Quinn v. Nasera

[2] 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5 * * * 6 TRELLIS QUINN, Case No. 2:24-cv-00635-MMD-NJK 7 Plaintiff, SCREENING ORDER (SAC) v. [8] GABRIELA NASERA, et al., [9] Defendants. [10] 11 I. SUMMARY 12 On June 5, 2024, the Court issued an order screening pro se Plaintiff Trellis 13 Quinn’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. (ECF No. 7.) The 14 screening order deferred a decision on Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, 15 dismissed the FAC without prejudice for including improperly joined claims, and granted 16 Plaintiff leave to amend. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (ECF 17 No. 8), and the SAC is now the operative complaint. The Court will screen the SAC under 18 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and address the application to proceed in forma pauperis. 19 II. SCREENING STANDARD 20 Federal courts must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which an 21 incarcerated person seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of 22 a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the Court must identify 23 any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a 24 claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 25 immune from such relief. See id. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings, however, must 26 be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 27 1990). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , a plaintiff must allege two essential 28 elements: (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United 2 of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 3 In addition to the screening requirements under § 1915A, the Prison Litigation 4 Reform Act requires federal courts to dismiss an incarcerated person’s claim if “the 5 allegation of poverty is untrue” or if the action “is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a 6 claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who 7 is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2). Dismissal of a complaint for failure 8 to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is provided for in Federal Rule of Civil 9 Procedure 12(b)(6), and the Court applies the same standard under § 1915 when 10 reviewing the adequacy of a complaint or an amended complaint. When a court dismisses 11 a complaint under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint 12 with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the face of the complaint 13 that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Cato v. United States, 70 14 F.3d 1103 , 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 15 Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See 16 Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). Dismissal for failure to 17 state a claim is proper only if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in 18 support of the claim that would entitle them to relief. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756 , 19 759 (9th Cir. 1999). In making this determination, the Court takes as true all allegations 20 of material fact in the complaint and construes them in the light most favorable to the 21 plaintiff. See Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996). Allegations of a 22 pro se complainant are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 23 lawyers. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). While the standard under Rule 24 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must provide more than 25 mere labels and conclusions. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 26 A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. See id. 27 Additionally, a reviewing court should “begin by identifying pleadings [allegations] 28 that, because they are no more than mere conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption 2 the framework of a complaint, they must be supported with factual allegations.” Id. “When 3 there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then 4 determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “Determining 5 whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that 6 requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. 7 Finally, all or part of a complaint filed by an incarcerated person may be dismissed 8 sua sponte if that person’s claims lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This 9 includes claims based on legal conclusions that are untenable (e.g., claims against 10 defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a legal interest which 11 clearly does not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations (e.g., 12 fantastic or delusional scenarios). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 , 327–28 (1989); 13 see also McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 14 III. SCREENING OF SAC 15 In the SAC, Plaintiff sues multiple Defendants for events that took place while he 16 was incarcerated at Southern Desert Correctional Center (“SDCC”). (ECF No. 8 at 1.) He 17 sues the State of Nevada, the Nevada Department of Corrections (“NDOC”),1 Warden 18 Gabriela Najera2, Associate Warden Karissa Currier, and Correctional Lieutenant Jose 19 Navarrette. (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff brings three claims, requesting monetary damages and 20 the return of statutory good time credits. (Id. at 4-7, 10.) He alleges the following. 21 Plaintiff faced disciplinary charges for possession of contraband and possession 22 or sale of intoxicants. (Id. at 4.) At a disciplinary hearing on June 29, 2023, Lt. Navarrette 23 found Plaintiff guilty on both charges. (Id.) Navarrette did not allow Plaintiff to call any 24 witnesses, including Plaintiff’s cellmate, who had admitted responsibility for the [25] 26 1The State of Nevada and NDOC are not proper parties to this action because states and state agencies are not “persons” who can be sued for purposes of § 1983. See 27 Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989). The Court therefore dismisses these Defendants from this action with prejudice, as amendment would be futile. [2] 2 Disciplinary Hearing form that Plaintiff declined the opportunity to call a witness. (Id. at 5, 3 21, 24.) Navarrette also relied solely on officer reports to support the guilty findings. (Id. 4 at 3-4.) Plaintiff’s sanctions for these convictions included disciplinary segregation, loss 5 of statutory good time credits, phone restriction, and commissary restriction. (Id. at 4.) 6 Plaintiff appealed, and Warden Najera reversed the findings of guilt and accompanying 7 sanctions. (Id. at 11, 25.) Plaintiff, however, did not receive the statutory good time credits 8 back, nor did he receive the monetary compensation that he requested on an NDOC 9 Administrative Claim Form. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that Warden Najera and Associate 10 Warden Currier are liable for failing to ensure that Plaintiff received these remedies after 11 the guilty findings were reversed. (Id. at 6-7.) 12 Based on these allegations, Plaintiff brings an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel 13 and unusual punishment and a Fourteenth Amendment claim for deprivation of due 14 process. (Id. at 4-7.) The Court will address each claim. 15 A. Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment 16 The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments places a 17 broad range of responsibilities on prison officials, including barring them from using of 18 excessive physical force, requiring them to take reasonable measures to guarantee the 19 safety of inmates, and obligating them to provide humane conditions of confinement by 20 supplying adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. See Farmer v. Brennan, [21] 511 U.S. 825 , 832–33 (1994) (citations omitted). “Detention beyond the termination of a 22 sentence could” also “constitute cruel and unusual punishment if it is the result of 23 ‘deliberate indifference’ to the prisoner’s liberty interest.” Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 24 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-06 (1976)). 25 Plaintiff does not specify what type of Eighth Amendment claim he is attempting to bring 26 in this case, and the substance of the allegations does not lend itself to a reasonable 27 inference as to his intention. See Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010) 28 (citing McKinney v. De Bord, 507 F.2d 501, 504 (9th Cir. 1974) (clarifying that the liberal 2 conceivable doubt; the court is obligated to draw only reasonable factual inferences in the 3 [party’s] favor”)). Plaintiff also does not allege that he was held beyond the termination of 4 his sentence. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a colorable Eighth Amendment claim for 5 cruel and unusual punishment. The Court dismisses this claim without prejudice and 6 without leave to amend. 7 B. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 8 “The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects persons against 9 deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural 10 protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 11 U.S. 209 , 221 (2005). When analyzing a due process claim, courts engage in a two-step 12 analysis: (1) “determine whether the inmate was deprived of a constitutionally protected 13 liberty or property interest,” and (2) “examine whether that deprivation was accompanied 14 by sufficient procedural protections.” Johnson v. Ryan, 55 F.4th 1167 , 1179 (9th Cir. 15 2022) (citing United States v. 101 Houseco, LLC, 22 F.4th 843 , 851 (9th Cir. 2022)). “An 16 interest in avoiding certain conditions of confinement constitutes a liberty interest 17 protected by the Due Process Clause if the challenged condition imposes atypical and 18 significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” 19 Ashker v. Newsom, 81 F.4th 863 , 887 (9th Cir. 2023) (citations and quotation marks 20 omitted). “[T]here is no single standard for determining when circumstances are atypical 21 and significant,” but the Ninth Circuit has “detailed three guiding considerations: (1) 22 whether the challenged condition mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in 23 administrative segregation and protective custody, and thus comported with the prison’s 24 discretionary authority; (2) the duration of the condition and the degree of restraint 25 imposed; and (3) whether the state’s action will invariably affect the duration of the 26 prisoner’s sentence.” Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). 27 Plaintiff alleges that his disciplinary convictions came with four sanctions: 28 disciplinary segregation, phone restriction, commissary restriction, and loss of statutory 2 monetary compensation he requested in an Administrative Claim Form. 3 As an initial matter, Plaintiff does not have a protected interest in the requested 4 monetary compensation because it was not deducted from his account as a sanction for 5 the disciplinary convictions; it was simply not awarded to him as a remedy after the 6 convictions were reversed. See Vance v. Barrett, 345 F.3d 1083 , 1089 n.6 (9th Cir. 2003) 7 (holding that inmates have a protected property interest in their inmate accounts). 8 As for the disciplinary segregation, Plaintiff does not allege any facts about the 9 details of that environment or how long he was placed there. Plaintiff also does not allege 10 that he has a condition making placement in disciplinary segregation particularly harsh 11 for him personally. See Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2003) 12 (holding that an inmate’s placement in administrative segregation implicated a protected 13 liberty interest only because he had a disability that resulted in those conditions imposing 14 an atypical and significant hardship on him). Plaintiff has not established that placement 15 in disciplinary segregation alone imposed an atypical and significant hardship on him in 16 relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. See id. at 1078 (collecting cases) 17 (“Typically, administrative segregation in and of itself does not implicate a protected liberty 18 interest.”). 19 As for the phone and commissary restrictions, Plaintiff does not explain what these 20 restrictions entailed or how long he experienced them. So these temporary restrictions do 21 not give rise to a protected liberty interest either. See Ashker, 81 F.4th at 889 (quoting 22 Johnson, 55 F.4th at 1196) (“[R]estrictions constituting atypical and significant hardship 23 should cause a ‘material change in the underlying conditions of [an inmate’s] 24 confinement,’ with ‘incidental, fleeting benefits’ . . . failing to rise to that level.”); Koerner 25 v. Angelone, Case No. 97-15681, 1999 WL 1103339 , at *3 (9th Cir. Dec. 6, 1999) (holding 26 that “80-day suspension from the prison canteen” did not implicate a protected liberty 27 interest). [28] 2 statutory framework he is referring to here, but the Court assumes that the relevant statute 3 is NRS § 209.4465, which permits the award of credit deductions from an inmate’s 4 minimum and/or maximum sentence in certain circumstances. See Galanti v. Nev. Dep’t 5 of Corr., 65 F.4th 1152 , 1156-57 (9th Cir. 2023) (comparing this statute to other states’ 6 “good-time statutes”). Liberally construing the SAC in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court infers that 7 Plaintiff is alleging that the sanction in question could have affected either his minimum 8 sentence or his maximum sentence. 9 An award of credits to an inmate’s minimum sentence has the effect of moving up 10 a parole eligibility date. See NRS 209.4465(7)(b); Williams v. State Dep’t of Corr., 402 11 P.3d 1260, 1262 (Nev. 2017). And “Nevada prisoners do not have a liberty interest in 12 parole.” Galanti, 65 F.4th at 1156 (citing Moor v. Palmer, 603 F.3d 658, 661-62 (9th Cir. 13 2010)). Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff is claiming that prison officials removed credits 14 that had been awarded to his minimum sentence as a sanction for the disciplinary 15 convictions, Plaintiff fails to establish a protected liberty interest. 16 It appears that an award of credits to an inmate’s maximum sentence, however, 17 may invariably affect the duration of the inmate’s sentence.3 See NRS 209.4465(7)(a); 18 Galanti, 65 F.4th at 1156 (citations omitted) (“Despite being instructed by [the Ninth 19 Circuit] to brief the issue, Defendants do not respond to [Plaintiff’s] argument that [NRS] 20 § 209.4465 contains the mandatory language necessary to create a constitutionally 21 protected liberty interest in maximum-sentence deductions, similar to good-time statutes 22 [the Ninth Circuit has] previously found to create liberty interests.”). Therefore, for the 23 purposes of this screening order, the Court finds that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that 24 one of the sanctions accompanying his disciplinary convictions implicated a protected 25 liberty interest. See Igbinovia v. Dzurenda, Case No. 2:19-cv-00588-RFB, 2024 WL 26 27 3That is, so long as the inmate is not serving a life sentence. See Witherow v. Farwell, 383 F. App’x 688 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted) (“Nevada has not created a 28 liberty interest in the application of good time credits to a life sentence.”). There is no 2 deductions under this statute “creates a liberty interest”). 