Leeman v. Shinn

1 WO [5] 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA [8] 9 Angela Rene Leeman, No. CV-18-00551-TUC-JGZ 10 Petitioner, ORDER 11 v. 12 Charles L Ryan, et al., 13 Respondents. [14] 15 On May 15, 2023, Petitioner Angela Rene Leeman filed a First Amended Petition 16 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 27.) On June 7, 2023, the Petitioner and the State of 17 Arizona filed a Motion for Order and Judgment Granting Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant 18 to Agreement of the Parties. (Doc. 34.) In the stipulated Motion, the parties requested that 19 the Court grant relief as to Petitioner’s Amended Claim One and order Petitioner’s 20 unconditional release from confinement. (Id. at 2.) On April 12, 2024, Magistrate Judge 21 Lynette Kimmins issued a Report & Recommendation (R&R) in which she recommended 22 denial of the stipulated Motion and Claim One. (Doc. 46.) On June 6, 2024, this Court 23 adopted the R&R, concluding Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Claim One. (Doc. 53.) 24 On August 2, 2024, the Respondents filed their Answer to the First Amended 25 Petition as to the remaining claims - Claims Two, Three, and Four. (Doc. 56.) On December 26 16, 2024, Magistrate Judge Kimmins issued an R&R in which she recommended denial of 27 those claims. (Doc. 57.) The Petitioner filed an objection to the R&R, and Respondents [28] 1 filed a response. (Docs. 63, 64.)1 For the following reasons, the Court will accept the R&R 2 in full, overrule the Petitioner’s objections, and deny the First Amended Petition. 3 I. Standard of Review 4 This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 5 recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1). The Court “must 6 review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, 7 but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en 8 banc). The party seeking de novo review must provide “specific written objections to the 9 proposed findings and recommendations” of the magistrate judge. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) 10 (emphasis added). The clear purpose of this requirement is judicial economy—to permit 11 magistrate judges to resolve matters not objectionable to the parties. See Thomas v. Arn, [12] 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985). Because de novo review of the entire R&R would defeat the 13 efficiencies intended by Congress and Rule 72, a general objection has the same effect as 14 a failure to object. See Warling v. Ryan, No. CV 12-01396-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 5276367 , 15 at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 19, 2013); Eagleman v. Shinn, No. CV-18-2708-PHX-RM (DTF), [16] 2019 WL 7019414 , at *5 (D. Ariz. Dec. 20, 2019). 17 II. Factual and Procedural History 18 The R&R describes the factual and procedural history of this case. (Doc. 57 at 1-3.) 19 Because there is no objection to this portion of the R&R, the Court adopts it in its entirety. 20 III. Analysis 21 A. Objections Regarding Claim Two 22 In Claim Two, Petitioner argues that, as a juvenile nonhomicide offender, her 6123 year cumulative sentence amounts to a life sentence without the possibility of parole, in 24 violation of Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). (Doc. 27 at 23-26.) The R&R 25 recommends rejecting Claim Two as untimely and on the merits. (Doc. 63 at 4-5.) The 26 Court agrees that the claim fails as to timeliness and merit. [27] 1 Although Respondents call their response a “reply,” it is a response. See Rule 72, Fed. R. 28 Civ. P. The R&R allowed for a response but prohibited a reply absent leave of the district court. (Doc. 57 at 18.) 1 1. Timeliness 2 Petitioner does not deny that Claim Two is untimely, but argues that, because she is 3 innocent of the sentence imposed, “any problem with the statute of limitations must be 4 excused.” (Doc. 63 at 5.) In support, Petitioner cites Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 , 3305 340 (1992), an opinion which discusses the requirements of an actual innocence claim in a 6 capital case. However, even assuming the same standard were applicable here, the 7 Petitioner concedes her argument is foreclosed by Ninth Circuit precedent. See Atwood v. 8 Shinn, 36 F.4th 834, 837 (9th Cir. 2022). The Court accepts the R&R’s analysis and 9 concludes that the Petitioner’s request for relief in Claim Two is untimely. 10 2. Merits 11 The R&R recommends rejecting Petitioner’s Claim Two because there is no clearly 12 established law that a 61-year sentence is the functional equivalent of a life sentence 13 without the possibility of parole. (Doc. 57 at 9-10.) The Petitioner objects to the R&R’s 14 conclusion, arguing that her sentence does not give her the “meaningful opportunity to 15 return to society” as contemplated in Graham and Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 16 2010). (Doc. 63 at 4-5.) 17 In both Graham and Moore, the juvenile petitioners were sentenced to terms that 18 would preclude any opportunity to obtain release during the juveniles’ natural lives. See 19 Graham, 560 U.S. at 57 (juvenile nonhomicide offender sentenced to life without the 20 possibility of parole); Moore, 725 F.3d at 1193-94 (juvenile nonhomicide offender 21 sentenced to 254 years with eligibility for parole after 127 years). Here, the Petitioner may 22 be released on July 12, 2051, when she is in her mid-seventies. (Doc. 57 at 8; Doc. 63 at 23 4.) The Supreme Court has differentiated between a life sentence without the possibility of 24 parole and a lengthy term-of-year sentence where a juvenile offender has the possibility of 25 release during his lifetime. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (lengthy terms 26 for juveniles impliedly constitutional as opposed to mandated life sentences without 27 parole). The Ninth Circuit has similarly held that a juvenile offender’s lengthy term-of28 year sentence is not the “functional equivalent” of a life sentence without parole. 1 Demirdjian v. Gipson, 832 F.3d 1060, 1076 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that a 50-year sentence 2 for a juvenile is not the “functional equivalent” of a life sentence without the possibility of 3 parole). A “State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender 4 convicted of a nonhomicide crime.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 75 (emphasis added). 5 The Court agrees with the R&R. There is no Supreme Court case supporting 6 Petitioner’s claim that a 61-year sentence for a juvenile is the functional equivalent of life 7 without the possibility of parole. Accordingly, relief may not be granted. See Carey v. 8 Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2004) (finding that the absence of a Supreme Court case 9 addressing the factual circumstances of the case precluded relief on the merits because the 10 state court ruling could not be contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law). 11 B. Objection Regarding Claim Three 12 In Claim Three, Petitioner alleges that her sentence was premised on false 13 information in violation of her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc. 33-3 at 26.) 14 The R&R concludes that Claim Three is subject to dismissal due to the absence of clearly 15 established Supreme Court law. (Doc. 57 at 13.) The R&R explains that the case which the 16 Petitioner relies on, United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972), is factually 17 distinguishable. In her Objection, Petitioner contends the R&R construes the “clearly 18 established” requirement of AEDPA too narrowly. (Doc. 63 at 6.) According to Petitioner, 19 under Tucker, due process is violated if a defendant “‘[is] sentenced on the basis of 20 assumptions concerning [her] criminal record which were materially untrue.’” (Id., Doc. 21 33-3 at 26-33.) 22 In Tucker, the Supreme Court found a due process violation where the sentencing 23 judge gave explicit consideration to the defendant’s previous convictions including two 24 convictions that were determined to be constitutionally invalid because they were obtained 25 while the defendant was unrepresented, in violation of Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 26 (1963). In contrast, Petitioner argues that the sentencing judge improperly discounted her 27 allegations of severe childhood abuse as a result of her aunt falsely testifying that Petitioner 28 was a “pathological liar.” (Doc. 26 at 26-29.) Petitioner states that the sentencing judge 1 was not aware that her aunt was involved in a fraud and murder-for-hire plot, and did not 2 have access to other corroborating information. (Id.) 3 The R&R concludes that the Supreme Court has not extended Tucker’s holding 4 beyond the facts of the case. (Doc. 57 at 12-13.) Petitioner does not cite to any caselaw or 5 legal authority where the rule in Tucker has been applied to situations other than a 6 sentencing court’s improper reliance on invalid uncounseled convictions. Notably, the 7 Supreme Court has declined to extend Tucker on several occasions. See United States v. 8 Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 187 (1979) (denying relief under Tucker where there is no 9 evidence that the sentence was based on “misinformation of a constitutional magnitude.”); 10 Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 495-96 (1994) (declining to extend the right to 11 collaterally attack prior convictions used for sentence enhancement beyond the failure to 12 appoint counsel for an indigent defendant); United States v. Bryant, 579 U.S. 140 , 155 n.8 13 (2016) (“Indeed, it is the validity of the prior conviction that distinguishes Nichols from 14 Tucker, in which we found impermissible the use at sentencing of an invalid, uncounseled 15 prior conviction.”) The Court agrees with R&R’s conclusion—Tucker does not provide a 16 “clearly established” legal rule from which the Petitioner may claim relief under the facts 17 of her case. When there is no clearly established federal law supporting a claim, relief may 18 not be granted. See Musladin, 549 U.S. at 77 . 19 In addition, after a thorough consideration of the record and applicable law, the 20 R&R concludes there was no due process violation because Petitioner’s sentence was not 21 based on false information. The R&R states: “[t]he Arizona Court of Appeals determined 22 the record did not indicate the judge discounted Petitioner’s evidence of an abusive 23 childhood, therefore, it was ‘unlikely that corroborating information would have altered 24 her sentence.’” (Doc. 57 at 15.) Petitioner fails to object to the R&R’s analysis rejecting 25 the merits of her Claim Three. (See Doc. 63 at 5-8.) The Court agrees with the R&R’s 26 analysis that, even if Tucker were extended to the facts of Petitioner’s case, Petitioner has 27 failed to show that the sentencing court actually relied on “misinformation of a 28 constitutional magnitude” in imposing her sentence. 1 C. Objection Regarding Claim Four 2 In her objection to Claim Four, the Petitioner concedes that the claim is non3 cognizable as no clearly established law supports her position “that when the authority 4 tasked with detaining her no longer believes it is lawful to do so, due process prohibits it.” 5 (Doc. 63 at 8.) Petitioner argues that the Court should recognize “the absurdity, unfairness, 6 and cruelty of that situation, even if the Court concludes it is lawful.” (Id.) Unfortunately, 7 when there is no clearly established federal law supporting a claim, as here, relief may not 8 be granted. Musladin, 549 U.S. at 77 . 9 D. Certificate of Appealability2 10 Petitioner requests a certificate of appealability (COA) so Petitioner can appeal the 11 Court’s ruling. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(1); Rule 11(a) of the Rules 12 Governing Section 2255 Cases. “The district court must issue or deny a certification of 13 appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Rule 11(a) of the Rules 14 Governing Section 2255 Cases. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c)(2), a COA may issue only 15 when the petitioner “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 16 The court must indicate which specific issues satisfy this showing. See 28 U.S.C. § 17 2253(c)(3). 18 With respect to claims rejected on the merits, a petitioner “must demonstrate that 19 reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims 20 debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). For procedural rulings, 21 a COA will issue only if reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition states a valid 22 claim of the denial of a constitutional right and whether the court’s procedural ruling was 23 correct. Id. 24 In its prior Order, the Court denied Petitioner’s Double Jeopardy claim in Claim 25 One because she failed to demonstrate that the separate criminal counts of which she was [26] 2 Petitioner’s statement that she will separately move for briefing on the propriety of a 27 COA, (Doc. 63 at 4 n.2), appears to be an oversight. The same statement was included in her initial Objection to the Report and Recommendation, (Doc. 59). The Court struck that 28 Objection and provided Petitioner additional time to file an Objection that “contain[ed] all of Petitioner’s objections and briefing.” (Doc. 62.) 1 convicted were based on the same harm. No reasonable jurist could debate that Count 1 of 2 Petitioner’s conviction contains a separate and distinct element from Counts 5-13, namely 3 endangerment. (Doc. 53.) Further, this Court’s exercise of its judicial duties in rejecting 4 the parties’ stipulated motion does not constitute a substantial showing of the denial of a 5 constitutional right. Accordingly, a COA will not issue as to Claim One. 6 As to the merits Claim Two, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that a reasonable 7 jurist would find debatable the Court’s assessment that there is no clearly established law 8 that Petitioner’s 61-year sentence is the functional equivalent to a life sentence without 9 parole. The lack of clearly established law is not debatable among reasonable jurists. 10 As to the procedural ruling on Claim Two, Petitioner cannot show that reasonable 11 jurists could debate whether the Court’s ruling was correct. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484 . 12 Petitioner admits that her procedural argument is foreclosed by Ninth Circuit precedent. 13 (Doc. 63 at 5.) See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484 (“Where a plain procedural bar is present and 14 the district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not 15 conclude either that the district court erred in dismissing the petition or that the petitioner 16 should be allowed to proceed further.”) 17 As to Claim Three, Petitioner objected to the portion of the R&R concluding that 18 Tucker was not “clearly established law” that would provide relief on the facts of her case. 19 (Doc. 63 at 5-8.) Petitioner did not object to the R&R’s further conclusion that no due 20 process violation occurred because Petitioner’s sentence was not based on false 21 information. (See id; Doc. 57 at 13-15.) Consequently, Petitioner failed to make a 22 substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, and a COA will not issue as to 23 Claim 3. 24 As to Claim Four, the Petitioner conceded that the claim is noncognizable, and 25 therefore a COA will not issue. The resolution of the claim is not debatable among 26 reasonable jurists. 27 IV. Conclusion 28 For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to 1 || demonstrate that she is entitled to relief on her Claims. 2 Accordingly, 3 IT IS ORDERED that the Petitioner’s Objections are overruled and the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 57) is adopted in full. 5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petitioner’s First Amended Petition for Writ 6 || of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 27) is denied. The Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly 7|| and close its file in this action. 8 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a Certificate of Appealability is denied. 9 Dated this 7th day of February, 2025. [10] 11 4 | afer / □ 12 p/ Jennifer G. i ps 13 Chief United States District Judge [28] -8-