198 June 4, 2025 No. 522
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. AUBREY RYAN QUINN-WARD, Defendant-Appellant. Washington County Circuit Court 22CR42733; A182601
Eric Butterfield, Judge. Submitted April 21, 2025. Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Rond Chananudech, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant. Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Hellman, Judge, and O’Connor, Judge. O’CONNOR, J. Affirmed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 198 (2025) 199
O’CONNOR, J. Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for first- degree online sexual corruption of a child, ORS 163.433.1 He assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his motion for judg- ment of acquittal. He argues that the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the state does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he “solicited” a child to engage in sexual conduct, as the legislature defined that term in ORS 163.431(5). The state responds that the trial court did not err because the evidence was legally sufficient, for the rea- sons explained in State v. Lewis, 292 Or App 1, 423 P3d 129, rev den, 363 Or 744 (2018). We agree that the trial court did not err. Thus, we affirm. We review for legal error a trial court’s interpreta- tion of a statute when a defendant’s challenge to the suffi- ciency of the evidence turns on the statute’s meaning. Id. at 6. We interpret the statute to identify the legislature’s intent by examining the text and context and reviewing the legislative history that we find helpful. State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). We then determine whether a rational factfinder viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state could have found the ele- ments of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Lewis, 292 Or App at 6. The legislature defined “solicit” in ORS 163.432 to mean “to invite, request, seduce, lure, entice, persuade, pre- vail upon, coax, coerce or attempt to do so.” ORS 163.431(5). Defendant argues that those words “connote affirma- tively seeking out as opposed to being a passive receiver of attention.”
1 ORS 163.433(1) provides: “A person commits the crime of online sexual corruption of a child in the first degree if the person violates ORS 163.432 and intentionally takes a substantial step toward physically meeting with or encountering the child.” ORS 163.432 provides, in relevant part: “(1) A person commits the crime of online sexual corruption of a child in the second degree if the person is 18 years of age or older and: “(a) For the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of the person or another person, knowingly uses an online communication to solicit a child to engage in sexual contact or sexually explicit conduct; and “(b) Offers or agrees to physically meet with the child.”
200 State v. Quinn-Ward
We rejected a similar argument in Lewis. In that case, the defendant had responded to a personal adver- tisement placed in the escort section of a website by an undercover police officer in which the officer posed as a 17- or 18-year-old named Sam. Lewis, 292 Or App at 3. Sam told the defendant that she was actually 15 years old, and he asked Sam over text message whether he could “head over” or “come over” to her house to engage in sexual con- tact. We held that the evidence in the light most favorable to the state established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had solicited the child, because the “defendant’s text messages asking ‘[c]an I head over?’ and ‘I’m good to come over now?’ were requests to engage in sexual contact; that is, they were solicitations within the meaning of [ORS 163.431(5)].” Id. at 6. Here, like in Lewis, an undercover police officer cre- ated a fake profile online. The fake profile was for a 22-year- old woman, Hannah. Defendant and Hannah connected online. Hannah told defendant that she was actually 15 years old and in high school. After learning Hannah’s age, defendant repeatedly asked her for pictures; messaged her about engaging in sexual contact; called her on the phone to discuss whether to bring condoms; called a second time to ask if Hannah wanted alcohol or marijuana; offered to go to Hannah’s house to engage in sexual contact; and drove to the address Hannah provided. As in Lewis, a factfinder viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly used an online communication to solicit a child to engage in sexual contact or sexually explicit conduct, in vio- lation of ORS 163.432, even though Hannah initiated some of the conversations about sexual contact. Affirmed.