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Earl A. Adams, Jr. v. Chevron USA, Inc.
EARL A. ADAMS, JR., ET AL. * NO. 2019-CA-0210
VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL CHEVRON USA, INC., ET AL. * FOURTH CIRCUIT * STATE OF LOUISIANA *******
CONSOLIDATED WITH: CONSOLIDATED WITH:
EARL ADAMS, ET AL NO. 2019-C-0198
VERSUS
CHEVRON USA, INC., ET AL
CONSOLIDATED WITH: CONSOLIDATED WITH:
EARL ADAMS, ET AL NO. 2019-C-0199
VERSUS
CHEVRON USA, INC., ET AL
CONSOLIDATED WITH: CONSOLIDATED WITH:
EARL A. ADAMS, JR., ET AL NO. 2019-C-0708
VERSUS
CHEVRON, U.S.A., ET AL
CONSOLIDATED WITH: CONSOLIDATED WITH:
EARL A. ADAMS, JR., ET AL. NO. 2020-CA-0069
VERSUS
CHEVRON USA, INC.
CONSOLIDATED WITH: CONSOLIDATED WITH:
ELDA LONG, ALTHEA SMART, NO. 2020-CA-0070 EARL HYNES, EDWARD WILLIAMS, KENNETH MOUILLE, MALCOLM HARRIS,
JR., AND MERLE MCINTYRE
VERSUS
JOSEPH GREFER AND THE ESTATE OF CAMILLE GREFER
APPEAL FROM CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH NO. 2002-19308, DIVISION “D” Honorable Nakisha Ervin-Knott, Judge ****** JAMES F. MCKAY CHIEF JUDGE ****** (Court composed of Chief Judge James F. McKay III, Judge Terri F. Love, Judge Roland L. Belsome)
ROBERT G. HARVEY LAW OFFICE OF ROBERT G. HARVEY, SR., APLC 600 North Carrollton Avenue New Orleans, Louisiana 70119 -and- DARLEEN MARIE JACOBS THE LAW OFFICES OF DARLENE M JACOBS 823 St. Louis Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70112 -and- ALAN DEAN WEINBERGER HANGARTNER, RYDBERG & TERRRELL Hancock Whitney Center, Suite 310 New Orleans, Louisiana 70112 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT -and- DONALD C. DOUGLAS, JR. THE DOUGLAS LAW FIRM, LLC 1070 West Causeway Approach, Suite B Mandeville, Louisiana 70471 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/ APPELLANTS
EBERHARD D. GARRISON PETER N. FREIBERG KEVIN HUDDELL LINDSAY E. REEVES CHRISTOPHER W. SWANSON JONES SWANSON HUDDELL & GARRISON, LLC 601 Poydras Street, Suite 2655 New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
REVERSED AND REMANDED
FEBRUARY 24, 2021
JFM TFL RLB This case arises out of the contamination of a parcel of land with naturally
occurring radioactive material (NORM), resulting from of oil-field supply cleaning
activities.1 The neighboring landowners filed suit against several defendants
involved in the oil-field supply cleaning activities, as well as the landowners of the
contaminated property. Eventually, the plaintiffs2 entered into settlement
agreements with most of the defendants with the exception of the landowners. 3
The landowners did not participate in the settlements, did not contribute to the
settlements, and were not parties to the settlements.
Several years after the plaintiffs had entered into the settlement agreements
with other defendants, the landowner defendants, on June 20, 2018, filed a motion
to enforce settlement agreement against the plaintiffs. A hearing on the motion
took place on August 30, 2018. After considering the motions, supporting
memoranda, and the exhibits thereto and opposition, as well as the oral arguments
1 For a more detailed history regarding the background of this case, one may wish to consult Grefer v. Alpha Technical, 02-1237 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/8/07), 965 So.2d 511, cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1014, 128 S.Ct. 2054(mem), 170 L.Ed.2d 810. 2 The named plaintiffs in this case are Elda Long, Althea Smart, Earl Hynes, Edward Williams, Kenneth Mouille, Malcom Harrison, and Merle McIntyre. 3 The named defendants in this case are Joseph Grefer and Camille Grefer.
presented by counsel, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion and dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice on September 11, 2018. It is from this judgment that the plaintiffs now appeal.4
The issue before this Court is whether the trial court erred in preventing the plaintiffs from offering evidence of the intent of the actual settling parties regarding the scope of the settlement and in dismissing the plaintiffs’ case.
The issue presented by this appeal is a question of law. Questions of law are reviewed de novo, with judgment rendered “ ‘on the record, without deference to the legal conclusions of the tribunals below.’ ” Holly J. Smith Architects, Inc. v. St. Helena Congregate Facility, Inc., 06-0582, p. 9 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So.2d 1037, 1045; quoting Louisiana Municipal Association v. State, 04-0227, p. 35 (La. 1/19/05), 893 So.2d 809, 836. “We are also mindful that when legal error committed by the trial court interdicts the fact-finding process, the appellate court must conduct a de novo review of the record.” Kennedy-Fagan v. Estate of Graves, 07-1062, p. 11 (La.App. 1 Cir. 7/21/08), 993 So.2d 255, 264; citing Levy v. Bayou Industrial Maintenance Services, Inc., 03-0037, p. 7 ((La.App. 1 Cir. 9/26/03), 855 So.2d 968, 974.
When a dispute arises as to the scope of a compromise agreement, extrinsic evidence can be considered to determine exactly what differences the parties intended to settle. Maggio v. Parker, 17-1112, p. 4 (La. 6/27/18), 250 So.3d 874,
4 This consolidated appeal involves the judgment enforcing the settlement agreement, a judgment compelling discovery, and several writs. However, based on the statements made by plaintiffs/appellants’ counsel, on the date of oral argument in this Court, it seems only the judgment enforcing the settlement agreement is now being appealed.
879 (internal citations omitted). In Maggio, the Louisiana Supreme Court explained and affirmed a long history of cases which established, recognized, and applied an exception to the “four corners” rule when interpreting settlement agreements. Id. at 879; See Brown v. Drillers, Inc., 93-1019 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d 741. A compromise settles only those differences that the parties clearly intended to settle. Maggio at 879. See La. C.C. art. 3076. Accordingly, the plaintiffs in the instant case contend that a clearly established exception to the “four corners” rule allows them to offer evidence.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that the landowner defendants are not parties to any settlement agreement with the plaintiffs. It is also undisputed that the landowner defendants did not contribute to any settlement agreement with the plaintiffs. As the landowner defendants are never mentioned in the four corners of any of the settlement agreements, the only way they could have been dismissed is by reference to something outside the agreements themselves.
Under these circumstances, the trial court should have considered the evidence of the intent of the actual parties to the settlement concerning whether the landowner defendants would or would not be released. To not do so interdicted the fact-finding process. Therefore, the district court erred as a matter of law in refusing to allow the plaintiffs an opportunity to offer evidence of the intent of the settling parties, i.e., a contradictory hearing where the parties could have called witnesses and introduced other extrinsic evidence to establish the true intent of the parties to the settlement.
For the above and foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and this case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.