CHINS: V M v. Indiana Department of Child Services

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana In the Matter of W.H. (Minor Child), FILED Child in Need of Services Mar 07 2025, 9:46 am

CLERK and Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court

V.M. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent

v.

Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner

March 7, 2025 Court of Appeals Case No. 24A-JC-2241 Appeal from the Madison Circuit Court The Honorable Stephen Koester, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 48C02-2405-JC-202

Opinion by Judge May Judges Weissmann and Scheele concur.

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May, Judge. [1] V.M. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s order adjudicating her child, W.H.

(“Child”), a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) and its dispositional order

directing her to complete services related to the reasons for the CHINS

adjudication. Mother raises two issues for our review, which we revise and

restate as:

1. Whether, in the order adjudicating Child a CHINS, the trial court’s findings support its conclusion that Child’s physical or mental health was seriously endangered or seriously impaired by Mother’s inability or unwillingness to address her mental health problems such that the coercive intervention of the trial court was needed; and

2. Whether, in the trial court’s dispositional order,

2.1 the trial court properly relied upon the predispositional report despite the fact that it had not been admitted as evidence; and

2.2 the trial court made the required findings.

We affirm.

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Facts and Procedural History [2] Child was born to Mother and B.H. (“Father”) 1 on March 7, 2024. When

Child was born, Mother experienced postpartum depression and bleeding

complications, so Child was released from the hospital to his paternal

grandparents because Mother “needed to kind of recover from [the bleeding

and postpartum depression].” (Tr. Vol. II at 30.) Shortly after Mother’s release

from the hospital, Child began spending daytime hours with Mother, while

paternal grandparents continued to provide overnight care. [3] On April 28, 2024, Mother called police alleging Father raped her and told her

that “he would easily be able to kill [Child].” (App. Vol. II at 23.) Following

that incident, Mother began to have suicidal ideation. On April 30, 2024,

Father found Mother “sitting on the couch [of their shared apartment] with

several knives . . . hysterically crying and stating she was scared and wanted to

hurt herself . . . [because Father] wanted to discontinue their relationship.” (Id.

at 24.) Father asked Mother to go to the hospital for psychiatric treatment, and

Mother checked herself into a mental hospital. Father was unable to care for

Child, so paternal grandparents cared for him while Mother was in the hospital.

Mother left the hospital after “a few days[.]” (Id.) Paternal grandparents

continued full-time care of Child, and Mother spent time with Child

periodically.

1 B.H. (“Father”) admitted Child was a CHINS and does not participate in this appeal.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-2241 | March 7, 2025 Page 3 of 19 [4] On April 30, 2024, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report

that Mother and Father were neglecting Child because “[Mother] contacted

Local Law Enforcement and made a report that she was raped by [Father] on

April 28, 2024. It was further alleged that [Father] has made comments that he

would easily be able to kill [Child].” (Id. at 13-14.) On the same day DCS

received its report, Mother had a mental health crisis that resulted in her

hospitalization. On May 3, 2024, DCS filed a petition alleging Child was a

CHINS based on Mother’s mental health issues, Father’s inability to care for

Child, and the family’s pending eviction. The same day, the trial court issued

an order granting DCS’s request to remove Child from Mother and Father’s

care and place him with paternal grandparents, where he was already living at

the time. [5] On May 6, 2024, the trial court held an initial hearing on the CHINS petition.

At that hearing, Mother asked that Child remain in paternal grandparents’ care

because she “had some postpartum depression and [she] was in a car

accident[.]” (Tr. Vol. II at 16.) Mother also noted that she and Father were

both “medicated to sleep” and acknowledged Child was probably safer with

paternal grandparents. (Id.) However, she did not admit Child was a CHINS. [6] On July 1, 2024, the trial court held a fact-finding hearing on the CHINS

petition. At that hearing, Mother testified she had “fetal alcohol syndrome[,] . .

. depression and anxiety[.]” (Id. at 38.) DCS presented evidence that, while

Mother testified at the hearing that she had been taking her psychiatric

medication, she told paternal grandmother via text message on June 10, 2024,

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that Mother was “going through withdrawal from [her] meds.” (Ex. Vol. I at

5.) In addition, on May 25, 2024, Mother had sent paternal grandmother a text

that said, “I love [Child] but I’m half tempted to let you guys keep him

[b]ecause [I don’t know] how I can be there for him[.]” (Id. at 3.) The trial

court adjudicated Child a CHINS based on Mother’s mental health struggles

and failure to provide adequate care and supervision for Child. [7] On August 14, 2024, the trial court held a dispositional hearing. The parties

presented argument about the appropriate services to address the reasons for

Child’s removal from Mother’s care based in part on the recommendations in

the predispositional report. On August 20, 2024, the trial court issued its

dispositional order requiring Mother to, among other things: complete a

parenting assessment and all recommendations; attend supervised visitation

with Child; and take steps to meet her mental health needs, including

“following all directions of nurses/doctors, attending all appointments, and

taking medications in the appropriate doses and frequencies specified in the

prescriptions[;]” participating in individual counseling; and demonstrating

“positive changes . . . as a result of the counseling.” (App. Vol. II at 8-9.)

Discussion and Decision 1. CHINS Adjudication [8] Mother argues the trial court’s findings do not support its conclusion that

Child’s physical or mental health was seriously endangered or seriously

impaired by Mother’s inability or unwillingness to address her mental health

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-2241 | March 7, 2025 Page 5 of 19 problems such that the coercive intervention of the trial court was needed. Because a CHINS proceeding is a civil action, DCS must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code. Matter of N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). DCS alleged Child was a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, which states:

A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) the child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

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A CHINS adjudication focuses on the needs and condition of the child. N.E.,

228 N.E.3d at 476. The purpose of a CHINS adjudication is not to punish the

parent but to provide proper services for the benefit of the child. Id. at 475.

“[T]he acts or omissions of one parent can cause a condition that creates the

need for court intervention.” Id. at 476.

While we acknowledge a certain implication of parental fault in many CHINS adjudications, the truth of the matter is that a CHINS adjudication is simply that - a determination that a child is in need of services. Standing alone, a CHINS adjudication does not establish culpability on the part of a particular parent. Only when the State moves to terminate a particular parent’s rights does an allegation of fault attach. We have previously made it clear that CHINS proceedings are “distinct from” involuntary termination proceedings. The termination of the parent-child relationship is not merely a continuing stage of the CHINS proceeding. In fact, a CHINS intervention in no way challenges the general competency of a parent to continue a relationship with the child.

Matter of To.R., 177 N.E.3d 478, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting In re N.E.,

919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010)), trans. denied. [9] When a trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions of law in a CHINS

decision, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re Des. B., 2 N.E.3d 828,

836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). We consider first whether the evidence supports the

findings and then whether the findings support the judgment. Id. We may not

set aside the findings or judgment unless they are clearly erroneous. Id.

Findings are clearly erroneous when the record contains no facts to support

them either directly or by inference, and a judgment is clearly erroneous if it Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-2241 | March 7, 2025 Page 7 of 19

relies on an incorrect legal standard. Id. We give due regard to the trial court’s

ability to assess witness credibility and do not reweigh the evidence; we instead

consider the evidence most favorable to the judgment with all reasonable

inferences drawn in favor of the judgment. Id. We defer substantially to

findings of fact but not to conclusions of law. Id. “We accept unchallenged

findings as true.” Henderson v. Henderson, 139 N.E.3d 227, 232 (Ind. Ct. App.

2019). [10] Mother argues the trial court’s findings do not support its conclusion that

Child’s physical or mental health was seriously endangered or seriously

impaired by Mother’s inability or unwillingness to address her mental health

issues such that the coercive intervention of the trial court was needed. Mother

does not challenge any of the trial court’s findings, and thus we accept them as

true. See Henderson, 139 N.E.3d at 232 (unchallenged findings accepted as true). [11] In its order adjudicating Child a CHINS, the trial court found:

6. The case was initiated following [Mother] having a mental health crisis and paternal grandmother [] taking her to a facility for an acute stay to address suicidal ideations.

7. At the time of the initiation, [Child] already resided with paternal grandparents due to neither parent being able to care for [Child] safely upon his discharge from the hospital after birth.

*****

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10. [Child] was born on March 7, 2024. Following [Child’s] birth, [Mother] was experiencing postpartum depression and discussed the options of safe haven and adoption for [Child].

11. [Mother] did not take her prescribed mental health medications during her pregnancy.

12. At that time, the family and medical team ultimately decided [Child] would go home with paternal grandparents [].

13. [Mother’s] team believed that with her state of mind upon her discharged [sic] from the hospital, she [was] unable to care for [Child] safely.

14. Since release from the hospital, [Child] has never stayed overnight in the care of either of his parents.

15. At the fact finding on July 1, 2024, [paternal grandmother] testified that based on her observations she did not think [Child] was safe in the care of [Father] or [Mother].

*****

17. From the time [of] [Child’s] release from the hospital until [DCS’s] involvement, [Mother] would intermittently care for [Child] during the day. [Child] would return to [paternal grandparents’] care in the evening.

18. [Mother] and [Father] both take sleeping medication that renders them unlikely to be responsive if [Child] were to awaken in the night.

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19. During this time, [Mother] was not properly managing her mental health medications.

20. [Mother], by her own admission, was on several occasions unable to care for [Child] due to her own mental health concerns. ...

*****

22. It was alleged that [Mother] contacted Local Law Enforcement and made a report that she was raped by [Father] on April 28, 2024. It was further alleged that [Father] has made comments that he would easily be able to kill [Child].

*****

24. On or about April 30, 2024, [Father] and [Mother] were living in an apartment together. [Father] returned to the apartment to find [Mother] sitting on the couch with several knives. [Father] had previously attempted to hide the knives from [Mother] and was unsure where she obtained the knives.

25. [Mother] was hysterically crying and stating she was scared and wanted to hurt herself. She was verbally upset that [Father] wanted to discontinue their romantic relationship.

26. In response to this incident, [paternal grandmother] and [Father] asked [Mother] to go to the hospital for treatment. [Mother] ultimately agreed.

27. [Mother] was checked in to a mental hospital in Plainfield. [Father] at the time stated that [Child] should remain in the care of paternal grandparents and he was unwilling to care for [Child].

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28. [Mother] left treatment after only staying for a few days.

29. Since the opening of the CHIN[S] case, [Mother] still is not properly managing her medication. As seen in DCS exhibit 1, on June 10, 2024, [Mother] stated she was going through withdraws [sic] from her “meds”.

*****

31. [Mother] has struggled to maintain employment. At the time of the initial hearing on May 6, 2024, [Mother] stated she was unemployed but seeking to return to her former employment.

32. [Mother] does not have a drivers license, a vehicle or a reliable form of transportation. Prior to the CHIN[s] case, [Mother] often relied on paternal grandparents for support and transportation however at the fact finding on July 1, 2024, paternal grandmother stated they would no longer assist [Mother] with transportation.

33. [Mother] has struggled to maintain a position on whether she wants [Child] returned to her care.

34. As seen in DCS exhibit 1, [o]n May 25, 2024, [Mother] sent a text message stating she did not know how she would be a mom to [Child] if she had no help.

35. As seen in DCS exhibit 1, [o]n May 25, 2024, [Mother] sent a text message stating she was “half tempted to let [paternal grandparents] keep [Child].”

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36. As seen in DCS exhibit 1, [o]n May 20, 2024, [Mother] sent another texting [sic] offering to let [paternal grandparents] keep [Child] because she didn’t see “things getting better.”

(App. Vol. II at 22-5.) Based thereon, the trial court concluded:

6. . . . [Child’s] physical condition is seriously endangered as a result of [Mother’s] and [Father’s] inability, refusal, or neglect to provide [Child] with adequate care and supervision by a safe and stable caregiver when [Mother] and [Father] are financially able to do so and/or as a result of [Mother’s] and [Father’s] failure and refusal to seek reasonable means to do so.

*****

8.[Father] and [Mother] neglected [Child] by failing to seek out the appropriate mental health care and medication management. Said neglect resulted in the removal of [Child] from their care.

9. [Child] is a Child in Need of Services that he is currently not receiving and is unlikely to receive without the coercive intervention of the Court.