3 When a protected liberty interest exists and a prisoner faces disciplinary charges, 4 officials must provide the prisoner with certain procedural safeguards, including the 5 opportunity to call witnesses, unless calling witnesses would interfere with institutional 6 security. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-70 (1974). Plaintiff alleges that Lt. 7 Navarrette committed a procedural error by not allowing him to call a witness during the 8 disciplinary hearing. 9 However, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a colorable due process claim 10 on this basis. Even if Lt. Navarrette committed a procedural error, that error was cured 11 through the administrative appeal process when Warden Najera reversed the disciplinary 12 convictions and associated sanctions. See Frank v. Schultz, 808 F.3d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 13 2015) (collecting cases to establish that procedural errors may be corrected through a 14 prison’s administrative appeal process). It is important to note that Najera expressly 15 ordered the return of Plaintiff’s good-time credits when the disciplinary convictions were 16 reversed on appeal. (ECF No. 8 at 11, 25.) “[A]dministrative appeal is considered part of 17 the process afforded, and any error in the process can be corrected during that appeals 18 process without necessarily subjecting prison officials to liability for procedural violations 19 at lower levels.” See Frank, 808 F.3d at 764 n.4 (quoting Torricellas v. Poole, 954 F. 20 Supp. 1405, 1414 (C.D. Cal. 1997)). Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s due 21 process claim without leave to amend in this case, as this claim fails as a matter of law. 22 The Court recognizes Plaintiff’s allegation that, despite Warden Najera’s ruling on 23 appeal, Plaintiff’s good-time credits have not actually been returned to him. Accepting this 24 allegation as true, Plaintiff’s concern is understandable, but that does not alter the Court’s 25 conclusion that Plaintiff has not stated a colorable due process claim in federal court. 26 Instead, it appears that the proper avenue for Plaintiff to bring a claim about the 27 application of good-time credits to his sentence is in state court, through a postconviction 28 petition for a writ of habeas corpus under NRS § 34.724(2)(c), after he exhausts all 2 about the application of credits earned under NRS § 209.4465 “challenges the 3 computation of time served and therefore is raised properly in a postconviction petition 4 for a writ of habeas corpus”). The Court takes no position on the merits of any such 5 petition Plaintiff may file. 6 IV. CONCLUSION 7 It is therefore ordered that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 8) is 8 the operative complaint in this action. 9 It is further ordered that the Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 8) is dismissed 10 in its entirety. 11 It is further ordered that the Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual 12 punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim are dismissed without 13 prejudice and without leave to amend in this case because amendment would be futile. 14 It is further ordered that Defendants State of Nevada and NDOC are dismissed 15 from this action with prejudice, as amendment would be futile. 16 It is further ordered that Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF 17 No. 5) is granted. Plaintiff is not required to pay an initial installment fee, but the full $350 18 filing fee will still be paid in installments under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 . 19 It is further ordered that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 , the Nevada Department of 20 Corrections will forward payments from the account of Trellis Quinn, #93626 to the Clerk 21 of the United States District Court, District of Nevada, at a rate of 20% of the preceding 22 month’s deposits (in months that the account exceeds $10.00) until the full $350 filing fee 23 has been paid for this action. 24 The Clerk of Court is kindly directed to send a copy of this order to the Finance 25 Division of the Clerk’s Office and to the Chief of Inmate Services for the Nevada 26 Department of Corrections at formapauperis@doc.nv.gov. [28] 1 It is further certified that any appeal from this order would not be taken “in good 2 || faith” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a)(3), so in forma pauperis status should not continue on 3 || any appeal. 4 The Clerk of Court is further directed to close this case and enter judgment 5 || accordingly. 6 DATED THIS 26!" Day of February 2025. [7] 8 , MIRANDA M. DU 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE