(PS) Claire v. County of Sutter

— 1 — — 2 — — 3 — — 4 — — 5 — — 6 — 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA — 9 — 10 ROUBLE P. CLAIRE, No. 2:22-cv-0780 TLN AC 11 Plaintiff, 12 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13 SARA M. HOLLIS, 14 Defendant. — 15 — 16 This case is before the court on plaintiff’s motion for damages following entry of default 17 judgment (ECF No. 54) in his favor. ECF No. 56. Defendant Sara M. Hollis appeared in pro se 18 prior to her default. The motion was referred to the undersigned pursuant to E.D. Cal. 19 R. 302 (c)(21). The motion for damages was filed on November 17, 2024. Defendant did not file 20 an opposition. On February 26, 2025, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the issue of 21 compensatory damages. ECF No. 61. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned 22 recommends the motion be GRANTED, though in a reduced amount. 23 I. Relevant Background 24 This case was initiated against multiple defendants, including pro se defendant Sara M. 25 Hollis. ECF No. 1 (initial complaint); ECF No. 4 (amended complaint). Plaintiff brought federal 26 civil rights claims against Sutter County and two Sutter County Sheriff’s Deputies, and various 27 state law claims against Hollis and an unserved Jane Doe. The complaint accused Hollis of a 28 racially motivated assault, Jane Doe of racist vandalism, and the County defendants with failing 1 to properly respond to the incidents. The causes of action stated against Hollis were for violation 2 of the Ralph Civil Rights Act ( Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7 (a)), the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (Cal. 3 Civ. Code § 52.1), assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. ECF No. 4 at 40-44, 4 45-46. 5 Hollis submitted a document to the court, which was docketed as an answer on July 14, 6 2022. ECF No. 7. This document stated in its entirety, “I, Sara Hollis have received and do 7 acknowledge that I am being sued in a civil court. The actions and statements made against me 8 are not true and all questions being presented have been answered and are contained in police 9 reports.” Id. 10 Judgment was entered against the County defendants pursuant to acceptance of an offer of 11 judgment. ECF No. 15. Because claims remained against pro se defendant Hollis, the case was 12 referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for continued proceedings. ECF No. 18. Hollis 13 failed to participate in case scheduling, VDRP, and discovery. See ECF No. 26 (noting 14 defendant’s failure to appear at pretrial scheduling conference), 32 (case removed from VDRP 15 due to defendant’s failure to appear for mediation), 42 (order directing defendant to appear for 16 deposition and respond to discovery requests, following failure to participate in discovery), 49 17 (noting defendant’s failure to appear at hearing on further discovery sanctions). Due to Hollis’s 18 persistent failure to participate in this litigation, plaintiff moved for terminating sanctions against 19 her and the court granted the motion. ECF Nos. 50, 53, 54. Default judgment was entered 20 against Hollis in an amount to be determined by later motion. ECF No. 54. That motion is now 21 before the court. 22 II. Motion 23 Plaintiff requests $125,000 in compensatory and exemplary damages for violations of the 24 Ralph Civil Rights Act, the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, assault, and intentional infliction of 25 emotional distress. ECF No. 56 at 6-8. Plaintiff also seeks $25,000 in statutory damages 26 pursuant to the Ralph Civil Rights Act. Id. at 6-7. Finally, plaintiff seeks an award of attorneys’ 27 fees and costs in the amount of $57,035. Id. at 9-10. The total amount requested is $207,035.00. 28 ECF No. 58 at 2. 1 III. Analysis 2 Default judgment has been entered on all counts against defendant Hollis, and all that 3 remains is the determination of damages. ECF No. 53, 54. Upon an entry of default, the factual 4 allegations of the plaintiff's complaint are taken as true, except those relating to damages. See 5 Derek Andrew, Inc. v. Poof Apparel Corp., 528 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 2008). 6 A. Statutory Damages 7 Hollis has been found liable by default for violations of California’s Ralph Civil Rights 8 Act. Her motion for damages seeks the $25,000 civil penalty authorized by California Civil Code 9 Section 52.1(b) on the Ralph Act claim. ECF No. 56 at 6-7. The court finds that plaintiff is 10 entitled to the $25,000 civil penalty authorized by statute. 11 B. Compensatory and Exemplary Damages 12 1. Defendant Hollis’s Actions and Plaintiff Claire’s Injuries 13 In addition to the statutory civil rights claims, Sara Hollis has been found liable by default 14 for assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress. ECF No. 4 (First Amended Complaint) 15 at 43-46; ECF Nos. 50 (Findings and Recommendations recommending default judgment against 16 Hollis), 53 (order adopting recommendation), 54 (default judgment). Plaintiff seeks 17 compensatory and exemplary or punitive damages on all claims against Hollis. Those claims 18 arise from the following factual basis.1 19 On May 11, 2021, Hollis and plaintiff were parked next to each other in the parking lot of 20 South Butte Market in the town of Sutter. Hollis was in her car, and plaintiff was standing next to 21 his. Yelling through her open car window, Hollis called plaintiff — who immigrated to the 22 United States from India in the 1970s — “a motherfucking Hindu.” She accused him of having 23 run over her dog on Maple Street, where plaintiff lives and where it was later discovered that 24 Hollis also lived. When plaintiff denied knowing anything about the dog, Hollis continued to use 25 profanity and to call plaintiff a “fucking Hindu.” Hollis then told plaintiff that she was “going to 26 ram him.” Hollis backed out of her parking space and, instead of driving away, drove straight at — 27 — 1 This factual summary is based on the allegations of the complaint (ECF No. 4 at 5-6, 40-44, 4528 46) as supplemented by plaintiff’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing on damages. 1 plaintiff at a high rate of speed. Plaintiff was afraid he would be hit, but Hollis stopped just short 2 of plaintiff’s car. She then parked perpendicular to the rear of his vehicle so that plaintiff was 3 blocked from leaving the parking lot. Fearing what Hollis might do next, plaintiff ran into the 4 market and asked a clerk who had witnessed the incident to call the Sheriff’s Department. 5 Later that day, Hollis’s friend Jane Doe knocked over the garbage cans at plaintiff’s house 6 and wrote the words “SAND NIGGER” in chalk on the street in front of his house and also on his 7 driveway. Jane Doe also used a racist slur directly to plaintiff’s face. Hollis refused to identify 8 Jane Doe to local law enforcement.2 9 Plaintiff sustained no physical injuries or property damages during the encounter with 10 Hollis, but he experienced fear, emotional and mental distress, humiliation, embarrassment, and 11 anxiety. The complaint also alleges that plaintiff “suffered economic harm and other 12 consequential damages including lost earnings, medical expenses from mental health providers 13 and other health professionals, as well as incidental expenses[.]” ECF No. 4 at 43; see also id. at 14 44, 45-46. By the present motion plaintiff requests $125,000 in combined compensatory and 15 exemplary damages, but the motion does not specify the amounts requested as compensatory 16 damages and as exemplary damages respectively. ECF No. 56 at 9. At hearing, counsel stated 17 that compensatory damages alone could appropriately be assessed at a total of $125,000. No 18 argument or authority was presented to justify this amount, and plaintiff has offered no evidence 19 regarding jury verdicts in similar cases.3 20 2. Compensatory Damages — 21 — 2 The claims against Sutter County and two of its Sheriff’s Deputies arose from their allegedly — 22 — inadequate response to plaintiff’s report of hate crimes, and from the County’s alleged practice or 23 custom of failing to equally enforce civil rights laws and to investigate hate crimes pursuant to the requirements of California law. As noted above, plaintiff settled with the County defendants in 24 2022. See ECF No. 15. 3 “District courts in this circuit, noting the dearth of Ninth Circuit case law on how to evaluate — 25 — the amount of damages claimed for emotional distress in the default judgment context, have 26 adopted the approach used by courts in the Second Circuit,” namely, “to compare the damages sought in default judgment to jury awards in similar cases.” ACF 2006 Corp v. L. Offs. of 27 Michael J. Libman APC, No. CV 19-2920-DMG (JCX), 2020 WL 7038384 , at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2020) (citing Brantley v. Boyd, No. C 07-6139 MMC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99388 , 2013 28 WL 3766911 , at *8 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2013) (collecting cases)). 1 a. Medical Expenses 2 In the default judgment context, a plaintiff must “prove up” the amount of damages he 3 claims. Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 501 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 4 Plaintiff’s declaration in support of the motion states only that he was “forced to seek continued 5 medical treatment after the attack” by defendant Hollis. ECF No. 56-3 at 5. At the hearing, 6 plaintiff testified that he saw a psychiatrist three times in person and a few more times via video 7 during a period of approximately three months following his encounter with Hollis. Plaintiff has 8 provided no medical bills or other evidence to establish the amount of any medical expenses he 9 incurred related to this treatment. The court accordingly finds that plaintiff has failed to prove up 10 any compensable medical damges, but will nonetheless consider the fact that plaintiff sought 11 mental health treatment as evidence in support of emotional distress damages. 12 b. Financial Losses 13 Plaintiff’s declaration in support of the motion stated that he “suffered substantial 14 economic harm, including lost earnings, as a result of the attack. I invest my own money in the 15 financial markets to make a living. Because of the attack, my ability to focus on my work has 16 been negatively affected, and I suffered significant financial loss as a result.” ECF No. 56-3 at 5. 17 Plaintiff’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing was similarly vague. Although Mr. Claire 18 estimated that he lost about $200,000 because he was unable to engage in trading for an 19 unspecified period after the incident due to emotional distress, he also acknowledged that he 20 “can’t do the mathematics” to justify that figure. The $200,000 figure appears to be entirely 21 speculative. Plaintiff has presented no evidence of his earnings from trading before and after the 22 incident, or any other evidentiary basis for a finding of economic loss. There is therefore no basis 23 for compensatory damages. The court will, however, consider Mr. Claire’s testimony in this 24 regard as it relates to emotional distress. 25 c. Emotional Distress 26 Under California law, emotional distress damages (noneconomic damages) are part of the 27 award of compensatory damages. McNairy v. C.K. Realty, 150 Cal. App. 4th 1500, 1506 (2007). 28 “There is no fixed or absolute standard by which to compute the monetary value of emotional 1 distress[.]” Plotnik v. Meihaus, 208 Cal. App. 4th 1590, 1602 (2012) (quotations and citation 2 omitted). Pursuant to California law, “the testimony of a single person, including the plaintiff, 3 may be sufficient to support an award of emotional distress damages.” Knutson v. Foster, 25 Cal. 4 App. 5th 1075, 1096 (2018) (emphasis in original). “The controlling standard for emotional 5 distress damages is that they must be reasonable.” Fite v. Beasley, No. 2:21-cv-03908-FWS-JPR, — 6 — 2023 WL 3551129 , at *9, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54643 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2023) (citing 7 Khraibut v. Chahal, 2021 WL 1164940 , at *20 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2021) and Cal. Civ. Code § 8 3359). 9 Plaintiff’s declaration and his testimony at the hearing credibly describe the fear and 10 shock he experienced when initially confronted by Hollis’s bigoted vitriol in the parking lot, the 11 fear for his life that he momentarily experienced when she drove at him after threatening to “ram” 12 him, and his fear of further escalation when she boxed his vehicle in to prevent him from leaving. 13 Plaintiff also described the lasting effects of this encounter, which caused anxiety, sleeplessness, 14 and problems with attention and concentration over the next few months. These effects were 15 serious enough to affect plaintiff’s normal activities, including financial trading, and to cause him 16 to seek treatment from a mental health professional. 17 Plaintiff described the May 11, 2021, incident itself as “torturous,” and testified that for 18 months afterward he was afraid for his own safety and that of his elderly mother, with whom he 19 lives. He stopped going out for walks in the neighborhood and on nearby trails, as had been his 20 habit, for an unspecified period of time. This is entirely understandable, given Hollis’s proximity 21 (she lived four houses down the street from plaintiff), her own conduct at the grocery store, and 22 the ensuing racist vandalism by her associate. 23 Plaintiff also suffered emotionally from being targeted by Hollis on the basis of his 24 perceived race, ethnicity, and/or religion. He testified that the incident made him “feel less than 25 human,” and that he “didn’t belong to the community.” Being made to feel both physically 26 unsafe and outside the fabric of the community on the basis of national origin (or membership in 27 any protected class) causes psychological harms above and beyond those otherwise caused by 28 assaultive or harassing conduct. Plaintiff’s mental suffering and emotional distress at being 1 targeted on the basis of his perceived ethnicity and/or religion weighs significantly in the court’s 2 assessment of emotional distress damages. 3 For all these reasons, an award of compensatory damages for emotional distress is entirely 4 appropriate. However, the amount requested is unsupported by any showing of jury awards in 5 similar cases. The requested amount appears excessive in light of the facts that (1) Hollis’s 6 actions were limited to a single incident and (2) plaintiff testified to fear and symptoms of distress 7 that affected his functioning for an ensuing period of no more than three months. Having 8 considered all of these factors, the undersigned finds that an award of $40,000 is reasonable. That 9 will be the recommendation. 10 3. Exemplary Damages 11 Section 3294 of the California Civil Code permits an award of exemplary damages for 12 non-contract claims only when “the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the 13 defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294 ; see also Scott 14 v. Phoenix Schools, Inc., 175 Cal. App. 4th 702, 715 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). In order to determine 15 whether exemplary damages should be awarded, and the amount to be awarded, courts consider: 16 (1) the nature of defendant’s acts; (2) the amount of compensatory damages awarded; and (3) the 17 wealth of the defendant. See Professional Seminar Consultants, Inc. v. Sino Am. Tech. Exchange 18 Council, Inc., 727 F.2d 1470, 1473 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 582 19 P.2d 980 (Cal. 1978). As to the third factor, the California Supreme Court has stated that the 20 record must contain some evidence related to the defendant’s financial condition in order to 21 ensure that the reward is nonspeculative. Adams v. Murakami, 54 Cal.3d 105, 114 (1991). “For 22 this reason, evidence of the defendant’s financial condition is a prerequisite to an award of 23 punitive damages in order to ensure that it is not based on speculation but based on deterrent 24 effect.” Harrell v. Kepreos, 2:06-0849 MCE CMK, 2008 WL 619117 , at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 25 2008), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:06-cv-00849 MCE CMK, 2008 WL 864043 26 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008). “The burden of establishing the defendant’s financial condition is on 27 the plaintiff.” Id. 28 Here, the record contains no evidence of defendant’s financial condition. Accordingly, 1 while the alleged conduct of Hollis is indisputably reprehensible, exemplary damages are not 2 available. 3 C. Recoverable Attorneys’ Fees 4 Reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs are directed recoverable by statute in California Civil 5 Code §§ 52(b)(3), 52.1(i). See also, Ventura v. ABM Indus. Inc., 212 Cal.App.4th 258 , 275 6 (2012). Calculation of reasonable attorneys’ fees is based on the “lodestar” approach, which 7 requires a similar analysis under both federal and state law. See Hensley v. Eckerhardt, 461 U.S. 8 424, 433 (1983); Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1131 (2001). The Court must first 9 determine a reasonable fee by multiplying “the number of hours reasonably expended on the 10 litigation” by “a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. Here, plaintiff requests a 11 reduced fee of $57,035.00 for 134.2 hours of attorney time at an hourly rate of $425. ECF No. 56 12 at 10. Counsel omitted from the requested hours tasks not related to the claims against defendant 13 Hollis and the “vast majority of time spent on internal meetings and communications.” ECF No. 14 56-1 at 4. Counsel submitted an adequate billing statement. ECF No. 56-2 at 11-16. Under the 15 circumstances of this case, the court finds this fee request to be reasonable. 16 IV. Conclusion 17 For all the reasons explained above, it is RECOMMENDED THAT plaintiff’s motion for 18 damages against defendant Sara M. Hollis (ECF No. 56) be GRANTED in the reduced total 19 amount of $122,035 ($25,000 in statutory damages, $40,000 in actual damages, and $57,035.00 20 in attorney’s fees). Following entry of the damages award, the undersigned recommends that the 21 Clerk of Court be directed to close this case. 22 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 23 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1). Within twenty-one days 24 after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 25 objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Id.; see also Local Rule 304(b). Such a 26 document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 27 Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be filed with the court and served on all 28 parties within fourteen days after service of the objections. Local Rule 304(d). Failure to file 1 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 2 | Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998), as amended _on denial of reh’g (Nov. 24, 3 || 1998); Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 4 | DATED: February 27, 2025 ~ 5 Htttenr— Lhar—e_ ALLISON CLAIRE 6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE — 7 — — 8 — — 9 — — 10 — 1] — 12 — — 13 — — 14 — — 15 — — 16 — — 17 — — 18 — — 19 — — 20 — — 21 — — 22 — — 23 — — 24 — — 25 — — 26 — — 27 — — 28 —