Rodriguez v. Otis Elevator Company, LLC

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 PATRICIA RODRIGUEZ, No. 1:23-cv-01537-KES-BAM 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 OTIS ELEVATOR COMPANY, et al., 15 Defendants. (Docs. 8, 9) [17] 18 Plaintiff Patricia Rodriguez seeks leave to amend her complaint and moves to remand this 19 action to the Madera County Superior Court. Docs. 8, 9. Defendant Otis Elevator Company 20 (“Otis Elevator”) timely opposed the motions to amend and to remand. See Docs. 10, 13. The 21 Court took both motions under submission. Docs. 15, 21. For the reasons set forth below, 22 Rodriguez’s motion to amend is granted and this action is remanded to Madera County Superior 23 Court. 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 Rodriguez alleges she was injured when an elevator at the Chukchansi Gold Resort and 26 Casino “suddenly and violently jerked” and knocked her to the ground. Notice of Removal, Ex. 27 A (“Complaint”), Doc. 1 at 19 ¶ 2. Rodriguez filed suit in Madera County Superior Court, [28] 1 alleging claims against defendants Otis Elevator Company, LLC (“California Otis”), Otis 2 Elevator, and Does 1 to 100 for (1) product liability - negligence, (2) strict products liability – 3 manufacturing defect, (3) strict product liability – failure to warn, and (4) strict products liability 4 – design defect. See Complaint. In the complaint, Rodriguez alleges that defendants “improperly 5 designed, manufactured, supplied, installed, inspected, repaired, and maintained the subject 6 elevator such that their actions were negligent” and caused her injuries. Id. ¶ 14. Otis Elevator 7 filed its Answer on October 3, 2023. Doc. 1 (“Notice of Removal”) at 30-36. Otis Elevator is a 8 New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business in Connecticut and is a citizen of New 9 Jersey and Connecticut. Id. ¶ 6. Rodriguez alleges that California Otis is a citizen of California 10 for diversity purposes. Id. ¶ 7. 11 On October 30, 2023, Otis Elevator removed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and [12] 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (b). Doc. 1 at 1. In its notice of removal, Otis Elevator alleges that California 13 Otis is not a proper party in this action as it is a separate and distinct business entity from Otis 14 Elevator and is not owned or controlled by Otis Elevator. Id. at 3 . 15 Following removal, Rodriguez moved to amend her complaint and moved to remand this 16 action to state court. Doc. 8; Doc. 9. Rodriguez seeks to amend her complaint under Federal 17 Rule of Civil Procedure 15 to add additional defendants and causes of actions. Specifically, 18 Rodriguez seeks to remove California Otis as a defendant and to add four new defendants: 19 (1) Kevin Dix, the manager of Otis Elevator’s Fresno office; (2) Christopher Beruke, the 20 superintendent of Otis Elevator’s Fresno office; (3) Scott Nakada, an employee of Otis Elevator’s 21 Fresno office; and (4) Claudia Gonzales, Chairwoman of the Chukchansi Gold Resort and Casino. 22 Doc. 8 at 9-10. The new proposed defendants are all citizens of California. Id. Rodriguez seeks 23 to add additional causes of action for negligence and for the negligent hiring, supervision, and/or 24 retention of employee Scott Nakada. Id. at 15-18 . 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 II. MOTION TO REMAND 2 Rodriguez first seeks to remand this action on the basis that California Otis was not 3 fraudulently joined and that there was not complete diversity at the time of removal. Doc. 9. 4 A. Legal Standard 5 “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter 6 jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c). A motion to remand is the proper 7 procedure for challenging removal. Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241 , 1244 8 (9th Cir. 2009). “The removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction, and the 9 burden of establishing federal jurisdiction falls to the party invoking the statute.” Cal. ex rel. 10 Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831 , 838 (9th Cir. 2004). If there is doubt as to the right of 11 removal, a federal court must reject jurisdiction and remand the case to state court. Matheson v. 12 Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003). 13 Federal courts have original jurisdiction over cases where complete diversity exists 14 between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and 15 costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a). “In determining whether there is complete diversity, district courts 16 may disregard the citizenship of a non-diverse defendant who has been fraudulently joined.” 