Sepulveda v. Valtoha Inc.

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 RICHARD SEPULVEDA, Case No. 2:24-cv-01497-DC-CSK 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS DECLINING SUPPLEMENTAL 13 v. JURISDICTION & DENYING MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGEMENT 14 VALTOHA INC., et al., (ECF Nos. 11, 15) 15 Defendants. [16] 17 On May 28, 2024, Plaintiff Richard Sepulveda filed this action against Defendants 18 Valtoha, Inc., individually and dba (“doing business as”) Patterson Chevron, and 19 Nardeep Sandhu, individually and dba Patterson Chevron, alleging the following causes 20 of action: (1) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 pursuant to [21] 42 U.S.C. § 12101 , et seq. (“ADA”); (2) violation of California’s Health and Safety Code 22 § 19955, et seq. (“Health and Safety Code § 19955”); (3) violation of California’s 23 Disabled Person Act pursuant to California Civil Code §§ 54, 54.1, and 54.3 (“Disabled 24 Person Act’); and (4) violation of California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act pursuant to California 25 Civil Code §§ 51 and 51.5 (“Unruh Act”).1 Compl. ¶¶ 18-71 (ECF No. 1). These claims 26 stem from alleged barriers Plaintiff encountered while he visited Patterson Chevron, [27] 1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 , Fed. R. 28 Civ. P. 72, and Local Rule 302(c). 1 which is owned and operated by Defendants. Compl. ¶¶ 4-5. On July 17, 2024, Plaintiff 2 requested a Clerk’s entry of default as to all Defendants, which was entered on July 18, 3 2024. (ECF Nos. 9, 10.) On September 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for default 4 judgment and set a hearing for October 29, 2024. (ECF No. 11.) On October 16, 2024, 5 after Defendants had failed to oppose the motion, the Court vacated the hearing date 6 and provided Defendants one final opportunity to oppose the motion before taking the 7 motion under submission. (ECF No. 13.) To date, Defendants have not responded or 8 appeared in this action. 9 On May 8, 2025, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why the Court should 10 not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. (ECF No. 15.) 11 On May 9, 2025, Plaintiff filed a timely response to the Court’s order to show cause. 12 (ECF No. 16.)2 For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends declining to exercise 13 supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims (Claim 2, for violation of 14 California’s Health and Safety Code § 19955, et seq.; Claim 3, for violation of California’s 15 Disabled Person Act pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54 , 54.1, and 54.3; and Claim 4, for 16 violation of California’s Unruh Act), these state law claims be dismissed without 17 prejudice, and the motion for default judgment (ECF No. 11) be denied without prejudice, 18 subject to renewal as to Plaintiff’s remaining claim (Claim 1, for violation of the ADA). 19 I. THE COMPLAINT 20 The Complaint alleges Plaintiff is a Vietnam veteran who is limited in the use of 21 his legs and uses a walker. Compl. ¶ 6. Defendants own and operate a business, known 22 as Patterson Chevron, located at 32 North 2nd Street, Patterson, California. Id. ¶¶ 7, 11 . 23 On or about April 27, 2024, Plaintiff visited Defendants’ business “for the purposes of 24 buying food and drink.” Id. ¶ 12 . Plaintiff encountered architectural barriers that denied 25 him access to a public accommodation in violation of state and federal laws. Id. ¶ 13, 17 . [26] 27 2 Plaintiff filed a supplemental response to the Court’s 05/08/2025 Order to Show Cause on May 29, 2025. (ECF No. 17.) Although Plaintiff’s supplemental response was 28 filed after the Court’s deadline, the Court will consider the filing in its determination. 1 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendants’ designated disabled-accessible parking space 2 was defective. Id. ¶ 4 . Plaintiff further alleges he was deterred from visiting on May 27, 3 2024. Id. ¶ 12 . Based on these visits, Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief. Id. at 4 21-22. 5 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 6 A court that has original jurisdiction over a civil action “shall have supplemental 7 jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such 8 original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of 9 the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (a). Notably, the Ninth Circuit has held 10 that claims asserted under the ADA and Unruh Act, “derive from a common nucleus of 11 operative fact and are such that a plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try them in one 12 judicial proceeding, they form part of the same case or controversy for purposes of 13 § 1367(a).” Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation 14 marks and citations omitted). However, supplemental jurisdiction “is a doctrine of 15 discretion, not of plaintiff’s rights” and district courts “can decline to exercise jurisdiction 16 over pendant claims for a number of valid reasons.” City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of 17 Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172 (1997) (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 18 U.S. 715 , 726 (1966)). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c), a district court may decline 19 supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if: 20 (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, 21 (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, [22] (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has 23 original jurisdiction, or 24 (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. [26] 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(1)-(4). The Ninth Circuit does not require an “explanation for a 27 district court's reasons [for declining supplemental jurisdiction] when the district court 28 acts under the first three provisions.” San Pedro Hotel Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 159 1 F.3d 470, 478 (9th Cir. 1998). However, a district court is required to identify why 2 circumstances may be “exceptional” when declining jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(4). 3 Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th at 1210 . 4 A district court’s inquiry as to whether to decline jurisdiction under [5] 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(4) involves a two-party inquiry. Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1210 . First, the 6 district court must identify “why the circumstances of the case are exceptional within the 7 meaning of § 1367(c)(4).” Id. (citation omitted). Second, to evaluate “whether there are 8 ‘compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction’ in a given case, the court should consider 9 what ‘best serves the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity which 10 underlie the pendent jurisdiction doctrine’ articulated in Gibbs.” Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1210 11 (citing Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 172-73 ). These two inquiries are “not 12 particularly burdensome.” Id. (citation omitted). 13 III. DISCUSSION 14 As to the first inquiry, the Court finds circumstances here are exceptional within 15 the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(4). The Ninth Circuit in Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1205 , 16 1207, recognized the “recent changes in California law governing Unruh Act claims” and 17 the California Legislature’s imposition of “additional procedural requirements on 18 construction-related accessibility claims’ in order to address what it believed was 19 continued abuse by ‘high-frequency litigants.’” Under California law, “high-frequency 20 litigants,” are defined as “[a] plaintiff who has filed 10 or more complaints alleging a 21 construction-related accessibility violation within the 12-month period immediately 22 preceding the filing of the current complaint alleging a construction-related accessibility 23 violation.” Cal. Civ. Proc. § 425.55(b)(1). “High-frequency litigants” are subject to a 24 special filing fee and further heightened pleading requirements. See Cal. Govt. Code 25 § 70616.5; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.50 (a)(4)(A). The requirements apply not just to 26 claims brought under the Unruh Act, but also to claims related to disability access under 27 the California’s Health and Safety Code and California’s Disabled Person Act. See 28 Gilbert v. Singh, 2023 WL 2239335 , at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2023) (holding claims 1 brought under California Health and Safety Code are “construction-related accessibility 2 claims” that are subject to the same pleading and filing requirements as a claim under 3 the Unruh Act) (citing Vo v. Choi, 49 F.4th 1167 , 1172-74 (9th Cir. 2022); Arroyo, 19 4 F.4th at 1211-14); Sepulveda v. Kobaree, 2023 WL 5020267 , at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 5 2023) (holding California Health and Safety Code claims are “subject to the same 6 procedural requirements as Unruh Act and Disabled Person Act claims”). As a result, the 7 Ninth Circuit has explained that “[t]he resulting differences between state court and 8 federal court have produced significant consequences for the filing of ADA-based Unruh 9 claims” and because “the significant expense and burden of California’s newly imposed 10 rules for ‘construction-related accessibility claims’ can be avoided by pairing the Unruh 11 Act claim with a parallel federal ADA claim and then filing the suit in federal court” there 12 has been a large increase in the number of ADA cases filed in federal court. Arroyo, 19 13 F.4th at 1207. Accordingly, “plaintiffs can circumvent the restrictions on high-frequency 14 litigants by filing their complaints in federal court, asserting federal question jurisdiction 15 over the ADA claim and supplemental jurisdiction of the state law claims. Shayler v. 16 1310 PCH, LLC, 51 F.4th 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing Arroyo 19, F.4th at 1207). 17 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit has had “little difficulty” in reaching the conclusion that “the 18 legal landscape” concerning Unruh Act actions constitute exceptional circumstances 19 within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(4). See Vo, 49 F.4th at 1169 (citing Arroyo, 19 20 F.4th at 1214). 21 Here, the Court’s review of its records shows Plaintiff has filed ten or more 22 complaints alleging a construction-related accessibility violation within the twelve-month 23 period immediately preceding the filing of the current complaint. See Sykes v. Rios, 2024 24 WL 5186841 , at *1 n.1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2024) (“It is well established that a court can 25 take judicial notice of its own files and records under [Federal Rule of Evidence] 201.”). 26 Plaintiff also does not dispute he is a high-frequency litigant and would therefore be 27 subject to California’s heightened pleading and procedural standards that apply to high28 frequency litigants in state court. See ECF Nos. 16, 17. Consistent with Ninth Circuit 1 precedent, the Court finds exceptional circumstances are present here within the 2 meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(4). 3 As to the second inquiry, the Court finds compelling reasons for declining 4 supplemental jurisdiction within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(4). In its evaluation 5 of this inquiry, the Court considers the Gibbs values of economy, convenience, fairness, 6 and comity. See Vo, 49 F.4th at 1171. Plaintiff argues the Court should exercise 7 supplemental jurisdiction because other courts in this district have retained jurisdiction 8 raising the same claims on motions for default judgment. ECF Nos. 16 at 1-2 (citing 9 Sepulveda v. Gray, 2:23-cv-02769 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2024); Sepulveda v. Garcia, No. 10 2:23-cv-02177 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2024)); 17 at 1 (citing Sepulveda v. Mann Bros Truck 11 Stop Inc., No. 2:24-cv-01863 (E.D. Cal. May 23, 2025)). Plaintiff further argues the 12 Court’s ruling on the pending motion for default judgment will ultimately decide the ADA 13 claim, which “Arroyo’s reasoning arguably militates in favor of exercising jurisdiction over 14 the Unruh claim in this case.” ECF No. 16 at 4. Finally, Plaintiff argues that Defendants 15 should not “gain the advantage of delay” by “causing plaintiff to have to go to state court 16 to open a new case” thereby “multiplying the litigation burden for the courts.” Id. The 17 Court disagrees with Plaintiff. This action is in its early stages of litigation. Plaintiff also 18 acknowledges this. See ECF No. 16 at 4 (“It is true that we are at an early stage of the 19 litigation[.]”). Moreover, no defendant has appeared, and the merits of Plaintiff’s claims 20 have not been addressed. Accordingly, this is not a situation such as in Arroyo, where 21 the Court has addressed Plaintiff’s ADA claim and where the case is at a “very late 22 stage” such that declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction would be inappropriate. 23 Compare Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1214 (finding district court abused its discretion declining to 24 exercise supplemental jurisdiction at a “very late stage” of the litigation after it had 25 granted summary judgment on ADA claim), with Vo, 49 F.4th at 1172 (finding the district 26 court “completely sidestep[ed] the core concern articulated in Arroyo” when it declined 27 supplemental jurisdiction “well before it ruled on the merits of the ADA claim.”). 28 Moreover, Plaintiff improperly assumes that he will be successful in this action. The fact 1 that declining supplemental jurisdiction would duplicate litigation does not, in light of 2 other considerations, warrant retaining jurisdiction. Especially in light of California’s 3 requirements for Unruh Act claims, such that it would not be fair, nor would comity be 4 served, if Plaintiff would be able to proceed on his state law claims in this Court and 5 “wholly thwart” California’s policy objectives in this area. See Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1214 6 (noting “comity-based concerns that California’s policy objectives in this area were being 7 wholly thwarted and its courts were being deprived of their crucial role in carrying out the 8 Legislature’s reforms of the Unruh Act.”). For these reasons, the Court finds declining to 9 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims is appropriate and 10 consistent with the Ninth Circuit. See Garcia v. Maciel, 2022 WL 395316 , at *5 (N.D. Cal. 11 Feb. 9, 2022) (“Under the circumstances of this case, which has not progressed beyond 12 threshold questions of standing and jurisdiction, the strong comity concerns identified by 13 the Ninth Circuit in Arroyo outweigh any countervailing considerations of economy and 14 efficiency that might be adversely affected by requiring [plaintiff] to refile his Unruh Act 15 claim in state court.”). This is also consistent with district courts in California declining to 16 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims brought under the Unruh Act 17 and other California disability access statutes. See, e.g., Sepulveda v. Taqueria y 18 Carniceria Martinez LLC, 2024 WL 69066 , at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2024); Gilbert v. 19 Singh, 2023 WL 2239335 , at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2023); Sepulveda v. Kobaree, 2023 20 WL 5020267 , at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2023). 21 Accordingly, the Court finds circumstances in this action are exceptional and there 22 are other compelling reasons to decline exercising supplemental jurisdiction over 23 Plaintiff’s Unruh Act and related state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(4). The 24 Court therefore recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s Health and Safety Code § 19955 25 claim (Claim 2), Disabled Person Act claim (Claim 3), and Unruh Act claim (Claim 4), 26 without prejudice to the refiling of these claims in state court. 27 IV. CONCLUSION 28 Based upon the findings above, it is RECOMMENDED: 1 1. The Court DECLINE to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's 2 Claim 2 for violation of California’s Health and Safety Code § 19955, et 3 seq., Claim 3 for violation of California’s Disabled Person Act pursuant to [4] Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54 , 54.1, and 54.3, and Claim 4 for violation of 5 California’s Unruh Act, and that these claims be DISMISSED without 6 prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(4); 7 2. Plaintiffs motion for default judgment (ECF No. 11) be DENIED without 8 prejudice, subject to renewal as to Plaintiff's remaining ADA claim (Claim 9 1); and 10 3. Plaintiff be GRANTED thirty (30) days to file a second motion for default 11 judgment. 12 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 13 | Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1). Within 14 | 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file 15 | written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. This document should 16 | be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any 17 || reply to the objections shall be served on all parties and filed with the Court within 14 18 | days after service of the objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time 19 | may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449 , 20 | 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). [21] 22 || Dated: June 23, 2025 C i s 23 CHI SOO KIM 24 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 25 || 4, seput497.24