10. [Father] is indifferent regarding the care and placement of [Child]. Fact-Finding Hearing show[s] that the coercive intervention of the Court is the only means by which [Father] and [Mother] will participate in the aforementioned services necessary to ensure [Child’s] safety and [Child’s] supervision by a capable and safe caregiver.

(Id. at 27.) Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-2241 | March 7, 2025 Page 12 of 19 [12] Mother argues “the fact that [Mother] had postpartum depression does not

make her unfit to care for her son.” (Mother’s Br. at 15.) However, the trial

court did not indicate Child was a CHINS because of Mother’s postpartum

depression. Nor did the trial court find Mother was “unfit.” As our appellate

courts have reiterated repeatedly, a CHINS adjudication focuses on the needs

and condition of the child, not on the culpability of the parents. N.E., 228

N.E.3d at 476. The trial court was concerned with the impact of Mother’s

mental health on Mother’s ability to care for Child without assistance. Further,

Mother does not challenge the findings regarding the incident in which Father

found her surrounded by knives while indicating she wanted to harm herself or

the finding that Mother refused to care for Child when she is struggling with her

mental health. She also argues that the trial court’s intervention was not

required because she and Child did not need services. However, the trial court

made several findings about how Mother did not consistently take her

medication and did not know how to care for Child. Therefore, we hold that

the trial court’s findings support its conclusion that Child’s physical or mental

health was seriously endangered or seriously impaired by Mother’s inability or

unwillingness to address her mental health problems such that the coercive

intervention of the trial court was needed. See, e.g., id. at 476-7 (child seriously

endangered and needs unmet based on parents’ domestic violence and refusal to

participate in domestic violence services).

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2. Dispositional Order [13] Mother presents two arguments regarding the trial court’s dispositional order –

(1) the trial court improperly referenced the predispositional report because it

had not been entered into evidence, and (2) the court did not make certain

findings in the order. Pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-19-1:

(a) The juvenile court shall complete a dispositional hearing not more than thirty (30) days after the date the court finds that a child is a child in need of services to consider the following:

(1) Alternatives for the care, treatment, rehabilitation, or placement of the child.

(2) The necessity, nature, and extent of the participation by a parent, a guardian, or a custodian in the program of care, treatment, or rehabilitation for the child.

(3) The financial responsibility of the parent or guardian of the estate for services provided for the parent or guardian or the child.

In its dispositional order, the trial court must make findings concerning:

(1) The needs of the child for care, treatment, rehabilitation, or placement.

(2) The need for participation by the parent, guardian, or custodian in the plan of care for the child.

(3) Efforts made, if the child is a child in need of services, to:

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(A) prevent the child’s removal from; or

(B) reunite the child with;

the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian in accordance with federal law.

(4) Family services that were offered and provided to:

(A) a child in need of services; or

(B) the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian;

in accordance with federal law.

(5) The court’s reasons for the disposition.

Ind. Code § 31-34-19-10(a)(1-5). In making the required findings, the trial court

“may incorporate a finding or conclusion from a predispositional report as a

written finding or conclusion upon the record[.]” Ind. Code § 31-34-19-10(b).

2.1 Predispositional Report [14] Mother argues the trial court erred when, in its dispositional order, it referenced

the predispositional report as a source of information in making its decision

because the predispositional report was not entered into evidence. However,

Mother has cited no statute or case law that requires the predispositional report

to be entered into evidence to be considered by the juvenile court during the

dispositional hearing.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-2241 | March 7, 2025 Page 15 of 19 [15] Instead, juvenile courts are required by statute to order preparation of a

predispositional report. Ind. Code § 31-34-18-1(a). Parents, guardians, and

even the child at issue have the ability to submit alternate reports for the court

to consider. Ind. Code § 31-34-18-1(b). Preparation of the report is to include

“individuals who have expertise in professional areas related to the child’s

needs[,]” Ind. Code § 31-34-18-1.1, and result in a list “of resources and

programs available” to assist the child, Ind. Code § 31-34-18-1.3, and the

parents, if necessary. Ind. Code § 31-34-18-2. The report is also to include a

recommendation about the child’s placement. Ind. Code § 31-34-18-4. After a

predispositional report is prepared, it must be submitted to the juvenile court,

which must then provide a copy to all attorneys of record at least forty-eight

hours before the dispositional hearing. Ind. Code § 31-34-18-6. As noted

above, the trial court may, in its dispositional order, “incorporate a finding or