17 Grancare, LLC v. Thrower by & through Mills, 889 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 2018). “A defendant 18 invoking federal court diversity jurisdiction on the basis of fraudulent joinder bears a ‘heavy 19 burden’ since there is a ‘general presumption against [finding] fraudulent joinder.’” Id. The 20 Ninth Circuit has recognized two ways to establish fraudulent joinder: “(1) actual fraud in the 21 pleading of jurisdictional facts, or (2) inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action 22 against the non-diverse party in state court.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 23 “[T]he test for fraudulent joinder and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) are 24 not equivalent. A claim against a defendant may fail under Rule 12(b)(6), but that defendant has 25 not necessarily been fraudulently joined.” Id. at 549 . Rather, the standard for fraudulent joinder 26 is akin to the “wholly insubstantial and frivolous” standard for dismissing claims under Rule 27 12(b)(1) for lack of federal question jurisdiction. Id. “[I]f there is a possibility that a state court 28 would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any of the resident defendants, the 1 federal court must find that the joinder was proper and remand the case to the state court.” Id. 2 (quoting Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in 3 original)). 4 B. Discussion 5 The sole issue raised in Rodriguez’s motion to remand is whether California Otis is a 6 proper defendant whose presence destroys diversity jurisdiction.1 In its notice of removal, 7 defendant Otis Elevator alleges that California Otis is not an affiliated entity, that it is not owned 8 or controlled by Otis Elevator, that it is infringing on Otis Elevator’s trademark, and that it is not 9 a proper defendant in this action. See Doc. 9. 10 Although “[n]ormally, the existence of federal jurisdiction on removal must be determined 11 from the face of plaintiff[’s] complaint,” Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Newman & Holtzinger, 12 P.C., 992 F.2d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1993) (alterations in original) (citation omitted), “this 13 proposition does not extend to the fraudulent joinder context,” Bell v. Terminix Int’l Co. Ltd. 14 P’ship, No. 16-00012 ACK-KSC, 2016 WL 3166318 , at *3 (D. Haw. June 6, 2016). Rodriguez 15 argues that, at the time she filed her complaint, she was not aware that California Otis was an 16 improper defendant. However, the fraudulent joinder inquiry does not require that plaintiff have 17 an intent to deceive, but rather, can be established by plaintiff’s inability to “establish a cause of 18 action against the non-diverse party in state court.” GranCare, 889 F.3d at 548 . “The term 19 ‘fraudulent joinder’ is a term of art, used for removal purposes, and does not connote any intent to 20 deceive on the part of plaintiff or his counsel.” Plute v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 141 F. 21 Supp. 2d 1005, 1008 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 2001). A defendant can establish fraudulent joinder by [22] 23 1 Rodriguez alleges that California Otis is a California corporation and is therefore a citizen of California for diversity purposes. Complaint ¶ 3. However, California Otis appears to be a 24 limited liability corporation. “A limited liability company is a citizen of every state of which its owners/members are citizens, not the state in which it was formed or does business.” Voltage [25] Pictures, LLC v. Gussi, S.A. de C.V., 92 F.4th 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because Rodriguez does not make any allegations regarding the citizenship [26] of California Otis’ members, if California Otis were a limited liability corporation Rodriguez’s 27 allegations would be insufficient to establish its citizenship. However, because the Court finds that California Otis was not properly joined, this Order need not further address the citizenship of 28 California Otis. 1 showing that the nondiverse defendant “cannot be liable on any theory.” GranCare, 889 F.3d at 2 548. 3 In its notice of removal, Otis Elevator submitted evidence that California Otis is not 4 affiliated with it and that it sent a cease-and-desist letter to California Otis for infringing on its 5 trademark. Rodriguez does not challenge the sufficiency of Otis Elevator’s evidence.2 More 6 importantly, in moving to amend her complaint, Rodriguez seeks to remove California Otis as a 7 defendant. See Doc. 8. In her motion to amend, Rodriguez argues that she timely moved to 8 amend her complaint upon learning that one of the defendants (i.e., California Otis) was not liable 9 in this action. Doc. 8 at 4. Rodriguez effectively concedes that California Otis is not a correct 10 defendant and that she is unable to establish a cause of action against California Otis under any 11 theory. See Doc. 8; see also GranCare, 889 F.3d at 548 . Accordingly, California Otis was 12 fraudulently joined, and this Court would have diversity jurisdiction over this action unless 13 Rodriguez’s motion to amend is granted. As such, the Court will turn to the motion to amend to 14 determine whether the proposed amendment, which would destroy diversity jurisdiction, is 15 appropriate. 16 III. MOTION TO AMEND 17 A. Legal standard 18 Where a proposed amendment would add a nondiverse defendant and destroy diversity 19 jurisdiction, district courts evaluate the proposed joinder pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (e). See 20 Garcia v. Welltower OpCo Grp., LLC, No. 8:20-cv-02250-JVS(KESx), 2023 WL 2612605 , at *5 21 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2023) (compiling cases); Nand v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 22 2:23-CV-01142 DJC AC, 2024 WL 1306170 , at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2024) (compiling cases). 23 “If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would destroy 24 subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the action to 25 the State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (e). “The language of § 1447(e) is couched in permissive [26] 27 2 After the briefing of the motion to remand was completed, Otis Elevator filed a contract showing that Otis Elevator and the Chukchansi Gold Resort and Casino were the only contracting 28 parties with respect to the servicing and maintenance of the elevator. Doc. 16 at 2. 1 terms,” and “the decision regarding joinder of a diversity destroying-defendant is left to the [2] discretion of the district court.” Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 691 (9th Cir. [3] 1998). [4] District courts generally consider the following factors when exercising their discretion to [5] permit or deny joinder of non-diverse defendants: [6] (1) whether the new defendants should be joined under Fed. R. 7 Civ. P. 19(a) (“Rule 19”) as “needed for just adjudication”; (2) whether the statute of limitations would preclude an original 8 action against the new defendant[] in state court; (3) whether there has been unexplained delay in requesting joinder; (4) whether 9 joinder is intended solely to defeat federal jurisdiction; (5) whether the claims against the new defendant appear valid; and (6) whether 10 denial of joinder will prejudice the plaintiff. [11] IBC Aviation Serv., Inc. v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. de C.V., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1008 , [12] 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (citing, inter alia, Palestini v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 193 F.R.D. 654 , 658 [13] (S.D. Cal. 2000)). [14] “Any of these factors might prove decisive, and none is an absolutely necessary condition [15] of joinder.” Sabag v. FCA US, LLC, No. 2:16-CV-06639-CAS(RAOX), 2016 WL 6581154 , at [16] *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2016) (quoting Cruz v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 12-00846, 2012 WL 17 2838957, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 10, 2012)). “Considerations of judicial economy are especially [18] relevant and often animate courts’ assessment of these factors.” Serna v. Costco Wholesale [19] Corp., No. 1:23-cv-01225-KES-CDB, 2024 WL 4554866 , at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2024) (citing [20] Palestini, 193 F.R.D. at 658 ). “[D]efendant bears the burden of establishing that removal is [21] proper,” and any doubt as to removability is resolved in favor of remand. Provincial Gov't of [22] Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). [23] B. Analysis [24] As Rodriguez seeks leave to join new defendants who would destroy diversity [25] jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (e) governs, and the Court considers the six factors listed above to [26] determine whether joinder of the new defendants, which would result in remand, is appropriate. [28] 1 1. Joinder Under Rule 19(a) 2 “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 requires joinder of persons whose absence would 3 preclude the grant of complete relief, or whose absence would impede their ability to protect their 4 interests or would subject any of the parties to