Eschelbach v. Dons II

[3] 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 * * * 7 SEAN S. ESCHELBACH, Case No. 2:24-cv-02131-RFB-NJK 8 Plaintiff, ORDER 9 v. 10 JAYMIE DONS II, et al., 11 Defendants. [12] 13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 Plaintiff Sean S. Eschelbach brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to 15 redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered at High Desert State Prison. ECF No. 16 1-1. On April 18, 2025, this Court ordered Eschelbach to update his address by May 19, 2025. 17 ECF No. 7. That deadline expired without an updated address or any other response from 18 Eschelbach, and his mail from the Court is being returned as undeliverable. [19] 20 II. DISCUSSION 21 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 22 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 23 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may 24 dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See 25 Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply 26 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal 27 Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In 28 determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) 1 the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its 2 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 3 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 4 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. 5 U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987)). 6 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 7 Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Eschelbach’s claims. The 8 third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a 9 presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered 10 by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). 11 The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly 12 outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 13 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used 14 to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish 15 v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983 , 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 16 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 17 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639 , 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive 18 force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives 19 prior to disobedience of the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., the “initial granting of 20 leave to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” 21 by Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing 22 a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 23 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). 24 This action cannot realistically proceed without the ability for the Court and the defendants 25 to send Eschelbach case-related documents, filings, and orders, and litigation cannot progress 26 without Eschelbach’s compliance with the Court’s orders. The only alternative is to dismissal is to 27 enter a second order setting another deadline for Eschelbach to file his current address with the 28 Court. But without an updated address, the likelihood that the second order would even reach 1 | Eschelbach is low, so issuing a second order will only delay the inevitable and further squander the Court’s finite resources. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these 3 | circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. [4] 5 I. CONCLUSION 6 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they weigh in 7 | favor of dismissal. 8 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED without prejudice based 9 | onEschelbach’s failure to file his updated address in compliance with this Court’s April 18, 2025, 10 | Order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other 11 | documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Eschelbach wishes to pursue his claims, he 12 | must file a complaint in a new case. 13 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Eschelbach’s application to proceed in forma pauperis 14 | (ECF No. 1) is DENIED as moot. 15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that that Eschelbach may move to reopen this case and 16 | vacate the judgment by filing a motion for reconsideration of this order. In this motion, Eschelbach 17 | is required to explain what circumstances the led his to failure to file his updated address with the 18 | Court. If the Court finds there to be good cause or a reasonable explanation therein, the Court will 19 | reopen the case and vacate the judgment. [20] 21 | DATED: May 29, 2025. 22 XN RICHARD F. BOULWARE, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE [28] -3-