Rebecca Thornock v. IRS

Full text

USCA4 Appeal: 25-1518 Doc: 12 Filed: 08/01/2025 Pg: 1 of 2

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-1518

REBECCA THORNOCK,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, (IRS); DANIEL I. WERFEL, IRS Commissioner, in his official capacity; JOHN DOE, IRS Officials,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. John A. Gibney, Jr., Senior District Judge. (3:25-cv-00134-JAG)

Submitted: July 29, 2025 Decided: August 1, 2025

Before KING, WYNN, and BERNER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Rebecca Thornock, Appellant Pro Se. Robert P. McIntosh, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. *2 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1518 Doc: 12 Filed: 08/01/2025 Pg: 2 of 2

PER CURIAM:

Rebecca Thornock seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying her motion to

recuse the presiding district judge in her pending civil action. 1 This court may exercise

jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and certain interlocutory and

collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan

Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1949). The order Thornock seeks to appeal is neither a final

order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. See In re Va. Elec. & Power Co.,

539 F.2d 357, 363-64 (4th Cir. 1976); accord Mischler v. Bevin, 887 F.3d 271, 271 (6th

Cir. 2018) (“[A]n order denying recusal is not immediately appealable under the collateral

order doctrine.”). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 2 We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

DISMISSED

1 Thornock’s informal brief might also be construed to appeal the district court’s order denying her motion to appoint counsel and its order denying reconsideration of that order. But those orders too are neither final orders nor appealable interlocutory or collateral orders. Insofar as Thornock’s informal brief presents arguments on the merits of her case, the district court has not entered a final order resolving the merits. 2 “A district judge’s refusal to disqualify himself can be reviewed in this circuit by way of a petition for a writ of mandamus.” In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 827 (4th Cir. 1987). But even if we were to construe Thornock’s notice of appeal and informal brief as a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking the district judge’s recusal, we would conclude that Thornock is not entitled to mandamus relief because she has not shown “a clear and indisputable right” to the district judge’s recusal. In re Moore, 955 F.3d 384, 388 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).