(PS) Moore v. Youssefi

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 CHARLESETTA MOORE SR., Case No. 2:24-cv-02448-DAD-CSK 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 CYRUS YOUSSEFI, et al., (ECF Nos. 1, 2) 15 Defendants. [16] 17 Plaintiff Charlesetta Moore Sr. is representing herself in this action and seeks 18 leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.1 (ECF No. 2.) 19 For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s IFP application be denied, 20 and the Complaint be dismissed without leave to amend. 21 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS [22] 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a) provides that the court may authorize the commencement, 23 prosecution or defense of any suit without prepayment of fees or security “by a person 24 who submits an affidavit stating the person is “unable to pay such fees or give security 25 therefor.” This affidavit is to include, among other things, a statement of all assets the 26 person possesses. Id. The IFP statute does not itself define what constitutes insufficient [27] 1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 , Fed. R. 28 Civ. P. 72, and Local Rule 302(c). 1 assets. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). In Escobedo, 2 the Ninth Circuit stated that an affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient 3 where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay court costs and still afford the necessities of 4 life. Id. “One need not be absolutely destitute to obtain benefits of the in forma pauperis 5 statute.” Id. Nonetheless, a party seeking IFP status must allege poverty “with some 6 particularity, definiteness and certainty.” Id. According to the United States Department 7 of Health and Human Services, the current poverty guideline for a household of one (not 8 residing in Alaska or Hawaii) is $15,060.00. See U.S. Dpt. Health & Human Service 9 (available at https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines). 10 Here, Plaintiff’s IFP application does not make the financial showing required by [11] 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a). Plaintiff’s IFP application indicates during the past 12 months, 12 Plaintiff has received “Disability, or worker's compensation payments.” ECF No. 2 at 1 13 ¶ 3. Plaintiff does not disclose the amount she receives in income from this source. 14 Though the Court cannot make a determination whether Plaintiff qualifies for in forma 15 pauperis status based on her current IFP application, the Court will recommend 16 Plaintiff’s IFP application be denied because the action is facially frivolous and meritless. 17 “‘A district court may deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it 18 appears from the face of the proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without 19 merit.’” Minetti v. Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Tripati v. 20 First Nat. Bank & Tr., 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also McGee v. Dep’t of 21 Child Support Servs., 584 Fed. App’x. 638 (9th Cir. 2014) (“the district court did not 22 abuse its discretion by denying McGee's request to proceed IFP because it appears 23 from the face of the amended complaint that McGee's action is frivolous or without 24 merit”); Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965) (“It is the duty of the District 25 Court to examine any application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis to determine 26 whether the proposed proceeding has merit and if it appears that the proceeding is 27 without merit, the court is bound to deny a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma 28 pauperis.”). Because it appears from the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint that this action is 1 frivolous and is without merit as discussed in more detail below, the Court recommends 2 Plaintiff’s IFP motion be denied. 3 II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 4 Even if the Court were to grant Plaintiff’s IFP application, Plaintiff’s Complaint 5 warrants dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)’s required pre-answer screening. 6 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e), the court must screen every in forma pauperis 7 proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to 8 state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a 9 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, [10] 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (2000) (en banc). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an 11 arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In 12 reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court accepts as true the factual 13 allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are clearly baseless or fanciful, and 14 construes those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See id. at 326-27 ; 15 Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 16 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011). 17 Pleadings by self-represented litigants are liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 18 F.3d 338 , 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (liberal construction appropriate even post–Iqbal). 19 However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable 20 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 21 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does 22 not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); 23 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 24 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough 25 facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 . “A 26 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 27 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 28 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 . A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the 1 complaint and an opportunity to amend unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be 2 cured by amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31 ; Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 3 F.3d 336 , 339 (9th Cir. 1996). 4 III. THE COMPLAINT 5 Plaintiff’s Complaint uses the fillable form complaint and names the following 6 Defendants: “Cyrus Youssefi” and “Raisa Cruz.” Compl. at 3 (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff does 7 not assert a basis for federal court jurisdiction. Id. at 4. Plaintiff also does not list a short 8 and plain statement of her claims. Id. at 6. Instead, Plaintiff refers the Court to various 9 attachments, including state court forms such as a “Petition for writ (small claims)” 10 (Compl. at 7-13) and a “Request to Correct or Cancel Judgment and Answer (small 11 claims)” (Compl. at 14-15) that allege the small claims judgment was based on legal 12 error. The Complaint also attaches a civil cover sheet that describes Plaintiff’s causes of 13 action as “bad faith, harassment, discrimination, abuse.” ECF No. 1-1. Although not 14 entirely clear, it appears Plaintiff requests to “correct or cancel [the small claims] 15 judgment.” Compl. at 11. 16 IV. DISCUSSION 17 A. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 18 The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Federal courts are 19 courts of limited jurisdiction and may hear only those cases authorized by federal law. 20 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Jurisdiction is a threshold 21 inquiry, and “[f]ederal courts are presumed to lack jurisdiction, ‘unless the contrary 22 appears affirmatively from the record.’” Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1519 (9th Cir. 23 1993) (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 (1986)); see 24 Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376 , 1380 25 (9th Cir. 1988). Without jurisdiction, the district court cannot decide the merits of a case 26 or order any relief and must dismiss the case. See Morongo, 858 F.2d at 1380. A federal 27 court’s jurisdiction may be established in one of two ways: actions arising under federal 28 law or those between citizens of different states in which the alleged damages exceed 1 $75,000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 , 1332. “Subject-matter jurisdiction can never be waived or 2 forfeited,” and “courts are obligated to consider sua sponte” subject matter jurisdiction 3 even when not raised by the parties. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012). 4 The Complaint does not establish the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See 5 Compl. The Complaint states no basis for federal court jurisdiction, and none is 6 apparent. No federal cause of action is asserted, and no federal claims are suggested by 7 the facts, to the extent the facts are discernible. This action involves a state court small 8 claims matter involving purely state law issues. See Compl. The Complaint also fails to 9 establish diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff fails to state the amount in controversy and does 10 not establish complete diversity of citizenship. On the face of the Complaint, all parties 11 appear to be citizens of California. See Compl. at 3. The Complaint identifies that both 12 Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ addresses are in California. Compl. at 3; see Morris v. 13 Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Section 1332 requires 14 complete diversity of citizenship; each of the plaintiffs must be a citizen of a different 15 state than each of the defendants.”). Because the Court lacks jurisdiction over this 16 action, it should be dismissed without leave to amend. 17 B. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 18 Even if the Complaint raised a federal question or diversity jurisdiction, the 19 Complaint should be dismissed without leave to amend under the Rooker-Feldman 20 doctrine, which prohibits federal district courts from exercising jurisdiction over “a de 21 facto appeal of a state court decision.” Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 22 2013); see Dist. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1986); Rooker v. Fidelity 23 Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923). “[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars suits ‘brought 24 by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered 25 before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and 26 rejection of those judgments.’” Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 27 2010) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indust. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 , 284 28 (2005)). “A de facto appeal exists when ‘a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an 1 allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court 2 judgment based on that decision.’” Bell, 709 F.3d at 897 (quoting Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 3 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003)). If the federal action constitutes a de facto appeal, district 4 courts are barred from deciding not only the issues decided by the state court, but also 5 any other issues that are “inextricably intertwined” with an issue resolved by the state 6 court's decision. Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 7 Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158 ). 8 It is clear that both elements of a de facto appeal under the Rooker-Feldman 9 doctrine are present in Plaintiff’s Complaint. First, Plaintiff asserts the “temporary judge” 10 that decided her small claims action in state court “made a legal error” in applying 11 California law and ruling that Plaintiff was not owed any money by Defendants. Compl. at 12 9-11. Plaintiff is therefore asserting the state court made an erroneous decision in its 13 review of her small claims action. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164 (Rooker-Feldman bar 14 applies when the “federal plaintiff [is] complaining of legal injury caused by a state court 15 judgment because of a legal error committed by the state court”). Second, Plaintiff seeks 16 to have the small claims judgment “correct[ed]” or “cancel[led].” Compl. at 11, 14-15. 17 Plaintiff is therefore seeking relief from the state court’s judgment. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 18 1164. 19 The Court also does not find the narrow exception to the Rooker-Feldman 20 doctrine is applicable. A narrow exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies 21 “where a party alleges extrinsic fraud by an adverse party in procuring a state court 22 judgment…because such a claim does not challenge the state court decision directly.” 23 Benavidez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 933 F.3d 1134, 1143 (9th Cir. 2021). Here, Plaintiff 24 does not make any specific allegation of fraud on the state courts by the other parties in 25 the state court action, rather, Plaintiff alleges in a conclusory fashion that the state court 26 acted in bad faith and erred in its decision and application of state law. See Compl. at 827 9, 11, 14-15. As such, the Court does not find the extrinsic fraud exception is present 28 here. Therefore, Plaintiff’s action is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the 1 Court recommends that this action should be dismissed in its entirety. See deRosier v. 2 Longaker, 551 F. App'x 362 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming dismissal where plaintiff brought 3 “forbidden de facto appeal” that raised constitutional claims “inextricably intertwined” with 4 state court small claims judgment). 5 C. Failure to Comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 6 Plaintiff’s Complaint also does not contain a short and plain statement of a claim 7 as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. In order to give fair notice of the claims 8 and the grounds on which they rest, a plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of 9 particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims. See Kimes v. 10 Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court is unable to discern what causes 11 of action Plaintiff intends to bring. Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading 12 policy, even a pro se litigant’s complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of a 13 claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646 , 649 14 (9th Cir. 1984). The Complaint therefore fails to state a claim on which relief may be 15 granted and is subject to dismissal. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178-80 (9th 16 Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of complaint where “one cannot determine from the 17 complaint who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with enough detail to 18 guide discovery”). 19 D. Leave to Amend 20 In considering whether leave to amend should be granted, the Court finds that the 21 Complaint is without merit and consists entirely of allegations with no basis in law. See 22 generally Compl. The Complaint does not contain facts supporting any cognizable legal 23 claim against Defendants. In light of the Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the 24 Complaint’s deficiencies, granting leave to amend would be futile. The Complaint should 25 therefore be dismissed without leave to amend. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31 ; Cato 26 v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1995). 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 || V. CONCLUSION 2 Based upon the findings above, it is RECOMMENDED that: 3 1. Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) be DENIED; 4 2. The Complaint be DISMISSED without leave to amend; and 5 3. The Clerk of the Court be directed to CLOSE this case. 6 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 7 || Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1). Within 8 | 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file 9 || written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. This document should 10 | be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any 11 | reply to the objections shall be served on all parties and filed with the Court within 14 12 || days after service of the objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time 13 || may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449 , 14 | 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). [15] 16 | Dated: March 28, 2025 Cc (i s □□ 7 CHI SOO KIM 18 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE [19] 20 || 4, moor2448.24