional provision authorizes the Program.” Br. 46. Aside from § 52-a (addressed below), Harris County does not rely on any of the provisions the State discusses to authorize the Program. To the extent the State intends its survey of later-enacted - 66 -constitutional provisions to be used to interpret § 52(a), its reliance is misplaced. Br. 7-9; 46-49. Subsequent enactments do not inform the original meaning of § 52(a). Later additions cannot change the meaning of unamended text “as it was understood by those who ratified it,” which is the meaning that matters. See In re Abbott, 628 S.W.3d 288, 296 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding). Additionally, the Supreme Court has recognized, in rejecting a Gift-Clause challenge, that those amendments are just as likely to be matters of political expediency rather than necessity: “[T]he history of the submission of constitutional amendments in this State will prove that not all of them have been submitted in order to create a legislative power. Some few have undoubtedly been submitted to ascertain the will of the people, and to enable them to express such will regarding a governmental policy.” Friedman v. Am. Sur. Co. of N.Y., 151 S.W.2d 570, 580 (Tex. 1941); accord Braden, supra, at 235-36 (“One can only conclude that [art. III, §51-a] was a device to get public approval of the program. Once the unnecessary provision got into the constitution, every change would naturally follow the same route.”). The State relies on Linden, to argue that these addendums can in fact change the meaning of unamended text. Br. 8, 47. But Linden “has only the remotest rational connection” to the Gift Clauses. Braden, supra, at 233. The dispositive legal question in Linden had nothing to do with what a county could spend public money on, only - 67 -whether counties are “corporations” as used in article III, § 51. 220 S.W. at 761, 763-64. Linden’s broader discussion of the Gift Clauses is obiter dictum. In any event, Linden makes clear the Court’s view that “the care of the poor” is a “strictly government purpose” on which county funds may be spent. 220 S.W. at 763-64. D. The Community Prosperity Program is authorized by § 52-a. Regardless of whether the Program clears the Borgelt test, the Constitution expressly authorizes the Program in article III, § 52-a. Contra Br. 49-52. Article III, § 52-a states: Notwithstanding any other provision of this constitution, the legislature may provide for the creation of programs and the making of loans and grants of public money . . . for the public purposes of development and diversification of the economy of the state” and “the elimination of unemployment or underemployment in the state. By its plain text, § 52-a thus authorizes economic-development programs like this one that focus on the elimination of unemployment or underemployment. Section 52-a is an express exception to other constitutional restrictions on spending public funds. See Ex Parte City of Irving, 343 S.W.3d 850, 855 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2011, judgment vacated w.r.m.); see also Tex. Legis. Council, Analyses of Proposed Constitutional Amendments and Referenda 14 (Sept. 1987) (naming article III, §§ 51-52 as constitutional impediments that § 52–a was intended to overcome) (App. 23). Sections 51 and 52 (and the Borgelt test) do not apply to economic development - 68 -programs authorized by § 52-a: the authority under § 52-a exists “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this constitution.” Tex. Const. art. III, § 52-a. In turn, Local Government Code § 381.003(a) grants counties the authority to administer community and economic development projects authorized by federal law. And Local Government Code § 381.004 authorizes counties’ “making . . . grants of public money” in similar programs, without connection to federal law. The Community Prosperity Program is a federally authorized program aimed at improving the economy and reducing unemployment and underemployment. 2.RR.10, 15. It was created in part to ameliorate the County’s historically high unemployment rate during the pandemic. 3.RR.15. A program under § 52-a need not satisfy the Gift Clauses. “Notwithstanding any other provision of this constitution” has a clear meaning. “Notwithstanding . . . indicates that the main clause that it introduces or follows derogates from the provision to which it refers.” Scalia & Garner, supra, at 119; accord Univ. of Tex. v. Garner, 595 S.W.3d 645, 650 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam); In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 454 (Tex. 2013). Section 52-a thus plainly derogates from the other provisions in the Constitution. See City of Irving, 343 S.W.3d at 855-57. And § 52-a’s permissive language—“the legislature may provide for the . . . making of loans and grants of public money”—parallels §§ 51 & 52(a)’s prohibitions. Applying - 69 -those prohibitions would reverse the superordinating function of “notwithstanding” § 52-a. On the State’s tortured reading, it is the Gift Clauses, not § 52-a, that apply “notwithstanding any other provision of this constitution.” The State may not rewrite the Constitution in this manner. In the Uplift Harris case, the Supreme Court said nothing about the underemployment and unemployment aspects of § 52-a. See In re State, 2024 WL 2983176, at *3-4; see Br. 49-50. Moreover, a new program is before this Court, and Harris County has significantly developed the argument since that emergency litigation last April. Therefore, the Supreme Court’s preliminary assessment of § 52-a (ignoring wholly underemployment and unemployment) does not control here. Section 52-a authorizes the Community Prosperity Program. E. The Community Prosperity Program does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The trial court did not err in dismissing the State’s equal protection claim, which borders on frivolous. The “equal protection analysis requires that the classification be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Sullivan v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 616 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Tex. 1981). “The party challenging the rationality of the legislative classification has the burden of negating every conceivable basis that might support it.” Gardner v. Children’s Med. Ctr. of Dall., 402 S.W.3d 888, 892 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.) (citing Heller v. Doe ex rel - 70 -Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)). “It is not [the court’s] place to question the [government’s] policy decisions when conducting a rational basis review” of a program challenged on equal protection grounds. Hebert v. Hopkins, 395 S.W.3d 884, 900 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.). The State’s claim fails out of the gate because eligible participants are treated equally—each had an equal chance of being selected. See Campbell v. Bd. of Educ., 310 F. Supp. 94, 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). At any rate, a lottery is a rational tool of government in use for millennia.21 If selection by lot is good enough for military drafts and jury pools (50 U.S.C. §3805; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 35.11) it is good enough for public benefit pilot programs. Indeed, the State itself makes certain housing benefits dependent on the outcome of lotteries.22 And college admissions.23 Government use of lotteries for benefits abounds. The State’s argument is frivolous in any event. Harris County acted rationally in using a limited pool of federal funds in line with federal regulations to achieve 21 “The Archons of ancient Athens would undoubtedly have been surprised to learn that their selection by lot from among the citizenry was the result of an invidious discrimination.” Campbell, 310 F. Supp. at 103. 22 TDHCA announces Housing Choice Voucher Program pre-application for wait-list to open May 2 (April 28, 2022), https://www.tdhca.texas.gov/news/tdhca-announces-housing-choice-voucher- program-pre-applications-wait-list-open-may-2. 23 19 Tex. Admin. Code §5.5(g) (Tex. Higher Educ. Coordinating Bd., Uniform Admission Policy). - 71 -multiple rational public purposes. The State challenges what it says are Harris County’s justifications for the program’s parameters. Br. 53-56. But the rational basis test puts no burden on Harris County: “The party challenging the rationality of the legislative classification has the burden of negating every conceivable basis that might support it.” Gardner, 402 S.W.3d at 892 (emphases added). The State does not even purport to try—the State merely complains (Br. 54) that Harris County could have done better. The State’s argument has no connection to the rational-basis test that governs its claim. F. The Court Must Affirm the Trial Court’s Conclusion that the Community Prosperity Program Is Statutorily Authorized. The appellant’s brief says nothing about the trial court’s dismissal of Count 3, which alleges that the Program is not authorized by two statutes. CR.17-19, 540. “[I]f an appellant fails to challenge all grounds upon which the trial court could have granted a motion to dismiss and plea to the jurisdiction, we have no discretion to do anything other than to accept the validity of the unchallenged ground.” Owens v. Alexander, 2019 WL 3334626, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, no pet.) (citations omitted) (cleaned up). The State’s failure to press this claim on appeal is unsurprising: the County is statutorily authorized to provide support for the poor. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 81.027. The Court must affirm on this Count. • * * - 72 - Because the State lacks any viable ultra vires claim, it has not carried its burden, and the trial court properly granted the plea to the jurisdiction. Conclusion and Prayer The Court should affirm the final judgment. Appellees further request all other legal and equitable relief to which they are entitled. - 73 -Dated: January 14, 2025 Respectfully submitted, CHRISTIAN D. MENEFEE Of Counsel: Harris County Attorney /s/ Jonathan G.C. Fombonne Grant B. Martinez JONATHAN G.C. FOMBONNE State Bar No. 24104118 Deputy County Attorney and First Assistant gmartinez@yettercoleman.com State Bar No. 24102702 Justin P. Tschoepe Jonathan.Fombonne@harriscountytx.gov State Bar 24079480 TIFFANY S. BINGHAM jtschoepe@yettercoleman.com Managing Counsel Lily E. Hann Affirmative & Special Litigation Division State Bar No. 24133836 State Bar No. 24012287 lhann@yettercoleman.com Tiffany.Bingham@harriscountytx.gov Yetter Coleman LLP CHRISTOPHER GARZA 811 Main Street, Suite 4100 Senior Assistant Harris County Attorney Houston, Texas 77002 State Bar No. 24078543 Phone: (713) 632-8000 Christopher.Garza@harriscountytx.gov ELEANOR MATHESON Assistant Harris County Attorney State Bar No. 24131490 Eleanor.Matheson@harriscountytx.gov RYAN COOPER Assistant Harris County Attorney State Bar No. 24123649 Ryan.Cooper@harriscountytx.gov EDWARD D. SWIDRISKI III Assistant Harris County Attorney State Bar No. 24083929 Edward.Swidriski@harriscountytx.gov Office of The Harris County Attorney 1019 Congress Plaza, 15th Floor Houston, Texas 77002 Phone: (713) 274-5101 Attorneys for Appellees - 74 - Certificate of Service I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this document was served on all counsel of record in this case, identified below, on January 14, 2025, electronically through the electronic filing manager in compliance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure: Ken Paxton Brent Webster Ralph Molina James Lloyd Kimberly Gdula William D. Wassdorf William H. Farrell (lead counsel) Office of the Attorney General P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059) Austin, Texas 78711 Phone: (512) 936-1700 Fax: (512) 474-269 Biff.Farrell@oag.texas.gov Counsel for Appellant /s/ Jonathan G.C. Fombonne Jonathan G.C. Fombonne - 75 - Certificate of Compliance I certify that this brief complies with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4. It contains 14,996 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1). This brief complies with the typeface requirements because it has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft 365 E5 in 14-point Equity font for text and 12-point Equity font for footnotes. /s/ Jonathan G.C. Fombonne Jonathan G.C. Fombonne - 76 - No. 15-24-00120-CV In the Fifteenth Court of Appeals Austin, Texas State of Texas, Appellant, v. Harris County, Texas, et al., Appellees. On Appeal from the 165th District Court, Harris County, Texas Cause No. 2024-63919, Hon. Ursula Hall, Presiding Judge Appendix 1. Amended Final Judgment 2. Tex. Const. art. III, §52(a) 3. Tex. Const. art. III, §52-a 4. Tex. Const. art. IV, § 22 5. Tex. Const. art. V, § 21 6. George D. Braden, et al., The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis (1977) (excerpts). 7. Brief for Attorney General, Paxton v. Longoria, No. 22-0224 (Tex. Apr. 7, 2022) (excerpt) 8. Elizabethan Poor Law 9. Jill S. Quadagno, From Poor Laws to Pensions, 62 Milbank Mem’l Fund Q. 417, 419 (1984) 10. Act of Dec. 20, 1836 11. Act of Mar. 16, 1848 12. Convention Proceedings, Austin Weekly Statesman (Oct. 7, 1875) 13. Grant, Oxford English Dictionary (1989) 14. Webster’s Complete Dictionary (1864) 15. Aid, Oxford English Dictionary Aid (1989) 16. Relief, Black’s Law Dictionary (1881) 17. Act of July 22, 1876 18. Local Intelligence, Brenham Weekly Banner (Jan. 4, 1878) 19. ATTENTION, PAUPERS!, The Dallas Daily Herald (June 15, 1877) 20. Texas—Facts and Fancies, Austin American-Statesman (Aug. 16, 1878) 21. Commissioners’ Court, Brenham Weekly Banner (June 1, 1882) 22. Brenham Weekly Banner (July 12, 1878) 23. Tex. Legis. Council, Analyses of Proposed Constitutional Amendments and Referenda 14 (Sept. 1987) 24. Tex. Const. art. I, § 3 -2- TAB 1 FI LED Manlyn Burgess District Clerk Time: JOV 2 5 2024 CAUSE NO. 2024-63919 Deputy STATE OF TEXAS, IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff, HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS, HARRIS COUNTY COMMISSIONER COURT, LINA HIDALGO, in her official capacity as Harris County Judge, RODNEY ELLIS, in his official capacity as Commissioner of Harris County Precinct 1, ADRIAN 165th JUDICIAL DISTRICT GARCIA, in his official capacity as Commissioner of Harris County Precinct 2, TOM RAMSEY, in his official capacity as Commissioner of Harris County Precinct 3, and LESLEY BRIONES, in her official Capacity as Commissioner of Harris County Precinct 4, HARRIS COUNTY PUBLIC HEALTH, BARBIE ROBINSON, in her official capacity as Executive Director of Harris County Public Health, Defendants. HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS AMENDED FINAL JUDGMENT The Court replaces its Order granting the Harris County Defendants’ plea to the jurisdiction, signed on October 24, 2024, with this Amended Final Judgment. On October 24, 2024, the Court considered Harris County Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction filed in the above-styled and numbered cause. After having considered the pleadings, all documents on file with the Court, testimony of witnesses, exhibits, and arguments of counsel, the Court GRANTS the Harris County Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction. On November 22, 2024, the Court considered the Harris County Defendants’ Sworn Motion to Show Authority Under Rule 12 (the “Motion”). After having considered the motion, response, any replies, and arguments of counsel, the Court GRANTS the Motion. RECORDER'S MEMORANDUM This instrument is of poor quality 539 at the time of imaging — 540 — IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the Court refuses to permit the Attorney General and attorneys working for his office from appearing on behalf of the State of Texas in this Court in this case. Unless a person who is authorized to prosecute this case on behalf of the State appears by November 25, 2024, it is further ORDERED that all pleadings filed in this action by the Attorney General purportedly on behalf of the State are stricken. IT IS THEREFORE FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUGED, and DECREED that Harris County Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is GRANTED and all parties and all claims are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. All costs shall be borne by the party incurring them. This Order is Final and Appealable. 23rd SIGNED this day of November, 2024 P’m‘ JUDGE PRESIDING -2- TAB 2 THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 3. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT REQUIREMENTS AND LIMITATIONS Sec. 52. RESTRICTIONS ON LENDING CREDIT OR MAKING GRANTS BY POLITICAL CORPORATIONS OR POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS; AUTHORIZED BONDS; INVESTMENT OF FUNDS. (a) Except as otherwise provided by this section, the Legislature shall have no power to authorize any county, city, town or other political corporation or subdivision of the State to lend its credit or to grant public money or thing of value in aid of, or to any individual, association or corporation whatsoever, or to become a stockholder in such corporation, association or company. However, this section does not prohibit the use of public funds or credit for the payment of premiums on nonassessable property and casualty, life, health, or accident insurance policies and annuity contracts issued by a mutual insurance company authorized to do business in this State. (b) Under Legislative provision, any county, political subdivision of a county, number of adjoining counties, political subdivision of the State, or defined district now or hereafter to be described and defined within the State of Texas, and which may or may not include, towns, villages or municipal corporations, upon a vote of two-thirds majority of the voting qualified voters of such district or territory to be affected thereby, may issue bonds or otherwise lend its credit in any amount not to exceed one- fourth of the assessed valuation of the real property of such district or territory, except that the total bonded indebtedness of any city or town shall never exceed the limits imposed by other provisions of this Constitution, and levy and collect taxes to pay the interest thereon and provide a sinking fund for the redemption thereof, as the Legislature may authorize, and in such manner as it may authorize the same, for the following purposes to wit: (1) The improvement of rivers, creeks, and streams to prevent overflows, and to permit of navigation thereof, or irrigation thereof, or in aid of such purposes. (2) The construction and maintenance of pools, lakes, reservoirs, dams, canals and waterways for the purposes of irrigation, drainage or navigation, or in aid thereof. (3) The construction, maintenance and operation of macadamized, graveled or paved roads and turnpikes, or in aid thereof. (c) Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsection (b) of this Section, bonds may be issued by any county in an amount not to exceed one-fourth of the assessed valuation of the real property in the county, for the construction, maintenance, and operation of macadamized, graveled, or paved roads and turnpikes, or in aid thereof, upon a vote of a majority of the voting qualified voters of the county, and without the necessity of further or amendatory legislation. The county may levy and collect taxes to pay the interest on the bonds as it becomes due and to provide a sinking fund for redemption of the bonds. (d) Any defined district created under this section that is authorized to issue bonds or otherwise lend its credit for the purposes stated in Subdivisions (1) and (2) of Subsection (b) of this section may engage in fire-fighting activities and may issue bonds or otherwise lend its credit for fire-fighting purposes as provided by law and this constitution. (e) A county, city, town, or other political corporation or subdivision of the state may invest its funds as authorized by law. (Feb. 15, 1876. Amended Nov. 8, 1904; Subsecs. (a) and (b) amended and (c) added Nov. 3, 1970; Subsec. (d) added Nov. 7, 1978; Subsec. (a) amended Nov. 4, 1986; Subsec. (e) added Nov. 7, 1989; Subsecs. (a), (b), and (c) amended Nov. 2, 1999.) (TEMPORARY TRANSITION PROVISIONS for Sec. 52: See Appendix, Note 1.) TAB 3 THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 3. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT REQUIREMENTS AND LIMITATIONS Sec. 52-a. PROGRAMS AND LOANS OR GRANTS OF PUBLIC MONEY FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. Notwithstanding any other provision of this constitution, the legislature may provide for the creation of programs and the making of loans and grants of public money, other than money otherwise dedicated by this constitution to use for a different purpose, for the public purposes of development and diversification of the economy of the state, the elimination of unemployment or underemployment in the state, the stimulation of agricultural innovation, the fostering of the growth of enterprises based on agriculture, or the development or expansion of transportation or commerce in the state. Any bonds or other obligations of a county, municipality, or other political subdivision of the state that are issued for the purpose of making loans or grants in connection with a program authorized by the legislature under this section and that are payable from ad valorem taxes must be approved by a vote of the majority of the registered voters of the county, municipality, or political subdivision voting on the issue. A program created or a loan or grant made as provided by this section that is not secured by a pledge of ad valorem taxes or financed by the issuance of any bonds or other obligations payable from ad valorem taxes of the political subdivision does not constitute or create a debt for the purpose of any provision of this constitution. An enabling law enacted by the legislature in anticipation of the adoption of this amendment is not void because of its anticipatory character. (Added Nov. 3, 1987; amended Nov. 8, 2005.) TAB 4 THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 4. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Sec. 22. ATTORNEY GENERAL. The Attorney General shall represent the State in all suits and pleas in the Supreme Court of the State in which the State may be a party, and shall especially inquire into the charter rights of all private corporations, and from time to time, in the name of the State, take such action in the courts as may be proper and necessary to prevent any private corporation from exercising any power or demanding or collecting any species of taxes, tolls, freight or wharfage not authorized by law. He shall, whenever sufficient cause exists, seek a judicial forfeiture of such charters, unless otherwise expressly directed by law, and give legal advice in writing to the Governor and other executive officers, when requested by them, and perform such other duties as may be required by law. (Feb. 15, 1876. Amended Nov. 3, 1936, Nov. 2, 1954, Nov. 7, 1972, and Nov. 2, 1999.) (TEMPORARY TRANSITION PROVISIONS for Sec. 22: See Appendix, Note 1.) TAB 5 THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 5. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT Sec. 21. COUNTY ATTORNEYS; DISTRICT ATTORNEYS. A County Attorney, for counties in which there is not a resident Criminal District Attorney, shall be elected by the qualified voters of each county, who shall be commissioned by the Governor, and hold his office for the term of four years. In case of vacancy the Commissioners Court of the county shall have the power to appoint a County Attorney until the next general election. The County Attorneys shall represent the State in all cases in the District and inferior courts in their respective counties; but if any county shall be included in a district in which there shall be a District Attorney, the respective duties of District Attorneys and County Attorneys shall in such counties be regulated by the Legislature. The Legislature may provide for the election of District Attorneys in such districts, as may be deemed necessary, and make provision for the compensation of District Attorneys and County Attorneys. District Attorneys shall hold office for a term of four years, and until their successors have qualified. (Feb. 15, 1876. Amended Nov. 2, 1954.) TAB 6 226 Art. Ill, § 50a Comparative Analysis Most states have a prohibition on extending state credit to private groups. The prohibitions normally include corporations but usually do not include "municipal" or "public" as part of the characterization of corporation. (The Index Digest is not always clear on this point and it may be that there are more states that include ·municipal corporations than the Index shows. Moreover, there may be states where the courts have construed "corporation" to include municipal and other public corporations.) Many states have made exceptions to the prohibition in order to meet a public problem-housing, agricultural development, education, and welfare, for example. Neither the United States Constitution nor the Model State Constitution has a comparable provision. Author's Comment As noted in the History, Section 50 is unchanged from the wording first presented to the 1875 Convention. This indicates that no one noticed the misplaced comma that makes the sentence ungrammatical. The second comma belongs after, not before "of." (The third comma should be omitted or another comma inserted after "or to.") There is no apparent reason for distinguishing between the power of the legislature to act directly or to authorize action. If somebody feared that a denial of power to lend would permit the legislature to authorize the treasurer to lend, the sectiqn could have been redrafted to start out: "the credit of the State shall not be given, lent, or pledged .... " This would have simplified the sentence and also avoided the omission of a prohibition against authorizing the pledging of credit. The structure of the sentence as it stands limits the denial of power to authorize to "giving or lending," but not to pledging. One final puzzle in the drafting of Section 50 is why the forbidden recipients are called in the first half "any person, association or corporation, whether municipal or other," but in the second half are called "any individual, association of individuals, municipal or other corporation whatsoever." Apart from all this close ~nalysis of poor draftsmanship, one may raise the broad question as to why municipal corporations were included in the lending pro- hibition. The basic reason for Section 50 was to prevent the government from aiding 1 private parties in their grandiose schemes to build railroads and other internal improvements. Section 52 stops municipal corporations from doing this. Thus, there was no occasion to forbid the state to bail out profligate municipalities that might underwrite internal improvements. But, someone might argue, municipal corporations might go wildly into ·debt if they did not know that the state could not bail them out. This will not wash, however, for the original limitations on municipal taxing power under Sections 4 and 5 of Article XI, combined with the practical limitation on going into debt contained in Section 7 of that article, made wild borrowing well-nigh impossible. One earl only conclude that some draftsman in the 1875 Convention was so intent on ending government profligacy that he blindly included everything he could think of. The pity of the blindness is that it gave rise to the ridiculous social security flap that necessitated Section 51g of this article. For a discussion of the advisability of a provision like Section 50, see the Author's Comment on Section 51. Sec. 50a. STATE MEDICAL EDUCATION BOARD; STATE MEDICAL EDUCATION FUND; PURPOSE. The Legislature shall create a State Medical Education Board to be composed of not more than six (6) members whose 229 Art. Ill, § 50b-1, 51 merely authorizing the bonds and stating their purpose. (See the Author's Comment on Secs. 49-b and 49-c.) Sec. 50b-l. ADDITIONAL STUDENT LOANS. (a) The Legislature may provide that the Coordinating Board, Texas College and University System, or its successor or successors, shall have authority to provide for, issue and sell general obligation bonds of the State of Texas in amount not to exceed Two Hundred Million Dollars ($200,000,000) in addition to those heretofore authorized to be issued pursuant to Section 50b of the Constitution. The bonds authorized herein shall be executed in such •form, upon such terms and be in such denomination as may be prescribed by law and shall bear interest, and be issued in such installments as shall be prescribed by the Board provided that the maximum net effective interest rate to be borne by such bonds may be fixed by law. (b) The moneys received from the sale of such bonds shall be deposited to the credit of the Texas Opportunity Plan Fund created by Section 50b of the Constitution and shall otherwise be handled as provided in Section 50b of the Constitution and the laws enacted pursuant thereto. (c) The said bonds shall be general obligations of the state and shall be payable in the same manner and from the same sources as bonds heretofore authorized pursuant to Section 50b. (d) All bonds issued hereunder shall, after approval by the Attorney General, registration by the Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas, and delivery to the purchasers, be incontestable and shall constitute general obligations of the State of Texas under this Constitution. (e) Should the Legislature enact enabling laws in anticipation of the adoption of this Amendment such acts shall not be void because of their anticipatory nature. History • At the time Section 50b-1 was added in 1969, there remained available for issuance some $46 million of the original $85 million authorized by Section 50b, and projections indicated that the $46 million would be sufficient to carry the student loan program only through 1971. Explanation An additional $200 million in bonds was authorized, but, unlike Section 50b, which limited the interest rate to 4 percent, this section is more realistic in that it permits the coordinating board and legislature to set interest rates for the new bonds. (See also the Explanation of Art. III, Sec. 65.) Comparative Analysis No other state constitution contains a provision resembling this section. Author's Comment See the Author's Comment on Section 50b. Sec. 51. GRANTS OF PUBLIC MONEY PROHIBITED; EXCEPTIONS. The Legislature shall have no power to make any grant or authorize the making of any grant of public moneys to any individual, association of individuals, municipal or other corporations whatsoever; provided, however, the Legislature may grant aid to indigent and disabled Confederate soldiers and sailors under such regulations and limitations as may be deemed by the Legislature as expedient, and to their widows in indigent circumstances under such regulations and limitations as may be deemed by the 230 Art. Ill, § 51 Legislature as expedient; provided that the provisions of this Section shall not be construed so as to prevent the grant of aid in cases of public calamity. History This grants prohibition dates from the 1875 Convention. (But see the History of Sec. 6 of Art. XVI for a related prohibition in earlier constitutions.) The section as originally adopted consisted of the words up to the first semicolon plus the proviso at the end concerning public calamities. The original 1876 Constitution contained an exception to the grants prohibition in the form of a section authorizing the legislature to provide small pensions to indigent soldiers who fought for independence from Mexico, to indigent signers of the Declaration of Independence of Texas, and to their widows remaining unmarried. (This was Sec. 55 of Art. XVI which was repealed for obvious reasons in 1969.) In 1894, the first of many welfare amendments was adopted. It provided that the legislature could "grant aid to the establishment and maintenance of a home for indigent and disabled Confederate soldiers or sailors who are or may be bona fide residents .... " No more than $100,000 a year could be granted for this purpose. (See the following Author's Comment for a discussion of this curious provision.) Four years later a second Confederate amendment was adopted. Without a great deal of historical research it is not possible to be sure what was happening, but one can speculate that the Confederate home was inadequate and that Confederate veterans were moving to Texas to get into the home. The amendment limited aid to indigent and disabled Confederate soldiers and sailors "who came to Texas prior to January 1st, 1880." The amendment also authorized direct "aid" to individuals in addition to "aid" for establishment of a home, but, naturally, "no inmate of said home" could receive any other aid from the state. Various other restrictions showed up. Direct grants were not to exceed $8 a month. Covered under these grants were veterans "who are either over sixty years of age, or whose disability is the proximate result of actual service in the Confederate army for a period of at least three months." Widows also were covered for direct aid but only if (a) "in indigent circumstances," (b) "never re-married," (c) bona fide residents prior to March 1, 1880, and (d) married to such soldiers or sailors "anterior"(!) to March 1, 1866. The amendment put an annual ceiling of $250,000 for the "purpose hereinbefore specified," but went on to include a ceiling of $100,000 for the veterans' home. It is not clear whether the $100,000 was included in the $250,000 or was in addition to it. This new grant program lasted for six years. In 1904 another amendment was adopted. This one increased the maximum from $250,000 to $500,000 but preserved the $100,000 for the veterans' home in the same ambiguous wording. A new group of widows was allowed in. The magic marriage date was changed from March 1, 1866 to March 1, 1880; the same date as the residency cut-off. Three years later an effort was made to get wives, widows, and "women who aided in the Confederacy" into the veterans' home. Although the words "under such regulations and limitations as may be provided by law" were retained, somebody thought it necessary or appropriate specifically to authorize the legislature to "provide for husband and wife to remain together in the home." The amendment increased the annual maximum from $100,000 to $150,000. (This change leads one to believe that the ceiling amount was in addition to the ceiling for the "purpose hereinbefore specified" since no change was made in that ceiling.) The amendment lost by the close vote of 41,079 to 43,732. This was a special election at which four other amendments were voted upon,.all defeated by 231 Art. Ill, § 51 margins of three to one or greater. This was obviously a " coat-tail" phenomenon, for three years later the same amendment was adopted by a vote of 113,549 to 28,534. This was at a general election at which no other amendments were considered. (See Marburger, p. 16.) This new deal lasted only two years. In 1912 a new amendment was adopted. This one removed the ceilings and the $8 a month maximum and substituted the power to levy a property tax, "in addition to all other taxes heretofore permitted by the Constitution of Texas," not exceeding 5¢ on the $100 valuation for the purpose of creating a "special fund for the payment of pensions." (This would seem to mean that the special fund was not to be used to maintain the veterans' home and that there was no limit on how much could be spent on the home. But at this late date, who knows what the amendment meant?) The amendment changed the date of arrival in Texas from January 1, 1880 for men and March 1, 1880 for widows to January 1, 1900 for both sexes. The magic marriage date was also moved to "anterior" to January 1, 1900, but young widows were excluded-no one born "since 1861" could qualify as a widow. (Any widow under age 50, therefore, was considered "young.") The amendment also expanded the definition of soldier to include those who for at least six months during the War between the States either served in the Texas militia or in "organizations" for the protection of the frontier against Indian raids or Mexican marauders. The minimum pension age of 60 and the definition of "disabled" were dropped. Finally, for no apparent reason, the public calamity proviso was dropped. Things remained unchanged until 1924, but only because amendments went down to defeat in 1919 and again in 1921. The two defeated amendments and the successful one in 1924 were identical except for one date-the 1917 proposal would not have let a widow be born after 1866 whereas the other two retained the original "after 1861." (There were idiosyncratic variations among the three versions in the usual bad punctuation of Texas amendments.) There were four substantive changes: (1) the residency and marriage date was moved from 1900 to 1910; (2) the minimum six months' service requirement in the militia and frontier organizations was dropped; (3) the levy was made 7¢ instead of 5¢ and changed from an authorization to a direct levy with legislative power to decrease the tax; and (4) the public calamity proviso was reinstated. The next amendment was adopted in 1928. It simply dropped the residency and marriage dates and deleted the prohibition against pensions for "young" widows. A 20-year-old woman could now marry an 80-year-old veteran and feel secure that she could qualify for a pension-if she were in indigent circumstances, of course. Things remained the same in Section 51 until 1968, but only in the sense that the words of the section remained unchanged. Evidently, the special Confederate fund grew too large. For five years beginning in 1943, the levy was reduced from 7¢ to 2¢. (See Anderson and McMillan, Financing State Government in Texas, at p. 54.) In 1947, Section 17 of Article VII was adopted. The first paragraph thereof "amended" Section 51 by levying a 2¢ tax but with legislative authority to reduce the tax. Evidently, the Confederate fund still continued to generate too much money, for in 1954 Section 51-b of this article was added. It "amended" Section 51 by killing off the special fund, in effect, but directed that the pensions continue to be paid. (See Explanation of Sec. 51~b.) In 1958, Section 66 of Article XVI was added. It "amended" Section 17 of Article VII by directing payment of Texas Ranger pensions from the special Confederate fund. (This appears inconsistent with killing off the fund in the preceding paragraph. Presumably the drafter forgot that the "fund" as such had been abolished.) 232 Art. Ill, § 51 In 1968, the current version of Section 51 was adopted. Simultaneously, Section 1-e of Article VIII was adopted. It "amended" both Section 51 and Section 17 of Article VII. Among other things, Section 1-e kills the 2¢ tax as of December 31, 1976, and directs that, if in the meantime the legislature establishes a new trust fund for Confederate veterans, Texas Rangers, and their widows, the 2¢ tax is to be dropped forthwith . Explanation Section 51 is three things and at one time was four things. First, and principally, it is a limitation on the power of the state, acting through the legislature, to dispense money. Second and third, the section contains two exceptions to that limitation-Confederate pensions and aid in case of a public calamity. Fourth, from .1912 to 1947, the section contained an operative exception to a different limitation-the power of the state to raise money by levying a tax on property. {This is all very confusing. Section 51 contained the words of the exception until the 1968 amendment, but Section 17 of Article VII took over the tax in 1947.) Prohibitions on grants and loans for private purposes came into state constitu- tions in the 19th century as a reaction principally against giving away the public domain to builders of railroads, canals, 'and other "internal improvements." These giveaways had usually been obtained by gross corruption of ·legislatures. The reaction to this was so strong that the resulting prohibitions were frequently cast in extremely restrictive language. This was the case in 1875; the convention not only used harsh language, it kept saying the same thing over and over again. (In addition to Sec. 51, there are Secs. 50 and 52 of this article, Sec. 3 of Art. VIII, Sec. 3 of Art. XI, and Sec. 6 of Art. XVI. Moreover, Secs. 44, 53, 54, and 55 of this article are analogous prohibitions flowing from this same reaction.) The problem with these extreme formulations is that they soon get in the way of all sorts of governmental action that is arguably for a public purpose but looks like a "grant." The Texas story of these sections over the last hundred years has been one of extreme rigidity in some areas, considerable inconsistency in others, and general confusion across the board. Fortunately, over the past 20 years the courts have been pointing the way toward clearing up the confusion by a simple rule: if the grant is for a public purpose the grant is constitutional. Although this is now the principal controlling rule, it is appropriate to discuss another rule that has been used to avoid the prohibition and can continue to be used. The thrust of the new rule is to say that there are ."good" grants, those for a public purpose, and " bad" grants, those for a private purpose. Another approach is to distinguish between a grant and what appears to be but really is not a grant. The formal rule is that a grant is not a grant if the state receives a "quid pro quo." This can be easily illustrated if, as in some state constitutions, the word "gift" is substituted for "grant. " If one says "You're a nice person, I'll give you ten dollars," one has made a gift. But if one says "You're a nice person, I'll give you ten dollars if you'll whitewash the fence," one has made a promise that is enforceable if the person whitewashes the fence. Although the verb "give" is used in both cases, the verb has distinct meanings. Likewise, there is a difference between a statute that "grants" a pension to veterans because they served in the armed forces and a statute that promises to "grant" a pension to employees who work for the state for a specified minimum number of years. If the "grant" is announced in advance and requires something in return, there is a quid pro quo and the "grant" has become something else. The only clear instance of judicial reliance on this "quid pro quo" rule is the landmark pension case of Byrd v. City of Dallas discussed in the Explanation of 233 Art. Ill, § 51 Section 48a of this article. There the commission of appeals made it clear that a pension plan announced in advance is part of the employee's compensation. There are other cases that can be brought under either the "quid pro quo" or the "public purpose" rule, but only because of the fuzzy way in which the court discussed the issue. Consider, for example, Weaver v. Scurry (28 S.W. 836 Tex. Civ. App. 1894, no writ). A state law authorized counties to pay cash bounties for the killing of predatory animals. The court upheld the statute against an attack based on Sections 51 and 52, stating that the bounty was a proper means "by which the public calamity wrought by these animals is to be averted." This is to say that there is_no "grant" because the government got something in return. (It should be noted that this one-page opinion succeeded in confusing everything. Note the words "public calamity" in the quotation, presumably a reference to the public calamity exception in Sec. 51. Moreover, the court cited Sec. 23 of Art. XVI as bringing "the enactment within the scope of legislative powers." This might imply that Sec. 23 created an exception to Secs. 51 and 52.) An even more obscure case is Housing Authority v. Higginbotham (135 Tex. 158, 143 S.W.2d 79 (1940)). This case involved an attack, on multiple constitu- tional grounds, on a state statute authorizing subsidized housing for the poor. The court set out at length the legislative declaration of necessity and relied upon the declaration's assertion that slum clearance would cut down disease and crime and in other ways benefit the entire state. This declaration was used to support the "public use" necessary to justify exercising the power of eminent domain. Later in the opinion the court disposed of the grants-and-loans argument thus: "It necessarily follows from the above holding that the law is not violative of Sections 52 and 53 .. . . " (135 Tex. at 168, 143 S. W.2d at 86. Presumably the court meant Secs. 51 and 52.) There is no way of telling whether the court meant that the benefits to the state were a quid pro quo or that a grant is not a grant if it is for a public purpose. At first blush this appears to be logic chopping of the worst sort. What difference does it make whether a general benefit to the state is called a "quid pro quo" that takes a grant out of the "giveaway" class or is called a "public purpose" and thereby makes the grant constitutional because it is not for a private purpose? In a practical sense there is no difference. As a matter of logical constitutional interpretation there is a profound difference. Sections 3 of Article VII and 6 of Artide XVI prohibit spending for a private purpose. If one follows the standard rule that drafters of legal documents mean what they say, Sections 51 and 52 prohibit grants to private individuals whether for a private or a public purpose. Otherwise, the sections are redundant. The "quid pro quo" rule permits one to use the public purpose as if it were consideration for the grant, thus making the action analogous to a contract and taking it out of the giveaway category. Be all this as it may, Sections 50, 51, and 52 are now to be applied as if they read: "No grant or loan may be made to any person, etc., for a private purpose." There is a line of cases that permits one to reach this conclusion. The first is Bexar County v. Linden, a case which has only the remotest rational connection with Section 51. (The case is discussed in the Explanation of Sec. 1 of Art. XI.) In the course of the opinion the supreme court said: "The giving away of public money, its application to other than strictly governmental purposes, is what the provision is intended to guard against" (110 Tex. 339, 344, 220 S. W. 761 , 762 (1920)). The next significant case was, paradoxically, the clear-cut "quid pro quo" pension case of Byrd v. City of Dallas. In the course of developing the argument that a pension plan is part of compensation, the court said: " . . . , if it is a part of the compensation of such employee for services rendered to the city, or if it be for a public purpose, then clearly it is a valid exercise of the legislative power." (118 -234 Art. Ill! § 51 Tex. 28, 36, 6 S.W.2d 738, 740 (1928) (emphasis added).) Subsequent cases that seem to support this new "public purpose" rule include Davis v. City of Lubbock (160 Tex. 38, 326 S. W.2d 699 (1959)); State v. City of Austin (160 Tex. 348, 331 S.W.2d 737 (1960)); and Harris County v. Dow/earn (489 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ . . App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ refd n. r. e.) ). Actually, the attorney general is principally responsible for taking the cited cases and drawing the new rule from them. In one recent letter advisory, he said: "Expenditures for a true public purpose do not violate Article III, Section 51 of the Constitution... , even when a private agency is used to achieve the purpose" (Tex. Att'y Gen. Letter Advisory No. 6 (1973)). And again:" ... Section 52 does not prohibit the grant of funds or property or credit for a public purpose" (Tex. Att'y Gen. Letter Advisory No. 9 (1973)). (See also Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. Nos. H-120 (1973); M-391 (1969); C-584 (1966); C-530 (1965).) Under the new rule, the question is, of course, whether the grant or loan is for a public purpose. In a sense this is no more than asking whether the public benefit is too remote, indirect, or general to serve as a "quid pro quo." In 1973 the attorney general refused to approve an issue of revenue bonds by the City of McAllen for the purchase of land to be used for industrial development. (In 1968 an amendment permitting this had been defeated. See the History of Sec. 52.) The city sought leave to file a mandamus action to compel approval of the bonds, but the supreme court overruled the city's motion (City of McAllen v. Hill, No. B-4315, 17 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 128). In a 1974 opinion on an analogous proposal, the attorney general discussed his earlier refusal to approve the McAllen revenue bonds and concluded: ". . . it is not considered a public purpose within this legal context, when municipal credit is used to obtain for the community and its citizens the general benefits resulting from the operation of a private industry." (See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. H-357 (1974).) The question raised in Opinion No. H-357 was whether a city could give a promissory note to the United States for surplus land under terms that precluded the city from ever being liable on the note. The note was to be paid off out of rents received for the use of, or proceeds from sales of, the land. As in the case of McAllen, the land would be used for industrial purposes. The attorney general's conclusion was: "It is not constitutionally permissible for a city. to purchase land for future industrial development by means of a promissory note to be paid out of revenues generated by the land without recourse to the city when the benefit to the public from such a purchase is such benefit as may be derived from the attraction of new industry." It is fair to speculate whether opinions such as this would be forthcoming if the constitution contained no "grants and loans" prohibition. Would it be so clear that a lending of municipal credit in order to further the general well-being of the community and to increase the city's tax base was not for a public purpose if the constitution were silent about whom the credit was extended to? Obviously, what is a public purpose is a matter of judgment. Even under the new rule that any grant or lending of credit is constitutional if the grant or loan is for a public purpose, it seems likely that Sections 50, 51, and 52 will have some influence on the person trying to make a judgment about whether a public purpose is involved. To put it another way, old habits are hard to break; people frequently look at problems the same way that they always did. Consider, for example, the attorney general's advice concerning a bill that would indemnify members, officers, and employees of the legislature against financial loss arising out of a claim based on negligence or other acts resulting from the maintenance of order in the legislature. The attorney general said: " Our Constitution prohibits grants of public moneys to an individual in Sec. 51 of Article III. If the state itself is liable for the loss, indemnification would be valid but if there is no liability upon the part of the State 235 Art. Ill, § 51 as where a claim is barred by governmental immunity, the use of public money to pay a claim owed by an individual is a gift or donation in violation of the Constitution." (Tex. Att'y Gen. Letter Advisory No. 33 (1973). See also Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. H-70 (1973).) This sounds like the workmen's compensation problem all over again. (See the History of Sec. 59 of this article.) Indemnification becomes a grant because the state may assert the comnion law rule of sovereign immunity. (See the following Author's Comment.) But the real problem is that the attorney general apparently forgot his earlier statement: "Expenditures for a true public purpose do not violate Article III, Sec. .51 of the Constitution." It can certainly be argued convincingly that a public purpose is served if the state tells its employees that they may carry out their duties without fear of financial loss. The public interest is not served if employees are afraid to do their job for fear that they will be sued and that their employer will not pick up the tab. (See also Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. H-15 (1973) where the attorney general implies that a death benefit payable to the beneficiaries of a deceased county employee would be a prohibited grant under Sec. 52. There is no discussion of public purpose.) There remains the question of the meaning of the new "public purpose" rule as it applies to grants to municipal corporations-a term which, in effect, means any local government. In the normal sense of the terin, a grant by the state to a county, a city, a school district, or any other political subdivision could hardly be for a "private purpose." Presumably, the new statement of the rule equates "public purpose" with "state purpose." In other words, the state can grant money to a local government engaged in activity of interest to the state, but not for activity of interest only to the local government. For example, a grant to a city for a sewage treatment plant might be for a state public purpose whereas a grant to the same city to buy a privately owned public utility might be considered a "private" purpose. (But see the following Author's Comment.) Finally, this new equating-of Section 51 with public purposes leavesthe public calamity exception out in left field. Since a public calamity is a public purpose par excellence, the exception has withered away. But then the exception apparently is really only an exception to Section 6 of Article VIII, which limits appropriations to two ·years. In Dallas County v. Mccombs, the supreme court disallowed a five-year state grant of state ad valorem taxes to counties during the Great Depression. The ground was the violation of Section 6 of Article VIII. Other instances of long-term grants of such taxes were distinguished because they were for real public calamities whereas in the case before the court the legislative declaration of calamities was too general to qualify under Section 51. (135 Tex. 272, 140 S.W.2d 1109 (1940).) Comparative Analysis About half the states have a grants and loans prohibition. Some of the states have added exception,s, usually in terms of aiding the poor. Two of the newest constitutions, Illinois and Montana, omit the earlier restrictions, both of which were aimed directly at aid to railroads. The new Louisiana Constitution preserves the prohibition with a typical set of exceptions. Neither the Mode/State Constitu- tion nor the United States Constitution has a comparable provision. Author's Comment One wonders whether the 1894 amendment mentioned above is the first Critz theory amendment. (See Author's Comment on Sec. 62 of Art. XVI.) In the light of Section 2 of Article XI calling for the establishment of county poor houses and farms, there could hardly have been any doubt that the state had the power to 236 · Art. Ill, § 51-a operate. a poor house for Confederate veterans. One can only conclude that the amendment was a device to get public approval of the program. Once the unneces- sary provision got into the constitution, every change would naturally follow the same route. It was suggested earlier that a grant to a municipal corporation to buy a private public utility might be considered for a "private purpose." Actually, the problem of grants to municipal corporations should be considered a problem of general versus local laws. If the state offered grants to any and all municipalities that wished to carry out some local "proprietary" function, there would be no need to argue that a private purpose was involved. (For "proprietary functions," see Explanation ofSec. 1 of Art. XI.) If the grant were only to cities with populations between 192,567 and 192,569, the better approach would be to strike down the law as local rather than say that. it was a grant for a private purpose. In any event, revenue sharing is now "in." A Section 51 prohibiting grants to local governments is a restriction whose time has gone. It was also suggested that, notwithstanding the new "public purpose" broom, the "grants and loans" muddle has not been wholly swept away. The recent letter advisory discussed earlier (Tex. Att'y Gen. Letter Advisory No. 33) demonstrated that the sovereign immunity doctrine is stronger than "public purpose." If the state abandoned sovereign immunity there would be no Section 51 problem. To indemnify a public officer or employee for acts for which his employer, the government, is not liable would be spending money for a "private" purpose. But a law that indemnifies the officer or employee for acts for which the government would be liable if'it were to waive its immunity is in effect an indirect waiver of immunity and an expenditure for a public purpose. It must be conceded that an agency of the state has no authority to carry liability insurance to cover a tort which is not covered by the Tort Claims Act, for that would be thwarting the legislative policy not to waive immunity. But even here, it is not appropriate to rely on Section 51. The vice is not a grant for a private purpose but an unauthorized administrative act. On this basis the attorney general's opinion cited previously (Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. H-70 (1973)) is undoubtedly correct; his reliance on Sections 51 and 52 is subject to question. If the legislature specifically authorizes liability insurance for an act for which the government could be held liable absent sovereign immunity, Sections 51 and 52 are red herrings diverting attention from the real issue of indirect waiver of sovereign immunity. (See also the Author's Comments on Sec. 59 of this article. and Sec. l of Art. XI.) Assuming that today Section 51 means simply that money can be spent only for a public purpose, then the section should be dropped. A requirement that public money be spent for public purposes is reasonable. It is not reasonable to state the requirement several different ways, especially if one of the ways is literally saying something else. (For an exposition of the more traditional distinction between "public purpose" and "grants and loans," see Willatt, "Constitutional Restrictions on Use of Public Money and Public Credit," 38 Texas Bar J. 413 (1975).) • Sec: 51-a. ASSISTANCE GRANTS AND MEDICAL CARE FOR NEEDY AGED, DISABLED AND BLIND PERSONS, AND NEEDY CHILDREN; FED- ERAL FUNDS; SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS. The Legislature shall have the power, by General Laws, to provide, subject to limitations herein contained, and such other limitations, restrictions and regulations as may by the Legislature be deemed expedient, for assistance grants to and/or medical care for, and for rehabilitation and any other services included in the federallaws as they now read or as they may hereafter be amended, providing matching funds to help such families and individuals attain or 259 Art. Ill, § 52 prohibition in the original section. Be all this as it may, the effect of the Collingsworth opinion is to make the earlier flat statement true in fact. For Collings- worth concludes (a) that the original Section 52 did not prohibit issuing bonds for purposes for which counties and other local governments could spend money and (b) that the 1904 amendment broadened rather than restricted· that preexisting power. Thus, Collingsworth leaves the lending prohibition with only its natural grammatical meaning. Subsection (a). Although this subsection is the "local" version of Sections 50 and 51, the Explanation of Section 51 covers both "grants" and "loans" as such, whether the government involved is the state or a local unit. Thus, that explanation covers this subsection. Subsection (b). This subsection is part of the constitutional tax structure and can be understood only after a review of the tax sections, particularly Section 9 of Article VIII. (See History and Explanation of that section.) The primary original purpose of the subsection was to provide additional means for raising capital funds for water and for roads. With the adoption of Section 59 of Article XVI in 1917, the water power of Subsection (b) became almost but not quite obsolete; there are still some Section 52 water districts around. To avoid duplication of coverage, the constitutional problems of water districts will be discussed under Section 59 of Article XVI. Road districts are a different matter. They still exist and will continue even though the state long ago took over many county roads for the state highway system. (There is a long story concerning the takeover of county roads but the problems involved do not arise from Section 52. The leading cases are Robbins v. Limestone County, 114 Tex. 345, 268 S.W. 915 (1925), and Jefferson County v. Board of County and District Road Indebtedness, 143 Tex. 99, 182 S.W.2d 908 (1944).) Road districts are not "special districts" in the technical sense of an independent unit of government with fiscal and administrative power to provide particular services. A road district is a "body corporate" that can sue and be sued (Horn v. Matagorda County, 213 S.W. 934 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted)), but it exists solely as a geographical unit for the purpose of determining who is to vote and to be taxed for a bond issue for road construction. The issuing of the bonds, the levying of the tax, and the construction of roads are handled by the county commissioners court. Subsection (b) authorizes a road district covering more than one county, but the legislature has authorized only whole counties so to combine to form a road district. (Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 778a (1964). See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 0-4214 (1941).) Since the road district exists in practice only as a money-raising unit, the judicial gloss on Subsection (b) is limited substantially to questions concerning bond issues. For example, the proceeds of a bond issue must be used for the roads that the election specified would be built. (Fletcher v. Howard, 120 Tex. 298, 39 S.W.2d 32 (1931).) Although the section speaks of "macadamized, graveled or paved roads," "paved" has been interpreted loosely to cover almost anything that makes a road reasonably permanent. (Aransas County v. Coleman-Fulton Pasture Co., 108 Tex. 223, 191 S.W. 556 (1917); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 0-3652 (1941).) Bond money of a road district that includes a city may be spent on city streets that are part of a highway system (see City of Breckenridge v. Stephens County, 120 Tex. 318, 40 S.W.2d 43 (1931)); but a city may issue its own bonds for city streets that are part of the highway system. Such bonds are not subject to the limitations of Subsection (b). (Se-e Lucchese v. Mauerman, 195 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1946, writ refd n.r.e. ), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 812 (1947).) It must be kept in mind at all times that Section 9 of Article VIII and 351 Art. IV, § 22 Constitution. At the 1875 Convention the delegates added the duty to authenticate publi- cation of the laws and added a sentence fixing his salary at $2,000 annually. There was an effort to make the office elective and extensive debate about the amount of his salary but none on the deletion of "elect" following "Governor" in the 1869 phrase. (See Debates, pp. 162-63, 166, 256-57.) In 1936 an amendment increased the salary for the office to $6,000 annually, and in 1954 an amendment removed the constitutional limitation on salary, but a companion amendment prohibited the legislature from setting the salary at less than $6,000. (See Art. III, Sec. 61.) Explanation With one exception, this sectiori is self-explanatory. The peculiar wording about the tenure of the office suggests that a governor who succeeds to the office when vacant can select his own secretary of state. That construction was more plausible under the earlier constitutions, when the tenure was the "term of service of the Governor elect," but there is no indication that the 1875 delegates intended to make a change, for if they had, it easily could have been clearer. Comparative Analysis Most states have a constitutional secretary of state. A majority make it an elective office, and two provide for filling it by a joint .vote of the legislature. Almost all states'provide that the duties of the office ar~ to be prescribed by law, and a substantial percentage provide some constitutional duties ranging from ex officio membership on boards to attending to the governor, council, and legis- lature. There is no secretary of state provided by the Model State Constitution. Author's Comment Constitutional debate about the secretary of state usually involves the necessity of making it a constitutional office. The Author's Comment on Section 16 points out that two states have made the officer who performs the duties of the.secretary of state the successor to the governor. Unless the secretary of state performs this rol~, however, there seems little justification for maintaining his constitutional status. Sec. 22. A TIORNEY GENERAL. The Attorney General elected at the general election in 1974, and thereafter, shall hold office for four years and until his successor is duly qualified. He shall represent the State in all suits and pleas in the Supreme Court of the State in which the State may be a party, and shall especially inquire into the charter rights of all private corporations, and from time to time, in the name of the State, take such action in the courts as may be proper and necessary to prevent any private corporation from exercising any power or demanding or collecting any species of taxes, tolls, freight or wharfage not authorized by law. He shall, whenever sufficient cause exists, seek a judicial forfeiture of such charters, unless otherwise expressly directed by law, and give legal advice in writing to the Governor and other executive officers, when requested by them, and perform such other duties as may be required by law. He shall reside at the seat of government during his continuance in office. He shall receive for his services an annual salary in an amount to be fixed by the Legislature. History The 1845 Constitution created the constitutional office of attorney general in the judicial article. He was appointed by the governor, with advice and consent of 352 Art. IV,§ 22 the senate, to a two-year term, and his duties and salary were prescribed by statute. An amendment in 1850 made the office elective, and the 1861 Consti- tution retained the 1845 language and the 1850 amendment. • In the 1866 Constitution the office remained in the judicial article. He was elected to a four-year term, required to reside in the capital and perform duties fixed by law, and received, . in addition to perquisites, an annual salary fixed at $3,000 that could not be "increased or diminished during his term of office." The 1869 Constitution moved the office into the executive article and provided that it be filled by appointment of the governor with senate confirmation. Again, the attorney general had to reside in the capital and served for four years. In addition to the duties required by law, he was to "represent the interests of the State in all suits or pleas in the Supreme Court in which the State may be a party; superintend, instruct, and direct the official action of the district attorneys so as to secure all fines and forfeitures, all escheated estates, and all public moneys to be collected by suit; and . . . when necessary, giving legal advice in writing to all officers of the government. .. . " (See Tex. Const. Art. IV, Sec. 23 (1869).) Only the 1869 Constitution imposed qualifications (same as the governor) on the office. The 1876 Constitution again made the office elective and reduced its term to two years. The attorney general's compensation was an annual salary of $2,000 "besides such fees as may be prescribed by law; provided, that the· fees which he may receive shall not amount to more than two thousand dollars annually." The delegates to the 1875 Convention without much debate added lengthy instructions to the attorney general about corporate charters and illegal corporate actions or charges. (See Journal, p. 295; Debates, pp. 163-64.) In 1936 an amendment increased the attorney general's salary to $10,000 and deleted the fee provisions. In 1954 another amendment adopted the present language on compensation while a companion amendment prohibited the legis- lature from setting the salary at less than $10,000. {See Art. III, Sec. 61.) A 1972 amendment increased the term of the office to four years. Explanation The provisions of this section regarding the attorney general's term of office, residence, and compensation are simple and straightforward. If the powers and duties of the office had been left to be prescribed by law, Section 22 would have caused few problems. Since some powers and duties were included, however, the meaning of the section has been a continuous source of litigation and speculation. One of the first questions to arise involved the relationship between the attorney general and the county and district attorneys. Article V, Section 21, provides that the county and district attorneys " shall represent the State in all cases in the District and inferior courts," and this section requires the attorney general to "representthe State in all suits and pleas in the Supreme Court." Presumably, the draftsmen intended the local state's attorneys to handle trials and the attorney general to handle appellate work. If that was so, Section 22 was incomplete because the constitution directed no one to appear for the state in the court of appeals, which appeared in the 1876 Constitution as it was originally adopted. (The court of criminal appeals and courts of civil appeals replaced the court of appeals in 1891. See the History of Art. V, Sec. 1.) Apparently, the Committee on the Executive Department, whose report the convention considered and finally adopted four days before the Committee on the Judicial Department had even reported (Journal, pp. 375, 406), anticipated that the judiciary article would provide only one appellate court-'-a supreme court-as had been the case in all the prior state constitutions. (See the History of Art. V, Sec. 1.) In fact , the report of 353 Art. IV,§ 22 the Committee on the Judicial Department provided only for the supreme court. (Journal, pp. 406-22.) The convention added the court of appeals during floor debate more than 20 days after final adoption of the executive article (Journal, p. 640), and apparently no one remembered to go back and add the court of appeals to this section. • Shortly after adoption of the constitution, Justice Stayton, who had been a delegate to the 1875 Convention, stated for the supreme court that indeed the constitution divided responsibility for representing the state with the attorney general to appear before the supreme court and county and district attorneys to appear in trial courts. (The legislature could determine who would represent the state before the court of appeals.) This constitutional division of a~thority was mandatory, and a statute could not authorize the attorney general to file suit in behalf of the state without express constitutional authorization. (State v. Moore, 57 Tex. 307 (1882).) Such a division of authority proved impracticable, however. As a supreme court opinion in a later case pointed out (see following citation for Brady v. Brooks), county and district attorneys are elected locally and they are elected primarily to perform their principal function-prosecution of criminal cases. Their independence of any statewide authority made it impossible to apply a uniform policy in the initiation (or defense) of suits on behalf of the state. Perhaps for those reasons the legislature ignored Moore and continued to direct the attorney general to sue on behalf of the state to collect delinquent taxes, recover state lands, etc. Finally, in Brady v. Brooks (99 Tex. 366, 89 S.W. 1052 (1905)) the supreme court ruled that the phrase in Section 22 directing the attorney general to "perform such other duties as may be required by law" empowers the legislature "to create causes of action in favor of the state, and to make it the exclusive duty [of the attorney general] to prosecute such suits" in trial as well as appellate courts. Since Brady the courts have emphasized repeatedly that the attorney general may be given trial duties when the legislature creates a new or additional cause of action. (See Smith v. State, 160 Tex. 256, 328 S.W.2d 294 (1959); Maud v. Terrell, 109 Tex. 97, 200 s.w. 375 (1918).) The Brady rule that the attorney general may appear for the state in trial court only to enforce a new cause of action in favor of the state has not been explored further. No reported opinion has ruled that a cause of action the attorney general sought to enforce pursuant to a statutory authorization was an old or preexisting one that is to be enforced exclusively by county and district attorneys. One case, however, ruled that the attorney general may not be given exclusive authority to prosecute criminal offenses, but the court declined to decide whether he may be authorized to prosecute crimes in instances in which local state's attorneys refuse to prosecute. (See Shepperd v. Alaniz, 303 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1957, no writ).) In practice, the Moore-Brady rule that the trial-appellate division of powers in this section and Article V, Section 21, is exclusive has been ignored. The attorney general frequently appears for the state at the trial level, sometimes without statutory authorization, and district and county attorneys usually appear before the supreme court in appeals of cases they handled in trial court. The ,attorney general's constitutional powers respecting private corporations have also required judicial clarification. Soon after adoption of this constitution the supreme court ruled that the attorney general's supervisory powers over private corporations authorize him to institute and maintain suit to prevent or redress illegal acts by private corporations even in the absence of a statute and that his power to do so is exclusive and may not be exercised by or given by law to the county and district attorneys. (State v. Paris Ry., 55 Tex. 76 (1881); State v. International & G.N.R. Co., 89 Tex. 562, 35 S. W. 1067 (1896). Prior to Brady, this 354 Art. IV,§ 22 was the attorney general's only constitutional authority to appear in trial court.) The attorney general may not sue a corporation when only private rights are involved, however; injury to the public generally must have occurred or be imminent. (State v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 81 Tex. 530, 17 S.W. 60 (1891).) Thus if a public utility seeks to charge unreasonably high rates, the attorney general may, at least in the absence of governmental regulation of rates, institute suit to prevent imposition of the unreasonable rates. (State v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 526 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. 1975).) This section and Article V, Section 22, in defining who may represent the state, are exclusive. The legislature may not authorize a private citizen to maintain suit on behalf of the state (American Liberty Pipe Line Co. v. Agey, 167 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1942), affd,,141 Tex. 379, 172 S.W.2d 972 (1943)). More importantly, the legislature may not authorize another state, county, or district office or agency to employ attorneys to represent its and, hence, the state's interest in court unless the agency's attorney acts as a subordinate to and with approval of the attorney general or a county or district attorney. (Maud v. Terrell, 109 Tex. 97, 200 S. W. 375 (1918).) Perhaps because the caseloads in some instances have become too burdensome for the state's attorneys and their staffs, the legislature occasionally authorizes other attorneys to represent the state in court (presumably as a special assistant state's attorney), if the attorney general or a local state's attorney approves. (See, e.g., Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 7335a.) The legislature has created an office of state's attorney, appointed by the court of criminal appeals and independent of the constitutional state's attorneys, to represent the state before the court of criminal appeals. (See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1811.) Presumably, the legislature concluded that it could do so because this section mentions only appearances for the state before the supreme court. An early case stated that the attorney general may act only if he has constitutional or statutory authority to do so. (Day Land & Cattle Co. v. State, 68 Tex. 526, 4 S.W. 865 (1887) (Stayton, J.). See also Garcia v. Laughlin, 155 Tex. 261, 285 S. W.2d 191 (1955); State ex rel. Downs v. Harney, 164 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1942, writ refd w.o.m. ).) Several attorneys general have contended, however, that the office has inherent, common-law powers (e.g., Shepperd, "Common Law Powers and Duties of the Attorney General," 7 Baylor L. Rev. 1 (1955)), and gratuitous statements in a few early decisions support the contention (e.g., Queen Ins. Co. v. State, 22 S.W. 1048, 1052 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 86 Tex. 250, 24 S.W. 397 (1893)). In fact, the attorney general has been representing the state on the assumption that he has common-law authority to do so in federal habeas corpus proceedings, for example. (See Taylor, "Modernizing the Powers of the Attorney General of Texas," 36 Texas Bar J. 51 (1973).) The issue has not yet been decided by the courts. It is not inconceivable that the courts ultimately may decide that the office has implied or common-law powers to represent the state in situations in which the constitution and the statutes are silent. Yet the Brady case and the express constitutional requirement that county and district attorneys represent the state in trial courts appear to be insuperable obstacles to any implied power to institute or defend suits in state courts. The attorney general's constitutional duty to render advisory opinions has caused no problems. Indeed, the constitutional duty has been supplanted by broader statutory responsibilities (Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4399). Comparative Analysis The attorney general is a constitutional officer in most states and is elected in about half. In one state he is appointed by the supreme court to an eight-year term, 355 Art. IV,§ 22 His term of office is usually the same as the governor's, and his duties are usually prescribed by law, although several states also prescribe some duties in the constitution. Only a few constitutions require the attorney general to be an attorney. The Model State Constitution does not mention a chief law officer. Author's Comment It is because of the excessive detail about the duties of the attorney general (and of the county and district attorneys) that this section has caused so much litigation. If the 1875 Convention had abandoned the 1869 Constitution's specifi- cation of duties and returned to the form of the first three state constitutions, which left all the attorney general's duties to be prescribed by law, a century of jurisdictional clashes with local state's attorneys probably would not have occurred. Moreover, if the 1875 Convention's Committee on the Executive Department had paid closer attention to the effect of the changes it was making it might have foreseen the unworkability of divided authority to represent the state. The 1869 Constitution directed the attorney general to represent the state before the appellate court, but it also gave him supervisory power over local state's attorneys in most civil cases. (See the History of this section.) Thus the 1869 division of authority made sense. At least in theory, the cases the attorney general handled on appeal had been tried by his subordinates. The committee probably was displeased , with the theoretical subordination of local state's attorneys to the attorney general, but their retention of the 1869 Constitution's division of authority without any central supervision over the local trial attorneys undoubtedly created as many problems as it solved. It may have appeared convenient to delegates who had come long distances to the convention, probably on horseback over poor or nonexistent roads, to let the attorney general stay in the capital and the local state's attorneys stay in their localities, but had the delegates questioned the need for preserving that convenience in the constitution, particularly in light of the change they made in the status of the local state's attorneys, they might have elected to return to the .language of earlier constitutions. Traditionally, the primary state function of county and district attorneys has been the prosecution of criminal cases. The connotations of the label "district attorney" should be sufficient to preserve that function. If the constitution must expressly divide authority to represent the state, however, it should go no further than to specify the local state's attorneys' criminal responsibilities. Section 22 also illustrates the importance of convention procedures in deter- mining the content of the convention's proposal. The task of drafting a constitution probably cannot be handled successfully without dividing its parts among several committees. Usually there are committees on the executive article, the legislative article, the judiciary, local government, etc. The product of each committee, however, is part of a single document, and all its parts must mesh. Close coordination between committees is imperative, but even this is not enough. It was not the lack of committee coordination that led the 1875 Convention to overlook inclusion of the court of appeals in this section; that court was written into the judicial article during floor debate after the executive article had been finally approved. Final approval of each article should await preliminary approval of all articles, and the convention ~hould prescribe some procedure for detecting the impact of a change made in one article on other articles and for making the necessary modifications prior to final approval. TAB 7 FILED 22-0224 4/7/2022 4:52 PM tex-63382247 SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS BLAKE A. HAWTHORNE, CLERK No. 22-0224 In the Supreme Court of Texas Warren K. Paxton, in his official capacity as Attorney General of Texas; Shawn Dick, in his official capacity as Williamson County District Attorney, Defendants-Appellants, v. Isabel Longoria; Cathy Morgan, Plaintiffs-Appellees. On Certified Questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit BRIEF FOR APPELLANT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS Ken Paxton Judd E. Stone II Attorney General of Texas Solicitor General Brent Webster Lanora C. Pettit First Assistant Attorney General Principal Deputy Solicitor General State Bar No. 24115221 Office of the Attorney General Lanora.Pettit@oag.texas.gov P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059) Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Beth Klusmann Tel.: (512) 936-1700 Assistant Solicitor General Fax: (512) 474-2697 Cody C. Coll Assistant Attorney General Counsel for the Attorney General of Texas — 37 — speech, but it prevents the Court from prematurely resolving the question based on the record before it. 13 III. The Attorney General Cannot Seek Civil Penalties Under Texas Election Code Section 31.129. The last question certified by the Fifth Circuit is whether the Attorney General can bring a suit for civil penalties under Texas Election Code section 31.129. Longo- ria, 2022 WL 832239, at *7. That answer will inform but not determine whether Plaintiffs’ suit against the Attorney General is barred by sovereign immunity, as he must have “some connection” to enforcement in order to avoid dismissal under Ex parte Young.14 Because the Legislature did not explicitly grant the Attorney General the authority to seek these particular penalties on behalf of the State, the answer to the third certified question is “no”—though that does not mean that the Attorney General entirely lacks means to enforce section 276.016. 13 As a practical matter, Longoria’s claims will also soon be moot. This Court has set the case for argument on May 11, two days before applications to vote by mail are due for the May 2022 primary runoff—the last election before her resignation will be effective. Compare KHOU 11, supra n.4, with Texas Secretary of State, Important Election Dates 2021-2022, https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/voter/important- election-dates.shtml (visited April 5, 2022). 14 Ex parte Young also requires Plaintiffs to show that the Attorney General has demonstrated the willingness to exercise any enforcement authority he may possess. City of Austin v. Paxton, 943 F.3d 993, 1001-02 (5th Cir. 2019). They have not done so; their allegations show merely that Paxton “has chosen to intervene to defend different statutes under different circumstances,” which is insufficient under federal law. Id. at 1002. — 38 — A. Under the Texas Constitution, the Attorney General requires legislative authorization to represent the State in a state trial court. The Texas Constitution generally splits the duty of representing the State be- tween the Attorney General and the district and county attorneys based on the court in which an action will be pursued. Tex. Const. art. IV, § 22; id. art. V, § 21. District and county attorneys “shall represent the State in all cases in the District and inferior courts in their respective counties.” Id. art. V, § 21. The Attorney General’s consti- tutional duties include representing the State in this Court and in certain trial-court actions involving corporations and charters. Id. art. IV, § 22. He may also “perform such other duties as may be required by law.” Id. Under this Court’s jurisprudence, the “other duties” clause permits the Legis- lature to assign other duties to the Attorney General that may include representing the State in trial court, notwithstanding the general assignment of that duty to the district and county attorneys. El Paso Elec. Co. v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins., 937 S.W.2d 432, 438 (Tex. 1996); see also, e.g., Brady v. Brooks, 89 S.W. 1052, 1055 (Tex. 1905) (noting the district and county attorneys’ constitutional duties do not deprive the Legisla- ture of “the authority to empower the Attorney General to bring suits on behalf of the state”). Giving the example of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 101.103, the Court has explained that “[w]hile there is no general statute authorizing the Attorney General to represent the State and its agencies in district court, the — 39 — Legislature has provided for such representation in particular types of cases.” El Paso Elec. Co., 937 S.W.2d at 438-39. 15 Under this precedent, when the Legislature wants the Attorney General to be able bring a cause of action on behalf of the State, it typically must explicitly authorize the Attorney General to do so. “[I]t is clear that when the Legislature creates a new or additional cause of action in favor of the State it may also constitutionally authorize the Attorney General to prosecute such cause of action in both the trial and appellate courts of the State.” Smith, 328 S.W.2d at 295 (emphasis added). But this Court has generally required a clear statement that “expressly authorized the Attorney Gen- eral, as well as any District or County Attorney, to institute and prosecute the statu- tory suit thus created.” Id. at 294-95; Brady, 89 S.W. at 1053 (examining a statute stating that “[t]he Attorney General is authorized and required upon request by the Comptroller, to bring suit in the name of the state”). Because “magic words” rules are disfavored, it may be possible that the overall statutory context will permit the Attorney General to bring suit without express au- thorization. For example, in an unrelated context, this Court has found that while sovereign immunity can typically be waived only by extremely clear language, it can also be waived “on rare occasions” based on a larger statutory framework 15 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently rejected this Court’s reasoning on this important constitutional question. Stephens, 2021 WL 5917198, at *8 (stating that this Court “erroneously” interpreted the “other duties” clause). Because that holding is limited to criminal proceedings, it does not impact the application of this Court’s precedent on civil penalties such as those at issue here. — 40 — demonstrating that “the Legislature has clearly and unambiguously waived sover- eign immunity.” Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 697 (Tex. 2003). But the Court made clear that the standard for showing such a waiver absent “magic words” is quite high. The Attorney General is unaware of any cases where this Court has explained when (if ever) statutory context can authorize the Attorney General to bring suit in state trial court absent an express grant of authority. But the Austin Court of Appeals has applied not dissimilar factors to those set out in Taylor to find authorization for the Attorney General to pursue a cause of action for civil penalties under section 242.065 of the Texas Health and Safety Code. State v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, 981 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.). In partic- ular, the court found authorization from the overall role of the Attorney General in the statutory scheme as well as a provision that required the Attorney General “to cooperate in any legal proceeding requested by” the defendant department. Id. at 511-14 (citing Tex. Health & Safety Code § 242.073) (emphasis omitted). Absent such clear evidence of legislative authorization, this Court has typically found that such authorization was lacking. For example, in Day Land & Cattle Co. v. State, neither the Attorney General nor the district attorney had authority to bring suit for the cancellation of land patents at the time the Attorney General filed such a suit. 4 S.W. 865, 867 (Tex. 1887). The Court stated that “it would be difficult to hold that either of them had the implied power resulting from the general grants of power or imposition of duties” and that “no power ought to be exercised for which warrant is not there found.” Id. The Legislature, however, subsequently passed a law — 41 — retroactively approving such suits by the Attorney General, and the Court concluded that “the suit must stand as though the attorney general and district attorney had express authority to institute and maintain it.” Id. at 867-68. More recently, the San Antonio Civil Court of Appeals considered a statute that did not explicitly give the Attorney General the authority to seek removal of a county officer in a nepotism case. State ex rel. Downs v. Harney, 164 S.W.2d 55, 57-58 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1942, writ ref’d w.o.m.). It concluded that, because the statute did not mention that the Attorney General could bring such actions, he was prohibited from doing so—even though he was permitted to seek similar relief in quo warranto proceedings. Id. at 58. This Court later approved that decision, stating that “had such holding been incorrect we could not have failed to have granted the writ on such an important law question.” Garcia v. Laughlin, 285 S.W.2d 191, 194 (Tex. 1955). B. The Legislature has not clearly authorized the Attorney General to represent the State in seeking civil penalties under section 31.129 in trial courts. While the Attorney General is involved in various capacities in Texas’s elec- tions, the Legislature has not clearly authorized him to bring a claim in a trial court for civil penalties under section 31.129. Section 31.129 itself is silent on who may en- force its substantive requirements. More generally, the Election Code “delineates between the authority of the Secretary of State and local officials” and leaves rela- tively little role for the Attorney General in directly enforcing its terms. Tex. Demo- cratic Party, 978 F.3d at 179. Although the Attorney General frequently represents — 42 — the Secretary of State in election-related litigation, and the Secretary can refer a vio- lation to the Attorney General for enforcement, Tex. Elec. Code § 31.005(c), there is no provision in the Election Code similar to that in Evangelical Lutheran, which requires the Secretary “work in close cooperation” with the Attorney General “throughout any legal proceedings requested by the department.” Tex. Health & Safety Code § 242.073(a); see also Evangelical Lutheran, 981 S.W.2d at 512 (discuss- ing Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 242.073, .320). This silence is telling as the Legislature has demonstrated that it is well aware of how to assign a duty to the Attorney General. Indeed, elsewhere in S.B. 1 itself, the Legislature assigned the Attorney General the duty to collect a different civil penalty. See Tex. Elec. Code § 18.065(f). That language would have been unnecessary if the Attorney General had the inherent or implicit authority to bring suit on behalf of the State. Because section 31.129 does not expressly permit the Attorney General to sue for civil penalties, it is unlikely that this is an “other duty” given to the Attorney General by the Legislature. The answer to the third certified question, therefore, is “no”—at least so far as it applies to initiating a claim for civil penalties under section 31.129 in trial court. C. The Attorney General retains authority to enforce Texas election laws by other means and in other circumstances. The lack of authority to bring civil penalties under section 31.129 does not, how- ever, mean the Attorney General is without any authority to enforce provisions of the Election Code. In specifying the remedies available for violation of the anti-solic- itation provision, S.B. 1 preserved pre-existing remedies not once but twice. See S.B. — 43 — 1 § 7.04 (codified at Tex. Elec. Code § 276.016(f) (noting that the criminal remedy is “cumulative” and that a violation “is subject to injunctive relief or mandamus as provided by this code”)); id. § 8.01 (codified at Tex. Elec. Code § 31.130 (specifying that an official-capacity action “including an action for a writ of mandamus” be brought against the officer in his official capacity)). This preservation of remedies was made in the context of this Court’s decision in Hollins, which allowed the Attor- ney General to use an ultra vires action to rein in election officials who intended to violate the law. See generally 620 S.W.3d 400. Moreover, the Election Code has long provided for proceedings to “compel the performance of any duty imposed by law in connection with the holding of an election or a political party convention” directly in this Court under Texas Election Code section 273.061(a). By preserving that as an available remedy, the Legislature presumptively intended the Attorney General to retain some enforcement role—albeit in a highly discretionary context—because the Attorney General is the government actor empowered to represent the State in this Court. Tex. Const. art. IV, § 22. 16 With respect to criminal violations, the Attorney General retains the authority to investigate violations of election laws, Tex. Elec. Code §§ 31.006(b), 273.001(a), and may assist a local prosecutor or be deputized by one to bring criminal charges, 16 That authority would also presumptively require the Attorney General to repre- sent the State on appeal from a suit brought by a county or district attorney for civil penalties under section 31.129. But the Attorney General does not understand that to be the thrust of the Fifth Circuit’s question since it would not allow him to initiate enforcement actions as required under Ex parte Young. See, e.g., Tex. All. for Retired Ams. v. Scott, 28 F.4th 669 (5th Cir. 2022). — 44 — Stephens, 2021 WL 5917198, at *10. He can also seek an injunction or mandamus at the request of the Secretary of State if a person refuses to abide by an order of the Secretary and is impeding the right to vote. Tex. Elec. Code § 31.005. And there remain specific provisions of the Election Code that identify the Attorney General as having authority to bring suit. E.g., Id. §§ 18.065(f), 34.005(a), 122.0911(c). But because that language is not present in section 31.129, it does not grant him the au- thority to seek the civil penalties that section provides. — 45 — Prayer The Court should answer the Fifth Circuit’s questions as follows: 1. No, VDRs are not “public officials” under Texas Election Code section 276.016. 2. “Solicits” requires importuning or strongly urging someone to submit an application for a mail-in ballot and does not include merely providing information. 3. No, the Attorney General is not a proper official to seek the specific penalties authorized by Texas Election Code section 31.129, but he may enforce the anti-solicitation provision through other means. Respectfully submitted. Ken Paxton Judd E. Stone II Attorney General of Texas Solicitor General Brent Webster /s/ Lanora C. Pettit First Assistant Attorney General Lanora C. Pettit Principal Deputy Solicitor General Office of the Attorney General State Bar No. 24115221 P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059) Lanora.Pettit@oag.texas.gov Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Tel.: (512) 936-1700 Beth Klusmann Fax: (512) 474-2697 Assistant Solicitor General Cody C. Coll Assistant Attorney General Counsel for the Attorney General of Texas TAB 8 TAB 9 — 417 — From Poor Laws to Pensions: The Evolution in of Economic Support for the Aged 1n England and America J I LL S. QUADAGNO JILL QUADAGNO University of Kansas T H E YEAR YEAR 1 6 4 4 , THE 1644, T H E TOWNSHIP T O W N S H I P OF PORTSMOUTH, PORTSMOUTH, I N THE Rhode Island, Rhode Island, delegated delegated the the care care ofof "ould “ould John John Mott'' Mott” to to the the town overseers. The town overseers. overseers arranged The overseers arranged forfor aa caretaker caretaker who who would would provide for provide for his his "diett “diett and and washing” washing" in in exchange exchange for for 5s5s per per week. week. These arrangements These arrangements were were mademade in spite of in spite of the the fact fact that that John John Mott Mott had aa son. had son. Rather than caring Rather than caring for his father for his father personally, personally, the the son son agreed agreed to pay co pay "A“A Cowe Cowe forfor ever and 55 bushels ever and bushels of of Corne Come by by the the yeare yeare so so longe longe as the as the ould ould man man shall shall live live .. . . that that soso he he might might be be dischardged dischardged fromfrom any further any further Chardge" Chardge” (Creech 1936). Old (Creech 1936). Old John John Mott Mott was was clearly clearly not not self-reliant, and self-reliant, and hishis son, son, while while notnot abandoning abandoning his his father father entirely, entirely, relegated his relegated care to his care members of to members of the the town, town, thus thus discharging discharging himself himself from any from any further further responsibility. responsibility. The case The case of of John John Mott Mott is is not not unique, unique, not not some some historical historical anomaly anomaly that can that can bebe readily readily explained explained away.away. Yet Yet aa common common theme theme among among contemporary writers contemporary writers is that old is that old ageage dependency dependency was was notnot aa problem problem until the until the lace late nineteenth nineteenth century century and that older and that older people people either either worked worked 1 or were or were cared cared forfor by by family, family, friends, friends, or charity.^ These or charity. conclusions. These conclusions, 1 ^Several w riters coming Several writers c o m in g from persp ectives as modernization from such diverse perspectives m od ern ization theory or Marxist M arxist political p olitical economy econom y pursue this them theme. e. For a general statement, statem ent, see R othm an ((11971). Rothman 9 7 1 ) . For specific sp ecific statements sta te m e n ts on secu rity of on the security o f the aged in O lso n ( 11982) the past, see Olson 9 8 2 ) and Achenbaum A c h e n b a u m ((11983). 9 8 3 ). M em orial F Milbank Memorial Fund (^u 2xx:^T\y! H ea lth and und Quarterly/Health a n d Society, S o ciety , Vol. V o l. 62, 62, N o . 3, No. 3 , 1984 1984 © © 1984 Milbank M ilb a n k Memorial M em o ria l F und and Massachusetts Fund M assach u setts Institute In stitu te of o f Technology T ech n o lo g y 4 i8 Quadagm Jill S. Quadagno while understandable given the lack of detailed information regarding either the either the extent extent or or adequacy adequacy of of support support for for older older people people in in the past,^2 the past, are curious in are curious in their their romanticism, romanticism, and and perhaps perhaps reflect reflect more more thethe views views of twentieth-century reformers, haunted by the discovery of old age pauperism, than of pauperism, than of actual research findings. actual research findings. Given Given the the existing existing evidence evidence of of old-age dependency from old-age dependency from thethe earliest earliest years years of the colonial of the period, colonial period, it seems apparent that no generalizations about the adequacy of care for the for dependent aged the dependent aged inin the the past past should should be made without be made without some some more detailed attention more detailed being directed attention being directed toward toward the history of the history of old-age old-age security and the care provided older people under the poor law. Throughout the Throughout the past past 400 400 years, years, old-age old-age security security has has been transformed been transformed from a locally financed and administered system of care to a massive, bureaucratic, national program of income maintenance. Yet, as we shall see, some of the same conflicts over eligibility for aid that threatened the sense of community in the colonial era are still present in contemporary contemporary programs programs forfor the the aged. aged. In this this paper paper II will will trace trace the the development of various forms of economic support for older people, beginning with those that evolved from the English Poor Law, showing how poor law precedents were maintained in welfare policy even when welfare became a national rather than just a local issue. The English Poor Law The first The first English English poor poor relief relief laws, laws, which which date date back back toto 1535 1535 (around (around the time the time ofof the the decline decline ofof the monasteries), were the monasteries), were concerned concerned primarily primarily with providing with providing modes modes of of punishment punishment forfor beggars who increased beggars who increased asas the number the number of landless laborers of landless laborers and and cottagers cottagers rose. rose. The The Elizabethan Elizabethan Poor Law Poor Law ofof 1601 1601 represented represented aa major major turning turning point point inin the the history histor}^ of welfare in that it recognized state responsibility for the indigent. It distinguished distinguished between between the the able-bodied and and the impotent poor poor and declared that declared that it was the it was the duty duty ofof the community to the community to help help the the indiYiduals individuals who could who could not not help help themselves. themselves. Further, Further, every every citizen citizen enjoying enjoying thethe 2 *■Demos ((1978) 1978) asserts chat that ·'many ' many elderly New Englanders retained a substantial capacity for work, ordinary forms of social intercourse." work. for public service, for ordin.try intercourse, ” Yet Yee much of his evidence could have more negative connotations. He cites numerous examples of older people performing arduous. arduous, probably pare-time part-time tasks, such as mowing salesalt water grass or hauling grist to co the local mill, and he also finds that chat it was common for tor older men co to withdraw from public office. From From Poor Laws to Pensions 4 19 advantages of advantages of government government was was obliged obliged to to contribute contribute to the relief relief of of those in those in distress distress by by payment payment of of aa compulsory compulsory tax tax levied levied by by each each parish parish for the for care of the care of its its own own poor, the first poor, the first public public tax ever levied tax ever levied forfor that that purpose. While charging kin with responsibility for the care of their aged parents aged parents and and grandparents, grandparents, the the law law also also recognized recognized that that this this duty duty might not be fulfilled. Thus, it provided for the establishment of ‘‘convenient dwellings" ··convenient dwellings” for the old and infirm, whereas workhouses were to be built for the able-bodied poor, poor. A later addition to the poor law was the Act of Settlement of 1662, which required every person to have a settled domicile within 40 days and be enrolled in some fixed community. community. Each recent settlement cancelled aa previous cancelled previous one,one, and and paupers paupers who who could not prove could not prove settlement settlement in a given community were often sent off to other areas where they or perhaps some relative had established settlement. Instead of simplifying administration, the settlement administration, settlement acts acts only only increased increased thethe problems problems of of administering the poor law, as administrators and poor relief recipients attempted to determine settlements (Quadagno 1982). The hallmark The hallmark of of the the poor law was poor law local autonomy, was local autonomy, and and byby 1832 1832 the poor law was administered through 15,000 independent parishes. Gradually, due Gradually, due to to aa series series of of abuses abuses and and inequities inequities in in thethe assessment assessment of the of the rates, pressures for rates, pressures for reform arose. In reform arose. 1834 aa bill In 1834 for the bill for the amendment amendment of the poor law was brought before Parliament. After extensive debate, debate, it was passed it was passed with overwhelming support. with overwhelming support. The The key philosophical issue key philosophical issue was how to to return "able-bodied" “able-bodied” paupers to to a condition of economic and moral and moral independence. independence. This This was was accomplished accomplished by by implementing “workhouse test" the twin principles of the "workhouse test” and "less “less eligibility eligibility.'. ., The term "less term “less eligibility" eligibility” referred referred toto the belief that the belief that the the condition condition of of the the pauper relieved pauper relieved should should bebe worse worse thanthan thethe condition condition of of thethe poorest, poorest, independent, self-supporting independent, self-supporting laborer. laborer. Outdoor Outdoor reliefrelief was was to to be be reduced, reduced, and the and the "able-bodied" “able-bodied” poor poor were were to to be be incarcerated incarcerated in in workhouses. workhouses. order to In order to apply apply thisthis policy policy on on aa uniform uniform basis basis throughout throughout the the country, aa permanent country, central authority, permanent central authority, the the Poor Poor Law Law Commission, Commission, was established to to direct the system. Independent parishes were to be consolidated into unions, and relief was to be administered by relieving officers under the direction of an elected board of guardians. Although Although poverty poverty was generally considered was generally considered an an indication indication of of individual individual failure, calling for rebuke and stern treatment, the philosophy toward to the aged was somewhat more ameliorative. The report of relief to 1834 concluded, "We “We find that even in places distinguished in general 420 420 Jill S. Quadagno by the most by the most wanton wanton parochial parochial profusion, profusion, thethe allowances allowances to to the the aged aged moderate” (quoted in Quadagno 1982). While some and infirm are moderate" argued that argued that continued continued support support of the aged of the aged by by the the parish parish would further would further erode familial erode familial ties, ties, the the commission commission determined determined that that parish support parish support for the aged was necessary because the English working classes were totally deficient totally deficient inin natural natural filial filial affection. affection. Thus, Thus, it it became became general general policy to policy to continue continue to to allow allow small small amounts amounts of of out-relief out-relief to to the the aged aged without specific concern about pressuring children to contribute (Webb and Webb 1909). In 1847 the Poor Law Commission became the Poor Law Board, and this board was subsequently absorbed into the new Local Government , Board in 1871. The Local Government Boards Board's jurisdiction encompassed the poor law under aa broader the broader spectrum spectrum of of social social support, support, usurping usurping local authority local authority further further andand placing placing poor poor law law administration administration more more clearly under the clearly under the jurisdiction jurisdiction of of the the central central government. government. Almost immediately after its creation, the Local Government Board and and its its inspectorate launched aa campaign inspectorate launched against outdoor campaign against outdoor reliefrelief in in anan attempt to return the poor law to the principles of 1834. The 1871 “Circular on "Circular on Outdoor Outdoor Relief," Relief,” which which was was one one ofof the the first first policy policy rec- rec- ommendations of ommendations of the Local Government the Local Government Board Board in in regard regard to to the poor the poor law, condemned the out-relief system and suggested -that 'that all applications for relief be more carefully scrutinized with an increased reliance on on the workhouse as the workhouse as aa test test of of destitution. destitution. NewNew stress stress waswas placed placed on on getting contributions from kin, for it was implied that if the aged were confronted were confronted with with thethe workhouse, workhouse, their their relatives relatives would would come come forward forward and maintain them (Webb and Webb 1910). The circular The circular was was accompanied accompanied by by an an administrative administrative change change thatthat emphasized implementing deliberate policy rather than allowing decisions about relief about relief to be dependent to be dependent on on temporary statutes and temporary statutes and whims whims of of local local authorities. Steady authorities. pressure was placed Steady pressure placed onon boards boards of of guardians guardians to to reduce out-relief in spite of the fact that the sick and aged made up at least half and perhaps as much as three-quarters of the adult population receiving population receiving our-relief.' out-relief.^ There There was increased concern was increased concern withwith record-keeping, and tables showing the amount of relief given by -^ Law returns were not tabulated by ,1ge ~Although Poor law age until 1890, there was a separate category termed "aged '‘aged and infirm.” infirm ... According co to the Poor Law Commission’s annual Law Commission's annual reports, reports, over over half half of of the the adult adult paupers paupers on on outdoor outdoor least as early relief were aged and infirm from at lease 1840 (Rose 19--:-_n. earlr as I~~O 19^2). The Webbs ((1910) 1910) had estimated an even higher highl'r figure. From Poor From Poor Lau·s Laws to to Prmions Pt>2sions 421 421 each union each were published union were published and and circulated. circulated. Unions Unions that gave dispro- that gave portionate amounts portionate amounts were were he held Id accountable, regardless of the proportion of aged of aged in in the population. This policy This policy remained remained in in effect (with great effect (with great regional variation in administration) administration) until until the 1890s when the 1890s when the the first first return of paupers by age was age was made (Collins 1965). made (Collins 1965). Reformers' Reformers’ arguments arguments were supported by the by the data data gathered gathered by by Charles Charles Booth Booth (1891, (1891, 1894) on the condition of the of the aged aged poor, showing that poor, showing that the average rate the average rate ofof pauperism among those aged those aged 6565 and and above above waswas over over 2929 percent percent and and in in many districts over 50 percent. 50 percent. In In the mid-1890s, two the mid-1890s, two Royal Royal commissions commissions were organized to investigate to investigate the the condition condition of the aged of the aged poor. Testimony presented by by witnesses witnesses at at the the hearings hearings of the Royal Commission on the Aged Poor indicated Poor indicated that policy implementation varied tremendously from that policy union union to co union, union, withwith some some relying largely on relying largely on out-relief out-relief while others only only provided provided reliefrelief in in the the workhouse. workhouse. Even Even where out-relief was provided systematically, provided systematically, the the amount amount given given was was meager, and many older people older people lived lived in in total total destitution. destitution. ThoseThose granted granted out-relief out-relief often often found found the the experience experience of of having having to apply degrading, to apply degrading, and and many others in need in need made made no no application application for for relief relief for for fear of being fear of being denied denied outright or of or of being being "offered “offered the the house" house” (Quadagno (Quadagno 1982). The commission's commission’s findings combined findings combined with with pressure pressure from Parliament led to from Parliament to a reversal of poor law poor law policy policy in in regard regard to to relief relief ofof the the aged. aged. In 1896 a circular was issued was issued from from the Local Government the Local Government Board Board that extended liberal that extended liberal outdoor relief outdoor relief to to the deserving aged the deserving aged poor, poor, those those whowho had been "of “of good character, thrifty character, thrifty according according to to their their opportunities, opportunities, and generally in- dependent in dependent in early early life" life” (Circular (Circular of of 11th 11th July July 1896). 1896). This This policy policy shift coincided shift coincided with with aa general general trend trend in in the the poor poor law system toward law system toward greater specialization greater specialization of of care care and and differentiation differentiation of of paupers paupers into into categories. categories. In spite In spite ofof the the liberalization liberalization of of relief relief policy, policy, the the issue of filial responsibility remained responsibility remained aa concern. concern. The The 1895 1895 Royal Commission on the Aged the Aged PoorPoor readread into into the the hearings hearings a quotation from the 1834 report regarding report regarding the the neglect neglect of of kin kin by the working classes. The issue was also was also apparently apparently aa concernconcern among among individual individual unions. unions. For For example, in 1905 the in the Fulham Fulham Board Board of of Guardians Guardians felt felt it necessary to formally specify that specify sons and that sons and unmarried unmarried daughters daughters of sufficient means were of sufficient responsible for responsible for the maintenance of the maintenance of aged aged and and infirm infirm parents: parents: Legitimate children Legitimate children (sons (sons,, whether whether married married or or single, single, and daughters, if unmarried) if unmarried) are are bound bound toto maintain maintain their their parents when unable parents when to unable to work through sickness or work through sickness or other cause. . . It is only relatives of 422 422 Jj ill S. Quadagno sufficient ability sufficient ability who who are are liable, liable, and and proof proof of of ability ability is is required by required by justices before an order can be made (Wall 1977). In 19 0 9 , owing In 1909, owing inin large large part part to the active to the active intervention intervention ofof organized organized labor, most labor, most older older people people were were effectively effectively depauperized depauperized withwith the the im- im- plementation of plementation of the the Old Old Age Age Pension Pension Act, Act, although although substantial substantial nwnbers numbers remained in remained in poverty. poverty. Under Under the Old Age Age Pension Pension Act, Act, every every person of British of British nationality nationality whowho had had resided resided atat least least twenty twenty years years in in the the United Kingdom was entitled to to a pension at age 70. Excluded were those whose incomes exceeded £31 10s., those who "habitually failed to work . . . according to ability, opportunity and need for the to maintenance of themselves and those legally dependent on them," them,” lunatics, prisoners, and lunatics, and those those receiving poor relief relief (Gilbert (Gilbert 1964- 1964- 19 6 5 ). National pensioners were removed from the jurisdiction of the 1965). poor poor law authority and law authority and transferred transferred to county councils to county councils that administered that administered pensions through the post office. In 1911 the pauper disqualification was removed, and state income maintenance was extended ro to even the poorest the poorest agedaged (Collins (Collins 1965). 1965). Although the amount of the pension granted was meager (5s. a week), it was it was significant significant in that it in that it spelled spelled the demise of the demise of local control of local control of the the support of the aged. It depersonalized income maintenance and shifted that responsibility from the local community to to the state bureaucracy. This shift This shift represented represented aa major major break with tradition break with tradition inin that that funding funding was moved from local rates to national taxation, and eligibility was based on based on universal universal rather rather than than particular criteria. particular criteria. Relief under the Early Colonial Poor Law English settlers in the American colonies brought with them the Elizabethan concept Elizabethan concept that that giving giving public public relief relief to to those those who who could could not not support themselves, support themselves, or or secure secure support support from from relatives, friends, or relatives, friends, or private private philanthropy, was aa proper philanthropy, was proper function function of of local local government. government. WithWith only only one exception, one exception, every every community community in in the the Plymouth Plymouth andand Massachusetts Massachusetts Bay Colonies provided for relief in the initial stages of settlement and subsequently administered relief as a regular town function.~ function.^ As early 1 ^The exception was the town of Taunton in Plymouth Colony which was cited for not providing relief during the 1650s (Lee 1982). Ocher Other regions were not as quick to establish poor laws. Both Boch North and South Carolina in were slow to pass poor law legislation and, although poor laws existed in Virgina, they often were not implemented (Wisner 1970). From Poor Lau·s From Laws to to Pensions 423 as 164 as 1647, 7, at the first session of its colonial legislature, Rhode Island announced the announced the poor poor lawlaw principles principles that that stressed, stressed, mostmost importantly, importantly, public responsibility public responsibility for for the the poor. poor. Public Public responsibility responsibility for for thethe poor poor was buttressed was buttressed by by thethe other other principles principles of of English English poor law— local poor law-local responsibility, family responsibility, family responsibility, responsibility, and and thethe residency residency requirement requirement 5 of legal of legal settlement. settlement.^ The proper objects of relief were the aged, infirm, or insane, who were separated from their means of support and also from a household, and various arrangements were made to care for the needy, including providing light providing light employment, employment, giving giving provisions provisions and and aa pension, pension, and and boarding with boarding with aa relative relative or or neighbor neighbor at at town town expense expense or or care care in in an an almshouse, the almshouse, the first first of of which which waswas erected erected in in Rensselaerswick, Rensselaerswick, New New York, in 1657 (Axinn and Levin 1982). One common solution to old age dependency was to assign the person's person’s property over to the community in exchange for care for life, usually through some boarding arrangement. For arrangement. For example, example, in in 1660 1660 the the case case of of Mr. Mr. Burrowes, Burrowes, aa resident of resident of Providence, Providence, Rhode Rhode Island Island,, was considered at was considered at thethe town town meeting because meeting because of of his his need need ofof relief relief through through "age “age and and weakness'· weakness” (Creech 1936). (Creech 1936). Mr. Mr. Burrowes Burrowes was was moved moved into into the the home home of of aa townsman townsman who had who had been been found found willing willing to to take take care care ofof him, him, andand his property his property and possessions and possessions were were turned turned over over to to the the town. town. Similarly, Similarly, William William Baker petitioned the free inhabitants of Portsmouth, Rhode Island, to take to take his his sheep sheep in in return return for for care. care. TheThe town town meeting meeting granted granted his his request and request and bargained bargained with with "Hinory “Hinory Pearcey" Pearcey” to to provide provide "diat“diat and and lodgin’’ for lodgin" for aa year year for for £8. £8. Sometimes Sometimes the the sense sense ofof communal communal responsibility responsibility was taken was taken quite quite literally, literally, andand aa rotation rotation system system for for boarding boarding was was established among established among members members of of the the town. town. In In 1687 1687 the the town town meeting meeting of Hadley, of Hadley, Massachusetts, Massachusetts, voted voted that that the the widow widow Bald Baldwin win bebe removed removed from house from house to to house house "to “to such such asas are are able able toto receive receive her" her” and and "remain “remain aa fortnight fortnight in in each each family" family” (Kelso (Kelso 1922). 1922). The decline The decline of of Joseph Joseph Patchin Patchin can can be be documented documented throughthrough the the changing responses changing responses of of the the Fairfield, Connecticut, town Fairfield, Connecticut, town meetings meetings to to his needs. his needs. InIn 1673 1673 the the records records indicate indicate that that "Goodman “Goodman Patchin Patchin is is to to continue his continue his worke worke aboutabout thethe meeting meeting house." house.” EightEight years years lacer later due due to his "weaknes to “weaknes and age" age” Joseph Patchin applied to the townsmen townsmen., ^Actually, 5 local administration Actually, local administration of of relief relief was was not not implemented implemented immediately. immediately. Initially, in Initially, in Plymouth Plymouth thethe town town meeting meeting shared shared responsibility responsibility for for relief relief with with colony officials colony officials and and it it wasn't wasn’t until until 1649 1649 that that the the town town inhabitants inhabitants delegated delegated the cask the task to to their their selectmen. selectmen. The The pattern pattern was similar in was similar in the the Bay Bay Colony Colony (lee (Lee 1982). 1982). 424 Jill S. Jill S. Quadagno Quadagno “desiring his owne estate may mayntayne him as far as it will reach." "desiring reach.” Just one year later it is apparent that his health had deteriorated still further, and further, and it it is is now “old Patchin" now "old Patchin” thatthat the the town refers to town refers to when when it it provides Thomas provides Thomas Bennet Bennet with £13 for with £13 for aa year's year’s food food and and lodging lodging (Pumphrey and (Pumphrey and Pumphrey Pumphrey 1961).1961). Other Other older older people people received similar received similar consideration in Fairfield. Thus, assistance to the aged was flexible and might and might shiftshift from finding work from finding work forfor an an ailing ailing man man to to providing providing food and lodging when deteriorating health made employment impossible. impossible. Although it is difficult to make any accurate assessment regarding the proportion of older people receiving relief, in Plymouth, Mas- sachusetts where sachusetts where thethe population population grewgrew from from 500 500 to about 700 to about 700 between between 1630 1630 and 164 1645, 5, 5577 cases of relief were recorded, and many of the relief recipients were relief recipients were old. old. Similarly, Similarly, in in Watertown, Watertown, Massachusetts, Massachusetts, 21 individuals received relief between 1660 and 1675, and most was given given to older people, to older people, usually usually widows widows and and widowers widowers (Lee (Lee 1982). 1982). If no generalization no generalization about about the the extent extent ofof support support can can be drawn, it be drawn, it is is still still readily apparent readily apparent that some older that some older people people in in every every colonial colonial town town had had no family no family members members either either willing willing oror able able toto provide provide support support andand that that relief to the aged was one of the more common functions of poor relief. It relief. It also also appears appears that that the concept of the concept of family family responsibility responsibility was was applied liberally as best fit the needs of individual family members and was and was associated, associated, at at this this stage, stage, with with economic factors rather economic factors rather than than any punitive any pun1t1ve intent. In these In these early early years years ofof the the colonial colonial period, period, administrators administrators of of relief relief to the to the needy needy were were neighbors neighbors in in small small communities, communities, and and the the concept concept of family of family governance governance reigned, reigned, as as seen seen byby the the frequency frequency withwith which w^hich boarding boarding was was used used asas aa means means forfor relieYing relieving thethe aged. aged. Yet, Yet, as as early early as 1617, as 1 6 1 7 , British British poor poor law officials began law officials began the the practice practice ofof dumping dumping their their undesirables— vagrants, paupers, undesirables-vagrants, and conYicts-upon paupers, and convicts— upon the colonies.^6 the colonies. 6 ^There is a lively debate regarding the extensiveness of chis this practice. Campbell Gmapbell (1959) argues that chat most British immigrants co to the colonies were from from the middle ranks of British society. Galenson (1978) challenges her conclusions that boys released directly from parish authorities, and and cites evidence chat and men released from jails where they had been confined for debt or vagrancy, comprised aa good portion of the immigrants. Georgia w..is was founded by men debtor’s released from debtor's prison (Wisner 1970). Regardless of who is correct this debate, the perceptions of the colonises in chis colonists that dumping undesirables undesirables was a common British practice caused them to act as if it were true. From Poor Laws to Pensions From 425 As a means of protecting themselves against this British practice and as aa way as way ofof maintaining maintaining religious religious and and moral moral solidarity solidarity within within the the community, the community, the colonies colonies established established laws laws regulating regulating thethe terms terms under under which a resident might attain inhabitancy. This was accomplished through a procedure termed "warning “warning out,,. out,” which was based on the belief that each town was a corporation that had the right co to choose whom it admitted to permanent residency. The purpose of warning was to free the town of any obligation to provide relief, and once warned an individual might become an inhabitant to all intents and purposes except for the right to receive support (Benton 1911). One of One of the the basic basic reasons reasons forfor denying denying settlement settlement to to aa stranger stranger was was likelihood of early dependency, and older people were among those at risk. at risk. This This was was recognized recognized in in an an order order passed passed in in 1680 1680 inin Portsmouth, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, which declared "that “that if any children, or older person shal be sent or come from one town to another, to school, or to nurs .. .. . . if if such such shal shal stand stand inin need need ofof relief, relief, they they shal shal be be relieved relieved at at the the charge of the Town, from whence they came and do belong; and not by the town, to which they are sent" sent” (Benton 1911). Thus, even though they though they might might need need aid, aid, older older people people whowho were were not not town town residents residents were were given given nono special special consideration consideration and,and, inin fact, fact, were were even even perceived perceived as a threat. This was demonstrated in the case of John Harmon, "a “a decriped decriped man," man,” whowho hadhad no no established established clear clear inhabitancy. inhabitancy. In In 1680 1680 the Massachusetts towns of Taunton and Plymouth disputed which was was liableliable for for the the support support of of John John Harmon. Harmon. The The dispute dispute continued continued for for twotwo years years until until the the court court finally finally ordered ordered thatthat "the “the towne towne of of Taunton Taunton shall receive and entertaine him for the space of one whole yeer, and Plymouth then to take him for one whole yeer; and soe to be kept from yeer from yeer to to yeer" yeer” (Kelso (Kelso 1922). 1922). This This waswas aa practical practical but but hardly hardly humane humane solutionsolution and and illustrates the difficulty illustrates the difficulty ofof determining determining just who just who the town’s town's poor were. The Impact of Social Change 1n in the Eighteenth Century In the late seventeenth century, a series of colonial wars uprooted hundreds who came pouring into the cities and towns needing relief. These paupers were not familiar citizens who had earned the right to be maintained by the community but neither were they disreputable strangers who could easily be warned away. 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  TAB 11 Laws of the Staie of Texas. 113 CI-IAPTI~H 98. An Act to orga.nize County Courts . •..\.iction 1. De i t cnadec1 by the Legislature of t he State t)f Texas, rrhat there shall be in each county of this State an inferior Court) to be styled "The County Court'' which shall be composed of one Chief Justice. Sec. 2. That the said Court shall have the power to take th0 Probate of vVil]s, to appoint guardians, to grant letters testament- ary, and of administration, to settle the accounts of executors, ad- ministTators and. guc1rtlians, to transact all business appertaining to the estates of deceased persons, minors, idiots, lunatics, and per- sous non compos 111entis, and the settlen e. t, partition and distri- bution of such estates; ,vhich powets shall be exercised in the n1an- ner perscribed by law·. Sec. 3. That the said Courts .Jiall have power to lay off and divicle their respective counties into convenient precincts for the election of J ustices of the Peace and Constables., to establish places in such precincts where elections shall be held; to establish public ferries in their respective counties., ,.vherever the public interest rnay require; o license ferryn1en and regulate the tolls to be charged at all public ferries in heir ·aunties; to lay out and estab- lish, change and discontinue public roads and higlnvays; to build bridges; to appoint overseers Eend apportion hands, to work on pub- lic roads, ~ighvvay~ and bridges, and saicl Courts shall have and ex- ercise general control and superintendence over all roads, high- ways, bridges and ferries in theiT counties; said Courts shall also have pow-er, and it shall be their duty to provide Court Houses, Jails and all necessary public buildings; to allow and settle all coun- ty accounts, and direct their pay1nent in such manner and at such times as 111ay 111eet the public interest; to try contested elections for county o.ffi.cers; to appoint patrols for their respective counties, whenever in t heir opinion the public welfare may require it; and to exercise general jurisdiction over police matters in their re- spective counties; and it shall be the duty of said C<;:mrts to provide for the support of indigent persons re:s ident in the county, who can not support themselves, and for the burial of paupers. Sec. 4. That the said County Courts shall have power to levy and collect a tax for county purposes, upon all subjects :)f 8-VOL. Ul. ( 118) 120 Laws of the State of T exas. Sec. 29. That this act take effect and be in force on and after the fust fonday in A1igu t 1848, and on and after t hat day an act organizing County Courts, approved 13t h l\1a3, 1846, shall be and is hereby repealed. Approved, :M~arch 16, 1848. CH.A.P'l1ER 99. An Act regulating Elections. Section 1. Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Texas, That the County Courts of each county, shall at their first regular session, after this act takes effect and thereafter at their first regular session in each year if they deem nece s~ry, designate such places for holding elections as may be most suitable and con- venient :for the people, which places so designated shall be num- bered and called election precincts, and they shall also at the same time select and appoint from among the residents at or near each election precinct, some suita,ble person to be the presiding officer at such precinct in all elections which shall be held thereat,. during the year in which he may be appointed. Sec. 2. Be it further enacted, That forms for notices, writs and returns of elections as :furnished by the Secretary of State to the Chief J11stice of each county, shall be pTeserved in the office of th~ County Clerk. Sec. 3. Be it further enacted, That the Chief Justices of the several co11nties, or ·in case of vacancy in that office, or any in- nbility of the Chief Justice to act, then any two of the County Com- missioners, shall order all eleqtions in their respective counties. Sec. 4. Be it fuTther enacted, That whenever an election n1ay be ordered, except in cases of vacancy in the I e2islature,. at ]east ten davs notice of the election . hall be given bv tb.e officer ordering it by· notice posted up at each . election., pre- cinct, or by publication ·11 son1e newspaper if one be published jn the county, specifying the time and p]aces a.t which such election is to be he]d_, ~nc1 the officer or officers to be chosen, in ( 120) TAB 12 Newspapers· The Austin Weekly Statesman (Austin, Texas) · Thu, Oct 7, 1875 · Page by <f)I ancestry· 2 https://www.newspapers.com/image/49664747/ Downloaded on Jan 13, 2025 im- The next lmsiness waa tl;e lurtbcr con- aisc sideration of the LegiBlaU ve depnrtml:JlL; in- the queatino being oo the amendment to ll Section fifty-one, "that the Legislature and shllll not grllot money, public hrnds, or h1ch anything of value." Mr. Stoclrdllle spoke against the amend - out ment, and told the Convention bow the e ord West had 90/fered for wllot of railroads, the wbilo at the &lime time .hey bad always paid their full share ol taxes, and 888isted enu- lll the aupport of the 11overoment equal to Jevy aay othPr aection. lee- Mr. King made an able and eloquent ap- peal against the amendment. lle aaid it king had been the p{)licy of the State to grant lJeaf a.id to works nf inr.emal improvcmc11t, aud th t. now, wbeo tbtl \Vest is still lucking Lbe bat convCJ1icoces Lhllt olhcr sections po ""85, it dop- is now coolly proposed to crn•b out the 1Jriociµle of gra.ntiDJ,!' ai«i to works of inter- tiog nal improvement. 11., ssh) be "ould btLY fur io &II e11rnes1U0<1S nod kiodnC88, nod with- ti te.n out m"8oiog it 11>1 s menace, tb•t if this .~ policy ,. o:re 1mn-ncd 1 the $tat,, wuul<I be t by divide,!. Tho w.,.t bud euJicred long • ords enough, and hid people were restleos. He the lo\'ed Texas with all the devotion or his heart., and would be pained beyond mu - 0 ·1 .. ure, ,f this great and ~lonous State, with 1c1·. 0 d i •,er hallowed memories of the put, were di\ idcd. He deaircd to sound the alarm in sub- nme, and prt:vo:ot, if po88ible, 11t1ch a. sad c11111struphe. n., WIMI pa1ued to know that uiis amcndmuu, wu iGtruduCtld by a momhtll' from the wcet (Mr. Arnio). He had li•tened atwutively tu the sddreBB of Mr. McCormick on yeaterday, t o hear him ad.,•oce a s10gle &rl{umcut in •Up1>0rt of tbt: s amendmen~. .Mr. D.LroeU bad 111\id thut 001 a singlt: l'1lilroMI h11d been built by State aict. Ile Ile ()fr. Kiog) would venture the llS•c rtiou t ID that not a siuJ'IC ruilroad bad 1,,..,u b11ilt in ally, tbi,. SL3to witb .. ut such aid. may r. Lynch followed Mr. King. He eaid c (ore, you e&n t>tke our llllld, a.nd 1~11vc us out of The the advantage you po15<,a , but you CIUl ugh, ocver take from us th" bnllow,d memories t. of the Goliad od the Alamo, where Travis sub- and his '60 comradea foll io dcf nse of tbeit the blessed Texa,. CAD· Mr. McCormick eaid be appreciated the king honesty 11f the mcrubera who had µreceedt:d tac- him, but be ua a member Crum t he t weat, opposed to •~naud~ng the public domain on railroada, but desired it should be ginn to public o0boola. Ile uked mcm- b ·rs to be not at all alarmf!d ,rt the "bloody ■ hirt" held ov...- u.eir i......i l>y I.be mem- bers who bad prect:ded billl.. Weat~m Texu was u l'Jy I any 01ber pc-rt1on ol tlie tate, aud b d no idea of Mt:venog the "Lone tar'' with all her gn:at &nd 11Iorioo1 p t and I.be bal.loweu mmuoriea of we t lr. Lockett · d he represented an hon• est and generous people, who desired to extend all the benelltl! po 'ble to the wen. He aid thia bad n a compact oot cen the «: an,t west, and could not, in good faith, be broken. Mw>y of hia coll "el from the t !lad trneled nearly. all lhe Dlize to get here. Jte bad COllll to · Stat~ aboai \ euty yean aiDce, an, had trneled ly all the way by nlil, but i\ ..... 81lch a nil . . Joe did DO\ deaiJ'e to ua~el by again-it wu a rail pruiog atage■ out of \be mud at nearly enry t.ep. The propoaldoa of -... cCormlek to gi.,. tbe pu he ii to WM a aobterfage. .1111,. 1oGna • epoke acaiM I.Jae am d- • t. Be aaid railroaJa had t-a a bl iDf to the SCMe. 'flleJ. bad bf h\ IWllll· r- 1111d .enled up pi th bad n 1 ut iL liarrea WUte. Weni Juda l in Talue by the adnnt of railrollil 1 Would th and collec\or ta..Ja dj ot to n.ilioadl at the ame pric,: h Id wlore Uni railroaJ came f O lllr. Statesman 10/7/1875 Clipped By: lhann923 Jan 13, 2025 Copyright © 2025 Newspapers.com. All Rights Reserved. TAB 13 1/13/25, 10:32 AM 00097875 | Oxford English Dictionary This is the unrevised text of the entry as published in the Second Edition of the OED (1989). It may contain unrevised text that was originally published much earlier. View current version of this entry grant, v. (grɑːnt, -æ-) Pa. tense and pa. pple. granted. Forms: 3 granti, 3–7 graunt(e, 4 grant(t)e, granty, 5–6 grawnt(e, (5 grawunt, grownte), 3– grant. Also pa. tense 4 gra(u)nt; pa. pple. 4–6 gra(u)nt. [a. AF. graunter, granter, OF. graanter, greanter, altered form of craanter, creanter:—pop. L. type *crēdentāre, f. crēdent-em pr. pple. of crēdĕre to entrust, believe.] †1. intr. To agree, consent; to assent to the request of (a person: const. dat.); to agree or consent to or to do (rarely at do) something. Obs. a1300 Cursor M. 16851 Ioseph‥Ne granted neuer wit wil ne werc, to þair gret felunni. 1340 Ayenb. 225 Þe ilke bernþ þet to zenne graunteþ. 1375 Barbour Bruce iv. 352 I grant thar-till; To ly heir mair war litill skill. c1385 Chaucer L.G.W. 2665 Hypermnestra, [Egiste commanded his daughter, with threats, to kill her husband;] And, for to passyn harmles of that place, She grauntyth hym. 1390 Gower Conf. III. 338 He‥ graunteth with hem for to wende. c1400 Mandeville (Roxb.) xxx. 138 Þai graunted at do all þat he wald bidd þam do. c1400 Sowdone Bab. 250, I graunte to be his derlynge. c1440 Jacob's Well (E.E.T.S.) 198 Þe freendys prayed þe preest to ley þe dede body on his asse. Þerto grauntyd he hem. 1485 Caxton Paris & V. 15 At these words graunted Parys to goo to the sayd Ioustes. 1523 Ld. Berners Froiss. I. ccxliii. 363 He graunted to the warr with an yuell wyll. a1547 Surrey Æneid ii. 164 Assigning me To the altar; whereto they graunted all. 1593 Shakes. 3 Hen. VI, i. i. 245 The Souldiers should haue toss'd me on their Pikes, Before I would haue granted to that Act. 2. trans. To agree to, promise, undertake. †a. Const. dat. of person, and acc. of thing. Obs. c1250 Gen. & Ex. 1423 Ðo gan ðat moder and laban Rebecca freinen ðor for-ðan, And ȝhe it grantede mildelike. c1305 St. Cristopher 77 in E.E.P. (1862) 61 He grantede þis anon. 1390 Gower Conf. II. 243 She graunteth and behight him this. c1400 Destr. Troy 978 And he hir graunted þat gate with a good wille. a1400– 50 Alexander 516 ‘Þat graunt I gudly,’ quod þe gome. 1559 Mirr. Mag., Hen. VI, xxvii, Aduise wel ere they graunt, but what they graunt, perfourme. b. with inf. (preceded by to) or clause as obj. Obs. exc. in legal documents. c1420 Chron. Vilod. st. 141 Þe Kyng of Denmark ȝold hym anon þo And granted crystenmon ever to be. c1450 Merlin 23 They that shull come to seche me, have graunted their lorde that they shull me sle. 1484 Caxton Fables of Æsop ii. xi, To promytte & graunte to gyue to the that whiche thou neuer leuest to me. 1512 J. Wastell in Willis & Clark Cambridge (1886) I. 609 The said John Wastell graunteth to gyff‥.xx. markes. 1558 in Vicary's Anat. (1888) App. v. 186 The said T. D.‥couenaunteth and graunteth, to and with the said T. V.‥that if he [etc.]. 1647 N. Bacon Disc. Govt. Eng. i. (1739) 200 Do you grant to hold and keep the Laws and rightful Customs, which the Commonalty of your Realm shall have chosen? 1818 Cruise Digest (ed. 2) IV. 68 A. covenanted, granted, and agreed that B. should have the land. https://www.oed.com/oedv2/00097875 1/5 1/13/25, 10:32 AM 00097875 | Oxford English Dictionary 3. To accede to, consent to fulfil (a request, prayer, wish, etc.). a1225 Ancr. R. 34 Holdeð hine ueste, uort he habbe igranted ou al þet ȝe euer wulleð. c1275 Lay. 14152 Þe bet we wolleþ cweme þe ȝef þou þis wolt granti me [1205 Ȝif þu þis ȝettest me]. c1290 S. Eng. Leg. I. 20/33 And grauntede al his bone. a1300 Cursor M. 13988 Iesus grant him his praier. 1390 Gower Conf. I. 182 The souldan graunteth her axinge. c1450 Mirour Saluacioun 3878 So crist‥what eure sho wille aske grauntis he hire fauourably. 1526 Pilgr. Perf. (W. de W. 1531) Gb, Yf I sholde graunt you at all tymes your affeccyons and desyres. 1600 J. Lane Tom Tel-troth 110 O graunt my suit. 1697 Dryden Virg. Georg. i. 63 Use thyself betimes to hear and grant our Pray'rs. 1797 Mrs. Radcliffe Italian iii. (1826) 20 Grant me then the only request I have to make. 1867 Smiles Huguenots Eng. vii. (1880) 126 The authorities at once cheerfully granted all that they asked. 4. a. To allow or concede as an indulgence; to permit or suffer (a person) to have (something); to bestow or confer as a favour, or in answer to a request. Const. dat. of person, and acc. of thing. 1297 R. Glouc. (Rolls) 11552 Leue him was igraunted god wot to wuch ende. a1300 Cursor M. 2506 (Cott.) Was nan þai raght þai grantid grith. Ibid. 25340 Grant vs þi maght til oþer sua forgiue þair sin, þat [etc.]. c1340 Ibid. 20011 + 894 (B.M. Add. MS.) Þe archibisshop‥haþ graunted xl daies to pardoun to alle þat þis vie wol here. c1374 Chaucer Anel. & Arc. 188 Sheo ne graunted him in hir lyvynge No grace. c1380 Wyclif Serm. Sel. Wks. I. 132 First Crist apperide to þes holy wommen, fer to graunt a privylegie to womman's kynde. 1390 Gower Conf. III. 219 God to hem that ben well thewed Hath yove and graunted the victoire. c1400 Rom. Rose 2986 He me graunted ful gladly The passage of the outer hay. a1450 Knt. de la Tour Hivb, He graunted his [Absalon's] grace and pardon. 1484 Surtees Misc. (1888) 41 God graunte & gyff thaym joy and comforth. c1500 Lancelot 456 Grant ws dais three. a1586 Sidney Arcadia iii. (1590) 274 To onely thee thou seest we graunt this speciall grace Vs to attend. 1651 Hobbes Leviath. ii. xviii. 93 When he has granted all he can, if we grant back the Soveraignty, all is restored. c1709 Prior Callimachus' Hymn to Jupiter 116 Great father! grant us virtue, grant us wealth. 1711 Fingall MSS. in 10th Rep. Hist. MSS. Comm. App. v. 172 By his granting better conditions to the garrison. 1841 Lane Arab. Nts. I. 102 Granting him a delay of three days. 1855 Macaulay Hist. Eng. xii. III. 208 It was an Act purporting to grant entire liberty of conscience to all Christian sects. 1860 Tyndall Glac. i. viii. 60 He had‥the good sense‥to grant me the liberty I requested. 1871 R. Ellis Catullus xvii. 7 This rare favour, a laugh for all time, Colonia, grant me. 1885 Mabel Collins Prettiest Woman x, Why might he not grant himself one more sight of her at the door of the Church. †b. With a thing as subj. or as indirect obj.: To allow to have. Obs. c1420 Pallad. on Husb. i. 105 Thikke and drie, espie & graunte hit rest. 1668 Culpepper & Cole Barthol. Anat. ii. vi. 98 A smal valve‥grants entrance to the blood into the right Ventricle. †c. To sanction, permit (an action). Obs. c1386 Chaucer Melib. 22 Attempree weping is nothing defended to him that sorweful is‥but it is rather graunted him to wepe‥But thogh attempree weping bee y-graunted, outrageous weping certes is defended. d. with inf. or clause as obj.; rarely with obj. and compl. https://www.oed.com/oedv2/00097875 2/5 1/13/25, 10:32 AM 00097875 | Oxford English Dictionary c1250 Old Kent. Serm. in O.E. Misc. 36 Þider lord granti us to cumene. c1380 Wyclif Last Age Chirche p. xxxvi, Þe whiche semlant he graunte us to see. a1400–50 Alexander 1826 Bot wald ȝe grant vs to gaa & gefe vs ȝour lefe. 1513 Douglas Æneis i. viii. 51 O hie princes, quham to Jupiter hes grant To beild ane new cietie. 1535 Coverdale Isa. xxvi. 13 Graunte, that we may only hope in the. 1570–6 Lambarde Peramb. Kent (1826) 207 They graunt him to take it with him. 1607 Shakes. Cor. ii. i. 156 The Gods graunt them true. 1720 Strype Stow's Surv. I. i. viii. 35/2 Our Lord Richard the King‥hath granted‥That all the Kidels that are in the Thames be taken away. 1834 Southey Lett. (1856) IV. 384 God grant that I may find you well enough‥for a morning walk. e. In pa. pple. as a polite rejoinder to an apology. 1902 Kipling Traffics & Discov. (1904) 238 ‘Granted—granted as soon as asked,’ he said, unbending. ‘I did think it a shade odd at the time.’ 1924 —— Debits & Credits (1926) 311 ‘‥I beg your pardon.‥’ ‘Granted.’ 1926 R. Macaulay Crewe Train ii. v. 103 When others craved their pardon for stepping on their toes, their reply was, ‘Granted.’ 1951 E. Coxhead One Green Bottle v. 115 ‘Pardon?’ said Cathy, momentarily bewildered; whereat Mr. Derwent‥replied: ‘Oh-er, granted.’ 1967 ‘H. Calvin’ Nice Friendly Town vi. 87 She yawned a great yawn and said, ‘Sorry.’ ‘Granted,’ I said. 5. a. To bestow or confer (a possession, right, etc.) by a formal act. Said of a sovereign or supreme authority, a court of justice, a representative assembly, etc. Also, in Law, to transfer (property) from oneself to another person, especially by deed. c1305 Pilate 82 in E.E.P. (1862) 113 Þemperour‥grantede pilatus al þat lond to holde bi maistrie. 1390 Gower Conf. III. 103 Asia‥Was graunted by commune assent To Sem. 1463 Bury Wills (Camden) 17, I graunte hem fulle pover. 1485 Wriothesley Chron. (1875) I. 1 A great taske and disme grawnted to the Kinge. 1605 Camden Rem. 138 Graunted by Patents. 1625 Bacon Ess., Friendship (Arb.) 181 Where Friendship is, all Offices of Life, are as it were granted to Him, and his Deputy. 1632 Sanderson Serm. 436 God the Father hath graunted vs‥a new Patent. 1651 Hobbes Leviath. iii. xlii. 302 The Power here granted belongs to all Supreme Pastors. 1766 Blackstone Comm. App. II. §2 They the said Abraham Barker and Cecilia his Wife‥do, and each of them doth, grant, bargain, sell, release, and confirm unto the said [D. E. and F. G.;], their heirs and assigns, All that the capital messuage called Dale Hall. 1817 W. Selwyn Law Nisi Prius (ed. 4) II. 725 Granting letters of administration, belongs to the prerogative court of the archbishop of that province. 1849 Macaulay Hist. Eng. ii. I. 193 The Commons alone could legally grant him money. 1858 Buckle Civiliz. (1873) II. viii. 575 They granted charters to the towns and privileges to the inhabitants. 1883 Law Reports 11 Q. Bench Div. 545 (headnote) An attachment granted to enforce compliance with the order of court. b. with advs., in technical phrases: to grant (land, a title) away, out. †to grant forth (a warrant): to issue. 1583 Stubbes Anat. Abus. ii. (1882) 16 The other officers who grant foorth the warrants, the Subpœnas. 1661 A. Brome Royalist's Answ. ii. Songs 75 All titles of honours‥being granted away With the grantees stay. 1844 Williams Real Prop. i. (1877) 2 The lands thus confiscated were granted out by the Conqueror to his followers. 1849 Macaulay Hist. Eng. x. II. 657 The estates of accused persons had been granted away before conviction. 1876 Digby Real Prop. i. i. §2. 14 The grantee of the land is to be entitled to grant the land away to whomsoever he pleases in his lifetime. https://www.oed.com/oedv2/00097875 3/5 1/13/25, 10:32 AM 00097875 | Oxford English Dictionary †6. To yield, give up. Also with over. Obs. 1390 Gower Conf. III. 122 For Libra graunteth him [i.e. Scorpion] his ende Of eighte sterres. a1400–50 Alexander 3103 Þi meche we beseke‥to grant vs oure modire‥out of bande. a1586 Sidney Arcadia i. (1590) 42b, Palladius not accustomed to grant ouer the possession of him self vpon so vniust titles, with sword drawne gaue them so rude an answer, that [etc.]. 1613 Purchas Pilgrimage (1614) 331 Certain Thracian women‥ granted their haire to this purpose. 7. To admit, confess, acknowledge. Now only in a more restricted use: To concede to an actual or hypothetical opponent (a proposition) to be used as a basis of argument. a. with obj. either acc. with inf. or a clause introduced by that (often suppressed), rarely how. In this sense the imperative mood, the pres. pple. (used absol.) and the pa. pple. often introduce an adverbial (concessive) clause. c1340 Cursor M. 27428 (Fairf.) A man‥grauntis [Cott. yetes]‥þat he is falling in misliking. c1375 Sc. Leg. Saints, Laurentius 366 Þat ypolyt‥before al had granttyt þare, þat he had bene a cristine mane. 1411 Rolls of Parlt. III. 650/1 The sayd Robert wold nouht graunte that he had submytted hym in that mater. a1450 Le Morte Arth. 1652 There he grauntyd a monge hem alle‥How in an appelle he dede the galle. 1558 Bp. Watson Seven Sacram. xxi. 123 A synner maye graunt and confesse, that he hathe not considered thys great kyndenes of God. 1581 Mulcaster Positions xli. (1887) 237 But graunting thinges there to be well done already. 1604 E. G[rimstone] D'Acosta's Hist. Indies i. v. 16 They graunt there is a Heaven on this other part of the world. 1659 D. Pell Impr. Sea 73 Grant they never used drinking and bezling before they came to Sea‥they will soon finde out the art. 1659–60 Pepys Diary 11 Jan., I went to see Mrs. Jem, who was in bed, and now granted to have the small-pox. 1674 tr. Scheffer's Lapland 4 Granting there were antiently such names‥it remaines doubtfull [etc.]. 1711 Steele Spect. No. 4 ⁋5, I grant her Dress is very becoming, but [etc.]. 1849 Macaulay Hist. Eng. ii. I. 156 Grant that such a man had, by his recent services, fairly earned his pardon. Yet [etc.]. 1849 Ruskin Sev. Lamps iv. §1. 94 Only asserting that to be beautiful which I believe will be granted me to be so without dispute. 1853 J. H. Newman Hist. Sk. (1876) 161 Granting that that downfall is to come, it is reasonable [etc.]. a1861 T. Woolner My Beautiful Lady (1863) 128, I grant a few, the greatest, live content. 1884 tr. Lotze's Metaph. 101 Granted that two Beings, A and B, are so independent of each other‥ then [etc.]. b. with n. or pron. as obj. Also absol. a1340 Hampole Psalter xxi. 15 In dust of ded thou has me broght. This says he, noght grauntand it, for his body rot noght. 1375 Barbour Bruce xix. 48 The lord sowlis hass grantit thar The deid in-to plane parliament. 1428 Surtees Misc. (1888) 3 He gart yarof, als he graunted, ixxx peces & xij. 1526 Tindale Acts xxiii. 8 The phariseies graunt bothe. 1596 Shakes. 1 Hen. IV, ii. iv. 390, I grant ye, vpon instinct. 1611 Bible Transl. Pref. 1 This will easily be granted, by as many as know story. 1612 in Extracts Aberd. Reg. (1848) II. 312 Patrick Gordoune‥being accusit for trubling of this burght‥in drawing of ane sword, and persewing thairwith Gilbert Leslie‥graunted the drawing of his sword to the said Gilbert, and persewing him thairwith. 1671 Grew Anat. Plants i. Ep. Ded., Like the first Principles of Mathematical Science, they are‥granted by all. 1709 Berkeley Th. Vision §15 Though we should grant the real existence of those optic angles. 1774 Goldsm. Nat. Hist. (1776) I. 107 This granted, we shall take something more. 1848 Keble Serm. Pref. 41 If thus much be granted,‥how is not our principle conceded? 1879 Geo. Eliot Coll. Breakf. P. 287 We settle first the measure of man's need Before we grant capacity to fill. https://www.oed.com/oedv2/00097875 4/5 1/13/25, 10:32 AM 00097875 | Oxford English Dictionary c. with obj. and complement: To admit or concede (a person or thing) to be so and so. rare. 1387 Trevisa Higden (Rolls) IV. 367 Vienna was þo i~graunted the place of corsynge. a1400–50 Alexander 3125 And if [he] grant him noȝt de-grayd. 1602 Shakes. Ham. ii. ii. 100 Mad let vs grant him then. 1653 Walton Angler 139 [I] haue not tryed it; yet I grant it probable. 1730 Swift Traulus i. 83 Grant him but a drone at best. 1810 Scott Lady of L. ii. xiv, I grant him brave, But wild. d. To admit the existence of. Obs. rare—1. a1619 M. Fotherby Atheom. i. vi. §3 (1622) 46 For, of necessitie hee granteth him [God], though of impotencie hee blaspheme him. 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GOODRICH, D.D., LL.D., • ••~•· .J_ • • ' Lilli PBODSSOB 01' BBE':fOBlO AMD OBATOBY, AND ALSO Pl\Ol'BSSOB 01' THB PASTORAL OBA.BGll IN YA.LB OOLLBGJII; · AND NOAH PORTER, D.D., PBODSIIOB 0-. lt:OUL PBILOSOl'BY Alm lllft.APBY~OS IN YALE OOLLBGIII. LONDON: PUBLISHED FOR THE PROPWETORS BY BELL .AND DALDY, 186 FLEET STREET; LONG11.A1' & Co.: sµt:PKJN, MA.BSHALL, & Co. ; WHITTAKER & Co.: ~AMILTON, ADA.MS, & Co.: QBOOMB:aIDGE & SONS: VIRTUE :BROTHEBS; KENT & Co.: GRDi'FIN & Co, El>INBlmGB: JOHN MENZIES. DUBLIN: M•GLASHAN & GILL, ltl~'-1 4Y.8~ I A AHEIGHT 32 AIR-PUMP 2. Rendlong ; with out restraint; prcclpitnntly. .in, v. •· To bo affected with po.In or uneaslnees o f 2. T o exp ose to bcnt1 for the purpose of expelllng They ,ulfcr them [children] to run a1..ad. IlEIJb•tmge. any sort. i . to bo In disp o sed or In troubl e ; as, o. per- dampnes s, or of warmmg ; as, to air linen, to alr A-height' (n-hiV), ad1,. [ Prefix a and heig1,t.] Aloft. ; s on Is auinp. liquo rs. on high. [Obs.] " Look up ahe1ght." S1utk. AilJ n. Ind1sp osltl on o r m o rbid affecti o n . Pope. .iir' tt� "· £N. Lat. aira, Gr. a.lpa, dorncl, It., Bp. A-high' (-hi'), aav. [Prefix a and 1tig1&.] On high . .l.t-1�'tus, "· [Fro m ailant o I . c ., tree of heaven, aira. J (Bot.) A. genus of grasses ; h ai r-grass. r Obs. l the name o f the tree In tho M o luccne. ] (Bot.) A. £ir'-bal -loon', ,1. Seo BALLOON. A..'.'ltiilol.', adv. [Prefix a and Twl,l.] Near tho wind ; genus o f beo.u U ful trees, natives of tho ]fast. There .&Jr,-blith, n. An arrangement for drying substances ns, to Jay n ship alwl<l. I Obs.] S1uik. nr o tw o kinds, one having an offensive od or, tho In air of any desired temperatu re. A.-hnu'ai (a-Mb'ii) n. ['rho 1 n digen ous Brazilian o ther n o t. Luudon. h'-bed, n. .A case o f India-rubber cl oth, or other name ; Fr. a1touai. j (Bot.) A species o f Gerbcra, a W'" Commonly, bnt Improperly, spelt ailanlhu,. material, made o.ir-Ught, and ln.llated through tubu _ closed by stop-cocks. t tree found In Brazil, having thick leaves, full o f A.1.1-lette', n. [Fr., dim. - SimllWlldl. milky juice. Its fruit i s II drupe, o r nut, wh ose ker- of allle, Lnt. ala, Alr'-bllid'der, n. .A peculiar organ In some kinds A,ifjif�Nl� : of fishes, containing afr, by whlcb they arc enabled ncls are a deadly poison. Lou<lon. wing. l A. small square A-hoy', i11te,;j. fPrclix a and Twy, q. v. l (Naut.) shield" on tho sh oul- _ t o mo.lntnln their equillbrlum In the water. Baird. A. term used In naUlng ; as , " Ship ahoy.'1 ders o f knights, being .iUr'-bullt (-bTit), a. Erected In the air ; having no .jhfri-uaa,a, n. [Per. a1trim1m, Skr. ari, fo e.] Tho the prototype of the solid foundation ; cblmerlcnl ; as, nn alr-built cnstlc evil genius or demo n of th o Persians ; - oppo sed to modem epaulet. Air'-eii.s'ing, n. .An alr-ught casing around � O romasdcs or Ormuzd, tho goo d dem on . Gibbon. Fairliolt. pipe, &c., at a llttle distan ce from It, Intended to A-hi\11', ;;;/,o. [Prefix a nnd hull.] (Naut.) With AJJ.'ment, n. Indlsp o - sec ure tho interposition o f air as a non-conductor the sails furled, and th o helm lnshed ;- applied to sltl on i morbid o.ffcc - of heat or c ol d• . shlps ln a storm. Totten. tlo n or th o b o dy; - n o t I , Air'-�iill, 11 . 1. A. cavicy- contalning nfr. ••'i, 11. [l!raz. <it Twit fro m the cry tho animal uttel'S ; appllcd ordlnnrllr. to Allleltc,. 2. (Bot. ) A co.vlty In the cellular tissue acute diseases . • Li ttle aUments." o f_p lants, containing air only. Fr. ai, 'hay. l (Zo ol.) Tho c ommon three-toed sloth; Lanadoume. n species or .JJ radypUB. Bairct. .i.lm, "· i. [Fr. Prov. Pie. amer, o. Fr. asmer, aasmer, 3. (Pllysiol.) .A receptacle of air In A.fd, v. t. [imp. & p. p. AIDED ; p. 1i r. & 11b. n. AID· esmer, Pr. esmar, aymar , ymar, O. Sp. asmar, to es- vari ous parts o f th e system, ns a cavi ty !'i<lar, _It. <lita e, : ractcd tlmntc, cal ulnte, adj ust, fit, to make an offer t in the c ell ular tissue of tl1c human lungs ; ING.) ! Fr. ai<(er1 Pr. r out c o the ai r-enc of birds ; the dilatation of from O. Fr. aJucter, <QUelj llluer1 Pr. qJUdar, Sp. strike, level, aim, Lat. mstimare, to estimate, val ue, er. M. H. Ger. llmeii eme11, nug a _ air vessels I n Insects. Carpenter Alr-<,!Js. ayu1lar, It. ajutare, from Lnt. ad;utare, t o h elp · v. G fll&men, a to g o freq. fr. a411Lvare, to help ; ad nnd juvare, to he ! p.J cnsk, Ger. machallmen, to !mil.a le .] Air'-chii.m'ber, n • .A cavity c ontalnlng,tlr to act BB 1. T p i t with a missive we apon ; 118, to aim at n spring f r equnllzlng the fl ow of a To support, either by furnishing strcngtl1 o r means o o n o an enemy. llquid In hydmullo mnchlnes , to effect n purpose, o r to p r event or remove evil ; to h elp ; to BSB!st ; ns 1 Heaven ai<l-B th ose wh o aid 2 . To direct th e Inten ti on or purp os c i to attempt Tho cut Is n e o ctlon of n locomotive pnmp. themselves. the accomplishmen t of a purp ose; - roll ow c d liy Tho water Is drawn by the action or the Syn. - To help ; nas!st; support; sustlll.n ; succor ; at ; as, to aim at disUnctl on. ' .J.im'at th ou at plunger In the barrel B, through the feed- rcllo,·e. pri nc es V " Pope. plpo C and the valves D (resting on tho Aid, n. [Fr. aide, o. Fr. a,,�1 aie, Pr. ayda, a1iia, 3. T o gues� or conjecture. [ Obs.] Sl&ak. seats E, and held In place by the cage, F} , · . & . AIMED p . & 1Jb. to the air-chamber A1 In the top of which It. a'Ua ; O . Fr. ojude, ojue, ame, aile, Pr. oju<la, Sp. .i.lm " t [ imp . p. p ; p. r n. l. tus, a., p. of ac{i• u- AIM.ING. ) 'l' o direct or p oint, a s � weap o n ,· to the air Is compressea, forcing the wat er ,,,,mla, It. a�1<to.L rrom L at. ,u�u ou t or the dellvery-pIpe O beyo nd It m1d- s di re ct to a p nrtlculnr object ; as, t o aim o. musk et o r ft :,-;�re to he . Tho A-S. aide Is taken from tho O . die position when tile pi ston Is at the end \?, an arrow, tbc fist or a bl ow ; to a'm o. satire or a re- o r N,orm. r. Sec supra.] of its stroke. Clari;. flcctl on nt some perso n or vtco. • � 1. Help ; succor ; support ; aselst.nnco ; relief. " An T , -- '- un con s tituti onal m o de o f obt.nlnlng aid." Ha llam. aim , n . [O . Fr. i& Pr . esm e, Catnl.nn esma, est.I- ,ur cv,sh 'lon, n. A.n nlr-Ught cushi on sup- matlo n , appreciat on. See sup ra.] which can be Inflated. l+ancis. 2. The person o r th i n g that aids or yields ryden 1. The 1-drii.ln , n. (Arch.) A cavity be- D . p o inting r di ecti n f n missile weap n ; h port ; n helper ; an auxllinry. o r o o o the d i r ecti o n of an y thi n g to arti cular p o int or tween tho external walls of a bui lding, Let us mnk• unto hlm [mllll) nn aid like unto hlmaclf. � Tobit viii. a. object, with a view to strike o r n cct It, as of n spear �1-� ent dampness. Wetile. n bl ow, n discourse, o r remark. " Each o.t the hon d .i. - IJWll, a. Drawn o r painted In S. (Eng. Lato.) A n extrnordlnnry grant o f a sub- l eveled his deadly aim." on. air; Imaginary. " This Is tho air-dnnm dagger." AI'.U sldy or tax to tho king by parliament. 2. The p oint Intended t o be bit, or object Intended Shtrl:. 4 . (Feuda l Law.) A pecuniary tribute ( orlgi n nlly to be affected. " T o bo th o aim of every dangerous .£tr'- en1tlne, n. An engine put In motion bf ho\ yolu.ntnry, nftcrwnrd compul s or y) ald by o. vassal f s h o t.'' Sltak. air Instead o f steam j n co.Jorie engine. Nithol. t o his lord on cer tain occasi o ns o pe°'111o.r om cr- 3. Purp o se ; lntenU on ; s cheme. " How oft am- AJr1er, n. 1. One wn o exp o ses to the n! r. A gcncy. �lackstone. J>op e. 2 • .A frnme on which c l othes arc a.Ired or dried. b! tl o us mms arc crossed I " 5 _ A.n ald-de-carop, ,_, 80 onllcd by abbrevtntlun ; 118, 4. C o njec tu re. l Obs.l " ,Vbat y ou would w ork Air'-es-eiipe', ti. .A c ontrivance for letting o lf nlr a general's lh••· me to, I have s ome aim.It Shak. from water-pipes. hmici.•. To pra11 in aid (La11J), to call In a person In terested 7b •• ~, � aim, to encouro"c. [Obs .] Sh- •. h'-foun'tain, n. A. contrivance for producing • In a title to assist In defending It. The petition for this j t O f wate b Ym e ans f compreBBed lllr. Syn.- End ; object ; scope ; drift ; doslgn ; purpos e ; � c r "" o 0 Puri,osc Is call ed aid-p,·a11er. Cowell. Blackstone. AJr'-giln, n. An Instrument rescmbllng a musktt, Intention ; schemo. A.td'an�e, n. [O. Fr. aiclance.] Al d . [Rare. J -ihn'er, n. One wh o alms, directs, o r p oints. to discharge bullets by tho cl11Stic force of tho air, The me11n11 o.nd aidances 111upplicd by tha Suprome! R�on. bn' • comp ressed C:olendge. A Ie ss , a. With out n1m ; as, an aimless ll fc . into o. me - e ss-l y.1. adv. Wi th out nfm, o r pu112 osc . • .iltd'ant, a . [Fr. aitlm1.t, p. pr. of ai<ler, t o l1 c lp. ] 4fm'l (4 ) \ n. [.1rr . air, Pr. air, aire, Sp. aire, Pg. ar, talllc gl obe Helping ·, helpful ·, su£ plylng nld. [ Rare.] Sha1:. Air It. aria, nlr and tuno, Lat. ai!r, Gr. d�• air.] b mean s � g) (SByn o p., § 130) ' n. ; f 0 n c on - Ald1- de-eamp (iid ' e - k• un � 1. Tho fluid w hich we breathe, o.riuJ whfcb sur• r de .c11m , fr om aide, Ah-1!Un. p l. AIDS-DE-CAMP. [Fr. a-l c, 1_ n o fficer rounds th o earth ; th e atm osphc1·e. It Is Invisible , "._ dc nse . , cnmp .] (M•!. sc - nsslstnnt, and cmn r, fficer to assis t ?it! In his mill- ln o d oro us, Insipid, transparent, co mp 1·c ss l bl o , clas - a.u.·'- hold'er, "• 1. A.n Instrument for holding air, lccted bf n gene ra o tic, and po nd crable. for the purp ose of counter acting the pressure of a tnr7. dutit;- de crenslng column of mercury• Dffl:y. 1171"" Ily tho ancient philosophers, ai,· wn rc--'cd ti'"u as A.Id er, n. Onc who h cI ps ; nn ass I atnn t or auxIl l n ry. o n clement ; but modcni sclcnco bas showne that 2. A. gnsometer. con - Alr'-hol n . 1. A J Hcl lcss j wi h ut aid. Tennyson. fl Aid'le ss, a . t o e, 1ole t o admit or dlschn""" - �- air. T ,._td'•mii ; ° 'Jo1·, " · 'he ndj ut.nnt f a reg1m en t • [ Ob s. ] slsts essentially or two gnsos, oxygen nnd nitrogen, tn the proportion of 20.81 pnrts of the former to 76.9'J of t h e 2. (Fuun<ling. ) A. b o lo or cavity I n o. casting, pro• Al'gret , .lt-grettc'J ! A.l'gre , ?I. See EAGRE . n. [F r. aig1•ette, a s o rt o f wl1ltc h�cro n , wfth a l o ng an d s en d er tuft o f ,cath - latter; or, by weight, ot 23.01 oxygen, and 79.10 nit rogen , ��ccd by bubbles of o.l r in th e liquid metal. bcuctoth a o um ns . Tb °,.,.oxygo11 J e th o v llnl portion, �-'l-ly, adv. In nn airy man n er• rdolnngl trt011D e11 1s 11ccc 88 8., 10 dll11u 10 11 _ .iUr'l-ness, n. 1. Th e stnte or quality of bolng nlry; ra I s n cn d ; a tu ft b11 n ch1 o f feathe rs ; dim . . A. pn rtlcnlar st.a te o f th o atm o sphere, ns r e- o pe n ness or exp o sure to th o nlr; ns, the airiness of e on t or 2 rnti o n cut ofi"}, Fr. Pr ov. o f 1,eron (wl�h t11e ospl . sp c c ts heat, cold, m ois ture, and t ho like, o r as affec t- a co u ntry-sent. eoro11, P r . aig r on, Sp. air 01 !, O. F�. hai r 0 !•• It . Ing th e sc'!sntl on \i ns, a sm oky air, o. damp air, th e 2: Lightness of spirits ; gaycty ; levity ; as, the agllironc from 0, Il. Gor. lleigir, hl!lgro, hl!l{lero, mo rn in g air, &c. airiness of young pe rs o ns •. Ice!. 11egri, A.-S. l&ige r e. l 3. Any ai!rlform b ody ; n gas ; as, oxygen was for- Ah-1lng , ?I. 1. A wnlk or ride In tho open nlr; a r. ( Ormt/1.) Tho smaU white heron ; - comm only mc rly called vital ai,·. short cxcul'Sl on . co.llcd egret. 4. Alr In m otl o u ; n light breeze ; n gentle wind . 2. .A n e xp o sure to al r1 or to a fire, for wll?Ttllng or 2. (Bot. ) A feathery crown of seed. See EGRET. Let vornol airs through trembling oalora piny. Pope. � �lrylng, &c. ; as, th o airi11g of lln c11, or of a room. 3. A plnmc or an or nament for the head c o mposed A>r'-Ji\ck'et 11. A jacket having air-tight cells, or of fe ath e rs, o r of preci o us sto nes, I n tho form of o. 5 • U ttcranc c nb road ; publ! cIt tak cn air. " Y u fa; vo It air b� orc me:'' a s , n 8t ory h ne � DnJ1le11. cavities wlilch c an be flll cd with air, to render per- so ns bu oy ant I n swimming. h eron's c!"cet. 6 • H c nco , i°n t cgn llll gcn c c ; auvl c c ; m, orm ntl o n . .£.tr11 A.f' til- l iitte' (iVgll-l� t •), n. [Fr. Se o .AGLET.J e ss1 a. No t open t o a frco curre nt of Rl r ; want- f. A. point or tng at the end of a fringe o r Ince. [ Obs.] Bacall. I ug frcsn air' or communIcatI on wI th ope n nlr':. . us. ) A m11slcnl tlt o ugl1t expressed ln o. A! ·1I ". (Mil.) (a.) A. "' t.agged p o int h anging il from rn th 7 (Ill pl cnelug and symmetrical successi on of single t ones ; r Ing 11• A thoulthtlcss , gny pcrsou. ) 0w. Illid 61, ouldor upon the breast , In some m l ttory un orme rare .] /• Slight airlings." • Jo11so11. o c d w rn fr m ne n mel o cly • ; n tune ., nn arln. In Europe. (b.) A brnld o r or o o o '-ma-tJblne ' (-mn-shocn'), n. An nppnrntus for B. Tll o peculiar lo ok, appear ance, manner , m i en .i.tr Sll o uldcl. acro ss the brcMt, forro c rly used In tho or carriage o f a pe rs o n ,· ae the air o f n y outh •, a ventilating mines u niform of certain p o r tio n s of tho U. S . army. h envy air . a I 0 fl' ai•r . " ll• - 8 v ery m•r.,, Sha ,. . .i.b:'-uipe, n. A pipe used to draw foul air from a Ai•�u-let, n. [Fr. Seo AGLET- / A. l.ng or n t. -""p osi er. ' 1 9. pl. An nrtl1jr,clnl or affected ma n ner ; sl1 o w .: of shJpTs ho ld, mine s, and other cl ose places. �- ' l" t G,-ier. T l ;,lct' .,.. Al ( 'row, I n. " G olden alrlllet8.' A. species o lichen, o r m o ss. �,., e,1 · g pride , l1 au h tlncss as, It Is · , said o f n p e rs o n, h e pu t s .a.ii· -P .. n • n. C BOt • ) -"- grows fo r o. c o nsld cr nblc • P I nnt Wh i ch 11 vcs nnd time with o ut being rooted o u airs. .ln, "· t. [imp. & p. P• AILED ; V• pr. &; vb. 11• AIL- 10. ( Paint.) T ho representati on o r repro du cti o n I n c nrtlJ, or In any 0ther 1110.] r A.-S. eglan, eglian, elm,, aol,jan t o feel o f th o cft'e ct o f tl 1 c o.tm o spl1 crl o medi um tl, ro u gh .£tr, substance • paln te lroubl<;i me eglctfi., It grieves me, eg 1e, sharp, which every o bject In nat ure Is viewed. N ,oAm. Gyc. e ai,.-fnii�ls!'.i 1 [F troul,lcsomc, u o th . ugls, tro ublesome, Irksome, 11.':�:e 1b lake air, t o \Jc ,uvulgod ; lo- \Jo mndo publfc. - 1b <Lglo, aglitlia, paln, trouble.] To afl'oct with pain strumcnt t o measure o r uneasiness, eltl1er physical o r m en tal ; to trotiillc i take the air, to go nbronll ; lo wnllt or rlllc out. ���c weight o f tho air. t o be the matter wi th ; t o affec t In nnr wo.y ; - us c n Air v. t. [imp. &p.J>. AI RED ; J>. pr . & vb. n. AIRING.] All"'-pi\Jn p, n. I. A i . To exp o se to th o air fo r th e purp o se o f coo li ng, to express some u n easi n ess or nO:ectl on , whose pump or machine \"a- cnusc ls u nknown ; ns, what ails the mo.n ¥ I k no w rc frcshlug, cxhl bltl ng, or purifying; t o v ontllo.tc ; rl o usly c on st ruot cJ, fo r not what ails lllm . ns, to afr n room. " It wer e goo d wisdom • . . tJ1at exhausting tho air from WhBI aile!h thee, Baga:r7 Gm. xxl. 17. tho jail wero airecl." Bacon. a cl osed vessel. ar n le never used 1.o express a specific dlsonse. Wo Were you but riding lbrth to air yourself. Shak. 2. ( Steam-en_Qi11es.) novcr sny, o. fov or aill Wm; bul somctblng all• him. .Airing o anowy bond and 1l1111ct ring. 7l-rmlf80ll. A pump used to ex- ,AJ,-.pump. .GRAND.AM 585- GR.APE-VINE oplendid, mngnlftccnt, enbllmc; ao, n grand vlow ; Gril.Dd'•r o grand conccpUon. d man · U 8• TbeJ are the hlghe1l 11100C'.'h of e.zprualora, the nnti! '" l\nnch, n. b ] A greedy follow; D gonr- u.~ra:;{~=ti:~'!,~~':'l:t':":o~~!f~~,~ fbr ' ·Slntoa. Bat now, In England, the usunl morl,, of lrnns- ferrJng realty I• by uranl; auu so, In aome of tho S1111cs, the term vranl le llppllc<I to conveyances of CYerY kind of roal property. Dourier. ~/h1rrill. prouhed IDll.sler1 or the gnmd aerie. .JI. Arr,o!d. Jlol/and. GrAnt'a-ble, a. Cnpable of being granted or con- 3. Holding oo clcvntcd or ndvnnccd rnnkJ no In Grilnd'stre, n. .A grondfothcr; moro generally, veyod. - ycor• or olJ\lion; - ofte11 forming compounao with any ancestor. Gr4ut-ee', n. (.LalD.) The person to whom a gront the following word; o.s, n grr111df111.hcr; n 91•and or conveyance le made. Jury; a grand Jodgo; o gra11d vizier, nnd tho Uke. Grind'a6n (-slfn), n. The son of a son or dangh- ter. Dl• grace will not ,orvlve the poor grantee he dt1pl1e1. BtaJ:e. GrtJnd day, (Eng. La.u,), ccruiln days In the terms Griine, ti, 8t n. Tho oomc ao GROAN. [ Obs.] GrAn.tler, n. One who granlo. whfch aro solemnly kept In tile ln11s of cnnrt aml cban- ttry. -Grand dute. (a.) A so,·crcl,:11 duko Inferior jn Griinfe, n. [Fr. gt·ange, barn, Pr., Sp., & Pl!'- Gr4nt'or (127), n. (Law.) The pcreon by wl1om A rant to a king. (b.) (Or11ilh.) Tho greo.t horned-owl ( 811/JQ mtJrimu.,). - /Jraml j 11ror, one of o gt11Jld Jnry. - Grand {,"'Y (l,ar.o), o Jury of not le.. u,an twdvo nor gra1ua, storing b&rn, gro.ln; i'nrm, a L. Lat. granory; gra11gia,frane,1, ca, from Lnt. granum, Eng. grain. A house for Griin'4-lar, n born; hence, gra,ia- nlso, o grant or Griln'fi-la-ry, I conveyonce le made. a. (Fr. granulaire. Seo GRAN· IJLE.] Consisting of, or r cscm- bllng, grains; ao, 11 granul.ar substnnce; a stone of ~~~~l1~~r:c~,~~:u~;;•~t~·;::. ~fePc~~~r.~e J!~J 1 ~~ form, with Its etobles and other buildings. Ne have the wotry fowla a cerlaln granu, granufar nppcarance. crlmc-1 and If they .see Just cirnsc. them 10 ftnd bUls or f.o- s,,,,,.,,-. Griln'ft-lar-ly, adt1. In a grnnulor form. a .11 rllctment agillnst thcm 1 to be prcscnt<'"d to t.he cvurt; - c4.lled iilso grand ilJ.quut. bom;ier. - Grand pia.no-Jorte Wherein lo rel!. :Nor burnt Che /INffO<,DOJ' boned the mllkln,:-m;~.:..,,..... Griln'O-liite, ti. ,. [imp. & f· p. GRANULATED; lllllli (d/u,.) • pecollor ,pcelc• of the pin no-forte, In ,vlilch tbe Griin'ger, n. .A farm-steward or bttlllff. Holland. JJ.pr. &t1b. n. 011.ANDLATINO. [Fr. gra,mle1·. Sec \fires Or .srrinJrs nrc gcn<'!rnJJ.r lripiicntt•d, JncrcasJng 1be Gra-nlf'er-oils, a. [Lat. gra11ifer, from g_ran1tm, GRANULE.] ~c;;;;.;-;::c'll'of~~ic.tllc cJ1lcf mcrub<,r or hcud of tile groin, and ferre, to beor; Fr. gra1l(fere.] Bearing 1. To form Into groin• or smnU masses; no, to seed& l!ko grain. Humble. granulate powder or sugar. Syn.-Mognlficent; sobllmo; mnjcsllc; dli:mlncd ; Griln'l-f&rm, a. (Lot. franum , grain, nnd furma, 2. To raise In small aoperitlce; to mnkc rough on clented : stately; august ; Jl-Ompous ; lofty: o:rnltcd : form; Fr. granifvrme. Formed like groins of the surfnce. /lay. noblc.-GRA~D, .M.AG~"lFIC&S1, St:1u,nr1::. Grand, Jn ref- com. .Loudon. Gri1n'ii-liitc, ti. i. To collect or bo formed Into ... b,1< ;~!~ ~:1,~j Ria;~~~ l~O tai.nt:;1~~do;r~1 5IJ~r !°,3in\~ ;;;~,l[;~~gtl;;~ . :1~d\\'~~ts~-;~ i,~~~;~n~~ th i,~ ~-~RS l~~.1~ 1 Griin'lte (grlln'it), n. [Fr. grsnit, It. granito, Sp. gralns; na 1 cnlle Juice [7f'rinulate., Into engnr. granido, from Lot. gru,iu,111 grain, It. gr,mitoj G•·iln'ii-latoc, I a. l. Consisting of, or rescm- graln;y, grained, p. p. of gramre, to make grolny. Griin'ii•lii'ted, I bUng, grnlne. 11 nd elevating. A cntnrn.ct is 9rand; a rich nnd ,·nricd (Geol.) .A crystolllnc, unstratified rock, consisting 2. Having DUDlCrous omoll elovnlloos, ne sl1a- lllnd.scapo Is ma!]nijicen,; nn o,·crh n.n.1-:r11g precipice Js o! quartz, feldspar, and mica, and present.Ing neu- green. llrande. 1,lfJ/i1n'- 11 Grandeur ndmit~ of dc-~rcc.s and muUlflca- ally a whitish, grayish, or flesh-red color. It difl'cre G•iin'ii-lii'tlon, n. [Fr. gran11lation.] Tho net of lfon,; but mag11/fice11ce Is that which hoa nlrcndy rcnchcd from gneiss In not hovlng tbc mica In planes, and forming Into groins; os, the gra11ulati.on of powder the highest degree of ,upenorlty naturally b<,Jonglng to therefore In being destitute of a schletoec structure. nnd sugar· Ure. u,e ob)ect lo question." Criwb- ;:;;r- Granite ta one of tho motamorpWc rocks, like Suppurati~• gra1'ulali•n. (Ph11#ol.) (a.) The dc,•cl- Gd.n' dam, n. (Ji'r. {lf'and, grrz,ule, and dame. Seo- gnelsa and mica sclllst. n ta o.Jso regarllcd as a true 1g. opment of cells fl"om the cft'us!on of n mw snr61cc whlch auprr, aod D.uu;;.J .A.n old woman; spoelftcally,_a neous rock. £Jana.. forma small grain-like protuberances nnd pustules. It grandmoLhcr. Shak. Gneiuoid uranit8, llTDnfte In which the mien ha• tmccs serves to 1111 np the cnvlty ond unite tho sides. (b.) Tho Griind'ellild, n. A son'• or daughter'• child; a of a regular arrangement. _ Grap/Ii,; granU•, grnnlto act or proccsa of •uch development. T111ly. child lo the •econd degree of deacont. Griintl1d!1ugb 1ter (-d&w 1tcr), n . '.!.'ho daughter of a""" or dnughlcr. :;~~!~!r'lfc1~~:zq~~:~,:,~~.:;;:1 3Y,~ w, to appear, In a transverse sectlon, Ukc orlontnl chnmc- 1~;Jd~~~f;; 6 1f~~:11:-I dl~~·!t[v':.n~ii'..~.~la':.!!~~ir!i~~~~lt~J A little grn n; a smnll pnrUclc. Grn11-dee', "· [Sp. gra1Ule. See GaANI>.] .A man of elev.tied rt1nli or station; a nobl eman. 1:n Spain, a nobleman or the first rank, w ho hos the king's 1~1 :~:r!~-~~~uf:8";~';.~~~\: 1; 1 Ing bomblen<le as well as ltllcn. {~~~: G~~~-:~:::.t}•~lr~f g~[jn{(~~:~le and Lnt. Gra-nil'l.l-f3rm, a. [Eng. grmmle and Lnt.form11, len,c to be covered In hie presence. Griin'l-tel, n. [It.granitrllo and grrinltella, dlmln- form.] (Min.) Having 011 lrregulnr granular etruc- Gn.n-dce'•llJp, n. The milk or estate of a gran- utlvc• of granito; Fr.9ranitelle. See supra.] ( Geol.) turo. dee. . Swinburne. A binary, granitic compound contolmng two eon- Grltu1tt-lltc, n. [Eng. granule nn<l Gr. .\{So,, Grlin,l'eilr (grlnd 1Y1Jr), n . \Fr., from grancl. See stltuent parte 1 11B qunrtz and feldspar, or qunrtz ond stone.] (Geol. ) .A whltfo!i, gr:mnlar rock, conslst- GRAND, ] The qual!ty ot be ng grand; \'tl8tncse of oborl ornornolende • .[Obs.] Jiirwan. Ing of feldopar Bn<l qunrlz lntimnlcly mlxcct;- •ho; ,pfcndor of appearance; clc~at.lon of thought Gra-nIVle, I [Fr it" ] It le eomet.lriies co.lied wMte-stone, lepty11itc, and or c1prc,,lon; nobtlltf of aet!on. Gra-nlt'le-al, I a. · · gran "]tie. e1'rlte. or hu~:; : 11~t:c:11,!~g;~;{eur and moje1Uo ■how Slmk. 1. Like gronlto In composition, color, &c.; hav- Gmu'ii-loils, a. fFr. gr_anulere:i:, Pr.gramdos, Sp. Ing tbc noture of granlto ; ee, graniti,c texture. granuloao, granilloso, l~ granelloso.] Full of B;'n.-Su~Umity; majesty; atatclrneas; nugueb1eH; Iollincs,. 2. Conelat.log of granite ; as, {lf'anll.i,c moun- groins ; obonndlng · Sec S1;"u,11n. tolne. with granular sub- · . ' ~ Gran -,U.-•t-ty, n. ago; lo_og llfc. ( Ob•. fLot. grand-dluitaa.] Great G••a-nlt11-f1-eii1tloni.. n . [Eng. granite and Lnt. Glanville. .[aceret to moke.] The art or process of being Griipe1 n. [Fr.grappe, etoncee. ,, , Gn.n--<le'voits, a. [L"o~ g ran,1teuu8, from qrmulia, formea Into grnnlte. Humble. O. l!t l'rov. Fr. grand! nnd a,ii,m1 llfet.lmc, age.] Of groat nge; Gra-nlt't-f6rm., a. [Eng. granite and Lat,forma, crape, It. grappo, ,, long-I vcd. [ Ob-1,J Railey. form .] ( Geol.) Resembling granite In etructurc or groppolo, D. grappe, ~'ff"\~) Grlnd 11/i1ther, 11-. .A fniher's or mother's !other; shape. Humble. krappe, o!Ued to It. 'J \'\,~ an nncc•tor In the next degree abo ve the father or Griln'l-tlne, n. [Fr. grrinitin. See GRANITE.] ,qrappa, Pr. & Sp. mother In llncnl ascent. ( Geol.) A rock containing three species of mlnerolo, grapri, a cramp-Iron, Grl11d'fli1 ther-ly, "· Having the ago or manner 8 ome of which differ from thooc which compose fcrroomtche~ _ n Hgrn_p10ln0gr'. Oh grondfar.hcr; klud; benignant; complacent. grnnlto, as qunrtz 1 fcldopor, and ohorl. Kirwan. v lif wu • ~r'aI1d/1tlhrrlv tort of pctt0ocge. ...¥. HatDthorn,. Grlin'l-totd, a. LFr. gronitoWe, from granit, ond krapfo, hook. Cf. W. Grar-dl1'Je, a, [Lnt. grandlftcw, ; grandls, grnnd, ,lo,,,, Gr. form .] Resembling gr1mlte fn gl'nnulnr grab, cluster, grope, ~ /uwe, to make.] MBklng grcnt. [R.] Balle,J. appearance, even though not Igneous; oo,g,·anitoid crap, gropplc.] gneiss. an.-dll'o•qnen\le, ,._ [It. gmndlloqmmza.J Gra-niv'o-roils, a, [Lat. granum, grain, ond ~'0- 1. The fruit of tho vino; bnt commonly bThe u,e of lofty words or phr11Bos ; - usually In o rare, to ent greedily; Fr. granitm·e.] Eating o single berry of tho ad ••nee; bom b~ot. Grall;dll'o-qucnt, a. (Lat. grandls, grand, nod grain ; feeding or eubelBtJng on seeds; aa, graiiit:o- vine. lDqu,, to speak.) PompoUA; bombnatlc; grandllo• Griln'na.m., rOUB birds, JJ1•01cne. 2. (Man . ) A mnn- quoue. In. [For grandam.] A grandmother; gy tnmor on the legs G~ll-dll'o-qnoih, a. [Lat. grandlloqutt.s; gran- Grdnt Gmn'ny I a grnndam. [L010.J JJ. Jonson. ofn horoe. fti •ttc; b'l':lod, nod larp!l, to 11pcalc.] Speoldng In o col, ti, t. [imp. & p. p. GRANTED; p .p.-. & t1b. -n. GR.ANTING.] ro. Eng. graunt, Norm. Fr. 3. (.lfil.) Grnpo- shot. Grnp••· Leovos, And ToudrllL Gr°- Y hombn•Ue. graunter, granter, t>. Fr. Qr(l.antcr, g1·at1u11ter, Gt'Q:J>6 of a eannon, tho caacabol or knob nt the butt. ILD d'. -ii•e' (126), a. [Lat. grandu, grand; ll'r. granclwse.] grrinter:., craanter, creanter, cran.tert to promloe, Grii.pe'-h9'n-~'fnth, n. (IJot.) A :plnnt found on yield, Lat. as If cre<lentare, to make ooUevc, from sondy soils 1n Englund; the .Mitsca,, raccmo•mn. I l. Ia1prc,,log or clevntlng In effllet • Imposing· •lr)klng; -uacd lo n good ocn•o. ' ' oreden8, P• pr. of credere, to bellevo.J Griipe'leBII a. Wanting In grapes or In the 1. To gtve over; to mak? conveyance of; to give otrength a,;d flnvor of the grnpo. ' Je111111s. In~ "'"' of tho P•rts ,.., lo bo ~rp,t.ally kept down tho poase88lon or title of, - neuolly In answer to Grii.p'er-y, n. A building or lnelosnre noed for tho = er not lo hnpolr the grand~ elfect of tho W'hole. ' pet!t.lon; to convey• r,nltl.-atlon of gm pee. 2 Ch JI. A.mold. OrfJ71t me tho place of this lhttahlng-ftoor. l CT,ro11. x:i:I, 22. Griipc'-sll~t, n, (.llil.) A certain number of !roll b •. nrnctcrlzcd by aelf-dlaplny .swell or bom- . b~t, fiaunLIJJg; turgid; bombnat!c ·-ueod In a 2. To bestow or confer, wltb or without compcn- balls, usually nine/ put. together by ""!onsc; ""• n grrmdiose style. '. sntloo part.lcularly In answer to prayer or ro- means of cost Iron c rculnr plates ot top G Yn-,,, gron.,fi,,,e red tulips, ..-hleh groW' wlld, E. D, Drouminu, quest.' ond bottom, with two rlngot.!'nd a ccnt.rtil r,.n,lll-lla'l-ty, 11. [Fr. 9rrindiosite. 1 Swell of Wherororo did God 11,ant mo my reque,1. Millon. oonncctlng pin nnd nut. .1mrmorly the · •tybole or manner; also, one who Ill gr&n1f pompous 3 To odmlt as true when disputed or nol sntlefoc- balls were p1nced In tiers oround an Iron or mbnellc ' ' torliy proved• to yield belief to· to allow· to yield• pin, ottoohed to o bottom ploto, nnd In- Grln',l_l•!•ods, a. [Lnt. grrin1linosm, from grando, d ' ' ' ' closed In a eonvao bng. Roberts. to cone~ e. Griipe'•stonc n. The stone or aced of ~a111lin11, hnll; It. q_ra,ulittoso.] Oon lllstlngofhnJI; Grunt !hal 1110 Falo■ I,avo ftrmed by their decree. Drt,tlm. the grapo ' · 6 •. wij11ng lu hall. [ Ohs.] 0 JJalle,1. Syn.-To give; con11!r; bestow; convoy; transfor; G - c'•sygtar 11 Soc GLUCOSE r,and 1-t)_', n , iLot. grmulitri~ 0 . Fr. gramlitt!, admit; ollow; concodo. 800 On·u. G~;:.,,.vfne, .:. (Bot.) A vine or ~limb- Gropo-,ho~ I r.gram/il(lt. Seo GIIAND.) 1treo.tneoe; magnlf- Gr4nt, '!· 1. The net ;encci [Obs. ) Camden. O; granting; o. bestowing or conforrmg; concession, odmlsalon of •omcthlng ne 8 Ing ebrub hnvlng mn11 green flowers and lobed lcnvos, ond bearing a fruit called grapes, growing In ~~f~ ly, "tlv. In o g,-nnd or lot'ty mnnnor; spleo- G • Y, •ubllmoly. tr~•· Th 0 thi ntod or bestowed ; a gift; n clustors. ra~il'm6t1, 1er (-ml!tl1 1er), 11. Tllo mother of • ng gro ar Tho common grnpc-,·lne Is VitiJ ritjfera, nntl ls n ODt • fulhcr or motbe,· boon. d I nnth·c of Central Asfn. Another vnrlcty Is that ylcltllng 3. (Law.) A transfer of property by deo or wr t-- n small seedless grnpc commonly cnlle<I Zt111/e ciwrt1 11 t1 Gbiwd•-ncph 1c w (-n~f'yn), n. The grandson o!a Ing· ospeclo.lly, nn appropriation or convcyonce 'J'hc northern FtJ:r-grap• ts the v. Lal>n1&rn, lh>mwhlch; G !:')lbc,r or slswr. mnde by the government; oa, a grant of land. by cuJtlvotlon, hns come tho l<abel/a vorlety. 'J'hc •out h- ~~n11 cu, n. Grandeur; grcntncea wlth bMuty; p,-- Formerly In English lnw, tho term wne spocltl• crn Fo:r-urape, or ,llusct1dine, Is tho V. 1ntlpim11. 'l'he Gr-:;-,,• , ccnoc. _ Woluuton. cnlly npplle<I to ironsfcra of lnoorpol'col 1,0.-c<lllnmonts, Frost-urape Is J~ co,•d(fo/ia, which hns ,·cry fmi,rnnt Otu11d un\lc, "· 'I"ho grnndclnughtcr of a brother cJ<pcctont cstntos, nnd Jotters-potent th,m J?Ovcmmonc : flowers, nn<I rlpono niter tho early frosts; whence tho r a 81 er. tmd such Is !ti! present nppllcatlon In somo or the Uulted nnmc. fllrl, rude, P\Uh; ,, 1, 0 , lll_o nt; " aa •; "h 88 sh; 11, eh, 88 k; t QII J, g 48 In g,et; I 48 z; ll as gz; n as fa Hoger, link; th ao In thiue. .H . ,_ TAB 15 1/13/25, 10:33 AM 00004830 | Oxford English Dictionary This is the unrevised text of the entry as published in the Second Edition of the OED (1989). It may contain unrevised text that was originally published much earlier. View current version of this entry aid, n. (eɪd) Forms: 5 eide, 5–7 aide, ayde, 6–7 ayd, 7– aid. [a. OFr. aïde, ayde, earlier aiude, Strasb. oaths aiudha, adiudha (cf. Pr. ajudha, ajuda, Sp. ayuda):—late L. adjūta, n. f. pa. pple. fem. of adiuvāre (see prec.) analogous to ns. in -ée, -āta; see -ade.] 1. a. Help, assistance, support, succour, relief. 1475 Bk. Noblesse 4 Be the eide of tho thre noble prynces. 1475 Caxton Jason 18b, If the goddes be in myn ayde. 1559 Myrroure for Mag., Rich II, vi. 1 Neyther lakt I ayde in any wicked dede. 1607 Shakes. Cor. i. vii. 3 If I do send, dispatch Those Centuries to our ayd. 1667 Milton P.L. vi. 119 His puissance, trusting in the Almighty's aid, I mean to try. 1771 Burke in Corr. (1844) I. 262 You have not called in the aid of fancy. 1807 Crabbe Par. Reg. ii. 130 Friend of distress! the mourner feels thy aid. 1868 Geo. Eliot F. Holt 22 She had never dressed herself without aid. b. in aid of, in support of (a cause or charity). Hence, fig. and colloq. (presumably having its origin in the freq. use of the phr. in appealing for the public support of a cause), about, concerned with; esp. in phr., often disparaging, what's this (or that) in aid of?, what is the meaning or purpose of this?, what is this all about? 1837 Playbill in M. Morley Old Marylebone Theatre (1960) 20 A Benefit will take place in Aid of the Funds of the New Alms Houses. 1860 S. S. Hennell (title) Thoughts in aid of faith. 1881 W. S. Gilbert Patience i. 19 In aid—in aid of a deserving charity, I've put myself up to be raffled for! 1915 Times 22 Oct. 11/3 Queen Alexandra‥was present at the Empire Theatre matinée in Aid of the British Red Cross Society. 1918 Punch 20 Nov. 332 (caption) Oh Mother,‥they've given us a whole holiday to-day in aid of the war. a1935 T. E. Lawrence Mint (1936) 127 The hut lights were on and he had brought me a tin of tea and a hot sausage roll. ‘Scram up!’ he called.‥ ‘What's all this in aid of?’ I asked, stupidly. 1935 Marsh & Jellett Nursing-Home Murder xv. 231 ‘That's your disillusioned expression, Fox,’ said Alleyn. ‘What's it in aid of?’ 1942 ‘Blake’ We Rendezvous at Ten ii. 41 The Group Captain called down the table to Roger: ‘Find out what that's in aid of, Roger, will you?’ 1949 E. Bowen Heat of Day xvii. 315 What you were in aid of‥often was a mystery to me. 1956 ‘M. Innes’ Old Hall, New Hall viii. 70 He couldn't quite make out what Olivia's questions and speculations were in aid of. 2. a. Eng. Law. Help or assistance in defending an action, legally claimed by the defendant from some one who has a joint-interest in the defence. to pray in aid: to claim such assistance. aid-prayer, the appeal therefor. 1625 Sir H. Finch Law (1636) 367 Ayd Prayer is for Tenant for life, to request him that hath the Inheritance, to helpe him plead‥and this Ayd Prayer is for the feeblenesse of his estate. 1751 Chambers Cycl. s.v., A city or corporation, holding a fee-farm of the king, may pray in Aid of him, if anything be demanded of them relating thereto. 1809 Tomlins Law Dict. s.v., There is a prayer in aid of patrons, by parsons, vicars, etc.‥ And also servants having done anything lawfully in right of their masters, shall have aid of them. https://www.oed.com/oedv2/00004830 1/4 1/13/25, 10:33 AM 00004830 | Oxford English Dictionary b. to call or crave in aid, properly a legal phrase, also in a loose transf. use. 1927 Observer 8 May 16/2 Imagination craves the wireless in aid. 1928 Ibid. 1 July 13/4 Many [bishops]‥ would call in aid, as justifying their action, the use of the Jus Liturgicum inherent in their office. 3. a. concr. Anything by which assistance is given in performing an operation; anything helpful, a means or material source of help. esp. in pl. aids and appliances. spec. in Horsemanship (see quot. 1751). 1597 Shakes. 2 Hen. IV, i. iii. 24 Surmise Of Aydes incertaine should not be admitted. 1697 Dryden Virg. Georg. iv. 465 Whom, scarce my Sheep, and scarce my painful Plough, The needful Aids of Human Life allow. 1711 F. Fuller Med. Gymn. 58 Exercise may deserve to be taken as a common Aid to Physick. 1751 Chambers Cycl., Aids, in the manage, are helps, or assistances, by which the horseman contributes towards the motion or action required of the horse; by a discreet use of the bridle, caveson, spur, etc.‥ Such a horse knows his Aids, answers his Aids, etc. 1824 Coleridge (title) Aids to Reflection. 1858 Gladstone Homer I. 23 He has furnished us with some aids towards the consideration of this question. 1953 G. Brooke Introd. Riding i. 16 During the period that the novice is riding his first mount, he should learn the aids (correct and combined applications of his hands and legs). b. Freq. with defining word, as approach, artificial, hearing, homing, legal, radio-navigational, visual aid: see these words. 1924 Lancet 31 May 1140/2 A new acoustic aid for the deaf. 1955 Oxf. Jun. Encycl. XI. 128/2 Hearing may be greatly improved by the use of‥electrical aids which amplify sounds. c. spec. Material help given by one country to another, esp. economic assistance or material help given by a rich to a poor or underdeveloped country. Also attrib. and Comb. Cf. Marshall. 1940 Economist 5 Oct. 421/1 The United States' aid to Britain would be rendered ineffective. 1946 Ann. Reg. 1945 100 The difficulties of procuring American aid for Britain on acceptable terms. 1951 Ann. Reg. 1950 337 The U.S. aid conventions with the Associated States [of Indo-China]. 1958 Spectator 17 Jan. 65/3 Congress would like to buy missiles with foreign-aid money. 1964 Listener 16 Apr. 614/1 Since the Soviet Union and‥ China have joined in the game of competitive aid-giving the Western Powers, it is argued, cannot afford to drop out. 1968 M. Pyke Food & Society xi. 165 Considerable thought has been given to the effectiveness of aid as a means of achieving the economic development and hence, presumably, the improved nutritional status, of poor countries. 1970 Theol. Stud. XXXI. 261 Such aid can also salve the conscience of Christians in the countries that control the world economy. 1974 M. B. Brown Econ. of Imperialism iv. 95 The underdeveloped countries complain also of the overpricing of goods and shipping in their manufactured imports from developed lands, particularly in the case of aid-supported supplies. 1981 Nat. Westminster Bank Q. Rev. Aug. 36 Aid, or official development assistance (ODA). d. As the second element in the names of events, etc., organized to raise money for particular charitable causes (see quots.), as Band Aid, Live Aid, etc. Based on Band Aid, the name of the rock music group formed by Bob Geldof in Oct. 1984 to raise money for famine-relief in Ethiopia. 1984 Times 12 Dec. 3/2 Do They Know It's Christmas, [a record] on which Boy George, Sting, George Michael, members of Duran Duran, Status Quo, and U2 appear under the joint name of Band Aid. 1985 Music Week 2 Feb. 2/3 Britain has been the source of musically-based political commentary—from the mostly British https://www.oed.com/oedv2/00004830 2/4 1/13/25, 10:33 AM 00004830 | Oxford English Dictionary composition of Band Aid to Frankie Goes to Hollywood. 1985 Times 11 July 32/1 The failure of Live Aid to penetrate the poorer countries is unlikely to affect adversely the amount of money it makes. Ibid. 5 Nov. 13/1 The fashion world is smouldering with gossip about Fashion Aid, which takes off like a rocket at the Albert Hall tonight. 1985 Sunday Tel. (Colour Suppl.) 29 Dec. 5/2 Other events such as Visual Aid, the sale of limited edition prints at auction, and School Aid, in which‥school-children are to be asked to contribute pocket money for famine relief. 1986 Daily Tel. 24 Sept. 5/2 Top performers due to appear in ‘Classic Aid’ to raise money for refugee relief will include Vladimir Ashkenazy, [etc.]. 4. Eng. Hist. A pecuniary grant in aid; a grant of a subsidy or tax to the king for an extraordinary purpose. Later, an exchequer loan. c1460 Fortescue Abs. & Lim Mon. (1714) 52 For the expensis wherof, he schal not so sodenly have Ayde of his People. 1523 Ld. Berners Froissart I. ccclxxxvii. 663 The kyng and his counsayle wolde generally reyse vp throughe all Fraunce ayedes, fowages, tayles and subsydes. 1669 Marvell Corr. 130 Wks. 1875 II. 294 The House did‥vote an aid to his Majesty not exceeding the summe of 400,000l. 1702 Lond. Gaz. mmmdcccix/8 Dropt‥a Talley on the Fourth 4s. Aid of 1000l. No. 2058. 1862 Ld. Brougham Brit. Const. xii. 166 For the granting of an aid or supply to the crown. 5. Feudal System. A pecuniary contribution by a feudal vassal to his lord; limited by Magna Carta to three special occasions. 1590 Swinburn Testaments 72 The lordes lost their‥aids, ‘Pur faire fitz chiualer & pur file marier.’ 1649 Selden Laws of Eng. i. lxii. (1739) 125 The aids were of three kinds, one to make the Lord's eldest Son Knight, the other to marry his eldest Daughter; the third to help him to pay a relief to his Lord Paramount. 1753 Chambers Cycl. Supp. s.v., The bishops also received aids, auxilia episcopi. 1768 Blackstone Comm. II. 63 Aids were originally mere benevolences granted by the tenant to his lord, in times of difficulty and distress. 1868 Chambers Encycl. I. 92 These Aids were abolished by 12 Car. II. c. 24. 6. French Hist. (pl.) Customs-dues. Court of Aids, the Court that supervised the customs-dues. 1714 Fr. Bk. Rates 29 Mr. John Rouvelin, Farmer-General of our Aids. 1753 Chambers Cycl. Supp., Aids, in French laws, denote a duty paid on all goods sold and transported either out of, or into the kingdom. 1792 A. Young Trav. France 20 The house of the first president of the court of aids. 7. a. A person who renders help or assistance; a helper, an assistant; pl. auxiliaries. (Cf. Fr. aide, L. auxilium, and Eng. help, all applied to persons.) 1569 Epitaph on Bonner in Harl. Misc. I. 615 His ayds took always pain To keep their god, their hope, their trust. 1587 Holinshed Chron. I. 37/2 He had no legionarie souldiers, but certeine bands of aids. 1611 Bible Tobit viii. 6 It is not good that man should bee alone, let vs make vnto him an aide like to himselfe [cf. Wyclif Gen. ii. 18 An help lijk to him self]. 1738 Wesley Ps. cxxi. 1 The Lord that built the Earth and Skies Is my perpetual Aid. 1838 Arnold Rome I. 397 He was at the head of a mighty army; for the Latins and the Hernicans had brought their aids. b. U.S. = aide. See also aid-de-camp. https://www.oed.com/oedv2/00004830 3/4 1/13/25, 10:33 AM 00004830 | Oxford English Dictionary 1780 S. Holten in Essex Inst. Coll. (1920) LVI. 94 One of General Lincoln's aids is arrived with the accounts of the surrender of Charlestown. 1832 J. P. Kennedy Swallow Barn I. xix. 190 Ned and myself formed part of his retinue, like a pair of aids somewhat behind the commander-in-chief. 1907 Chicago Tribune 8 May 2 Gen. A. W. Greely‥arrived with his‥aids. 8. Comb. and attrib., chiefly in sense 7, as aid-band, aid-cohort, aid-force, aid-soldier; or in sense 5, as aid- money: (all obs.). Also aid-major obs. an adjutant; aid-post, a post at which wounded soldiers receive first medical attention; aid-prayer in Law: see 2. 1600 Holland Livy xxx. xxxiii. 763c, Then he embattailed the aid souldiers [auxilia] of the Ligurians. 1603 Greenwey Tacitus Ann. xii. viii. (1622) 166 They intercepted two ayde-bandes. 1610 Holland Camden's Brit. ii. 65 A small powre of Aid-forces. 1635 Bacon Use of Com. Law 32 Ayde money to make the Kings eldest son a knight, or to marry his eldest daughter. 1670 Cotton Espernon iii. xii. 632 The Office of Aide Major to the Regiment of Guards. 1691 Lond. Gaz. mmdcc/2 L'Assurance Aid-Major killed. 1916 ‘Boyd Cable’ Action Front 49 To walk‥to the nearest aid-post and hospital. a1917 E. A. Mackintosh War, the Liberator (1918) 149 The Aid Post was like a shambles with blood and wounded men. About OED How to use the OED Historical Thesaurus Purchasing Editorial policy Help with access Updates World Englishes Institutional account management Contribute Accessibility Oxford University Press Contact us Oxford Languages Upcoming events Oxford Academic Case studies Oxford Dictionary of National Biography Media enquiries Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide Cookie policy Privacy policy Legal notice Copyright © 2025 Oxford University Press https://www.oed.com/oedv2/00004830 4/4 TAB 16 — 1891 — DICTIONARY OF LAW CONTAINING DEFINITIONS OF THE TERMS AND PHRASES OF AMER- .. ICAN AND ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE, ANCIENT AND MODERN INCLUDING THE PRINCIPAL TERMS OF INTERNATIONAL, CONSTITUTIONAL, AND COM- JilERCIAL LAW; WITH A COLLECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS AND NUllEROUS SELECT TITLES FROM THE CIVIL LAW AND OTHER FOREIGN SYSTEMS BY HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, M.A. Aathor of Treatis@i g11 "J cDGM::&NTs, " "Tu-T1TL&S," " C0Nsr1rcr10Nil PaoHIBmon, • e&o. ST. PAUL, MINN. WEST PUBLISHING CO. RELICTION 1018 REMAINDER N byRELICTION. An increase of the land and abuse the people with false denunciations the sudden withdrawal or retrocession of of judgment; punisha!Jle with fine, imprison• the sea or a river. ment, and infamous corporal punishment. 4 Broom & H. Comm. 71. RELIEF. 1. In feudal law. A sum pay• 0 able by the new tenant, the duty being inci- tlent to every feudal tenure, by way of fine or RELIGIOUS MEN. Such as entered into some monastery or convent. In olll oomposition with the lord for tai;:ing up the English deeds, the vendee was often re- estate which was lapsed or fallen in by the strained from aliening to "Jews or religions death of the last tenant. At one time th(l men" lest the liinds shonld fall into mortmain. p amount was arbitrary, but afterwards the re- Religious men we1·e civilly dead. Blount. lief of a knight's fee became fixed at one RELIGIOUS SOCIETY. A body of hundred shillings. 2 Bl. Comm. 65. persons associated together for the. purpose 2. "Relief" also means deliverance from of maintaining religious worship. A church oppression, wrong, orinjustice. In this sense Q it is used as a general designation of the as- and society are often · united in maintaining worship, and in such cases the society com- sistance, redress, or benefit which a complain- monly owns the· property, and makes the pe- iint seeks cit the hands of a court, particularly cuniary contrnct with the minister. But, in in equity. It may be thus used of such rem- many instances, societies exist without a R edie11 a5 ::pecific performance, or the reforma- tion or rescission of a contract; but it does church, and churches without a society. 16 Gray, 330; 9 Cush. 188. not seem appropriate to the awarding of m1111py damages. RELIGIOUS USE. See CHARITABLE :3. Thf' assistance or support, pecuniary or USES. otherwise, granted to indigent persons by the RELINQUISHMENT. In practice. A proper administrators of the poor-laws, is forsaking-, a!Jandoning, renouncing, or gi1·- also cii lied "relief." ing. over a right. RELIEVE. In feudal law, relieve is to REL IQUA. The remainder or debt depend; thus, the seigniory of a tenant in which a person finds himself debtor in upon capite relieves of the crown, meaning that the balancing or liquidation of an account. the tenant holds of the crown. The term is Hence reliquary, the debtor of a 1·eliqu,a; as not common in English writers. ,~weet. also a person who only pays piece-meal. Enc. RELIGION, OFFENSES AGAINST. Lond. In English law. They are thns enumerated REL IQ U ES. Remains; such as the by Blackstone: (1) Apostasy; (2) heresy; bones, etc., of saints, preserved with great (3) reviling the ordinances of the church; veneration as sacred memorials. They have (4} !Jlasphemy; (5) profane swearing; (6) been forbiuden to be used or brought into conjuration or witchcraft; (7) religious im- England . . St. 3 Jae. I. c. 26. posture; (8) simony: (9) profanation of the Lord's day; (10) drunkenness; ( 11) lewdness. RELOCATIO, In the civil law. A re- 4 Bl. Comm. 43. newal of a lease on its determination. It may be either express or tacit; the latter is RELIGIOUS. When religious books or when the tenant holds over with the knowl- reading are spoken of, those which tend to edge and without objection of the landlord. promote the religion taught by the Christian Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 412. dispensation must be considered as referred to, unless the meaning is so limited by asso- RELOCATION. In Scotch law. A re- ciated words or circumstances as to sbow letting or renewal of a lease; a tacit reloca• that the spealrnr or writer bad reference to tion is permitting a tenant to hold over with· some other mode of worship. 72 Me. 500. out any new agreement. RELIGIOUS HOUSES. Placessetapart REMAINDER. The remnant of an es- for pious uses; such as monasteries, churches, tate in land, depending upon a parlicuhir hospitals, and all other places where charity priol' estate created at tile same time and ~y was extended to the relief of the poor and the same instrument, and limited to ame orphans, or for the use or exercise of religion. immediately on the determination of that es• tate, and not in abridgment of it. 4 Kent, RELIGIOUS IMPOSTORS.