Funaki v. Starbucks Corp.

Funaki v Starbucks Corp. 2025 NY Slip Op 30583(U) February 21, 2025 Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: Index No. 153275/2020 Judge: Judy H. Kim Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York State and local government sources, including the New York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication.

INDEX NO. 153275/2020 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 89 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02/21/2025

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK NEW YORK COUNTY PRESENT: HON. JUDY H. KIM PART 04 Justice -----------------------X INDEX NO. 153275/2020 KOHEi FUNAKI, MOTION DATE 10/24/2024 Plaintiff, MOTION SEQ. NO. 002 - V -

STARBUCKS CORPORATION D/B/A STARBUCKS COFFEE COMPANY, HIGHGATE SECURITY & DECISION + ORDER ON LOCKSMITH LLC, MOTION

Defendants. --------------------------------------------------X

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 002) 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88 were read on this motion for REARGUMENT/RECONSIDERATION

In a decision and order dated September 23, 2024, this Court granted defendant Starbucks

Corporation's motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiffs motion for summary

judgment 1 (the "Prior Decision"). Plaintiff now moves for leave to reargue the Prior Decision and,

upon reargument, seeks an order from this Court denying Starbucks's motion and granting

plaintiff's motion. The instant motion is granted and, upon reargument, Starbucks's motion for

summary judgment is denied and the Court adheres to its previous denial of plaintiff's summary

judgment motion.

A motion to reargue "shall be based upon matters of fact or law allegedly overlooked or

misapprehended by the court in determining the prior motion ... " (CPLR 2221 [d][2]). "Reargument

is not designed to afford the unsuccessful party successive opportunities to reargue issues

¹ The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the facts and incorporates herein the factual and procedural history set out in the Prior Decision.

153275/2020 FUNAKI, KOHEi vs. STARBUCKS CORPORATION O/8/A Page 1 of⁴ Motion No. 002

INDEX NO. 153275/2020 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 89 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02/21/2025

INDEX NO. 153275/2020 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 89 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02/21/2025

INDEX NO. 153275/2020 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 89 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02/21/2025

Footnotes

[1] of 4 [* 1] previously decided ... or to present arguments different from those originally asserted" (Setters v AI Properties and Developments (USA) Corp., 139 AD3d 492, 492 [1st Dept 2016] [internal citations and quotations omitted]). Plaintiff argues that the Court overlooked plaintiff's deposition testimony that he did not recall the yellow caution signs placed on the ground in front of each door depicted in the photographs submitted by defendant (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 80 [Marked Photos] and 79 [Funaki EBT at pp. 48, 50, 144]) and misapplied the law in concluding that the three paper signs affixed to the functioning door (the "Signs") unambiguously warned of the specific danger at issue (the unhinged door to its right). The Court is not persuaded by plaintiff's first point, because its conclusion in the Prior Decision was based on the Signs posted on the Starbucks's door "directing customers to use a different entrance" (Funaki v Starbucks Corp., 2024 NY Slip Op. 33332[U], 3 [Sup Ct, NY County 2024]) rather than the presence of the yellow caution signs. However, the Court agrees that it erred in concluding that the Signs affixed to the working entrance door were sufficient warning as a matter of law such that summary judgment was warranted. "[T]he question of what, if any, warning is reasonable under the circumstances is usually a question of fact for the jury" (Van Alstine v Kentucky Fried Chicken ofCalifornia Inc., 292 AD2d 737, 738 [3d Dept 2002] [internal citations omitted]; see also Hewett v Conway Stores, Inc., 266 AD2d 13 7, 13 7 [1st Dept 1999] ["If a jury determines that defendants had adequate notice of the hazard, there is also a triable issue as to whether they took sufficient precautions to minimize the danger to pedestrians in the area by placing rugs, mats or warning signs either on the store entrance or on the steps where plaintiff fell"]). While this question may, on occasion, be resolved as a matter of law when a warning "sufficiently conveyed the specific danger to which claimants ... would be exposed" (Arsenault v State, 96 AD3d 97, 102 [3d Dept 2012] [emphasis added]), it does not apply 153275/2020 FUNAKI, KOHEi vs. STARBUCKS CORPORATION D/8/A Page 2 of4 Motion No. 002

[2] of 4 [* 2] here. Rather, given the Signs' directive that patrons should use the "side door" with arrows pointing toward the unhinged door, the Court agrees with plaintiff that it is for the factfinder to determine whether the Signs---on their own or in conjunction with the yellow caution signs, to the extent it is established that these caution signs were present at the time of the incident-adequately warned plaintiff of the danger presented by the unhinged door or whether plaintiff reasonably understood these Signs to be directing him to use that unhinged door. The cases cited by plaintiff are inapplicable, as they involve unambiguous warnings of specific hazards through signage (see Rivero v Spillane Enterprises, Corp., 95 AD3d 984, 985 [2d Dept 2012]; Hammond v Intl. Paper Co., 161 AD2d 914, 914-15 [3d Dept 1990]), speech (see Fernandez v Rutman, 120 AD3d 545, 546 [2d Dept 2014]), the presence of an employee of defendant addressing the condition (see McMullin v Martin's Food of S. Burlington, Inc., 122 AD3d 1103, 1105 [3d Dept 2014]) or all of the above (see Stasiak v Sears, Roebuck and Co., 281 AD2d 533, 533-34 [2d Dept 2001]). In addition, since a question of fact exists as to the sufficiency of Starbucks' s warnings, the principle enunciated in Arsenault v State that where a sign sufficiently warns of a specific danger the fact that "another type or configuration of warning sign---one that was larger in size, brighter in color or stronger in tone" may have been more effective does not present a bar to summary judgment (Arsenault v State, 96 AD3d 97, 101-03 [3d Dept 2012]) does not apply. Finally, this issue of fact also precludes summary judgment for plaintiff, and the Court therefore adheres to so much of the Prior Decision as denied plaintiff's motion for that relief. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for leave to reargue is granted; and it is further 153275/2020 FUNAKI, KOHEi vs. STARBUCKS CORPORATION D/B/A Page 3 of 4 Motion No. 002

[3] of 4 [* 3] ORDERED that, upon reargument, Starbucks Corporation's motion for summary judgment is denied; and it is further ORDERED that the Court adheres to so much of the Prior Decision as denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment; and it is ORDERED that plaintiff is to serve a copy of this decision and order, with notice of entry, upon defendants as well as on the Clerk of the Court (60 Centre Street, Room 141B) and the Clerk of the General Clerk's Office (60 Centre Street, Room 119); and it is further ORDERED that such service upon the Clerk of the Court and the Clerk of the General Clerk's Office shall be made in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Courthouse and County Clerk Procedures for Electronically Filed Cases (accessible at the "EFiling" page on this court's website at the address www.nycourts.gov/supctmanh); and it is further ORDERED that the Clerk of the Trial Support Office shall restore this action to the active trial calendar. This constitutes the decision and order of the Court. 2/21/2025 DATE ~ CHECK ONE: CASE DISPOSED NON-Fl AL DISPOSITION GRANTED □ DENIED GRANTED IN PART □ OTHER APPLICATION: SETTLE ORDER SUBMIT ORDER CHECK IF APPROPRIATE: INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT □ REFERENCE 153275/2020 FUNAKI, KOHEi vs. STARBUCKS CORPORATION D/B/A Page 4 of 4 Motion No. 002

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