Hyland v. Royal

[2] 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5 * * * 6 KEVIN HYLAND, Case No. 3:24-cv-00544-MMD-CSD 7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. [8] ROYAL, et al., [9] Defendants. [11] 12 Pro Se Plaintiff Kevin Hyland brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 13 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated. (ECF 14 No. 1-1.) On December 5, 2024, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file a fully complete 15 application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP application”) or pay the full $405.00 filing 16 fee on or before January 31, 2025. (ECF No. 3.) Plaintiff was warned the action could be 17 dismissed if he failed to file a fully complete IFP application with all three documents or 18 pay the full $405.00 filing fee for a civil action by that deadline. (Id. at 2.) When that 19 deadline expired, Plaintiff had not filed a fully complete IFP application or paid the full 20 $405.00 filing fee. 21 Instead, Plaintiff filed a motion for appointment of counsel. (ECF No. 4.) The Court 22 considered meaningful alternatives to dismissal and issued another order on February 23 11, 2025, granting Plaintiff another opportunity to submit a fully complete IFP application 24 by March 10, 2025. (ECF No. 5 at 2.) The Court also deferred a decision on the motion 25 for appointment of counsel until the matter of the filing fee was satisfied. (Id.) The latest 26 deadline has now expired, and Plaintiff did not file a fully complete IFP application, pay 27 the full $405.00 filing fee, or otherwise respond. 1 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 2 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where 3 appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, [4] 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s 5 failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439 , 6 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring 7 pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 8 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissing for failure to comply with court order). In 9 determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must 10 consider: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need 11 to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy 12 favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 13 alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th 14 Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone, 833 F.2d at 130). 15 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 16 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Plaintiff’s 17 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal 18 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing 19 a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 20 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of 21 cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 22 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 23 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 24 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983 , 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 25 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 26 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639 , 643 & n.4 (9th 27 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that 1 “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s 2 order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 3 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). 4 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a 5 case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 6 F.2d 1421 , 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and 7 unless Plaintiff either files a fully complete IFP application or pays the $405.00 filing fee 8 for a civil action, the only alternative is to enter a third order setting another deadline. But 9 the reality of repeating two ignored orders is that it often only delays the inevitable and 10 squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here do not indicate that this 11 case will be an exception—there is no hint that Plaintiff needs additional time or evidence 12 that he did not receive the Court’s order. Setting a third deadline is not a meaningful 13 alternative given these circumstances. The fifth factor thus favors dismissal. Having 14 thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they weigh in favor 15 of dismissal. 16 It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on 17 Plaintiff’s failure to file a fully complete IFP application or pay the full $405.00 filing fee in 18 compliance with the Court’s December 5, 2024, and February 11, 2025, orders. 19 It is further ordered that the motion for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 4) is 20 denied as moot. 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 1 Itis further ordered that the Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly 2 || and close this case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Plaintiff 3 || wishes to pursue his claims, Plaintiff must file a complaint in a new case and satisfy the 4 || matter of the filing fee. 5 DATED THIS 28'" Day of March 2025. [6] 8 MIRANDAM.DU- ——“‘“COC™~™~:C~S 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE