Eritrean Association in Greater Seattle v. Gebrekidan

[7] UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT [8] WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA [10] ERITREAN ASSOCIATION OF CASE NO. 3:24-cv-05517-DGE 11 GREATER SEATTLE, ORDER ON MOTION FOR 12 Plaintiff, PROTECTIVE ORDER (DKT. NO. v. 71) [13] HENOCK TECKLE GEBREKIDAN et al., [14] Defendant. [16] This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion for a protective order pursuant [17] to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). (Dkt. No. 71.) “As a general rule, the public is [18] permitted ‘access to litigation documents and information produced during discovery.’” In re [19] Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Oregon, 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting [20] Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206 , 1210 (9th Cir. 2002)). An exception exists under [21] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), which allows a party to move for a court order “to protect [22] a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” [23] Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(G). In the context of discovery, a party wishing to obtain a protective [24] 1 order must demonstrate “good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). “A party asserting good cause 2 bears the burden, for each particular document it seeks to protect, of showing that specific 3 prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted.” Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 4 Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Phillips v. Gen. Motors, 307 F.3d 1206 , 5 1212 (9th Cir. 2002)). “[B]road allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or 6 articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.” Beckman Ind., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 7 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992). 8 Defendants’ motion “seeks to protect the thirteen named and represented Defendants 9 from the disclosure of sensitive information that poses credible safety risks of serious retaliation, 10 harassment, and transnational repression coordinated by the Eritrean government and its 11 supporters, as well as protect the First Amendment privileges of each of the thirteen named 12 Defendants, and the journalist’s privilege of the Defendants Yonatan Tewelde, Henok Tekl 13 Gebrekidan, and Saba Kidane Heritage.” (Dkt. No. 71 at 2.) Although Defendants’ declarations 14 suggest that they may be entitled to a protective order of some kind, the instant motion fails to 15 meet the good cause standard because it is utterly capacious and lacking in the required 16 specificity. Simply put, the motion “fails to make a sufficient showing for each particular 17 document, or group of similar documents, that specific prejudice or harm will result if no 18 protective order is granted for such documents,” and does not provide a “narrowly-tailored 19 definition” of protected material for the documents and information Defendants seek to protect. 20 United States v. Arredondo, No. CR-12-1055-PHX-FJM, 2012 WL 1946955 , *2 (D. Ariz. May 21 30, 2012). Indeed, the proposed order defines “protected material” so broadly that entering the 22 order would essentially result in a blanket protective order. (See Dkt. No. 71-1 at 101) 23 (“‘Protected’ material shall include materials, information, and statements that are non24 1 disclosable pursuant this Court satisfying the compelling public interests of protecting 2 Defendants from credible safety risk of serious retaliation, harassment, and transnational 3 repression coordinated by the Eritrean government and its supporters.”). As Plaintiff points out, 4 this would “give Defendants the unfettered right to designate any testimony they wish in this 5 case to be protected, thereby placing it beyond the reach of discovery, and rendering it 6 inadmissible in these proceedings.” (Dkt. No. 74 at 9.) 7 At bottom, Defendants do not even try to establish that “specific prejudice or harm” will 8 result with respect to specific documents or information they wish to protect, because they do not 9 explicate what documents or information should be protected. C.f. United States v. Real Prop. 10 Located in Los Angeles, California, 345 F.R.D. 189 , 192 (C.D. Cal. 2023). Thus, defendants 11 have not “made the particularized showing necessary to sustain the protective order [they] seek” 12 under Rule 26(C). United States v. Exxon Corp., 94 F.R.D. 250, 251 (D.D.C. 1981). 13 Defendants’ motion (Dkt. No. 71) is DENIED with leave to amend. Should Defendants 14 wish to move again for a protective order, they must show that specific prejudice or harm that 15 will result if no protective order is granted as to each particular document or piece of 16 information—or specific category of documents or information—they seek to protect. Foltz, 331 17 F.3d at 1130; see also Local Rule 26(c) (“Parties that wish to depart from the model order must 18 provide the court with a redlined version identifying departures from the model.”). The Parties’ 19 stipulated motion to extend time (Dkt. No. 72) is DENIED as moot. 20 The Parties are also admonished to work together to draft an appropriate protective order 21 and that the Court’s model protective order found at the Court’s website should be utilized. 22 Modifications to the model protective order should be provided to the Court for review in a 23 redline Word version. [24] 1 Dated this 28th day of July, 2025. [2] a [3] David G. Estudillo 4 United States District Judge