Hutton v. XPO Logistics Freight Incorporated

1 WO [5] 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA [8] 9 Sonia R Hutton, No. CV-23-00805-PHX-DJH 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 XPO Logistics Freight Incorporated, et al., 13 Defendants. [14] 15 Defendants XPO Logistics Freight, Incorporated and Paul David Hartman 16 (“Defendants”) have filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings seeking judgment on 17 Plaintiff Sonia Hutton’s (“Plaintiff”) “negligence and negligence per se” claims under Rule 18 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 138 at 1). Plaintiff has filed a 19 Response in opposition and Defendants have filed a Reply. (Docs. 148 & 167). The Court 20 will deny Defendants’ Motion. 21 I. Background1 22 This is a trucking accident case. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hartman, a driver 23 for Defendant XPO, encountered wet road conditions while operating a tractor-trailer, and 24 as a result, drove into the oncoming lane of traffic on U.S. Route 60, striking a Buick 25 Enclave occupied by Larry Adair, Janet Adair, Luann Overton, and Diane Adair 26 (“Decedents”). (Doc. 1 at ¶ 1). Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of statutory [27] 1 Unless otherwise noted, these facts are taken from Plaintiffs’ Complaint (Doc. 1). The 28 Court will assume the Complaint’s factual allegations are true, as it must in evaluating a motion to dismiss. See Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001). 1 beneficiaries, asserts claims against Defendants for “negligence, negligence per se, 2 negligent hiring, negligent qualifying, negligent training, negligent entrustment, negligent 3 supervising, negligent retaining, and punitive damages.” (Id. at ¶ 2). Specifically, Count 4 One asserts a claim of “negligence and negligence per se” against Defendant Hartman. 5 (Id. at ¶¶ 42–51). Defendants state that the negligence per se claim also applies to 6 Plaintiff’s vicarious liability claim asserted in Count Three since that claim requires 7 Defendant Hartman be found negligent for Defendant XPO to be liable. (Doc. 138 at 12). 8 Defendants now seek judgment on these claims. (Id.) 9 II. Legal Standard 10 Under Rule 12(c), any party may move for judgment on the pleadings “after the 11 pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). 12 The pleadings are closed once a complaint and an answer have been filed. See Fed. R. Civ. 13 P. 7 (a); see also Doe v. U.S., 419 F.3d 1058 , 1061 (9th Cir. 2005). A motion for judgment 14 on the pleadings is functionally identical to a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 15 12(b)(6)—the same legal standard applies. See Cafasso v. General Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., [16] 637 F.3d 1047 , 1055 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Alsadi v. Intel Corp., 2019 WL 935670 , 17 at *3 (D. Ariz. Feb. 26, 2019) (“Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c) are substantially identical.”) 18 (citations omitted). However, unlike Rule 12(b)(6), a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on 19 the pleadings may be made by either party. Qwest Commc’ns Corp. v. City of Berkeley, [20] 208 F.R.D. 288, 290 (N.D. Cal. 2002). In considering a motion for judgment on the 21 pleadings, the court reviews the pleadings only. However, a document that is not attached 22 to the complaint may be considered if it is referred to in the complaint and the authenticity 23 of the document is not questioned. See The Armored Group, LLC v. Supreme Corp., 2010 24 WL 2595280 , at *2 (D. Ariz. June 24, 2010) (citing Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449 , 453 25 (9th Cir. 1994)). 26 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) requires the 27 Court to evaluate the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s claims. Cook v. Brewer, 637 F.3d 28 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2011). This test requires that the plaintiff present “enough facts to 1 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 2 544, 570 (2007). These facts must “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that 3 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged” with “more than a sheer possibility that 4 a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 5 “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 6 statements, do not suffice.” Id. 7 A complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim 8 to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 9 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 10 the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 11 alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 ). A complaint that provides “labels and 12 conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 13 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 . Nor will a complaint suffice if it presents nothing more than 14 “naked assertions” without “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557. The Court must 15 accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and interpret the facts in the light most 16 favorable to the counterclaimant. Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 17 2000). That rule does not apply, however, to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 . If 18 the court dismisses a claim for failure to state a claim, it must then determine whether to 19 grant leave to amend. See Telesaurus VPC, LLC v. Power, 623 F.3d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 20 2010). 21 III. Defendants’ Motion is Untimely 22 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s negligence per se claim should be dismissed 23 because (1) semi-truck drivers are held to the same standard as the rest of the motoring 24 public, not a higher standard; (2) the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations 25 (“FMCSRs”) do not mandate any action under the circumstances of this case to warrant a 26 claim of negligence per se; and (3) Commercial Drivers Licenses, the FMCSRs and 27 company manuals do not set forth an elevated standard of care for a negligence per se 28 claim. (Doc. 136 at 5, 7, 9). Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ Motion should be denied as 1 untimely, because negligence per se is an evidentiary doctrine and not a cause of action 2 and because the Motion does not meet Rule 12(c)’s standards. (Doc. 148 at 2–3). The 3 Court will deny Defendants’ Motion as untimely. 4 A district court has discretion to deny a Rule 12(c) motion after “excessive delay.” 5 Jones v. Town of Quartzsite, 2014 WL 12617038 , at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 24, 2014) (citing 6 Argo v. Woods, 399 Fed.Appx. 1 (5th Cir. 2010)). “Ordinarily, a motion for judgment on 7 the pleadings should be made promptly after the close of the pleadings.” Id. (quoting 5A 8 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1367, at 514 9 (1990) (emphasis added). 10 Plaintiff filed her Complaint on May 9, 2023. (Doc. 1). Defendants answered on 11 May 24, 2023. (Doc. 10). This Motion was filed thirteen months later, on June 10, 2024. 12 (Doc. 138). The Courts Scheduling Order originally required dispositive motions to be 13 filed by May 1, 2024. (Doc. 28 at 4). The Court extended this deadline to October 28, 14 2024, at the parties’ request. (Doc. 137). The deadline for amending pleadings lapsed on 15 September 20, 2023. (Doc. 28 at ¶ 2). 16 Defendants’ Rule 12(c) Motion comes extremely late. More than a year has passed 17 between Defendants’ Answer and this Motion. (Compare Doc. 10 with Doc. 138). 18 Moreover, almost nine months have passed since the deadline for amending pleadings and 19 this Motion. (Compare Doc. 28 at ¶ 2 with Doc. 138). Other courts in this district have 20 found that this scenario “suggests Defendants strategically waited to file the motion until 21 after the amendment deadline to make it more difficult for Plaintiff to cure any factual 22 pleading deficiencies by amendment.” Jones, 2014 WL 12617038 , at *1. The Court will 23 not speculate on whether Defendants’ Motion was filed for a strategic purpose, but it will 24 deny this Motion for excessive delay because it was not made “promptly after the close of 25 the pleadings.” See id. (denying a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings because 26 it was filed “eight months after Defendants filed their Answer and two months after the 27 pleading amendment deadline”) (emphasis added). 28 Accordingly, 1 IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Judgement on the Pleadings 2|| (Doc. 138) is DENIED. 3 Dated this 22nd day of January, 2025. [4] 5 JL — — —__f 6 Kear Diangé. 7 United States District Fudge [28] _5-