(PC) Houston v. Kuppinger

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 JIMMY LEE HOUSTON, Case No. 2:25-cv-1357-JDP (P) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 P. KUPPINGER, et al., 15 Defendants. [17] 18 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against 19 P. Kuppinger and J. Hunt, correctional officers at CSP-Sacramento, alleging violations of the 20 Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments and other state law torts. ECF No. 7.1 The allegations fail 21 to state a claim. Plaintiff may, if he chooses, file an amended complaint that addresses the 22 deficiencies noted herein. I will grant plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF 23 No. 6, and deny his remaining request as moot, ECF No. 2. [25] 1 Plaintiff filed his original complaint on May 13, 2025, see ECF No. 1, and filed an [26] amended complaint on May 30, 2025, see ECF No. 7. Because amended complaints supersede 27 original complaints, see Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896 , 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), I am only considering the allegations contained in the most recently filed complaint. I 28 note, though, that both complaints appear to be the same. 1 Screening and Pleading Requirements 2 A federal court must screen the complaint of any claimant seeking permission to proceed 3 in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e). The court must identify any cognizable claims and 4 dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon 5 which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 6 relief. Id. 7 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 9 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 10 require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 11 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 12 possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 13 identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024 , 14 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 15 give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257 , 1264 16 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 17 The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 18 U.S. 519 , 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it 19 appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 20 would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). 21 However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 22 of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251 , 23 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 24 Analysis 25 Plaintiff alleges that on December 16, 2022, CSP-Sacramento was conducting an 26 institutional mass search of inmate cells. ECF No. 7 at 3. He alleges that Kuppinger and Hunt 27 searched his cell. Id. After the search, Hunt signed a cell search worksheet and noted that he had 28 taken plaintiff’s headphones, cable wires, and trash. Id. According to plaintiff, Hunt and 1 Kuppinger also took his 15” television, but they failed to note that on the search worksheet or to 2 explain why it was taken. Id. 3 Plaintiff alleges that Kuppinger and Hunt violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth 4 Amendment rights when they confiscated his television. Id. at 4. He also alleges that this 5 conduct violated California Code of Rules and Regulations (“CCR”) Title 15 §§ 3191(c)(1), 6 3193(b), 3414(1), 3287(a)(2), (3), (4), and (5)(d), and 3278. Id. at 4-5. He further contends that 7 Kuppinger and Hunt inflicted intentional emotional distress (“IIED”) and harassed him and 8 discriminated against him because he has a serious mental illness, and that their conduct was in 9 violation of “Coleman v. Schwarzenegger and Heck v. CDCR.” Id. at 5. Finally, he alleges that 10 defendants’ actions violated the California Tort Claims Act. Id. 11 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim. First, plaintiff cannot adequately allege a 12 Fourth Amendment violation because the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable 13 searches and seizures do not apply to prison cell searches. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 , 14 526 (1984) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply 15 within the confines of the prison cell.”); see also Payne v. Hedgpeth, No. 09-cv-00127-GSA, [16] 2009 WL 1286518 , at *12 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2009) (dismissing plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment 17 claim based on a search and seizure of plaintiff’s personal property because inmates are not 18 protected by the Fourth Amendment within the confines of their prison cell (citing Hudson, 468 19 U.S. at 536)); Giba v. Cook, 232 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1186 (D. Or. 2002) (“It is well-settled that a 20 state prisoner has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell and is not entitled to Fourth 21 Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.”). 22 Additionally, to the extent plaintiff brings his claims under the Fifth Amendment, it is 23 unclear under which constitutional provision he brings his claim. If plaintiff is bringing this 24 claim under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, he fails to state a claim. Under the 25 Takings Clause, “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.” 26 U.S. Const. amend. V. The Takings Clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth 27 Amendment. Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194 , 1198 (9th Cir. 1998). 28 Importantly, the Takings Clause is only implicated when the alleged taking was for a public use. 1 Scott v. Jackson Cnty., 297 F. App’x 623, 625-26 (9th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff does not allege that 2 his television was taken for public use, and so he fails to state a claim under the Takings Clause. 3 To the extent plaintiff brings a Fifth Amendment due process challenge against the taking 4 of his television, he still fails to state a claim “because the due process and equal protection 5 components of the Fifth Amendment apply only to the federal government.” Sanchez v. City of 6 Fresno, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1098 (E.D. Cal. 2012). Plaintiff’s claims are against state, not 7 federal, actors, meaning he cannot bring a Fifth Amendment due process claim against these 8 defendants. 9 Plaintiff also fails to adequately allege an Eighth Amendment violation. The Eighth 10 Amendment protects inmates from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, [11] 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). To sufficiently allege an Eighth Amendment violation, a 12 plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of something “sufficiently serious,” and that the 13 deprivation occurred with a deliberate indifference. Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th 14 Cir. 2010). A deprivation is “sufficiently serious” when it results “in the denial of the minimal 15 civilized measures of life’s necessities.” Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 813 (9th Cir. 2009) 16 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). These life necessities are things such as shelter, 17 food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and safety. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726 , 731 (9th Cir. 18 2000). “[R]outine discomfort inherent in the prison setting” is insufficient to establish a 19 “sufficiently serious” deprivation. Id. Here, case law does not suggest that seizure of a television 20 qualifies as a “sufficiently serious” deprivation under the Eighth Amendment, as the seizure does 21 not implicate the deprivation of plaintiff’s food, shelter, medical care, or other basic life 22 necessities. While the Eighth Amendment protects inmates from cell searches that are conducted 23 for “calculated harassment,” Vigliotto v. Terry, 873 F.2d 1201 , 1203 (9th Cir. 1989), plaintiff 24 does not allege that the cell search was conducted for this reason. Accordingly, he fails to allege 25 an Eighth Amendment violation. 26 Finally, plaintiff vaguely alleges that defendants harassed and discriminated against him 27 because he has a serious mental illness, in violation of “Coleman v. Schwarzenegger and Heck v. 28 CDCR.” As best I can discern, plaintiff brings a claim based on Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 1 (2011), where the Supreme Court addressed varying constitutional concerns related to California 2 inmates with serious mental and physical health issues. The Supreme Court was asked to 3 determine whether a remedial order issued by a three-judge panel was consistent with the PLRA, 4 and whether the panel had authority to order the remedy selected to address these constitutional 5 concerns. See id. at 539-45 . Plaintiff’s allegations of an erroneously seized television bear little 6 apparent connection to the holding in Brown, and he fails to state a cognizable claim. 7 In light of the foregoing, plaintiff has failed to adequately plead any federal claim. 8 Therefore, the court declines to address the remaining state law claims of violations of CCR Title 9 15, IIED, or the California Torts Claim Act. See Decker v. Shasta Cnty., No. 2:16-cv-1179-KJN, [10] 2017 WL 3601382 , *3, (E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2017) (“Moreover, absent federal claims, this action 11 cannot proceed solely on the basis of state law claims. Although the court may exercise 12 supplemental jurisdiction of state law claims, a plaintiff must first have a cognizable claim for 13 relief under federal law.”). 14 Accordingly, plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim. I will allow 15 plaintiff a chance to amend his complaint before recommending that this action be dismissed. 16 Plaintiff should also take care to add specific factual allegations against each defendant. If 17 plaintiff decides to file an amended complaint, the amended complaint will supersede the current 18 one. See Lacey, 693 F.3d at 907 n.1. This means that the amended complaint will need to be 19 complete on its face without reference to the prior pleading. See E.D. Cal. Local Rule 220. Once 20 an amended complaint is filed, the current one no longer serves any function. Therefore, in an 21 amended complaint, as in the original, plaintiff will need to assert each claim and allege each 22 defendant’s involvement in sufficient detail. The amended complaint should be titled “Second 23 Amended Complaint” and refer to the appropriate case number. If plaintiff does not file an 24 amended complaint, I will recommend that this action be dismissed. 25 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 26 1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 6, is GRANTED. 27 Plaintiff’s remaining request to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, is DENIED as moot. 28 2. Plaintiff’s complaint, ECF No. 7, is DISMISSED with leave to amend. 1 3. Within thirty days from service of this order, plaintiff shall file either (1) an amended 2 | complaint or (2) notice of voluntary dismissal of this action without prejudice. 3 4. Failure to timely file either an amended complaint or notice of voluntary dismissal may 4 | result in the imposition of sanctions, including a recommendation that this action be dismissed 5 | with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 6 5. The Clerk of Court shall send plaintiff a complaint form with this order. [7] g IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: _ June 9, 2025 q-—— 10 JEREMY D. PETERSON i UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE [28] &K