In the Interest of S.M. v. the State of Texas

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-24-00345-CV __________________

IN THE INTEREST OF S.M.

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On Appeal from the 317th District Court Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause No. 23DCFM0895 __________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her three children, S.M., G.P., and A.P. 1 The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that statutory grounds exist for termination of Mother’s parental rights and that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the children. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), (2). 2

1To protect the identity of the children, we use initials to refer to the children.

See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). 2The trial court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that statutory

grounds exist for termination of Father’s parental rights and that termination of his parental rights to S.M. would be in the best interest of the child. Father is not a party to this appeal. The father of G.P. and A.P. is deceased.

Mother’s court-appointed attorney submitted a brief in which her attorney contends that there are no meritorious issues for appeal and that the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 730–31 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (Anders procedures apply in parental-rights termination cases.). The brief presents the attorney’s professional evaluation of the record and explains why no arguable grounds exist to overturn the trial court’s judgment. The attorney represented to the Court that she gave Mother a copy of the Anders brief she filed, notified Mother of her right to file a pro se brief, and provided Mother a copy of the appellate record. The Court notified Mother of her right to file a pro se response and of the deadline for doing so. Mother did not file a response with the Court.

We have independently evaluated the appellate record and the brief filed by Mother’s court-appointed attorney. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988) (citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744); Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d 618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.). Based on our review of the record, we have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal and we agree that the appeal is frivolous and lacks merit. See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827–28 (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the *3 requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d at 619. Therefore, we find it unnecessary to order appointment of new counsel to re-brief this appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order. 3

AFFIRMED.

KENT CHAMBERS Justice

Submitted on March 12, 2025 Opinion Delivered March 13, 2025

Before Johnson, Wright and Chambers, JJ.

3We note that if Mother decides to pursue review by the Supreme Court of

Texas, counsel may satisfy her obligations to Mother “by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards of an Anders brief.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016).