the danger of inconsistent obligations.” Clinco v. 5 Roberts, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1082 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a). “Although courts 6 consider the standard set forth in Rule 19 in determining whether to permit joinder under Section 7 1447(e), ‘amendment under [Section] 1447(e) is a less restrictive standard than for joinder under 8 Rule 19.’” Avellanet v. FCA US LLC, No. CV 19-7621-JFW(KSX), 2019 WL 5448199 , at *2 9 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2019) (quoting Sabag, 2016 WL 6581154 , at *4). This factor supports joinder 10 where the non-diverse defendants were directly involved in the alleged negligent conduct, but not 11 when the non-diverse defendants “are only tangentially related to the cause of action or would not 12 prevent complete relief.” IBC Aviation Servs., Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1011-12 . 13 Rodriguez argues that she has a “good faith belief” that the manager and superintendent at 14 Otis Elevator’s Fresno Office were “negligent in hiring and/or supervising those tasked with 15 maintaining the elevator.” Doc. 8 at 5. Otis Elevator argues that adding the new defendants is 16 futile because Rodriguez “does not allege that the Otis Elevator employees acted independently or 17 with an interest separate from their duties as agents of Otis Elevator” and, thus, any liability is 18 coextensive with that of Otis Elevator. Doc. 10 at 3. However, “[t]he fact that [the employer 19 defendant] may be both directly liable for its negligence and vicariously liable for the negligence 20 of [its employee] supports [the argument that the employee] is a necessary party to this action, 21 and not merely tangentially related.” Franco v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. CV 18-7586-MWF 22 (AFMX), 2018 WL 6333674 , at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2018); see also Roblin v. Costco 23 Wholesale Corp., No. 23-CV-01828-RFL, 2024 WL 1131038 , at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2024) 24 (employee is necessary party because plaintiff is entitled to pursue claims against employee 25 individually even if store would be vicariously liable for the alleged negligence); Pelz v. Sprouts 26 Farmers Mkt., No. 24-CV-02078-VKD, 2024 WL 3740125 , at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2024) 27 (compiling cases). 28 Rodriguez seeks to add the manager, the superintendent, and an employee of Otis 1 Elevator’s Fresno office, as well the Chairwoman of the Chukchansi Gold Resort and Casino. 2 The Court will focus on the allegations against the Otis Elevator employees because if those 3 defendants were joined, they would destroy diversity. The proposed amended complaint, like the 4 original complaint, alleges that Otis Elevator was negligent in maintaining and servicing the 5 elevators and that such negligence caused Rodriguez’s injuries. The amended complaint adds 6 additional causes of action for negligence and for the negligent hiring, retention, and/or 7 supervision of Nakada. See Doc. 8 at 17. Otis Elevator does not dispute that Dix, Beruke, and 8 Nakada are its employees and that they either directly serviced the elevator or supervised other 9 employees’ maintenance and servicing of it. See Doc. 10. Because the Otis Elevator employees 10 were responsible for the maintenance and servicing of the elevator prior to and at the time of the 11 incident, their joinder is arguably necessary for a “thorough examination” of their actions and 12 potential negligence. See J.A.V. v. PC Grp. Retail LLC, No. 8:24-CV-01637-JVS-JDE, 2024 WL 13 4404402, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2024) (owner and manager of property responsible for 14 overseeing all maintenance and repairs of escalator was a necessary party). As the actions of the 15 Otis Elevator employees directly affect plaintiff’s claims against Otis Elevator, the employees are 16 appropriately joined in this action. See Fortenberry v. Walmart Inc., No. EDCV 23-2601-KK17 SHKX, 2024 WL 1343166 , at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2024) (store manager allegedly negligent in 18 his duties to manage the premises and negligent in supervision of store’s employees was a 19 necessary party). 20 Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of permitting joinder of the Otis Elevator 21 employees. 22 2. Statute of Limitations 23 If the statute of limitations would preclude the filing of a new separate state court action 24 against the proposed defendants, this factor would weigh in favor of granting joinder of the new 25 defendants. Reyes v. FCA US LLC, No. 1:20-CV-00833-DAD-SKO, 2020 WL 7224286 , at *10 26 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2020). If, however, the plaintiff could file an action against the new defendant 27 in state court “then there is less reason to join them in this action.” Id. (quoting Sandhu v. Volvo 28 Cars of N. Am., LLC, No. 16-CV-04987-BLF, 2017 WL 403495 , at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2017). 1 The incident occurred on or about July 27, 2023. Complaint ¶ 19. As California’s statute of 2 limitations for personal injury suits is two years, Cal. Code Civ. P. § 335.1, the statute of 3 limitations had not expired at the time Rodriguez sought to amend her complaint but expired 4 while the instant motion was pending. To the extent the statute of limitations, absent any tolling, 5 would bar Rodriguez from filing a new action against the Otis Elevator employees, this factor 6 would weigh in favor of joinder. 7 3. Timeliness 8 In evaluating this factor, district courts consider the length of time that passed between the 9 filing of the original complaint and the amended complaint and whether dispositive motions have 10 been filed. See Reyes, 2020 WL 7224286 , at *5 (compiling cases). Rodriguez filed her original 11 complaint on July 27, 2023, and she sought to amend her complaint on November 16, 2023. 12 Rodriguez thus moved to amend within four months of filing her original complaint. 13 Otis Elevator argues that a four-month delay in seeking leave to amend is a dilatory tactic 14 that weighs against allowing amendment of the complaint. Doc. 10 at 6. However, Rodriguez 15 did not unreasonably delay by moving to amend four months after filing her complaint. 16 Rodriguez argues that she immediately further researched the matter as soon as she knew that 17 California Otis was fraudulently using Otis Elevator’s name. Doc. 8 at 4. Once Rodriguez 18 received the operative service agreement between Otis Elevator and Chukchansi Gold Resort and 19 Casino, which indicated that employees from Otis Elevator’s Fresno office worked on the 20 elevator that allegedly injured her, see id. at 3-4 , Rodriguez timely sought to amend her 21 complaint. Moreover, a four-month delay in seeking amendment is not inherently unreasonable. 22 See Lara v. Bandit Indus., Inc., No. 2:12-CV-02459-MCE-AC, 2013 WL 1155523 , at *3 (E.D. 23 Cal. Mar. 19, 2013) (five-month delay in seeking amendment of complaint was not 24 unreasonable). Further, this case remains at the pleading stage, the case management conference 25 is not scheduled to occur until November 13, 2025, and no dispositive motions have been filed. 26 As there has not been an unreasonable delay in seeking joinder of the new defendants, this 27 factor weighs in favor of permitting joinder. [28] 1 4. Motive for Seeking Joinder 2 A plaintiff’s motive for seeking joinder of a new defendant is relevant to the decision as to 3 whether to grant plaintiff leave to amend the complaint. Sandhu, 2017 WL 403495 , at *3. Here, 4 Rodriguez argues that “as soon as Plaintiff learned that one of the Defendants was not liable for 5 the instant case, she immediately did more research” and that she “uncovered several legitimate 6 Defendants.” Doc. 8 at 4. Rodriguez sought to add new defendants after learning that California 7 Otis was an incorrect defendant. Otis Elevator fails to show that Rodriguez’s sole motivation for 8 seeking leave to amend her complaint was to defeat diversity jurisdiction. Moreover, “the 9 question of whether joinder is solely intended to defeat jurisdiction is ‘intertwined’ with the 10 question of whether the claims against the new defendant appear valid.” Sabag, 2016 WL 11 6581154, at *5–6 (finding that plaintiff’s motive in joining dealership defendant was “not solely 12 to destroy diversity” because plaintiff's claim against the dealership was “facially legitimate”). 13 “Courts have permitted joinder even where the plaintiff appears to be primarily motivated 14 by a desire to defeat diversity jurisdiction, as long as the plaintiff has alleged a valid claim against 15 the non-diverse defendant.” Reyes, 2020 WL 7224286 , at *6 (collecting cases). Otis Elevator 16 argues that Rodriguez’s failure to initially name the new defendants shows that the proposed 17 amendment is a dilatory tactic made in bad faith. Doc. 10 at 6. However, the claims against the 18 proposed defendants, as discussed below, appear to be facially valid and the Court does not find 19 that Rodriguez has acted in bad faith in seeking to amend her complaint. See Reyes, 2020 WL 20 7224286, at *7 (“even if plaintiff was primarily motivated to destroy diversity … that too is 21 insufficient to support a finding of fraudulent joinder here because plaintiff has alleged a valid 22 claim against [the new defendant].”). This factor weighs somewhat in favor of joinder. 23 5. Validity of Claims 24 “The existence of a facially legitimate claim against the putative defendant weighs in 25 favor of permitting joinder under [Section] 1447(e).” Westberg v. FCA US LLC, No. 1:18-cv26 01509-BAM, 2019 WL 3500559 , at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2019) (quoting Forward–Rossi v. 27 Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, No. 2:16-cv-00949-CAS(KSx), 2016 WL 3396925 , at *4 (C.D. 28 Cal. June 13, 2016)). This factor requires only that the claim be facially valid, which is a lower 1 standard than on a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment. See Sabag, 2016 WL 2 6581154, at *6 (citing Freeman v. Cardinal Health Pharm. Servs., LLC, No. 2:14-cv-019943 JAM-KJN, 2015 WL 2006183 , *3 (E.D. Cal. 2015)). 4 Rodriguez has alleged that Otis Elevator negligently manufactured, sold, installed, 5 maintained and serviced the elevators at Chukchansi Gold Resort and Casino. Complaint ¶ 4. 6 Otis Elevator does not dispute that Rodriguez has stated facially valid claims against the Otis 7 Elevator employees for negligence, only that any liability against the employees would be 8 coextensive with that of Otis Elevator. Doc. 10 at 7. The negligence claims against an employee 9 who serviced the elevator, and against the manager and superintendent who supervised or trained 10 such employee, are facially valid. Because Rodriguez has identified facially valid negligence 11 claims against the Otis Elevator employees, this factor weighs in favor of joinder. 12 6. Prejudice 13 “Prejudice exists if the proposed defendant is ‘crucial’ to the case. Prejudice does not 14 exist if complete relief can be afforded without that defendant.” Sabag, 2016 WL 6581154 , at *6 15 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Where claims against parties sought to be joined 16 in an action ‘arise out of the same factual circumstances,’ it is in the economic benefit of all 17 parties and the judicial system to ‘have the entire controversy adjudicated only once[.]’’” Claar 18 v. Centaur Holdings United States Inc., No. 5:22-CV-00742-SHK, 2023 WL 359489 , at *9 (C.D. 19 Cal. Jan. 19, 2023) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 20 Otis Elevator argues that it will be prejudiced if the complaint is amended to add new 21 defendants and new causes of action because such amendment would expand the scope of the 22 litigation. However, the new claims and defendants arise out of and concern the same factual 23 circumstances. In her original complaint, Rodriguez alleged that Otis Elevator had a contract to, 24 among other duties, maintain and service the elevator. Complaint ¶¶ 4, 12-13. The amended 25 complaint alleges that Otis Elevator and the employees negligently failed to properly maintain 26 and service the elevator at issue. The addition of the new defendants and causes of action for 27 negligence would not significantly expand the scope of the litigation. However, if the Court 28 denies joinder, the California statute of limitations may bar a new action against the Otis Elevator 1 | employees in state court absent any tolling, and Rodriguez might have to forego her facially valid 2 | claims against the employees. This factor likewise supports joinder. 3 | IV. CONCLUSION 4 Given that the § 1447(e) factors overall weigh in favor of permitting joinder, the Court 5 | finds that the joinder of the Otis Elevator employees is appropriate. The Court will exercise its 6 | discretion to permit their joinder in this action. 7 As the addition of the Otis Elevator employees, who are citizens of California, destroys 8 | diversity jurisdiction, the Court will remand this action to the Madera County Superior Court. 9 | See 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (e). 10 Accordingly: 11 1. Rodriguez’s motion for leave to file first amended complaint (Doc. 8) is granted. 12 2. Rodriguez’s First Amended Complaint (Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Erik Harper in 13 Support, Doc. 8 at 8-20) is deemed filed and is the operative complaint. 14 3. This action is REMANDED to the Madera County Superior Court for lack of subject 15 matter jurisdiction. 16 4. The Clerk of Court shall mail a copy of this order to the clerk of the Madera County 17 Superior Court. 18 5. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case. [20] 91 | TIS SO ORDERED. _ 22 Dated: _ August 1, 2025 4h UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE