Rose v. State of Nevada

[2] 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5 * * * 6 DOUGLAS ROSE, Case No. 3:24-cv-00279-MMD-CLB 7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. [8] STATE OF NEVADA, et al., [9] Defendants. [11] 12 Plaintiff Douglas Rose brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to 13 redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated in the 14 custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections. (ECF No. 19.) On February 13, 2025, 15 the Court ordered Rose to update his address by March 17, 2025. (ECF No. 23.) That 16 deadline expired without an updated address from Rose, and his mail from the Court is 17 being returned as undeliverable. (ECF No. 24.) 18 I. DISCUSSION 19 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 20 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where 21 appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, [22] 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s 23 failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439 , 24 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring 25 pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 26 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissing for failure to comply with court order). In 27 determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must 28 consider: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need 2 favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 3 alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th 4 Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone, 833 F.2d at 130). 5 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 6 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Rose’s 7 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal 8 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing 9 a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 10 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of 11 cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 12 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 13 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 14 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983 , 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 15 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 16 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639 , 643 & n.4 (9th 17 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that 18 “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s 19 order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 20 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). 21 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a 22 case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 23 F.2d 1421 , 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed without 24 the ability for the Court and the defendants to send Rose case-related documents, filings, 25 and orders, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But 26 without an updated address, the likelihood that the second order would even reach Rose 27 is low, so issuing a second order will only delay the inevitable and further squander the [28] 1 || Court’s finite resources. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given 2 || these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 3 || Ul. CONCLUSION 4 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they 5 || weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without 6 || prejudice based on Douglas Rose’s failure to file an updated address in compliance with 7 || the Court’s February 13, 2025, order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment 8 || accordingly and close this case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed 9 || case. If Rose wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case and 10 || provide the Court with his current address. 11 It is further ordered that Rose’s application to proceed in forma pauperis for an 12 || inmate (ECF Nos. 1, 8) is denied. 13 DATED THIS 31* Day of March 2025. 15 we MIRANDA M. DU 16 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE