Lear v. Road Home

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF UTAH NICHOLAS JOSEPH LEAR, Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER TO CURE DEFICIENT COMPLAINT v. Case No. 2:24-cv-00058-DBB ROAD HOME et al., District Judge David Barlow Defendants. Apparently while at Utah State Hospital, pro se Plaintiff, Nicholas Joseph Lear, brought this civil-rights action, see 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (2025).1 Having now screened the Complaint, (ECF No. 5), under its statutory review function, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915A (2025),2 the Court orders Plaintiff to file an amended complaint curing deficiencies before further pursuing claims. 1 The federal statute creating a “civil action for deprivation of rights” reads, in pertinent part: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (2025). 2 The screening statute reads: (a) Screening.—The court shall review . . . a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. (b) Grounds for dismissal.—On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint— (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. A. COMPLAINT’S DEFICIENCIES Complaint: 1. improperly names Gail Miller’s Resource Center, Premier Security, Road Home, Salt Lake (SL) Legal Defenders Association, and Utah Community Action as defendants, when they are not state actors under § 1983. (See below.) 2. improperly names SL Police Department, SL County Jail, and SL County Sheriff’s Office as § 1983 defendants, when they are not independent legal entities that can sue or be sued. (See below.) 3. improperly names Utah Attorney General’s Office as a defendant, when it is not a person under § 1983 and is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment absent a waiver of sovereign immunity. See Hooper v. Robinson-Hogue, No. CIV-23-848, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35138 , at *4-5 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 29, 2024). 4. alleges conspiracy claims that are too vague. (See below). 5. improperly alleges civil-rights violations on a respondeat superior theory. (See below.) 6. does not properly affirmatively link an individual named defendant to each alleged civil-rights violation. (See below.) 7. does not adequately link each claim of improper physical treatment to specific named defendant(s). (See below.) 8. purports to bring a class action, though Plaintiff may not represent a class as a pro se litigant. See McGoldrick v. Werholtz, 185 F. App’x 741, 744 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (“[B]ecause plaintiffs are pro se, the district court would have abused its discretion if it had certified a class action.”). B. GUIDANCE FOR PLAINTIFF Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction . . .; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought.” Rule 8’s requirements mean to guarantee “that defendants enjoy fair notice of 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915A (2025). what the claims against them are and the grounds upon which they rest.” TV Commc’ns Network, Inc. v ESPN, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1062, 1069 (D. Colo. 1991). Pro se litigants are not excused from meeting these minimal pleading demands. “This is so because a pro se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to determine whether he makes out a claim on which relief can be granted.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Moreover, it is improper for the Court “to assume the role of advocate for a pro se litigant.” Id. Thus, the Court cannot “supply additional facts, [or] construct a legal theory for plaintiff that assumes facts that have not been pleaded.” Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff should consider these points before filing an amended complaint: 1. The revised complaint must stand entirely on its own and shall not refer to, or incorporate by reference, any part of the original complaint. See Murray v. Archambo, 132 F.3d 609, 612 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating amended complaint supersedes original). Also, an amended complaint may not be added to after filing without moving for amendment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. 2. Each defendant must be named in the complaint’s caption, listed in the section of the complaint setting forth names of each defendant, and affirmatively linked to applicable claims within the “cause of action” section of the complaint. 3. The complaint must clearly state what each individual defendant--typically, a named government employee--did to violate Plaintiff’s civil rights. See Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1976) (stating personal participation of each named defendant is essential allegation in civil-rights action). “To state a claim, a complaint must ‘make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom.’” Stone v. Albert, 338 F. App’x 757, 759 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (emphasis in original) (quoting Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008)). Plaintiff should also include, as much as possible, specific dates or at least estimates of when alleged constitutional violations occurred. 4. Each cause of action, together with the facts and citations that directly support it, should be stated separately. Plaintiff should be as brief as possible while still using enough words to fully explain the “who,” “what,” “where,” “when,” and “why of each claim. Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1248 (“The [Bell Atlantic Corp. v.] Twombly Court was particularly critical of complaints that ‘mentioned no specific, time, place, or person involved in the alleged [claim].’ [ 550 U.S. 544, 565 ] n.10 (2007). Given such a complaint, ‘a defendant seeking to respond to plaintiff’s conclusory allegations . . . would have little idea where to begin.” Id.”). 5. Plaintiff may not name an individual as a § 1983 defendant based solely on supervisory position. See Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.2d 1433 , 1441 (10th Cir. 1996). 6. Grievance denial alone, unconnected to “violation of constitutional rights alleged by plaintiff, does not establish personal participation under § 1983.” Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009). 7. “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under . . . Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.S. § 1997e(a) (2025). However, Plaintiff need not include grievance details in the complaint. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that must be raised by defendants. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). 8. State-actor requirement. “[T]o prevail on a § 1983 claim alleging a deprivation of constitutional rights, a plaintiff must show that he was injured as a result of state action. Thus, private conduct, ‘no matter how discriminatory or wrongful,’ may not be redressed by a § 1983 claim.” Read v. Klein, 1 F. App'x 866, 870 (10th Cir. 2001) (unpublished) (citing Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 935 (1982); Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1447 (10th Cir. 1995)). Further, “the Supreme Court has stated that ‘a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.’” Garza v. Bandy, 293 F. App’x 565, 566 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (quoting Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981)). And, “‘though the defective performance of defense counsel may cause the trial process to deprive an accused person of his liberty in an unconstitutional manner, the lawyer who may be responsible for the unconstitutional state action does not himself act under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983.’” Id. (quoting Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 , 329 n.6 (1983)). 9. Governmental sub-units. “Generally, governmental sub-units are not separate suable entities that may be sued under § 1983.” Hinton v. Dennis, 362 Fed. Appx. 904, 907 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding county criminal justice center not suable entity under § 1983). Indeed, the Tenth Circuit has acknowledged that sheriff’s departments and police departments “are not legally suable entities.” Lindsey v. Thomson, 275 Fed. App’x. 744, 747 (10th Cir. 2007); see also Smith v. Lawton Corr. Facility, No. CIV-18-110-C, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45488 , at *5 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 7, 2018) (stating correctional facilities “not suable entities in a § 1983 action”). 10. Conspiracy. As to Plaintiff’s possible conspiracy claim, Plaintiff “must specifically plead facts tending to show agreement and concerted action.” Beedle v. Wilson, 422 F.3d 1059, 1073 (10th Cir. 2005) (cleaned up). Plaintiff has not met this responsibility here; vague assertions that multiple people were involved in breaches of civil rights--thus a conspiracy must be involved--are not enough. Plaintiff must assert more detail to pursue this claim further. 11. Respondeat superior. The Supreme Court holds that, in asserting a § 1983 claim against a government agent in their individual capacity, “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 676 (2009). Consequently, there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. See id. (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Entities may not be held liable on the sole ground of an employer- employee relationship with a claimed tortfeasor. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 689 (1978). Supervisors are considered liable for their own unconstitutional or illegal policies only, and not for employees’ tortious acts. See Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307-08 (10th Cir. 1998). 12. Affirmative Link. [A] plaintiff who brings a constitutional claim under § 1983 can’t obtain relief without first satisfying the personal-participation requirement. That is, the plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant “personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation” at issue. Vasquez v. Davis, 882 F.3d 1270, 1275 (10th Cir. 2018). Indeed, because § 1983 is a “vehicle[] for imposing personal liability on government officials, we have stressed the need for careful attention to particulars, especially in lawsuits involving multiple defendants.” Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1225 (10th Cir. 2013); see also Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008) (explaining that when plaintiff brings § 1983 claims against multiple defendants, “it is particularly important . . . that the complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom”); Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504 , 532-33 (10th Cir. 1998)) (holding that district court’s analysis of plaintiff's § 1983 claims was “infirm” where district court “lump[ed]” together plaintiff’s claims against multiple defendants—"despite the fact that each of the defendants had different powers and duties and took different actions with respect to [plaintiff]”--and “wholly failed to identify specific actions taken by particular defendants that could form the basis of [a constitutional] claim”). Estate of Roemer v. Johnson, 764 F. App’x 784 , 790-91 (10th Cir. 2019). “A plaintiff’s failure to satisfy this requirement will trigger swift and certain dismissal.” Id. at 790 n.5. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit has “gone so far as to suggest that failure to satisfy the personal-participation requirement will not only justify dismissal for failure to state a claim; it will render the plaintiff’s claim frivolous.” Id. 13 . Inadequate physical treatment. These are the standards governing such claims: Prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). An inmate raising an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim must prove both an objective and subjective component associated with the deficiency. Id. at 834 . The objective component requires conditions sufficiently serious so as to (1) deprive an inmate “of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” or (2) subject an inmate to “a substantial risk of serious harm.” Shannon v. Graves, 257 F.3d 1164, 1168 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). “The subjective component requires that a defendant prison official have a culpable state of mind, that he or she acts or fails to act with deliberate indifference to inmate health and safety.” Id. To prove deliberate indifference, a prisoner must adduce sufficient facts to show the defendant knew of and disregarded “an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 . Under this standard, “the official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. This high standard for imposing personal liability on prison officials (i.e., the same standard of subjective recklessness used in the criminal law) is necessary to ensure that only those prison officials that inflict punishment are liable for violating the dictates of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 835-45 ; see also Self v. Crum, 439 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that Farmer’s “subjective component is not satisfied[] absent an extraordinary degree of neglect”); Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 191 F.3d 1281, 1286 (10th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that Farmer’s deliberate indifference standard sets out a “stringent standard of fault”). Brooks v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 12 F.4th 1160 , 1173 (10th Cir. 2021). C. MOTIONS FOR APPOINTED COUNSEL Plaintiff also moves for appointed counsel. (ECF Nos. 16, 18–19.) “As a civil litigant, plaintiff has no Sixth Amendment right to counsel." Johnson v. Johnson, 466 F.3d 1213, 1217 (10th Cir. 2006). And the Court lacks authority to appoint counsel; still, federal statute authorizes the Court to ask counsel to agree to represent an indigent plaintiff free of charge.3 See 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915 (e)(1) (2025) (“The Court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.”); McCleland v. Raemisch, No. 201390, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 29490 , at *15 n.3 (10th Cir. Sept. 30, 2021) (unpublished) (explaining, when prisoner-plaintiffs “refer to appointing counsel,” they “really refer to a request 3 The Tenth Circuit has noted: Each year, the district court receives hundreds of requests for legal representation and only a small number of attorneys are available to accept these requests. Accordingly, the district court must use discretion in deciding which cases warrant a request for counsel. To do otherwise would deprive clearly deserving litigants of an opportunity to obtain legal representation. The dilemma is unfortunate for litigants [denied counsel]. But the dilemma [i]s not the district court’s fault; that dilemma [i]s the product of the court's lack of authority to compel legal representation or to reimburse attorneys for their time. Rachel v. Troutt, 820 F.3d 390 , 397 n.7 (10th Cir. 2016); see also Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989) (stating courts may not “require an unwilling attorney to represent an indigent litigant in a civil case”); Greene v. U.S. Postal Serv., 795 F. App'x 581 , 583 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (“In most legal communities, only a limited number of attorneys are willing to take these cases. Thus, the district court [must] decide how to maximize the benefit from these local resources.”); Gross v. GM LLC, 441 F. App'x 562, 567 (10th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (observing courts rarely request counsel to represent parties in civil actions); Castner v. Colo. Springs Cablevision, 979 F.2d 1417, 1421 (10th Cir. 1992) (cautioning courts that indiscriminately appointing “volunteer counsel to undeserving claims will waste a precious resource and may discourage attorneys from donating their time”). that an attorney take the case pro bono”). Plaintiff has the burden of convincing the Court that Plaintiff’s claim has enough merit to warrant such a request of counsel. McCarthy v. Weinberg, 753 F.2d 836, 838 (10th Cir. 1985). But “[i]t is not enough” for Plaintiff to argue that he needs help “in presenting his strongest possible case, as the same could be said in any case.” Steffey v. Orman, 461 F.3d 1218, 1223 (10th Cir. 2006) (cleaned up). Instead, in deciding whether to ask volunteer counsel to represent Plaintiff at no cost, this Court considers a variety of factors, like “the merits of the litigant’s claims, the nature of the factual issues raised in the claims, the litigant’s ability to present his claims, and the complexity of the legal issues raised by the claims.” Rucks v. Boergermann, 57 F.3d 978, 979 (10th Cir. 1995) (cleaned up); accord McCarthy, 753 F.2d at 838-39 . Considering the above factors, the Court concludes here that, at this time, Plaintiff’s claims may not be colorable, the issues in this case are not complex, and Plaintiff does not appear to be too incapacitated or unable to adequately function in pursuing this matter. Thus, the Court denies for now Plaintiff’s motions for appointed counsel. D. ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 1. Plaintiff must within thirty days cure the Complaint’s deficiencies noted above by filing a document entitled, “Amended Complaint,” that does not refer to or include any other document. (ECF No. 5.) 2. The Clerk’s Office shall mail Plaintiff the Pro Se Litigant Guide with a blank-form civil-rights complaint which Plaintiff must use to pursue an amended complaint. 3. If Plaintiff fails to timely cure the above deficiencies according to this Order’s instructions, this action will be dismissed without further notice. 4. The amended complaint shall not include any claims outside the dates and allegations of transactions and events contained in the Complaint, which apparently happened on February 12–13, 2022. (Id. at 6.) The Court will not address any such new claims or outside allegations, which will be dismissed. If Plaintiff wishes to raise other claims and allegations, Plaintiff may do so only in a new complaint in a new case. If an amended complaint is filed, the Court will screen each claim and defendant for dismissal or an order effecting service upon valid defendants who are affirmatively linked to valid claims. 5. Plaintiff must tell the Court of any address change and timely comply with Court orders. See D. Utah Civ. R. 83-1.6(b) (“An unrepresented party must immediately notify the Clerk’s Office in writing of any name, mailing address, or email address changes.”). Failure to do so may result in this action’s dismissal for failure to prosecute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (“If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it. Unless the dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision (b) and any dismissal not under this rule--except one for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a party under Rule 19--operates as an adjudication on the merits.”). 6. Extensions of time are disfavored, though reasonable extensions may be granted. Any motion for time extension must be filed no later than fourteen days before the deadline to be extended. 7. No direct communication is to take place with any judge. All relevant information, letters, documents, and papers, labeled with case number, are to be directed to the court clerk. 8. Plaintiff must observe this District of Utah local rule: “A party proceeding without an attorney (unrepresented party or pro se party) is obligated to comply with: (1) the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) these Local Rules of Practice; (3) the Utah Standards of Professionalism and Civility; and (4) other laws and rules relevant to the action.” DUCivR 83-1.6(a). 9. Plaintiff’s motions for discovery are DENIED. (ECF Nos. 10, 14–15, 17.) There is no valid complaint on file as of this Order; thus, discovery requests are premature at this time. Plaintiff is also notified that, without Plaintiff's prompting, the Court will direct discovery as deemed necessary after screening an amended complaint. Further, Plaintiff asserts discovery is needed to allow him to flesh out his claims. For instance, Plaintiff contends he needs the names of “64 John Does,” (ECF No. 10). However, if Plaintiff does not know the names of defendants he wishes to sue, he must describe them and their behavior in enough detail that they may each be identified per cause of action. 10. Plaintiff’s motions for appointed counsel are DENIED. (ECF Nos. 16, 18–19.) However, if--after the case develops further--it appears that counsel may be needed or of specific help, the Court may ask an attorney to appear pro bono on Plaintiff’s behalf. The Court will continually reevaluate the need for counsel; thus, no further motions for appointed counsel are needed. 11. Plaintiff’s motions for service of process are DENIED. (ECF Nos. 20–21.) When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis (IFP), as here, a motion for service of process is not needed. After all, the IFP statute directs, “The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in such cases.” 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915 (d) (2025). The Court triggers service of process on its own after screening an inmate complaint and determining that it states a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jd. § 1915A. DATED this 3“ day of February, 2025. □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ United States District Court