AGUILAR GARCIA v. Bondi

[3] 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN JOSE DIVISION [7] 8 RICARDO AGUILAR GARCIA, Case No. 3:25-cv-05070 9 Plaintiff-Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING EX PARTE 10 v. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; AND ORDER TO SHOW 11 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY CAUSE WHY PRELIMINARY GENERAL PAM BONDI et al., INJUNCTION SHOULD NOT ISSUE [12] Defendants-Respondents. [Re: Dkt. No. 2] [14] 15 Before the Court is Petitioner-Plaintiff Ricardo Aguilar Garcia’s Ex Parte Motion for 16 Temporary Restraining Order. Dkt. No. 2 (“Mot.”). Petitioner-Plaintiff simultaneously filed his 17 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order against 18 Respondents-Defendants Acting Field Office Director Polly Kaiser, Acting Director of 19 Immigration and Customs Enforcement Todd M. Lyons, Secretary of the Department of 20 Homeland Security Kristi Noem, and United States Attorney General Pam Bondi on June 14, 21 2025, seeking an order temporarily enjoining the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), 22 their agents, employees, and successors in office from re-detaining him until such time as he has 23 had an opportunity to challenge his re-detention before a neutral decisionmaker. Id. at 1. 24 Petitioner-Plaintiff states that he was released from immigration custody nearly six years ago, but 25 fears that there is a substantial and immediate risk that he will be re-detained at an in-person 26 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) check-in appointment this weekend. Id. 27 For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Petitioner-Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Motion for 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Petitioner-Plaintiff was born in Mexico and has lived in the United States since he was 3 approximately three years old. Dkt. No. 1 (“Petition”) ¶ 12. He is now thirty-one years old and 4 lives in Hayward, California. Id. ¶ 17. He was previously granted status under the Deferred 5 Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) Program from 2013 to 2015, and has recently filed a 6 new application for DACA status. Id. ¶¶ 26–27. Petitioner-Plaintiff is married to Heaven Ramos, 7 a U.S. citizen, and is a stepfather to Ms. Ramos’s five-year-old child. Id. ¶ 20. He supports Ms. 8 Ramos in her academic studies and in her struggle with a long-term, chronic illness that is 9 exacerbated by stress. Id. ¶ 21. 10 In 2018, Petitioner-Plaintiff was charged as removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 11 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Id. ¶ 18 . After he was ordered removed by the Immigration Judge and his 12 appeal was denied by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), as was his motion to reopen 13 before the BIA, the Ninth Circuit denied his petitions for review on both BIA decisions. Id. 14 ¶¶ 18–19. But the Ninth Circuit granted his motion to stay issuance of the mandate in that case for 15 ninety days from May 23, 2025, to allow him to seek reopening of his case before the BIA based 16 on newfound eligibility for relief from removal. Id. ¶ 19 ; see Petition Ex. F. 17 After being held in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody during 2018 18 and 2019, Petitioner-Plaintiff was released on bond under an order of supervision. Id. ¶ 22 . Since 19 his release, he has been out of custody and has complied with reporting requirements. Id. ¶ 2 . 20 Petitioner-Plaintiff received notification at 2:18 p.m. on Friday, June 13, 2025 that he was required 21 to report to the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (“ISAP”) office in person in San 22 Francisco on either Saturday, June 14, 2025 or Sunday, June 15, 2025. Id. ¶ 3 . No reason was 23 given and ISAP did not respond to Petitioner-Plaintiff or his counsel’s inquiries regarding the 24 purpose of the check-in. Id. Petitioner-Plaintiff received the notice to report while driving his 25 wife to the emergency room for a health concern. Id. ¶ 33 . Thereafter, he filed the present 26 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and Ex Parte Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, 27 seeking to enjoin Respondents-Defendants from re-detaining him at his upcoming in-person 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is identical to the standard for 3 issuing a preliminary injunction. See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 , 1159 n.3 (9th Cir. 4 2017) (“[T]he legal standards applicable to TROs and preliminary injunctions are substantially 5 identical.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). An injunction is a matter of equitable 6 discretion and is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that 7 the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 8 U.S. 7 , 22 (2008). And “a TRO ‘should be restricted to . . . preserving the status quo and 9 preventing irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a [preliminary injunction] hearing 10 and no longer.’” E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 932 F.3d 742, 779 (9th Cir. 2018) 11 (quoting Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 12 70, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974)). 13 A plaintiff seeking preliminary injunctive relief must establish “[1] that he is likely to 14 succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary 15 relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public 16 interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. “[I]f a plaintiff can only show that there are serious questions 17 going to the merits—a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the merits—then a preliminary 18 injunction may still issue if the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor, and the 19 other two Winter factors are satisfied.” Friends of the Wild Swan v. Weber, 767 F.3d 936 , 942 20 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[W]hen the Government is the 21 opposing party,” the final two factors “merge.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). 22 III. DISCUSSION 23 As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that the requirements for issuing a temporary 24 restraining order without notice set out in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1) are met in this 25 case. Petitioner-Plaintiff’s attorney has set out specific facts showing that “immediate and 26 irreparable injury, loss, or damage” may result before the adverse party can be heard in opposition 27 and has stated that counsel attempted to contact the Civil Division Chief at the U.S. Attorney’s 1 Habeas Petition and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. See Dkt. Nos. 1-1 & 2 at 2. 2 The Court finds that Petitioner-Plaintiff has shown at least that there are “serious questions 3 going to the merits” and that “the balance of hardships tips sharply” in his favor. Weber, 767 F.3d 4 at 942 . Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 5 no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. 6 amend. V. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of 7 physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 8 U.S. 678 , 690 (2001) (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). Courts have 9 previously found that individuals released from immigration custody on bond have a protectable 10 liberty interest in remaining out of custody on bond. See Ortiz Vargas v. Jennings, No. 20-cv11 5785, 2020 WL 5074312 , at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2020); Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 12 963, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“Just as people on preparole, parole, and probation status have a 13 liberty interest, so too does Ortega have a liberty interest in remaining out of custody on bond.”); 14 Romero v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-02508, 2022 WL 1443250 , at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022) (“[T]his 15 Court joins other courts of this district facing facts similar to the present case and finds Petitioner 16 raised serious questions going to the merits of his claim that due process requires a hearing before 17 an IJ prior to re-detention.”); Jorge M. F. v. Wilkinson, No. 21-cv-01434, 2021 WL 783561 , at *2 18 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021). 19 For similar reasons as those discussed in the aforementioned cases, this Court finds that the 20 three factors relevant to the due process inquiry set out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 21 (1976)—“the private interest that will be affected by the official action,” “the risk of an erroneous 22 deprivation . . . and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” 23 and “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 24 burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail,” id. at 335—support 25 requiring a pre-detention hearing for Petitioner-Plaintiff. Petitioner-Plaintiff has a substantial 26 private interest in remaining out of custody on bond, which “enables him to do a wide range of 27 things open to persons” who are free from custody, such as working, living at home, and “be[ing] 1 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). There is also a risk of erroneous deprivation that 2 the additional procedural safeguard of a pre-detention hearing would help protect against. And, 3 like other Courts in this district, the Court concludes that the government’s interest in re-detaining 4 Petitioner-Plaintiff without a hearing is “low,” particularly in light of the fact that Petitioner5 Plaintiff has long complied with his reporting requirements. See Jorge M.F., 2021 WL 783561 , at 6 *3; Ortega, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 970. 7 Petitioner-Plaintiff is also likely to suffer immediate and irreparable harm in the absence of 8 preliminary relief. The Ninth Circuit has recognized “irreparable harms imposed on anyone 9 subject to immigration detention” including “the economic burdens imposed on detainees and 10 their families as a result of detention, and the collateral harms to children of detainees whose 11 parents are detained.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 995 (9th Cir. 2017). Both risks are 12 present here, where Petitioner-Plaintiff has a stepchild and spouse who both depend upon him for 13 support. Dkt. No. 1-1, Declaration of Raha Jorjani in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas 14 Corpus and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“Jorjani Decl.”) ¶¶ 12, 21–22. Indeed, as of 15 the time of filing of the motion, Petitioner-Plaintiff was at the emergency room with his wife. Id. 16 ¶ 12. In addition, “[i]t is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights 17 ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th 18 Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). 19 Finally, the balance of the equities and the public interest, which merge in light of the fact 20 that the government is the opposing party, tip sharply in Petitioner-Plaintiff’s favor. “[T]he public 21 has a strong interest in upholding procedural protections against unlawful detention, and the Ninth 22 Circuit has recognized that the costs to the public of immigration detention are staggering.” Jorge 23 M. F., 2021 WL 783561 , at *3 (cleaned up) (quoting Ortiz Vargas, 2020 WL 5074312 , at *4, and 24 then quoting Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 996 ); see also Preminger v. Principi, 422 F.3d 815, 826 (9th 25 Cir. 2005) (“Generally, public interest concerns are implicated when a constitutional right has 26 been violated, because all citizens have a stake in upholding the Constitution.”). Without the 27 requested injunctive relief, Petitioner-Plaintiff might be abruptly taken into ICE custody, 1 harm potentially imposed on Respondents-Defendants is minimal—a mere short delay in detaining 2 Petitioner-Plaintiff, should the government ultimately show that detention is intended and 3 warranted. Moreover, a party “cannot reasonably assert that it is harmed in any legally cognizable 4 sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations.” Zepeda v. U.S. Immigr. & Nat. Serv., 753 5 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983). 6 Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS Petitioner-Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary 7 Restraining Order. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, a court “may issue a preliminary 8 injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount that the 9 court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been 10 wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). The rule “invests the district court 11 ‘with discretion as to the amount of security required, if any,’” and the court “may dispense with 12 the filing of a bond when it concludes there is no realistic likelihood of harm to the defendant from 13 enjoining his or her conduct.” Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 919 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 14 Barahona–Gomez v. Reno, 167 F.3d 1228 , 1237 (9th Cir. 1999)). In this case, in light of the 15 minimal risk of harm to the government, the Court determines that security is not required. 16 IV. ORDER 17 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner-Plaintiff’s Ex Parte 18 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order is GRANTED to preserve the status quo pending further 19 briefing and a hearing on this matter. Respondents-Defendants are ENJOINED AND 20 RESTRAINED from re-detaining Petitioner-Plaintiff without notice and a hearing. This Order 21 shall remain in effect until Monday, June 23, 2025 at 5:00 p.m. The Petition for Writ of Habeas 22 Corpus, Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, and this Order SHALL be served on 23 Respondents-Defendants such that they receive actual notice by no later than Monday, June 16, 24 2025 at 2:00 p.m. 25 Respondents-Defendants are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE in-person at a hearing in the 26 courtroom of the assigned Judge, or as otherwise ordered by that Judge, on Monday, June 23, 27 2025 at 1:00 p.m. why a preliminary injunction should not issue. Respondents-Defendants shall ] p.m. No reply shall be filed. [2] 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. [4] 5 || Dated: June 14, 2025 at 1:15 p.m. ° i i H LABSON FREEMAN, as Duty Judge 7 United States District Judge [11] a 12 [17] Z 18