Forsberg v. Carson City

On appeal, appellants argue that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on their negligence claim on NRS 414.110 immunity grounds. Having reviewed the parties' briefs and appendices, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment. NRS 414.110(1) creates absolute governmental immunity for "activities relating to emergency management." In ASAP Storage, Inc. v. City of Sparks, this court held that emergency management activities include both preparation activities and response activities. 123 Nev. 639, 654, 173 P.3d 734, 744 (2007). And "[w]hether a pre-emergency act is immune turns solely on whether it was undertaken by the government in preparing for an emergency." Id. at 654-55, 173 P.3d at 744-45 (recognizing that NRS 414.110(1) provided immunity for emergency planning activities and emergency functions related to a flood); see also NRS 414.035 (defining emergency management as preparation for all emergency functions to minimize injury and repair damage from emergencies or disasters caused by floods, fires, and other disasters). Based on our review of the record on appeal, we conclude that the district court correctly held that Carson City's construction of the catchment road fell within the scope of activities covered by NRS 414.110(1) immunity. See ASAP Storage, 123 Nev. at 654, 173 P.3d at 744 (providing that "NRS 414.110(1) creates governmental immunity for emergency preparation activities as well as emergency responses"). Thus, given that appellants' complaint alleged only that Carson City was negligent in constructing the catchment road and did not include claims for gross negligence, willful misconduct, or bad faith, the district court did not err in granting Carson City summary judgment on appellants'

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negligence claims on NRS 414.110(1) immunity grounds. 3 ASAP Storage, 123 Nev. at 654-55, 173 P.3d at 744-45; see also Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005) (explaining that summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law). Accordingly, we ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 4

, J. Hardesty

J. Parraguirre

J.

3Although appellants also argue that granting summary judgment to respondent before any discovery was conducted was improper, we reject this contention. Notably, our review of the record provides no indication that appellants ever made a proper motion for a continuance to allow further discovery under NRCP 56(f). See Choy v. Ameristar Casinos, Inc., 127 Nev. „ 265 P.3d 698, 700 (2011) (concluding that the mere inclusion of a request for a continuance in an opposition to a summary judgment motion without an accompanying affidavit explaining why the continuance is being sought does not constitute an adequate request for further discovery under NRCP 56(1)); Aviation Ventures, Inc. v. Joan Morris, Inc., 121 Nev. 113, 118, 110 P.3d 59, 62 (2005) (requiring that a motion for a continuance under NRCP 56(f) provide an explanation of how further discovery will lead to the creation of a genuine issue of material fact).

4We have considered appellants' remaining appellate contentions and conclude that they lack merit. SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (0) 1947A

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cc: Hon. James E. Wilson, District Judge Laurie A. Yott, Settlement Judge Scarpello & Huss, Ltd. Watson Rounds Carson City Clerk

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