Eschelbach v. Nevada Department of Corrections

— 1 — — 2 — 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5 * * * 6 SEAN ESCHELBACH, Case No. 2:24-cv-01273-GMN-MDC 7 Plaintiff, DISMISSAL ORDER v. — 8 — NDOC, et al., — 9 — Defendants. — 10 — — 11 — 12 Plaintiff Sean Eschelbach (“Plaintiff”) brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. 13 § 1983 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated 14 at Southern Desert Correctional Center. (ECF No. 4 at 1.) On January 29, 2025, this 15 Court ordered Plaintiff to update his address and file an application to proceed in forma 16 pauperis by a non-prisoner by February 21, 2025. (ECF No. 7 at 1.) That deadline expired 17 without an updated address from Plaintiff, and his mail from the Court is being returned 18 as undeliverable. (See ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff also failed to file an application to proceed in 19 forma pauperis by a non-prisoner or pay the full filing fee of $405. 20 I. DISCUSSION 21 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 22 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 23 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829 , 831 24 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court 25 order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 26 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to 27 keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th 1 Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 2 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s 3 interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; 4 (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 5 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 6 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 7 Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987)). 8 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 9 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Plaintiff’s 10 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal 11 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing 12 a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 13 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of 14 cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 15 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 16 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 17 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983 , 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 18 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 19 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639 , 643 & n.4 (9th 20 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that 21 “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s 22 order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 23 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). 24 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a 25 case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 26 F.2d 1421 , 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed without 27 the ability for the Court and the defendants to send Plaintiff case-related documents, 1 || filings, and orders, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. 2 || But without an updated address, the likelinood that the second order would even reach 3 || Plaintiff is low, so issuing a second order will only delay the inevitable and further 4 || squander the Court's finite resources. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful 5 || alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 6 || Ul. CONCLUSION 7 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they 8 || weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without 9 || prejudice based on Plaintiff's failure to file an updated address and an application to 10 || proceed in forma pauperis by a non-prisoner in compliance with this Court’s January 29, 11 || 2025, order. The Clerk of Court is kindly directed to enter judgment accordingly and close 12 || this case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Plaintiff wishes 13 || to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case and provide the Court with 14 || his current address. — 15 — 16 March 4, 2025 Wl 17 LH “ Gloria avarro, Judge 18 United op District Court — 19 — — 20 — — 21 — — 22 — — 23 — — 24 — — 25 — — 26 — — 27 — — 28 —