Harmer v. Davis

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 * * * 4 BRYAN HARMER, Case No. 3:25-cv-00314-ART-CLB 5 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING 30-DAY v. EXTENSION OF TIME AND DENYING 6 APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL SCOTT DAVIS, et al., 7 [ECF Nos. 5, 6] Defendants. [8] 9 Plaintiff Bryan Harmer filed a case with another inmate when they were both 10 confined at Lovelock Correctional Center (“LCC”). After initiating that case, Harmer was 11 released on parole, and the Court entered an order severing Harmer from the original 12 case, which created this new case belonging to Harmer alone. (See ECF No. 3.) At that 13 time, the Court granted Harmer 30 days to file a first amended complaint (“FAC”) in this 14 new case containing only his own claims. (Id. at 10–11, 14–15.) Before the deadline 15 expired, Harmer filed a motion requesting a 90-day extension of time and the appointment 16 of counsel. (ECF Nos. 5, 6.) The Court now addresses Harmer’s motion. 17 The Court grants Harmer an extension of 30 days, rather than 90 days, to file a 18 FAC in this case. The new deadline for Harmer to file a FAC is August 25, 2025. Any 19 future request for an extension of time must be accompanied by a specific factual 20 explanation of why there is “good cause” for the requested extension. See Fed. R. Civ. 21 P. 6 (b). 22 Harmer also asks the Court to appoint him a free attorney as a “better solution to 23 the communication problems between him” and his former co-plaintiff, who is still confined 24 at LCC and proceeding on his own behalf in the original case. (See ECF No. 5 at 2.) 25 There is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in civil cases. Storseth v. Spellman, [26] 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981). The statute that governs this type of litigation, 28 27 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(1), provides that “[t]he court may request an attorney to represent any 28 person unable to afford counsel.” However, the Court will appoint counsel for indigent civil 1 || litigants only in “exceptional circumstances.” Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th 2 || Cir. 2009). “When determining whether ‘exceptional circumstances’ exist, a court must 3 || consider ‘the likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability of the petitioner to 4 || articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” /d. 5 || (quoting Weyganadt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983)). “Neither of these 6 || considerations is dispositive and instead must be viewed together.” /d. (citing Wilborn v. 7 || Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). 8 There is no active complaint on file in this case, so Harmer has not established 9 || that he is likely to succeed on the merits. Harmer has also shown that he can 10 || communicate with the Court in a coherent and detailed manner, so the Court has no basis 11 || to conclude that he is unable to articulate his claims pro se. The Court therefore denies 12 || Harmer’s request for the appointment of counsel without prejudice. 13 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Harmer’s motion for an extension of time and 14 || the appointment of counsel (ECF Nos. 5, 6) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Harmer is GRANTED a 30-day extension of time, 16 || so he shall file a FAC containing only his own claims in this case by August 25, 2025. 17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Harmer’s request for the appointment of counsel 18 || is DENIED without prejudice. 19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, if Harmer chooses not to file a FAC by August 20 || 25, 2025, this case will be dismissed without prejudice. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 DATED: July 24, 2025. [24] UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE