Stachow v. Nagappan

1 WO — 2 — — 3 — — 4 — — 5 — 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA — 8 — 9 Julia Katharina Stachow, No. CV-24-03180-PHX-DGC 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 Bharathiraja Nagappan, 13 Defendant. — 14 — 15 Plaintiff Julia Stachow asserts a breach of contract claim against Defendant 16 Bharathiraja Nagappan, her former spouse. Doc. 1. Plaintiff has filed a motion for default 17 judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b). Doc. 12. For the reasons 18 stated below, the Court will grant the motion in part and require further briefing on 19 damages. 20 I. Background. 21 Plaintiff immigrated to the United States from Germany in December 2019 on a 22 temporary visa. Doc. 1 ¶ 14. On September 1, 2020, the couple retained an immigration 23 attorney to help secure Plaintiff lawful permanent residence status in the United States. 24 Id. ¶ 15. The parties submitted the applicable forms to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 25 Services (“USCIS”) – a Form I-130 Petition for Alien Relative, a Form 485 Application to 26 Adjust Status, and a Form I-864 Affidavit of Support. Docs. 1-1, 1-2, 1-3. Defendant 27 agreed in the Affidavit of Support to provide Plaintiff with “any support necessary” to 28 ensure her an income of at least 125% of the Federal Poverty Guidelines for her household 1 size. Docs. 1 ¶ 31, 1-1 at 7. USCIS approved the Petition for Alien Relative and the 2 Application to Adjust Status on April 23, 2021, and Plaintiff became a lawful permanent 3 resident of the United States. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 27-28. 4 The parties separated in January 2023 and were divorced on July 1, 2024. 5 Doc. 1 ¶¶ 38-39. Plaintiff claims she has been unemployed since the couple’s separation 6 and has not been provided any financial assistance from Defendant as required by his 7 Affidavit of Support. Id. ¶¶ 42-43. 8 Plaintiff brought this breach of contract action to enforce Defendant’s obligations 9 in the Affidavit. Doc. 1. After several unsuccessful attempts to serve Defendant with 10 process, the Court authorized Plaintiff to serve Defendant using U.S. certified mail and 11 email. Docs. 6, 7. Plaintiff served Defendant on January 31, 2025. Doc. 8. 12 Defendant did not respond to the complaint and Plaintiff sought entry of default on 13 February 25, 2025. Doc. 9. The Clerk entered default against Defendant two days later. 14 Doc. 10. On March 19, 2025, Plaintiff informed the Court that the copy of the summons 15 and complaint served via certified mail were returned, but there was no indication the email 16 service was unsuccessful. Doc. 11. The same day, Plaintiff filed the present motion for 17 default judgment. Doc. 12. Defendant did not move to set aside his default, but has filed 18 a response to Plaintiff’s motion on March 20, 2025. Doc. 16. 19 II. Federal Court Jurisdiction. 20 Defendant argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction because the amount in 21 controversy is less than $75,000 and the parties are both Arizona residents. Doc. 16 at 1. 22 But Plaintiff asserts federal question jurisdiction, not diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. 23 § 1331; Doc. 1 at 2. By executing the Affidavit of Support, Defendant agreed to the 24 obligations and legal enforceability set forth in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 25 codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1183a, and “to submit to the jurisdiction of any Federal or State 26 court” any case seeking to enforce the Affidavit of Support. Doc. 1-1 at 8; see 8 U.S.C. § 27 1183a; Flores v. Flores, 590 F. Supp. 3d 1373 , 1379 (W.D. Wash. 2022). The Court has 28 federal question jurisdiction over this case. 1 III. Default Judgment. 2 After the clerk enters default, the district court may enter default judgment pursuant 3 to Rule 55(b)(2). The court's “decision whether to enter a default judgment is a 4 discretionary one.” Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). The Court 5 should consider seven factors: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits 6 of the claims, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the amount of money at stake, (5) 7 the possibility of factual disputes, (6) whether default is due to excusable neglect, and (7) 8 the policy favoring decisions on the merits. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th 9 Cir. 1986). 10 Plaintiff asks the Court to enforce Defendant’s obligations under the Affidavit of 11 Support. Doc. 12 at 16-17. Defendant does not contest the validity of the Affidavit or his 12 legal obligations to Plaintiff, but disputes the amount of damages claimed. The Court finds 13 that default judgment on liability is appropriate. 14 A. Prejudice to the Defendants 15 The first Eitel factor weighs in favor of default judgment. Judgment is appropriate 16 where a defendant fails to answer a complaint because otherwise the plaintiff “would be 17 denied the right to judicial resolution of the claims presented, and would be without other 18 recourse for recovery.” Hawks v. Seery, No. CV-21-00092-PHX-DGC, 2021 WL 5162536 , 19 at *2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 5, 2021). Plaintiff asserts that Defendant evaded service and chose 20 not to litigate this case after receiving notice. Doc. 12 at 12. Defendant refutes the evasion 21 accusations (Doc. 16 at 2), but has not filed a motion to set aside default so he can file an 22 answer and defend this action on the merits. Without default judgment, Plaintiff likely 23 would have no recourse and would suffer prejudice. 24 B. Merits of the Claim and Sufficiency of the Complaint 25 The second and third Eitel factors also favor default judgment. These factors often 26 are “analyzed together and require courts to consider whether a plaintiff has stated a claim 27 on which it may recover.” Best W. Int'l Inc. v. Ghotra Inc., No. CV-20-01775-PHX-MTL, — 28 — 2021 WL 734585 , at *3 (D. Ariz. Feb. 25, 2021) (citation omitted). 1 Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to support her breach of contract claim. For 2 such a claim, a plaintiff must identify a contract, breach, and damages. Thunderbird 3 Metallurgical, Inc. v. Ariz. Testing Labs., 423 P.2d 124, 126 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967). 4 Plaintiff pleads that Defendant entered into an enforceable contract with the United States 5 government when he signed the Affidavit of Support and that she is an intended third-party 6 beneficiary. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 56-57, 59; see Doc. 1-1. She also alleges that she is living below 7 the income threshold that triggers Defendant’s obligation to provide support, resulting in 8 economic damages. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 61-63. Plaintiff asserts a plausible claim for breach of 9 contract. 10 C. Amount of Money at Stake 11 Under the fourth Eitel factor, the Court considers the amount of money at stake and 12 the seriousness of Defendant’s alleged conduct. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 13 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2002). If the money at stake is disproportionate or 14 inappropriate, default judgment is disfavored. See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. 15 Streeter, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1071 (D. Ariz. 2006). The money at stake in this case is 16 relatively modest — 125% of the poverty line each year since January 2023, less any 17 income Plaintiff received. Defendant agreed to pay this amount to Plaintiff, if necessary, 18 when he signed the Affidavit of Support. Doc. 1-1 at 7. This factor favors default 19 judgment. 20 D. Possibility of Factual Disputes 21 The fifth Eitel factor also favors default judgment. Defendant has not filed an 22 answer, and there is no factual dispute about the valid and enforceable contract Defendant 23 signed. 24 E. Excusable Neglect 25 The sixth Eitel factor considers whether a defendant’s default is due to excusable 26 neglect. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472 . Defendant does not seek to file an answer and litigate 27 this case on the ground that he failed to respond to the complaint through excusable neglect. 28 This factor is therefore not relevant. 1 F. Policy Considerations 2 Default judgment is generally disfavored because “[c]ases should be decided upon 3 their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Id. But the mere existence of Rule 55(b), 4 which expressly authorizes default judgment, indicates that this consideration is not 5 dispositive. PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Defendant does not dispute that the 6 Affidavit of Support is valid and enforceable. See Doc. 16. The purpose of such an 7 affidavit is to “prevent the admission to the United States of any alien who ‘is likely at any 8 time to become a public charge.” Erler v. Erler, 824 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2016) (citations 9 omitted). Enforcing the obligations in such affidavits comports with public policy and 10 favors default judgment. 11 Weighing the Eitel factors, the Court finds that default judgment on Defendant’s 12 legal obligations under the Affidavit of Support is appropriate. 13 IV. Damages. 14 Plaintiff has the burden of proving the amount of her damages. Nguyen v. Embry 15 Health of Arizona LLC, No. CV-23-00422-PHX-KML, 2025 WL 1342819 , at *4 (D. Ariz. 16 May 8, 2025). The Court need not accept factual allegations in the complaint when 17 determining damages. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b); Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560. A party in default 18 may present evidence on the question of damages, but may not refute liability. Rubicon 19 Glob. Ventures, Inc. v. Chongqing Zongshen Grp. Imp./Exp. Corp., 226 F. Supp. 3d 1141 , 20 1147 (D. Or. 2016) (citing Henry v. Sneiders, 490 F.2d 315 (9th Cir. 1974)). 21 Defendant is obligated to support Plaintiff at 125% of the federal poverty line. 22 Doc. 1-1 at 7. Plaintiff shows that the federal poverty line for her situation was $14,580 in 23 2023 and $15,060 in 2024, making Defendant’s support obligation $18,225 in 2023 and 24 $18,825 in 2024, for a total of $37,050. Doc. 1 at 8. Plaintiff acknowledges that the amount 25 owed by Defendant is reduced by her annual income each year. Doc. 12 at 8. She claims 26 she had no income in 2023, and attaches two W-2s for work in 2024 at Ralph Lauren and 27 MD Helicopters, showing total earnings of $3,631.72. Docs. 14-1, 14-2. Subtracting this 28 amount, Plaintiff claims she is entitled to damages of $33,418 for 2023 and 2024, plus 1 interest. Docs. 1 at 12, 12 at 9. She also seeks damages for January 1, 2025 to date, an 2 order of specific performance for future payments, and attorneys’ fees. Doc. 1 at 11-12. 3 Defendant disputes Plaintiff’s damages claims. He asserts she had income in 2023, 4 pointing to non-cash bank deposits totaling almost $40,000 as discussed in the parties’ 5 divorce decree. Doc. 16 at 2. Plaintiff responds that the divorce court “may have double6 counted a $50,000 loan” from Plaintiff’s mother, which does not constitute income (Doc. 7 17 at 6), and provides the loan agreement between her and her mother as well as her bank 8 statements. See Docs. 18, 18-1, 18-2. After reviewing the record, it is unclear to the Court 9 which deposits Defendant is referring to and what income source he alleges they are from. 10 Defendant also asserts that he pays for the mortgage and other expenses on the 11 marital home at around $3,500 a month. Doc. 16 at 2. Defendant provides only six months 12 of bank statements to support this claim, but based on the divorce decree, it appears he has 13 been making these payments since the parties’ separation in January 2023. Docs. 1-4 at 3, 14 18-3 at 2. Defendant argues that he is entitled to offset payments owed under the Affidavit 15 of Support because Plaintiff continues to reside in the marital home while it remains on the 16 market, and implies that his continued payments on the home fulfill his support obligations. 17 Doc. 16 at 2. Plaintiff responds that Defendant asked the divorce court to revise the parties’ 18 divorce decree, which ordered the sale of the marital home and 50/50 division of the 19 proceeds. Doc. 17 at 4. The divorce court issued a revised decree on June 4, 2025, ordering 20 Plaintiff to vacate the marital home and awarding ownership of the property and associated 21 liabilities to Defendant. Doc. 21-1 at 2. But there is nothing in the original decree or the 22 revised decree that states Defendant was required to pay the mortgage on the home from 23 the parties’ separation in January 2023 until the revised decree becomes effective on July 24 15, 2025. If equity in the marital home is divided 50/50, it follows that mortgage payments 25 should be as well, and Defendant’s continued payment of all mortgage liability while 26 Plaintiff continues to reside in the home may constitute support. 27 Defendant also claims that Plaintiff owes him money under the division of debts in 28 the divorce decree. Doc. 16 at 3. But he does not cite any legal authority to suggest the 1 || Court should take this into account when assessing damages owed under the Affidavit. 2 Moreover, Defendant argues that he should not be responsible for supporting || Plaintiff, who agreed during their divorce proceedings that she could sustain herself if she worked for minimum wage. Doc. 16 at 2. But Plaintiffs earning potential is irrelevant to || Defendant’s legal obligation under the Affidavit of Support. The Affidavit requires || Defendant to provide Plaintiff with any support necessary to maintain her at an income that 7\| 1s at least 125% of the applicable poverty guideline, and provides that the obligation of 8 || support ends only under certain specified conditions, none of which have occurred to date. Doc. 1-1 at 7-8; see also Rimas v. Eugenio, No. 23-CV-02832-HSG, 2024 WL 1975455 , at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2024) (“While the Ninth Circuit has not opined directly on this 11 || issue, the great weight of district and sister circuit authority supports the proposition that ‘traditional contract defenses’ — of which mitigation is one — ‘cannot be used to avoid 13 || support obligations’ arising out of a support affidavit.”). 14 The Court cannot determine Plaintiffs damages based on the somewhat incomplete || record. Within 20 calendar days of this order, each party shall file a memorandum || addressing the issues identified above and providing additional relevant evidence. 17 IT IS ORDERED: 18 1. Plaintiffs motion for default judgment (Doc. 12) is granted in part. The || Court finds that Defendant had a legal obligation to support Plaintiff in the amount of 201) $18,225 in 2023 and $18,825 in 2024 if Plaintiff was unable to do so herself, and has an 21 || ongoing obligation to support her in the amount of 125% of the federal poverty level unless || one of the specified terminating events has occurred. 23 2. The parties shall have until July 3, 2025 to file memoranda on damages. 24 Dated this 13th day of June, 2025. D anal 6 Dank 0 Cnr phtl David G. Campbell 38 Senior United States District Judge