· In English Comm. 197. law. Those who falsely pretend an extraor- An estate limited to take effect and be enJ•0Yed dinary commission from heaven, or terrify after another estate is determined. As, if a man TAB 17 — 1898 — THE LAWS OF TEXAS 1822-1897 Austin's Colonization Law and Contract; Mexican Constitution oj 1824; Federal Colonization Law; Colonization Laws of Coahuila ancl Texas; Colonization Law of State of Tamau • lipas; Fredonian Declaration of Independence,· Law,s and Decrees, with Constitution • of Coahuila and Texas; San Felipe Convention,· Journals of the Consulta tion; Proceeclings of the General Council; Goliacl Declaration of Independence,· Journals of tl~c Convention at Washington; Ordinances and Decrees oj the Consultation; Decla1·ati.on of Independence,· Constitution ,of the Repub- lic; Laws, General and Special, of the Republic,· Annexation Reso- lution of the United States; Ratification of the same by Texas; Constitution of the United States; Constitutions of the State of Texas, with all the Laws, General and Special, passed thereunder, including Ordinances, Decrees, and Rcs- olidions, with the Constitution of the Confederate States and the Reconstruction Acts of Congress. COMPILED AND ARRANGED BY H. P. N. GAMMEL OF AUSTIN. WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY C. W. RAINES, VOLUME VIII. 40534 AUSTIN: THE GAM.tv.IEL Boox COMPANY. CONTENTS. Page Fourteenth Legislature~ Regular Session, _G eneral Laws, 1874 ........................ . ........ . .... . .. . I........ . 1 Fourteenth Legislature, R egular Session, Special Laws, 1874, 265 Fourteenth Legislature, Second Session, General Laws, 1875, 371 Fourteenth Legislature, Second Session, Special Laws, 1875, 589 Ordin;ances of the_Constitutional Convention, 1875 .. . . ..... . 751 ,· Constitution of the State of Texas, 1875 . . . . .. . . ..... . ... .. . 779 ·· Fifteenth Legisl ature, Regular Session, General Laws, 1876, 835 Fifteenth Legislature, R egular Session, Special Laws, 1876, 1185 Sixteenth Legislature, R egular Session, General Laws, 1879, 1299 — 1876 — GENERAL LAWS OF TIIE STATE OF TEXAS PASSED AT THE SES ION OF THE FIFTEENTH LEGISLATURE BEGUN AND HELD AT THE CITY OF AUSTIN APRIL 18TH, 1876 BY AUTHORITY. GALVESTON Laws of the State of Texas. 51 failed to issue a patent to the parties making such payment, shall be re- funded to such party or parties, upon application, as hereinafter provided. Sec. 2. It shall be the duty of the Commissioner of the General Land • Office, upon application to him, made by any party or parties claiming to have made payments under the said supplemental act of November 28, 1857, and failed to receive patents to the land for which such ·payment was made, to investigate such claim, and when it shall appear that such .claim is just, and that the money paid into the office of Commissioner -of the General Land Office has not ·been refunded to the party or parties making such payment, and that the State of -Texas is therefore justly in- debted t o the party or parties making such payments, he, the Commis- sioner of the General Land Office, shall issue to the party making .application, or his legal representatives, an official certificate, showing the amount of money so paid and date of payment. Sec. 3. Upon presentation to the Comptroller of Public Accounts of such certificate from the Commissioner of the General Land Office, prop- erly authenticated, it shall be his duty to draw his warrant upon the State Treasurer, in fa-vor of the party holding such certificate, for the whole a~ount originally paid into the General Land Office, as shown by the •-certificate of the Commissioner thereof, with interest thereon at the rate -of eight per cent. per annum from the date of the original payment into the Land Office to the date of the said warrant on the State Treasurer. 'The sum of two hundred dollars, or so much thereof as may be required, is hereby appropriated out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise :appropriated, to carry out the provisions of this act. Sec. 4. In order that immediate relief may be granted under the provisions of this act in cases of extreme destitution and want, this act . shall take effect from _and after its passage. Approved July 19, 1876. Takes effect from its passage. CHAP'rER LV.-An Act to organize Commissioners' Courts, and to define their jurisdiction and duties, and provide for vacancies therein. Section 1. Be it enacted by the Legislature of the ·State of Texas, That there shall be organized in each county in this State an inferior court, -to be styled" The Commissioners' Court," which shall be composed of the County Judge and four County Commissioners. Sec. 2. The County Judge shall be the presiding officer of said court, :and shall be elected at each general election held for State and coun.t y officers, and shall hold his office for two years, or until his successor ·shall be appointed or elected and qualified. Sec. 3. In each Commissioner's precinct tliere shall be elected at each general election, one County Commissioner, who shall hold his office for two years, or until his successor is qualified. Sec. 4. The said courts.shall have power, and it shall be their duty: 1st. To lay off their respective counties into precincts, not less than four nor more than eight, for the election of Justices of the Peace and . Constables, and shaH fix the times and places of holding the various .Justices' Courts in their· counties, and to. establish places in such pre- •c incts where elections shall be held. 2nd. To establish public ferries whenever the public interest may require. 3rd. To lay out and estab- lish, change and discontinue public roads and highways. 4th. To (887) 52 Laws of the State of T exas. build bridges. 5th. To apportion hands and appoint road overseers. .6th. To exercise general control and superintend over all roads, ferries, highways and bridges in their counties. 7th. To provide court-houses., jails, and all necessary public buildings. 8th.- To allow and settle. all county accounts and direct their payment. 9th. To provide for the support of paupers, and such idiots and lunatics as canll'ot be admitted into the Lunatic Asylum, residents of their county, who are unable to support themselves. 10th. To provide £or the burial of paupers. 11th. And said courts shall have and exercise such other powers and jurisdic- tion as is now or may be hereafter prescribed by the Constitution and laws of this State. Sec. 5. The said courts shall have power to levy and collect a tax for county purposes, upon all subjects of taxation in their respective counties. on which a tax may be levied by the State, but shall not levy more than one-half of the State tax in their respective counties for any one year for county purposes, except for the payment of debts already incurred, and :for the erection and repair of public buildings, under such limitation~ and with such restrictions as may be prescribed by law and the Constitu- tion of this State j prov-ided, that no tax levied for the purpose of pay- jng debts incurred prior to the eighteenth day of April, A. D. 1876, shall exceed two and a half mills on the dollar; and no tax levied for the erec- tion of public buildings shall exceed two and a half mills on the dollar for any one year. Sec. 6. That said coUTts shall examine and adjust the accounts and books of the County Treasurer, a.nd shall, quarterly, make up and cause- a detailed statement of receipts, expenditures a.nd debts of their respect- ive counties to be posted up in some conspicuous place in the office of' the County Clerk; provided, that said court shall, at the end of each year, make out a statement for the year of the receipts, expenditures. and debts of their respective counties, and cause the same to be published in some newspaper printed in the county, if there be one; and if not) . then to be posted in said Clerk's office as aforesaid, and at three other public places in fue county. . .. Sec. 7. Each Commissioners' Court of this State shall have a seal,-- whereon shall be engraved a star with :five points, the words "Commis- sioners' Court,---- county, Texas," (the blank to be :filled with the- name of the county), which seal shall be kept in the County Clerk's office, and shall be used in the authentication of all official acts of said court, or of the Clerk of said court, or of the presiding officer, in all cases where a seal may be necessary for the authentication o-f any of said acts. Sec. 8. The several County Clerks of the respective counties of this- State shall be ex-officio Clerks of the several Commissioners' Courts; and it shall be their duty to attend upon each term of the said courts; to pre- serve and keep in their possession all books, papers, records and efrects be- longing to said courts; to. issue all notices, writs -and process necessary for the proper execution of the powers and. duties imposed upon such courts; and shall perform all such duties as may be presc.ribed by law~- pro:vided, that the duties herein provided for shall be performed by the· District Clerks in those counties where no County Clerks have been elected, or where, by law, a single Clerk performs.the duties of .both Dis- trict and County Clerk. , • . Sec. 9. Each County Commissioners' Court shall have full power and authority to issue all such notices, citations, writs and process as may ( 888) Laws of the State of Texas. 53 be necessary for tbe proper execution of the powers and duties imposed ·upon such courts, and to enforce its jurisdiction; and all notices, cita- tions, writs and process issued by said courts shall be dated and signed'. by the Clerk, and when not otherwise directed by law, shall be exe•cuted: at least five days before the return day thereof, which shall be specified in the same; provided, however, that subpoenas for witnesses, whenever- necessary, may be execut ed and returned forthwith; and all such no- tices, citations and writs, other than subpoenas for witnesses, shall have the seal of such court impressed thereon, and may be directed to any lawful officer of the State, whose duty it shall be to execute and return the same. Sec. 10. The Commissioners' Court shall have like power to punish cont empts as the District and County Courts have, or may have, by law; provided, that said punishment shall· be by fine or imprisonment, and in no case by fine exceeding twenty-five dollars, or by imprisonment. beyond twenty-four hours; and in case of fine, the party to be held in custody until said fine be paid. Sec. 11. The Commissioners' Court shall cause t o be procured and kept in the Clerk~s office suitable books, in which shall be recorded the· proceedings of each term or the Court, which record shall be read over and signed by the County Judge, or the member of t he Court presiding, at the end of each term, and attested bv the Clerk. The Clerks shall also record all the proceedings of said Courts authorized to take place in the vacation between the terms; and such records so made in vacation shall be read over and signed on the first day of the proper court next after such proceeding took place. Sec. 12. Any three members of the Commissioners' Court, including the County Judge, shall constitute a quorum; provided, however, that no county tax shall be levied unless at some one o:f the regular terms, and when a full court fa present. Sec. 13. The regular terms of the Commissioners' Courts shall com- mence and be held at the court-house of their respective counties of this State, on the second Monday in February, May, August and No- vember in every year, and may continue in session one week. Special terms of said courts may be called by the County Judge, or any three of the Commissioners, and may continue in session until the business is disposed of; provided, that at the called. session of said courts the, said Commissioners shall not receive pay for more than four days' ser- vice; and provided, the members of said Commissioners' Courts shall not receive pay for more than one called session for any one month. Sec. l-1. 'rhe County Judges and County Commissioners shall P.ach receive the sum of three dollars per day for every day that they may. be necessarily engaged in attendance on any regular term of said court, and the $lame amount :for any special term, except as prescribed in the precedjng section, to be paid out of the county treasury, upon the order of said court. •• Sec. 15. All books, records, papers and effects·belonging to the State Police Courts of the different counties of this State shall be transferred to the Commissioners' Courts established by this act; and the said Com- missioners' Courts shall have and exercise all the powers conferred by law on County Courts as heretofore existing, which are not herein enu- merated, and which are not in conflict with the, provisions of this act. Sec. 16. Neither the County Judges nor any of the Commissioners shall enter upon the duties of their offices until they •shall have first ( 889) 54 Laws of the State of Texas. taken the oath of office prescribed by the Constitution, and shall also take an oath that they will not be directly or indirectly interested in any contract with a claim against the county in which they reside, ex- cept such warrants as may issue to! them as fees of office, before some officer authorized to administer oaths; which oaths, together with the certificate of the officer who administered the same, shall be filed and recorded in the County Clerk's office, in a hook to be provided for that purpose. Sec. 17. • In all cases where by law it shall be the duty of the Com- missioners' Court to approve the bond of any of the officers of their several counties, it shall be their duty, whenever they shall become satis- fied that said bonds, from any cause, are insufficient, to require new bonds or addition.al security to be given, as the case may require; and :said court shall cause the officer: whose bond is complained of· to be cited to appear at a term of their court, not less than :five days after service of said citation; and if any citizen shall be dissatisfied with the action of the Court approving the bond of any officer, or if any citizen or officer shall be dissatisfied with the action oLthe Court in the matter of requiring a new bond or additional security, as herein provided, an appeal may be made from the decision of said Commissioners' Court to the District Judge of the county, whose decision shall be final; and when sajd appeal is taken by a citizen, written notice shall be served upon the officer interested within ten davs after the order of the court on said hood. J • Sec. 18. In cases of vacancy, other than County Judge, in any of said Commissioners' Courts, from any cause, it shall be the duty of the District Judge in which such count y is situated, upon satisfactory infor- mation of such vacancy, to appoint some suitable person living in the precinct where such vacancy occurs, to serve as Commissioner for said precinct until the next general election. Sec. 19. A.s public policy demands immediate organization of Com- missioners' Courts in this State, and as these .courts have now no rules of law defining their duties and powers; therefore, an imperative public necessity exists for th;e immediate passage of this act, and the Rame shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage. Sec. 20. That whenever a vacancy occurs in any Jrn,tice's precinct for Justice of the Peace or Constable, or when it becomes necessary to create a new precinct, in either case it shall be the duty of the County Commissioners' Court to fill the same by appointment until the next general election. • . Sec. 21. In case there is a r egular established public hospital in the county, it shall be the duty of the County Commissioners to provide for the indigent sick in their county by sending such sick persons to a hospital; and when more than one public hospital exists in the county, indigent patients shall have the right to enter any such institution which such indigent patient may select. Sec. 22. That all laws and parts of laws in conflict with this act be and the same are hereby repealed. Approved .Tuly 22, 1876. Takes effect from its pas.sage. ( 890) TAB 18 Newspapers· Brenham Weekly Banner (Brenham, Texas) · Fri, Jan 4, 1878 · Page 3 by <f)I ancestry· Downloaded on Jan 13, 2025 https://www.newspapers.com/image/68037324/ • • II known d g ntl~men hnve 1 how , r, t iie\·e' havo be n "-een io t,nYn tul tified thcmioelvc ' . o for a p for n <l n ur , ~., p. · · 1 J cfi11:er \\'e h:H·e 1,e · 11 able tn lettrn pnb- u11 ur-~loy ni,_ 1t nrn i 1• · k ep a cl11;!! war ·h on 0 lie opini on i · fr ncrly iu farnr heir mo,eu1e r1 tt1, La tlm; far of tlte ;:tahli:;lrn1 11 t 0t a 1 our andy te rni 'f' h~ m11de le reet ! pp_v. rlt .Y lwv doue 11 11 mi ·l·hict. farm . Th re 1u·e ol c 01-se dif, J10ulcl at nil time - .rences 1,t opiuion re:?erdin!? IT 1.1 -Tue n rther , w11t 11 r 1· thee '.t.-, loc:\lion. When the tacts in th t. exp te fur a not wni uutil rob- the premi.;es ar tully de,·elopcd. arrived yt'@ter- m1,0irt <l fore t:ili- w thiuk, it Will be found thut u clock in the at - ing warniug. The police have , llme other fellow or foll ow tern n: no rigl:t to- nrr t tLeru trn I l1tH·e a place be r they are anx- Tm: B ~EB ac·.lrnnw1edg c.Jetected in me r:i c:dity a I ious to di:-J e of to the connty tbe r i.Jt ot an i 1vit!ltion t rhe ~encrally have ru ney and at a. ~ d roaud price. The attend & .Keg li11 Ball, aiven b_v <.'anuot he urreeted uuder th vricc al'"'r cd to liave heen puid .Bras ~ L11J ~ 27. . 0. M. ,agra11t law. · ta.rm cowiderfog --------- T • t ur t 11e L ew1s t W as'hin t;11 011 T~ ·d y e,e- its proximity t town, wa · 11inl"I next. From T u~ 1 ay'11 u .. 11y. lli. T. DWYK& h not exh rbitant. No ucti n P .utTY.-There was a ~ociul w ~ tnken by the coo rt in r ~ard therinl! and conve ati o par- work on hi new tu ti w n (' 1 011 to the tutnre e:;tdhli hment of a t · he r siden of ~r. C. R. t. hurlc treet. O(lflllt farm. Meanw!Jile the Ilrl;tt!dlo\•e• 01 Thurod 'v e,•euinlY Dnro-On the oveoinj!' of thirty-fi,re or torty paupers will e> which wa' finely eoioyed l,y all Dec. 19rh near Lamp a, 'fcx .. ntinne to draw their reuular th . e pr eat: M.Rb RF.B~- "'A. Toll, wile of J. U. nllowance from lie county. 1:- Tlic . . . Boulll. G.-The Brazos river Tom ~ rmcrlv of thi3 cit,· . .• .; 011 a iother rise-being nearly grnnd ju_ry would do well t r A'l'URAL LEAF.-Abe Merer examine the pnnper rolls and • e\'eu u-ith it,1 bank . Large has jn' t rc~ived a uew supply ee that th re nmJ no •'crooked •,n. ntities f drift w ti i S&id. of fi.ue natuml 1 Rt. Ln\'ers of paupe1-:;' drawi11g ac.-ip. t b: J a -~ing w11. rend«iog tl.ie weed will tick a pin here. er ." '- Ill ~ hJ· f,•rrs boat · . tr~ WC· J Ju . rJ.J To D T-r.-lfany ot dets trotn the A . &; M. --------- From Wed_ne!lday's Dully. BuT few people were in to~n Jan 4 1878 Clipped By: lhann923 Jan 13, 2025 Copyright © 2025 Newspapers.com. All Rights Reserved. TAB 19 Newspapers· The Dallas Daily Herald (Dallas, Texas) · Fri, Jun 15, 1877 · Page 2 by <f)I ancestry· Downloaded on Jan 13, 2025 https://www.newspapers.com/image/50858468/ Dallas June 15 1877 Clipped By: lhann923 Jan 13, 2025 Copyright © 2025 Newspapers.com. All Rights Reserved. TAB 20 News papers· Austin American-Statesman (Austin, Texas) · Fri, Aug 16, 1878 · Page 3 by <f)I ancestry· Downloaded on Jan 13, 2025 https://www.newspapers.com/image/358723279/ ,, 11f \'1 e ori 'OIJO r. l wn r ol l ·Ot i rcJy Of OP~ r nl' • 1 nn v • 01101 f, r t .' p t ml, r 4 ut " h r : m D· A 1~urrrl, h nd11p I in I ri• I! p f fl I •1~u l i:t f1 1 r I he d Tb r 1ug1c ~i111111l <··•n ai P11 ► l u r , no I h o • • r t in t. Oalb, rson ill lJ' unminu ted. Tho .. I e1. '' Gr b11 <' l ub Micl to lta-.e b o Iii! ly 1111 1z1:d at llem1 . 1te1d d oe no ov r twen ty memben. Corpus hri , b r111nt ntir~ d lfllDlt l ou 1rn11l , imply m ll•Urf' of .,, 1y Rg Ill thfl IUlfl' u ·tio o If d11Pu1 fr, rn • rlc The ou,·,u ny t hat t he R die 1 I aoalatea 11! t h1t c11uri 1y are fnu d , ... t t t y w ·r Ir· u iu 'cotly o .. mi- 111414 hy a. fr11 udu l ra c,mvcntio n. la Gri me nty the c ova e i, be- e,..n <iuct rt tricrl on col r lioP&. H ·D m,· r cy i w it , aod t he Jo. ••peadt ll t Or111.- oba k nr ·o orcd. Tbt t ot I , ln 01 pr11p,, rly io Harn ent■tJ p or it Q1• m1• 111 r II ju t om - pieced te O 0:10 T '1 t" ~1 value of t,)lffl pr11µ1:r1., Uou l a Io lu ed, is f' 883.62 . Waller oun y p,y o t !100 a year for ,11pp rtin ,g 1u1>l'r • nci the ow·- f,r waote t o e r h c,1 n tv nw n a uoor Iara, Wh t're puuptr m · lJti made to 11ppon t h<' rn !wl v • ; statesman 8/16/1878 Clipped By: lhann923 Jan 13, 2025 Copyright © 2025 Newspapers.com. All Rights Reserved. TAB 21 Newspapers· Brenham Weekly Banner (Brenham, Texas) · Thu, Jun 1, 1882 · Page 3 by <f)I ancestry· Downloaded on Jan 13, 2025 https://www.newspapers.com/image/68048610/ \t regular term of thi - court be un on th 8th day of 2, prt!sent alJ th com- mis loner the following pro .. - c ding r had : Tom hear as elected pr - ·i ing officer. The fir t day's session was devoted to road matters and the con ideration of plans and specific tions for a new co:ut- hous . Th motion to determine the matter of building a new court house and to receive plans and specifications for same a •this term of the court resu ted in a i vote. Ph ar and inkle- man voting no and Cain and Blunt aye. Charles fcCiellan being up- \ rds of on hundred years old, \ as declared a pauper and al- lowed 7 per month from May 1st. L. A. ood, road overseer, authorized to buy 1200 feet of lumb r. tephen a ell dec1ar d a pauper and order to poor farm. The propo ition of the com- missioners of Fayette co nty to adjust th boundary lin bet\ een Fayette and Washing- ton col!n ic was rejected, th boundary b ing consid red as settled. G. B. Cassells placed on pau- per roll a-Bd allowed 7 per month from ~y 1st. Brenham June 1 1882 Clipped By: lhann923 Jan 13, 2025 Copyright © 2025 Newspapers.com. All Rights Reserved. TAB 22 Newspapers· Brenham Weekly Banner (Brenham, Texas) · Fri, Jul 12, 1878 · Page 2 by <f)I ancestry· Downloaded on Jan 13, 2025 https://www.newspapers.com/image/68038199/ Benham July 12 1878 Clipped By: lhann923 Jan 13, 2025 Copyright © 2025 Newspapers.com. All Rights Reserved. TAB 23 ; '·••Analyses of Proposed Conslitutional Amendments and Referenda Appearing on ·1:he November 3, 1987, Ballot Analyses of Proposed Constitutional Amendments and Referenda Appearing on the November 3, 1987, Ballot Prepared by the Staff of the Texas Legislative Council - Information Report No. 87-2 • September 1987 - TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL of the 70th LEGISLATURE OF TEXAS Lieutenant Governor William P. Hobby, Chairman Speaker Gibson D. (Gib) Lewis, Vice-Chairman SENATORS REPRESENTATIVES Roy Blake Charles Evans Cyndi Krier Al Granoff Bob Glasgow James E. (Pete) Laney Bob McFarland Mike Millsap Carl Parker Tony Polumbo Randall Riley Jim D. Rudd Robert Saunders Stan Schlueter Ron Wilson Robert I. Kelly, Executive Director P.O. Box 12128, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711 — 14 — AMENDMENT NO. 4 House Joint Resolution 5, proposing a constitutional amendment authorizing the legislature to provide assistance to encourage economic development in the state. (HOUSE AUTHOR: Ashley Smith; SENATE SPONSOR: Bob Glasgow) The proposed amendment to Article Ill of the Texas Constitutron adds Section 52-a, authorizing the legislature to provide for programs and the making of loans and grants of public money to aid economic development in the state. The description of the proposed amendment that will appear on the ballot is as follows: "The constitutional amendment authorizing the legislature to provide assistance to encourage economic development in the state." BACKGROUND The Texas Constitution has prohibited grants and loans of public money to individuals, associations of individuals, and municipal and other corporations since 1876. The prohibition was added as a response to abuses of public funds, principally by the legislature. Essentially, state money was being given away to railroads and other private businesses. The general prohibition on grants and loans of public money is contained in Article tit, Section 51, of the Texas Constitution. Section 52(a) of that article, which applies only to local governments, repeats the prohibition. Although Article Ill, Sections 51 and 52, appear to be outright prohibitions on any grant or loan of public money to a private entity, over the years they have come to be interpreted as prohibitions on grants or loans for other than public purposes. Bexar County v. Linden, 220 S.W. 761 (1920); Tex. Att'y Gen. Letter Advisory No. 9 (1973). However, it has also been held that a grant for the purpose of obtaining the general benefits resulting from the operation of a private industry is not for a public purpose. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. H-357 (197 4). The Texas economy has recently been suffering hard times caused by, among other things, a drastic drop in the price of oil. Many businesses have failed and many people have lost their jobs. Proposals have been made to aid the state's economy and reduce unemployment by use of bond proceeds and other public funds to attract new businesses to the state and aid the development of existing businesses. Questions have arisen, however, concerning whether the proposed programs are prohibited by Article 111, Sections 51 and 52. The proposed amendment would resolve those questions by making it clear that public funds could be used to make grants and loans to private businesses to aid economic development in the state, including development of agriculture. — 15 — ARGUMENTS FOR: 1. Recent problems in the state's economy have damaged many private enterprises that are beneficial to the state, causing unemployment and other hardships for the state's citizens and loss of revenue to the state. The proposed amendment would stimulate the state's economy, and the resulting development would increase tax revenue, reduce unemployment, and provide other benefits to the state far outweighing the state's cost. 2. The state's economy is too dependent on the oil industry. The proposed amendment would provide for the diversification of the state's economy and prevent the state from being too dependent on the fortunes of a single industry. 3. Many other states have developed programs of state assistance to private economic development and have benefitted from those programs. The Texas constitutional prohibition on that type of program has put Texas at a competitive disadvantage with those other states in attracting new businesses and clients for existing businesses. AGAINST: 1. The fostering of private business is inherently a private matter. Public funds should not be used to support an enterprise having the purpose of providing a profit for private individuals. Quality businesses of the type the state needs are not the type that need handouts from the state. 2. The state is currently suffering massive shortages of public funds. What money the state has should be used to fund more essential government functions. The proposed amendment contemplates programs that are not essential government functions and that are of questionable benefit to the state, and thus are luxuries that the state cannot afford. 3. Abusive public giveaways of state funds to private businesses are the specific reason that the constitutional prohibition on gifts and grants to those businesses was originally adopted. There is no reason to assume that those abuses are less likely to occur now than they were when the prohibition was adopted in 1876. The proposed amendment does not provide adequate safeguards against those abuses. TAB 24 THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 1. BILL OF RIGHTS Sec. 3. EQUAL RIGHTS. All freemen†, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services. (Feb. 15, 1876.) † The language of this provision is identical to the language of the official legislative measure that originally proposed the provision. A digital image of the original text of the official enrolled measure can be found here. Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Andrea Mintzer on behalf of Jonathan Fombonne Bar No. 24102702 andrea.mintzer@harriscountytx.gov Envelope ID: 96225578 Filing Code Description: Brief Not Requesting Oral Argument Filing Description: Brief of Appellees Status as of 1/15/2025 7:19 AM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Yetter Coleman efile@yettercoleman.com 1/14/2025 6:14:55 PM SENT Christopher Garza 24078543 christopher.garza@harriscountytx.gov 1/14/2025 6:14:55 PM SENT Edward Swidriski 24083929 Edward.Swidriski@harriscountytx.gov 1/14/2025 6:14:55 PM SENT Jonathan Fombonne 24102702 jonathan.fombonne@harriscountytx.gov 1/14/2025 6:14:55 PM SENT Grant Martinez gmartinez@yettercoleman.com 1/14/2025 6:14:55 PM SENT Christian Menefee 24088049 christian.menefee@harriscountytx.gov 1/14/2025 6:14:55 PM SENT Ryan Cooper 24123649 ryan.cooper@harriscountytx.gov 1/14/2025 6:14:55 PM SENT William Farrell biff.farrell@oag.texas.gov 1/14/2025 6:14:55 PM SENT Andrea Mintzer Andrea.Mintzer@harriscountytx.gov 1/14/2025 6:14:55 PM SENT Eleanor Matheson 24131490 Eleanor.matheson@harriscountytx.gov 1/14/2025 6:14:55 PM SENT Nicole A.Myette nicole.myette@oag.texas.gov 1/14/2025 6:14:55 PM SENT Lily Hann lhann@yettercoleman.com 1/14/2025 6:14:55 PM SENT Marisa Mata mmata@yettercoleman.com 1/14/2025 6:14:55 PM SENT