Morrison v. Fire Insurance Exchange

Here, it cannot reasonably be disputed that the policyholder intended to inflict an injury on appellant when he punched appellant in the face. 2 See Walker v. Economy Preferred Ins. Co., 909 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995) (recognizing the "inherent contradiction in claiming than an intentional punch in the face was not meant to cause injury"); Woida v. N. Star Mut. Ins. Co., 306 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Minn. 1981) ("The intent [to injure] may be established. . . when the character of an act is such that an intention to inflict injury can be inferred as a matter of law."); Jones v. Norval, 279 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Neb. 1979) (refusing to find a question of fact regarding an assailant's intent to injure because doing so would "simply ignore[ ] reality"). Thus, the policyholder's conduct fits squarely within the language of the insurance policy's intentional-act exclusion, which unambiguously states: "We do not cover bodily injury. . . which . . . is . . . caused intentionally by . . . an insured." The fact that the policyholder may not have intended to cause the full extent of appellant's injuries is irrelevant. See Butler v. Behaeghe, 548 P.2d 934, 939 (Colo. App. 1976) ("[S]ince some injury was intended, it is immaterial that the particular

injury that resulted was not specifically intended."); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Spreen, 343 So. 2d 649, 651 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) ("The fact that [the insured] did not foresee the extent of [the victim's] injuries when he swung at [the victim] . . . is irrelevant . . . . The sole issue is whether [the insured] intended to inflict any harm on [the victim]."); Jones, 279 N.W.2d at 392 ("[I]t makes no difference if the actual injury is more severe or of a different nature than the injury intended."). Accordingly, we ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 3

Footnotes

[2] Wereject appellant's contention that the policyholder's deposition testimony was sufficient to create a question of fact regarding his intent to cause bodily injury. See Wood, 121 Nev. at 732, 121 P.3d at 1031 (indicating that a party opposing summary judgment must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the operative facts" (quotation omitted)); Clark v. Allstate Ins. Co., 529 P.2d 1195, 1196 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) ("[T]he act of striking another in the face is one which we recognize as an act so certain to cause a particular kind of harm that we can say a person who performed the act intended the resulting harm, and his statement to the contrary does nothing to refute that rule of law."). SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A ' J. Hardesty J. Parraguirr cc: Hon. Brent T. Adams, District Judge Nicholas F. Frey, Settlement Judge Piscevich & Fenner Horvitz & Levy LLP Feldman Graf Washoe District Court Clerk

[3] We deny respondent's motion to strike portions of appellant's reply brief, as appellant's reply brief was responding to an argument raised by respondent in its answering brief. NRAP 30(b)(5). SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A