(PC) Bennett v. Via Path Technologies

— 1 — — 2 — — 3 — — 4 — — 5 — — 6 — — 7 — 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA — 10 — 11 DAVID BENNETT, No. 2:24-cv-0769-TLN-CKD 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER AND 14 VIA PATH TECHNOLOGIES, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 15 Defendants. — 16 — 17 Plaintiff is a county inmate proceeding without counsel in this civil rights action filed 18 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 19 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1). 20 Plaintiff requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis. As plaintiff has submitted a 21 declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a), his request will be granted. 22 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 23 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the 24 initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. 25 Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding 26 month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded by 27 the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s account 28 exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (b)(2). 1 I. Screening Requirement 2 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 3 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 4 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 5 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 6 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 7 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 8 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 9 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 10 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, — 11 — 490 U.S. at 327 . The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 12 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 13 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227 . 14 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 15 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 16 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 17 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 18 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 19 upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 . “A 20 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 21 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 22 at 678 . When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, 23 the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and 24 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 25 U.S. 232 , 236 (1974). 26 II. Motions to Appoint a Guardian Ad Litem 27 Plaintiff filed two separate motions requesting the appointment of a guardian ad litem 28 (“GAL”) to represent him in this proceeding. ECF Nos. 9, 10. In his first motion, plaintiff 1 requests a GAL because of his mental illness and the Department of State Hospitals’ confiscation 2 of his legal property. ECF No. 9 at 2. The second motion seeks additional time to complete the 3 in forma pauperis application and indicates that plaintiff has been determined to be incompetent 4 to stand trial. ECF No. 10. 5 In a civil case, determinations of competency are governed by Federal Rule of Civil 6 Procedure 17. Allen v. Calderon, 408 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005). Rule 17(c) states that 7 “[t]he court must appoint a guardian ad litem-or issue another appropriate order-to protect a 8 minor or incompetent person who is unrepresented in an action.” The Ninth Circuit has held a 9 party “is entitled to a Rule 17 competency determination when substantial evidence of 10 incompetence is presented.” Allen, 408 F.3d at 1153 . The decision whether to appoint a 11 guardian ad litem is “left to the sound discretion the trial court.” Davis v. Walker, 745 F.3d 1303 , 12 1310 (9th Cir. 2014). Although the procedure for determining competency is determined by 13 federal law, the substantive standard for competency is taken from state law where plaintiff is 14 domiciled. See In re County of Orange, 784 F.3d 520, 523-24 (9th Cir. 2015); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 17(b)(1). Under California law, a party is incompetent “if he or she lacks the capacity to 16 understand the nature or consequences of the proceeding, or is unable to assist counsel in the 17 preparation of the case.” Golden Gate Way, LLC v. Stewart, Case No. 09-cv-04458 DMR, 2012 18 WL 4482053 , at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2012) (citation omitted). 19 In considering plaintiff’s motions for a GAL, the court notes that plaintiff is no longer in 20 custody at the Department of State Hospitals. A review of the Yolo County Superior Court 21 docket further indicates that plaintiff has been deemed competent to stand trial and has a jury trial 22 scheduled for June 23, 2025 on his state criminal charges.1 In the present action, plaintiff has 23 been able to successfully complete the in forma pauperis application without the assistance of a — 24 — 1 See People v. Bennett, No. CR2023-0488 (Yolo County Superior Court), available at — 25 — https://portal-cayolo.tylertech.cloud/Portal/Home/WorkspaceMode?p=0. This court takes judicial notice of this state court docket. See Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 954-55 (9th Cir. 2010) — 26 — (finding judicial notice is appropriate for state court dockets and pleadings that are available on 27 the internet). — 28 — 1 GAL. Based on the current state of the record, the undersigned finds that there is not substantial 2 evidence to demonstrate that plaintiff is currently incompetent to proceed pro se. He has 3 demonstrated his understanding of the nature of the present § 1983 action by raising 4 constitutional issues in his complaint, and he has completed court forms without the assistance of 5 a guardian ad litem. Therefore, the undersigned recommends denying plaintiff’s motions for the 6 appointment of a guardian ad litem. 7 III. Allegations in the Complaint 8 In his complaint, plaintiff challenges the Monroe Detention Center’s policy that denies 9 “equal access to educational, religious, and mental health material” on the tablet computers 10 provided to inmates. Plaintiff specifically alleges that the incentive program to earn free music 11 on the tablets requires him to listen and watch Christian rap music videos and educational 12 courses. As plaintiff is not religious, he contends that this violates his First Amendment right to 13 freedom of religion and his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection as a pretrial detainee. 14 He further alleges that the jail policy is discriminatory because there are no free educational or 15 religious programs on the tablets that are not Christian based. Based on his mental health 16 disability, plaintiff contends that the jail policy also amounts to a violation of the Americans With 17 Disabilities Act (“ADA”) because he needs educational programs on the tablets to maintain his 18 mental health. 19 Plaintiff sues Via Path Technologies, Touch Pay Online.com, Gettingout.com, Google, the 20 Monroe Detention Center, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 21 (“CDCR”), and Real Life Ministries. Plaintiff indicates that Google, Via Path Technologies, and 22 Touch Pay Online.com are the contractors responsible for the tablet program used at the Monroe 23 Detention Center. 24 In a pleading labeled as a “supplemental complaint,” plaintiff seeks to add a defendant to 25 this action. ECF No. 14. Plaintiff asserts that the rapper Drake conspired with Via Path 26 Technologies to violate his constitutional rights. ECF No. 14. 27 ///// 28 ///// 1 IV. Legal Standards 2 A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 3 “Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting under color 4 of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 5 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). “Persons” who may be sued under Section 1983 are “state and local 6 officials sued in their individual capacities, private individuals and entities which acted under 7 color of state law, and local governmental entities.” Vance v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 8 993, 995-96 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 9 B. Linkage Requirement 10 The civil rights statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 11 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 12 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 13 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a 14 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 15 in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 16 causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 17 Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must 18 link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of 19 plaintiff's federal rights. 20 C. Monell Liability 21 Municipalities cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of their 22 employees. Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 585 at 691, 694 (1978). “Instead, it is 23 when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those 24 whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the 25 government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694. Municipalities are considered 26 “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and therefore may be liable for causing a constitutional 27 deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178 , 28 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). To properly plead a Monell claim based on an unconstitutional custom, 1 practice, or policy, plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he possessed a constitutional right of which 2 he was deprived; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) such policy amounts to deliberate 3 indifference to plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) the policy is the moving force behind the 4 constitutional violation. See Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432 , 438 5 (9th Cir. 1997). The municipal policy at issue must be the result of a “‘longstanding practice or 6 custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity.’” Price 7 v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ulrich v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 308 8 F.3d 968 , 984-85 (9th Cir. 2002)). The proper defendant in a Monell action is the municipal 9 entity itself and not the specific county agency or department that implemented the policy at 10 issue. See Vance v. Cty. Of Santa Clara, 928 F.Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 11 D. First Amendment Establishment Clause 12 “The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any 13 showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which 14 establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving 15 individuals or not.” Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962). In determining whether a 16 challenged government law violates the Establishment Clause, courts review 17 “whether the challenged law or conduct has a secular purpose, whether its principal or primary 18 effect is to advance or inhibit religion, and whether it creates an excessive entanglement of 19 government with religion.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (citation omitted). 20 E. Equal Protection 21 The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause requires the State to treat all 22 similarly situated people equally. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 , 439 23 (1985) (citation omitted). “To state a claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a 24 plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against him 25 based upon his membership in a protected class.” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th 26 Cir. 2003) (citing Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)). Alternatively, a 27 plaintiff may state an equal protection claim if he shows similarly situated individuals were 28 intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate government 1 purpose. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam) (citations 2 omitted). As it relates to the practice of religion, a prisoner must be provided with “a reasonable 3 opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who 4 adhere to conventional religious precepts.” Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (per curiam). 5 V. Analysis 6 The court has reviewed plaintiff’s complaint and finds that it fails to state a claim upon 7 which relief can be granted under federal law. Plaintiff has not identified a proper defendant in 8 this action. First, the Monroe Detention Center is not a proper party. A local jail is not a 9 “person” subject to suit under Section 1983. See Powell v. Cook Cty. Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757 , 758 10 (N.D. Ill. 1993). To the extent that plaintiff identifies CDCR as a defendant, he does not link this 11 state agency to any of the asserted constitutional violations because he is not a state prisoner. The 12 remaining named defendants are not the governmental entity responsible for the creation of the 13 jail’s policy concerning tablet usage. As a result, they are not the proper defendant in a Monell 14 action challenging the jail’s policy that led to an alleged violation of plaintiff’s constitutional 15 rights. For all these reasons, plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, 16 grant leave to file an amended complaint. 17 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions 18 complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. 19 Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, in his amended complaint, plaintiff must allege in 20 specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. 21 § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the 22 claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Furthermore, vague and conclusory 23 allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of 24 Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 25 Finally, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 26 make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 27 complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 28 general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 1 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no 2 longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 3 complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 4 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 5 1. Plaintiff’s motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF Nos. 11, 13) are 6 granted. 7 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. All fees 8 shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the Director of the California 9 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith. 10 3. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed. 11 4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended 12 complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil 13 Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the docket 14 number assigned this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” 15 5. Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a 16 recommendation that this action be dismissed. 17 6. The request to seal plaintiff’s mental health records (ECF No. 15) is granted. 18 7. The Clerk of Court shall file plaintiff’s mental health records from the Monroe 19 Detention Center under seal and nunc pro tunc to January 30, 2025 when they were electronically 20 submitted to the court. 21 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s motions to appoint guardian ad litem 22 (ECF Nos. 9, 10) be denied. 23 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 24 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(l). Within fourteen days 25 after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 26 objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 27 “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 28 objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 1 | parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 2 || appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). — 3 — 4 | Dated: May 28, 2025 a / dip i 5 CAROLYNK. DELANEY 6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE — 7 — — 8 — — 9 — — 10 — 1] Th/benn0769. 14+motions — 12 — — 13 — — 14 — — 15 — — 16 — — 17 — — 18 — — 19 — — 20 — — 21 — — 22 — — 23 — — 24 — — 25 — — 26 — — 27 — — 28 —