(PC) Fleming v. Gates

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 MICHAEL FLEMING, No. 1:24-cv-01439-SAB (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT 13 v. JUDGE TO THIS ACTION 14 S. GATES, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF 15 ACTION FOR FAILURE TO STATE A Defendants. COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR RELIEF [16] (ECF No. 9) [19] Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action filed pursuant to 42 20 U.S.C. § 1983 . [21] Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed February 14, 2025. [22] I. [23] SCREENING REQUIREMENT [24] The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a [25] governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The [26] Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally [27] “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that [28] 1 “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 3 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 4 pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 5 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 6 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 7 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate 8 that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v. 9 Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 10 Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings 11 liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 12 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be 13 facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer 14 that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 ; Moss 15 v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant 16 has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s 17 liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ; Moss, 572 F.3d 18 at 969 . 19 II. 20 COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS 21 The Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint as true only for the purpose of the 22 screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 . 23 On April 22, 2023, officer E. Lopez escorted Plaintiff to the shower. After Plaintiff was 24 done showering, he was placed in handcuffs. In order to be handcuffed, inmates must crouch 25 down while putting one leg on the slippery shower ledge at the same time as holding or trying to 26 hold the shower stuff in one arm. There should have been a shower mat and Gates had 27 knowledge of the possibility someone could fall in the shower due to the lack of a floor mat. 28 Officer Lopez asked Plaintiff what happened and Plaintiff told him that he fell twice and 1 was left on the floor for a few minutes. Officer Lopez then activated the alarm. Plaintiff was left 2 on the floor until sergeant Monje and a few other officers arrived. Sergeant Monje did not 3 immediately tell the officers to get Plaintiff off the shower floor, while handcuffed with the water 4 running. Plaintiff had to get “mad” and ask Monje if officers were going to pick him up. Once 5 Plaintiff was picked up, Monje refused to switch his handcuffs from the back to waist chains. 6 Plaintiff’s handcuffs were not replaced until he walked to the administrative segregation unit, and 7 Plaintiff has reason to believe that the bone bruise was due to this fact. Plaintiff went to five 8 sessions of physical therapy even though he still experienced discomfort. 9 The Office of Appeals granted Plaintiff’s grievance finding the lower-level response did 10 not clearly explain the reasons for the denying the claim. 11 III. 12 DISCUSSION 13 A. Conditions of Confinement/Slippery Floors 14 The “ ‘treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is 15 confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.’ ” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 16 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to “ensure that inmates receive 17 adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care,” and to “ ‘take reasonable measures to 18 guarantee the safety of the inmates.’ ” Id. 19 To establish an Eighth Amendment claim on a condition of confinement, such as an 20 excessive risk to health or safety, a prisoner-plaintiff must show: (1) an objectively, sufficiently 21 serious, deprivation, and (2) that the official was, subjectively, deliberately indifferent to the 22 inmate's health or safety. Id. at 834. The objective prong may be satisfied by the existence of a 23 serious medical need if the failure to address that need “could result in further significant injury 24 or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 25 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant is deliberately indifferent if he knows that 26 an inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take 27 reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The defendant must not only “be aware of 28 facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but 1 he “must also draw the inference.” Id. There must be “harm caused by the indifference,” although 2 the harm does not need to be substantial. See Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 . 3 Case law is clear that a single defective condition – such as a slippery floor, a leaking 4 roof, or a broken oven – by itself without additional conditions contributing to a threat to an 5 inmate’s safety does not create an objectively sufficient and serious condition to implicate the 6 Eighth Amendment. Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit has 7 held that claims regarding slippery floors, without more, “do not state even an arguable claim for 8 cruel and unusual punishment.” Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 1989), 9 superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 , 1130-31 (9th 10 Cir. 2000). The Ninth Circuit repeatedly has affirmed dismissals of a pro se prisoner’s action, 11 where the prisoner complained only of a leaking roof and the resulting accumulation of water on 12 a cell floor. See, e.g., Pickett v. Nooth, No. 17-35305, 2017 WL 4541428 , at *1 (9th Cir. July 28, 13 2017) (dismissing appeal as frivolous where plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that he slipped and fell in 14 a puddle caused by a leaky roof); Winnop v. Deschutes Cnty., 471 F. App’x 602 (9th Cir. 2012) 15 (same); Gilman v. Woodford, 269 F. App’x 756 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The district court properly 16 determined that the allegations in Gilman’s second amended complaint failed to demonstrate that 17 prison officials’ conduct in maintaining the prison roof and floors violated the Eighth 18 Amendment.”). 19 The Ninth Circuit finds conditions such as a wet and slippery floor to be “minor safety 20 hazards,” which do not violate the Eighth Amendment unless there is some “exacerbating 21 condition[ ] ... which render[s] [the prisoner] unable to ‘provide for [his] own safety.’ ” Osolinski, [22] 92 F.3d at 938 . In order to state a cognizable claim for relief, there must be some exacerbating 23 condition in addition to the slippery floor. See Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124 , 1129 (9th Cir. 24 1998) (“[s]lippery floors without protective measures could create a sufficient danger to warrant 25 relief” when an inmate alleges facts that exacerbate the danger resulting from such conditions). 26 For example, in Frost, the prisoner-plaintiff was forced to traverse a wet and slippery shower 27 floor while on crutches, and thus was unable to balance himself as well as an uninjured person. 