conclusion from a predispositional report as a written finding or conclusion

upon the record[.]” Ind. Code § 31-34-19-10(b). [16] In light of the statutory obligation for a juvenile court to order the preparation

of a predispositional report that is intended to assist the court in entering the

dispositional order, we see predispositional reports being akin to presentence

investigation reports, which must be created before a defendant convicted of a

felony may be sentenced. Ind. Code § 35-38-1-8. Presentence investigation

reports are to contain various forms of information intended to assist the court

in creating the appropriate sentence for a specific defendant and crime, see Ind.

Code § 35-38-1-9, and defendants have the right to submit their own report for

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the court to consider. Ind Code § 35-38-1-11. As with pre-disposition reports,

presentence reports must be provided to the parties prior to the sentencing. Ind

Code § 35-38-1-12. [17] Importantly, our Indiana Supreme Court has referred to presentence

investigation reports as “‘non-evidentiary’ information” that a trial court “can

properly consider” when deciding how to sentence a defendant. Schiro v. State,

479 N.E.2d 556, 559 (Ind. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1036 (1986). We see no

reason not to apply that same logic to the predispositional report. Because the

court was required to order preparation of the report and the report had to be

provided to the parties prior to the dispositional hearing, the report did not need

to be admitted into evidence to be part of the record that the juvenile court

could consider. Mother has not demonstrated the juvenile court erred by

considering the predispositional report.

2.2 Findings [18] Mother argues the dispositional order “does not contain findings of fact[.] It

merely sets out what [Mother and Father] were to do. It does not say the

intervention of the state or the ordered services were necessary.” (Mother’s Br.

at 10) (citation to the record omitted). We address each separately. [19] Contrary to Mother’s first assertion, the order includes findings:

[Child] having been found to be a [CHINS,] the Court, after reviewing the Predispositional Report(s) and hearing statements and evidence presented to the Court regarding the disposition of this cause, finds:

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The needs of [Child] for care, treatment, or rehabilitation are: for [Child’s] parents or caregivers to participate and successfully complete a program of services and oversight to remedy [Child’s] CHINS conditions and fulfill parental responsibilities to [Child].

Participation by the parent, guardian, or custodian in the plan for [Child] is necessary to: ensure [Child] safety and to reunify the family.

(App. Vol. II at 7) (emphases added). [20] Mother’s second assertion is that the trial court erred by not including a finding

that “intervention of the state or the ordered services were necessary.”

(Mother’s Br. at 10). Indiana Code section 31-34-19-10 requires the trial court

to make findings and conclusions regarding the child’s needs for care, the need

for parental participation in that care, any efforts or services already provided to

parents, and the reason for the trial court’s dispositional order. That list does

not include a finding that state intervention was necessary – instead that

conclusion is required when a Child is adjudicated a CHINS pursuant to 31-34-

1-1(2)(B), and the trial court here made that conclusion as part of its CHINS

order. (See App. Vol. II at 27) (Child in need of services “unlikely to receive

without coercive intervention of the Court” and “coercive intervention of Court

is only means by which” parents will participate). As for a finding that the

ordered services were necessary, the court’s findings quoted in our prior

paragraph indicate that services are necessary to protect Child and reunify the

family. Accordingly, Mother has not demonstrated error. See, e.g., M.G. v.

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S.K., 162 N.E.3d 544, 549 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (no error when trial court not

required by statute to make a finding).

Conclusion [21] The juvenile court’s findings supported its adjudication of Child as a CHINS.

Further, the predispositional report did not need to be admitted into evidence at

the hearing to be considered by the juvenile court. Finally, Mother has not

demonstrated error in the dispositional order. Accordingly, we affirm. [22] Affirmed.

Weissmann, J., and Scheele, J., concur.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT David W. Stone IV Anderson, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana John R. Oosterhoff Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

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