Steelman v. Warshaw

1 KM 2 WO — 3 — — 4 — — 5 — 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA — 8 — 9 Matthew Aaron Steelman, No. CV-24-08205-PCT-JAT (DMF) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Johnathen L. Warshaw, et al., 13 Defendants. — 14 — 15 Self-represented Plaintiff Matthew Aaron Steelman, who is confined in the Yavapai 16 County Jail, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1) and 17 an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 7). The Court will dismiss this action. 18 I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee 19 The Court will grant Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. 28 20 U.S.C. § 1915 (a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915(b)(1). The Court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. Id. The statutory filing 22 fee will be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income credited 23 to Plaintiff’s trust account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. 24 § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate government 25 agency to collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula. 26 II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 27 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 28 against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 1 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 2 has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which 3 relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 4 relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 5 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 6 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 7 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the8 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 , 678 9 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 10 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 11 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 12 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, — 13 — 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 14 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 15 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 16 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 17 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679 . Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 18 allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 19 are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681 . 20 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts 21 must “continue to construe [self-represented litigant’s] filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, — 22 — 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a self-represented prisoner] 23 ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. 24 (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 25 If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other 26 facts, a self-represented litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before 27 dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en — 28 — 1 banc). Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, without leave to 2 amend because the defects cannot be corrected. 3 III. Complaint 4 In his three-count Complaint, Plaintiff sues criminal defense attorneys Jonathen 5 Warshaw and Anthony Petty, Deputy Yavapai County Attorney Steven J. Sisneros, and the 6 Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office. Plaintiff seeks review of his criminal case and release 7 from detention.1 8 In Count One, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Warshaw violated his due process rights 9 by waiving Plaintiff’s right to a preliminary hearing and violating several codes of conduct. 10 Plaintiff asserts Defendant Warshaw neglected Plaintiff’s criminal case, ignored Plaintiff’s 11 requests for “inclusion of evidence and for disclosure motions,” and refused to review 12 Plaintiff’s plea with Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Arizona State Bar and 13 Defendant Warshaw “recused himself.” 14 In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Petty violated Plaintiff’s due process 15 rights by failing to notify Plaintiff that he had been appointed to represent Plaintiff, refusing 16 to accept collect calls, and refusing to file Plaintiff’s motions. Plaintiff states the trial judge 17 denied Plaintiff’s motions for change of counsel. 18 In Count Three, Plaintiff alleges “the prosecutor[’s] office . . . willfully covered up 19 the unlawful waiver of [Plaintiff’s] preliminary hearing by pushing through four 20 supervening indictments far past the 10[-]day mark of Rule 5.1(c)(1).” 21 IV. Failure to State a Claim 22 A. Defendants Warshaw and Petty 23 A prerequisite for any relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a showing that the defendant 24 has acted under the color of state law. An attorney representing a criminal defendant does 25 not act under color of state law. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); 26 see also Szijarto v. Legeman, 466 F.2d 864, 864 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (“[A]n — 27 — — 28 — 1 Plaintiff cannot obtain release from custody in a § 1983 action. 1 attorney, whether retained or appointed, does not act ‘under color of’ state law.”). 2 Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Defendants Warshaw and Petty. 3 B. Defendant Sisneros 4 Prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for damages under § 1983 for their 5 conduct in “initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case” insofar as that 6 conduct is “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Buckley 7 v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 270 (1993) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 , 4308 31 (1976)). Immunity even extends to prosecutors for “eliciting false or defamatory 9 testimony from witnesses or for making false or defamatory statements during, and related 10 to, judicial proceedings.” Id.; see also Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 11 2003) (prosecutor absolutely immune from liability for failure to investigate the 12 accusations against a defendant before filing charges; for knowingly using false testimony 13 at trial; and for deciding not to preserve or turn over exculpatory material before trial, 14 during trial, or after conviction); Roe v. City & County of S.F., 109 F.3d 578, 583-84 (9th 15 Cir. 1997) (absolute immunity for decision to prosecute or not to prosecute and for 16 professional evaluation of a witness and evidence assembled by the police). Plaintiff sues 17 Defendant Sisneros for his actions related to initiating prosecution of Plaintiff and 18 presenting the State’s case. Accordingly, he is immune from § 1983 liability and he will 19 be dismissed. 20 C. Defendant Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office 21 The Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office is not a proper defendant because it is a “non22 jural entity.” Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Braillard 23 v. Maricopa County, 232 P.3d 1263, 1269 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010)). In Arizona, the 24 responsibility of operating jails and caring for prisoners is placed by law upon the sheriff. 25 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 11-441 (A)(5), 31-101. The sheriff’s office is simply an 26 administrative creation of the county sheriff to allow him to carry out his statutory duties 27 and is not a “person” amenable to suit pursuant to § 1983. Accordingly, the Yavapai 28 County Sheriff’s Office will be dismissed from this action. 1 D. Younger Abstention 2 The abstention doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), prevents 3 a federal court in most circumstances from directly interfering with ongoing criminal 4 proceedings in state court and applies while the case works its way through the state 5 appellate process. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 6 U.S. 350 , 369 (1989) (“[f]or Younger purposes, the State’s trial-and-appeals process is 7 treated as a unitary system”); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608 (1975) (“Virtually 8 all of the evils at which Younger is directed would inhere in federal intervention prior to 9 completion of state appellate proceedings, just as surely as they would if such intervention 10 occurred at or before trial.”). “[O]nly in the most unusual circumstances is a defendant 11 entitled to have federal interposition by way of injunction or habeas corpus until after the 12 jury comes in, judgment has been appealed from and the case concluded in the state courts.” 13 Drury v. Cox, 457 F.2d 764, 764-65 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). Special circumstances 14 occur “[o]nly in cases of proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state officials 15 in bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid conviction and perhaps in other extraordinary 16 circumstances where irreparable injury can be shown.” Carden v. Montana, 626 F.2d 82 , 17 84 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971)). 18 Plaintiff has failed to show special or extraordinary circumstances indicating that he 19 will suffer irreparable harm if this Court abstains from hearing his claims until after he has 20 a chance to present them to the state courts. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 45-46 ; Carden, 626 21 F.2d at 83-84. Thus, the Court will abstain from interfering in Plaintiff’s ongoing state22 court criminal proceedings and will deny his requests for review of his state criminal case. 23 These are issues that should be raised in his criminal case, not here. See, e.g., Mann v. Jett, — 24 — 781 F.2d 1448, 1449 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (abstention appropriate in § 1983 action 25 for denial of Sixth Amendment right to counsel; plaintiff can adequately litigate his claim 26 in ongoing state criminal proceedings and the potential for federal-state friction is obvious). 27 . . . . 28 . . . . ITIS ORDERED: 2 (1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 7) is granted. 3 (2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government agency, Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is not assessed an initial partial filing 5 | fee. 6 (3) |The Complaint (Doc. 1) is dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28U,S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and the Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly. 8 (4) The Clerk of Court must make an entry on the docket stating that the 9 | dismissal for failure to state a claim may count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (g). 10 (5) The docket shall reflect that the Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a)(3) 11 | and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3)(A), has considered whether an appeal of this decision would be taken in good faith and finds Plaintiff may appeal in forma 13 | pauperis. 14 Dated this 16th day of April, 2025. — 15 — 16 □ 3 — 17 — 18 _ James A. Teil Org Senior United States District Judge — 19 — — 20 — — 21 — — 22 — — 23 — — 24 — — 25 — — 26 — — 27 — — 28 —