28 See Frost, 152 F.3d at 1129. The Ninth Circuit held that the failure to “provide handicapped1 accessible accommodations for a pretrial detainee who wears a leg cast and relies on crutches,” 2 combined with the risk posed by the wet shower floor, was sufficient to state an Eighth 3 Amendment violation. Id. 4 Here, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to give rise to a claim for deliberate indifference based on 5 his slip and fall. Although Plaintiff declares that he slipped and fell on water and E. Lopez left 6 him lying on the floor, Plaintiff fails to set forth sufficient factual allegations to demonstrate that 7 any Defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his safety. Indeed, Plaintiff acknowledges 8 that Lopez activated the alarm which prompted additional officers and sergeant Monje to respond. 9 Further, Plaintiff’s allegations that he was left on the floor for a few minutes fails to demonstrate 10 deliberate indifference. See, e.g., Berry v. Bunnell, 39 F.3d 1056, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994) (per 11 curiam) (in the context of his fall and the surrounding circumstances, a two-hour delay was 12 “minor” and plaintiff did not show it “caused any harm.”) 13 Moreover, the fact that Plaintiff was handcuffed when he fell and sergeant Monje refused 14 switch to waist chains after he fell, does not give rise to a claim for deliberate indifference. The 15 Ninth Circuit has stated that forcing a prisoner to wear handcuffs and shackles in the shower does 16 not state an Eighth Amendment claim, “[e]ven if the floors of the shower are slippery” because “ 17 ‘slippery prison floors ... do not state even an arguable claim for cruel and unusual punishment.’ ” 18 LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 19 639, 641 (9th Cir. 1989) ), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 20 203 F.3d at 1130. Courts tend to find “that poorly maintained surfaces, [and] wet floors,” as 21 Plaintiff alleges here, “do not pose a substantial risk of serious harm supporting a constitutional 22 violation and are merely negligence claims.” Pauley v. California, No. 2:18-cv-2595 KJN P, [23] 2018 WL 5920780 , at *4, n.1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2018). 24 Lastly, Plaintiff’s conclusory claim that Gates had knowledge of the possibility someone 25 could fall in the shower due to the lack of a floor mat, fails to give rise to a cognizable claim as it 26 is nothing more than a potential claim for negligence. The failure to place a mat on the slippery 27 shower floor does not constitute an objectively serious deprivation that denied Plaintiff the 28 minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also Walker v. Reed, [1] 104 F.3d 156 , 157–58 (8th Cir.1997) (inmate’s allegation that he “slipped and fell” because of 2 water on the floor of his barracks bathroom, injuring his arm and shoulder, “alleges only a claim 3 for negligence,” and did not state a constitutional claim); Kirby v. Kentucky Correctional 4 Psychiatric Center, 198 F.3d 246 (Table), 1999 WL 1021736 at *2 (6th Cir. Nov.2, 1999) 5 (“Defendants acted, at most, with mere negligence or lack of due care by failing to provide 6 shower mats or railing”) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992); Wilson v. Seiter, [7] 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)); Davis v. Reilly, 324 F.Supp.2d 361, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (failure to 8 provide shower mats does not rise to level of constitutional violation). However, even assuming 9 Gates’s conduct constituted an objectively serious deprivation, Plaintiff alleges no facts showing 10 that he acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. The circumstances alleged do not 11 support an inference that Defendant Gates intended to harm Plaintiff, or that he understood that 12 the slippery floor posed a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff. Plaintiff's allegations 13 support no more than negligence, and therefore do not state a claim for relief under the Eighth 14 Amendment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976) (“An accident, although it may 15 produce added anguish, is not on that basis alone to be characterized as wanton infliction of 16 unnecessary pain” necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference). 17 In sum, there are no insufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that Plaintiff 18 possessed some exacerbating condition in addition to the slippery floor, that he was unable to 19 observe the water, or was otherwise unable to provide for his own safety. 20 B. Further Leave to Amend 21 If the Court finds that a complaint or claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, 22 the court has discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend. Leave to amend should be 23 granted if it appears possible that the defects in the complaint could be corrected, especially if a 24 plaintiff is pro se. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 , 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Cato v. 25 United States, 70 F.3d 1103 , 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A pro se litigant must be given leave to 26 amend his or her complaint, and some notice of its deficiencies, unless it is absolutely clear that 27 the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” (citation omitted). 28 However, if, after careful consideration, it is clear that a claim cannot be cured by amendment, 1 | the Court may dismiss without leave to amend. Cato, 70 F.3d at 1105-06. 2 In light of Plaintiff's failure to provide additional information about his claims despite 3 | specific instructions from the Court, further leave to amend would be futile and the first amended 4 | complaint should be dismissed without leave to amend. Hartmann v. CDCR, 707 F.3d 1114 , 1130 5 | (9th Cir. 2013) (“A district court may deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile.”’). 6 | Here, Plaintiffs allegations fail to give rise to a constitutional violation, and Plaintiff has 7 || previously been given leave to amend on two separate occasions. Accordingly, further leave to 8 | amend the complaint should be denied. 9 IV. 10 ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION 11 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall randomly 12 | assign a District Judge to this action. 13 Further, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the instant action be dismissed for failure 14 | to state a cognizable claim for relief, without further leave to amend. 15 This Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge 16 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1). Within fourteen (14) 17 | days after being served with this Findings and Recommendation, Plaintiff may file written 18 | objections with the Court, limited to 15 pages in length, including exhibits. The document should 19 | be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Plaintiff is 20 | advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on 21 | appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 22 | 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). [23] 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. OF. ee 95 | Dated: _ June 12, 2025 STANLEY A. BOONE 26 United States Magistrate Judge