State of Maine v. Pelletier

STATE OF MAINE UNIFIED CRIMINAL COURT KENNEBEC, ss LOCATION: AUGUSTA ~ ~OCKET NO. CDCR-19-551

State of Maine, ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Order on Motion to Suppress

Robert Pelletier, 1)CL(f\ C,t ~ ) Defendant. )

This matter came before the court on July 18, 2019 on Defendant's motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the stop of his vehicle, which he contends was done without

reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts. Although the written motion was broadly ' ' phrased, Defendant stipulated that his motion was limited to Whether there was a basis for the

initial stop. After hearing and upon consideration of the evidence, the court orders as fo([ows.

On March 6, 2019, Officer Hutchings of the Augusta Police Department responded to a call in the area of 41 Patterson Street. Officer Hutchings is an experienced and well-trained police officer. He was informed that a resident of 41 Patterson Street had cal!ed dispatch to complain that a silver or gray sedan was driving up and down Patterson Street past the cal!er's house. In addition, the same person had called the night before for the same reason: a silver or gray vehicle driving up and down past the caJlel"s house. Officer Hutchings was also aware that he had served a protection from abuse order at that same residence approximately a month before. He drove to the area to check the area in response to that call; he arrived approximately 10- 15 minutes after the call .

As Officer Hutchings was eastbound on Patterson Street, he saw a vehicle pull out of what he thought was 41 Patterson Street; he later determined that in fact it was 39 Patterson

Street. The vehicle briefly approached Officer Hutchings in the middle of the road, and then

turned into 34 Patterson Street, on the opposite side of the road. Although the vehicle traveled

for a short distance in the center of the road, that was not illegal or even unreasonable on a small

residential street with high snowbanks and no line markings. Officer Hutchings was able to

determine that the vehicle was a silver sedan, and as a result he pulled in behind it and

approached the driver .1

Officer Hutchings did not stop the vehicle because of its operation, but rather to

investigate potential criminal activity. There were no repo11s of any actual crimes or criminal

activity in the neighborhood,just the ca!ls from 41 Patterson Street that a silver or gray sedan

was driving up and down the street.

For an investigatory stop to be valid, the "officer must act on the basis of 'specific and a1ticulab!e facts which, taken with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion."' State v. Dulac, 600 A.2d 1121, 1122 (Me. 1992) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)). In this case, the court finds that there are a11iculable facts leading to a suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to warrant the stop. While the Defendant did not commit any traffic infraction or other criminal activity observed by the officer, the officer had a report of suspicious activity by a car matching the description of Defendant's car, not just for one night but for two consecutive nights. The act of driving up and down a street for two nights running is not illegal and can be consistent with many explanations. Nonetheless, it raises a suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot, whether stalking, "casing" for a burg! ary, or the like. Indeed, that suspicion was shared by the caller, and the officer did

1 Officer Hutchings did not pull over or stop the vehicle, but when he parked behind it.his blue lights were on and he was blocking the ability of the vehicle to leave. No one has disputed that this was a "stop" for purposes of this motion. See, e.g., State v. Chapman, 495 A.2d 314,316 (Me. 1985).

just what citizens want the officer to do: find out what it is going on and prevent the commission of any crime . See State v. Worster, 611 A.2d 979 (Me. 1992) (driving slowly through known deer habitat, looking from side to side, and braking unpredictably is reasonable basis upon which to make investigatory stop.)

Defendant's reliance on State v. Chapman, 495 A .2d 314 (Me. 1985) is misplaced. There, a vehicle was seen driving quickly through a parking lot in the early morning hours when businesses were closed. The motion justice denied the motion to suppress, finding sufficient articulable facts to justify the stop . The Law Court vacated the judgment, but not because there were not such sufficient facts. Rather, the Law Court held that because the officer did not himself articulate those facts as the basis for the stop, the stop was invalid.

The motion Justice was not clearly erroneous in finding that the facts as stated, could "raise the question in a reasonable man 1s mind or a reasonable officer's mind that there may have been a break, under all the circumstances, into those stores ." The crucial iss ue , then , is wh ether Officer Moor himself had such a suspicion when he first stopped the Defendant. W ithout such a finding, the ruling that the stop was objectively reasonable is irrelevant.

Chapman, 495 A.2d at 317 (emphasis in original). This holding- that the court must find that the officer actually had a such a suspicion at the time of the investigatory stop or the stop is invalid even if the objective facts could have justified it - is not applicable here. Officer Hutchings stopped the vehicle precisely because of the facts a1ticu!ated above.2 The infirmities

2 lo addition, the ruling that the officer must subjecti vely base the stop on the att iculated facts bas been discredited . In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), the Uni ted States S upreme Court concluded that a police officer can validly conduct a traffic stop based upon the observation that a traffic infraction has occurred , regardl ess of whether the officer was using the lraffic infracti on as a "pretext" to investigate the driver for other cri minal acti vi ty . Accordi ng to the CouJt, Whren 'foreclosef sl an y argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved." Id. at 813. In 1998, the Law Court applied W!iren in State"· Bolduc, 1998 ME 255 , ~ 6,722 A .2d 44,45 , thus effectively ove11·uling Chapman .

identified in State v. Garland, 482 A.2d 139 (Me. 1984), also cited by Defendant, are similar to Chapman and again provide little support for Defendant's argument.

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to suppress is denied and the case shall be placed on for docket call. This Order on Motion to Suppress may be incorporated on the docket of the case by reference.

Dated: ~ W,. '2,-0 I/ Valerie Stanfill Judge, Unified Criminal Cou1t