Ruiz v. GlaxoSmithKline Consumer Healthcare Holdings (US) LLC

[5] 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [8] 9 JIMY RUIZ, et al., Case No. 24-cv-06776-MMC 10 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 11 v. DISMISS 12 GLAXOSMITHKLINE CONSUMER Re: Dkt. No. 53 HEALTHCARE HOLDINGS (US) LLC, [13] Defendant. [14] 15 Before the Court is defendant GlaxoSmithKline Consumer Healthcare Holdings 16 (US) LLC’s “Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint Pursuant to Rule 17 12(b)(6),” filed June 2, 2025. Plaintiffs Jimy Ruiz and Allan Wong have filed opposition, 18 to which defendant has replied. Having read and considered the papers filed in support 19 of and in opposition to the motion, the Court rules as follows.1 [20] 21 BACKGROUND 22 Defendant manufactures and sells a dietary supplement called Emergen-C, which 23 is offered in seven flavors: Cranberry Pomegranate, Pink Lemonade, Raspberry, 24 Strawberry-Kiwi, Super Orange, Tangerine, and Tropical (collectively "the Products"). 25 (See Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) ¶¶ 22-23). 26 Plaintiffs allege that “the combination and repetition of text, graphical elements, [27] 1 colors, and pictures on the Products’ packaging is designed to give reasonable 2 consumers the overall impression that the Products are composed only of natural flavors” 3 (see SAC ¶ 34), which labeling, according to plaintiffs, is misleading because the 4 “Products contain an ingredient known as ‘malic acid’ which is used as a flavoring in the 5 Products,” and the “form of malic acid used in the[ ] Products is artificial” (see SAC ¶ 45). 6 In particular, plaintiffs allege, the phrases “Flavored Fizzy Drink Mix With Natural Flavors” 7 and “Natural Fruit Flavors” (see SAC ¶¶ 26-27), the pictorial representation of “fresh fruit 8 that corresponds to the ‘characterizing’ fruit flavor of the Products” (see SAC ¶ 28), the 9 color of the packaging (see SAC ¶ 29), and other “descriptors,” such as “Naturally, It’s 10 Good For You” (see SAC ¶ 33), combine to create the alleged misrepresentation. 11 Additionally, plaintiffs allege, Products do not contain “required disclosures regarding the 12 use of artificial flavors” (see SAC ¶ 77), which, plaintiffs assert, misleads consumers into 13 believing “Products contained only natural flavors and not any artificial flavors” (see SAC 14 ¶ 82). 15 Based thereon, plaintiffs assert the following three causes of action: “Violation of 16 the Consumer Remedies Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1750 et seq.” (“Count 17 1”); “Unjust Enrichment Under California Law” (“Count 2”); and “Breach of Express 18 Warranty Under California Law” (“Count 3”). 19 By the instant motion, defendant moves, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal 20 Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss all of the above-listed claims. [21] 22 LEGAL STANDARD 23 Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “can be 24 based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged 25 under a cognizable legal theory.” See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't., 901 F.2d 696 , 26 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Rule 8(a)(2), however, “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of 27 the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 1 Civ. P. 8(d)(1) (providing “[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct”). 2 Consequently, “a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need 3 detailed factual allegations.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nonetheless, “a plaintiff's 4 obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than . . . a 5 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” See id. (internal quotation, 6 citation, and alteration omitted). 7 In analyzing a motion to dismiss, a district court must accept as true all material 8 allegations in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the 9 nonmoving party. See NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). “To 10 survive a motion to dismiss,” however, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual 11 material, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 12 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “Factual 13 allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” 14 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion 15 couched as a factual allegation,” see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation and 16 citation omitted). [17] 18 DISCUSSION 19 A. Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”) 20 The CLRA makes unlawful “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive 21 acts or practices,” such as “[r]epresenting that goods or services have sponsorship, 22 approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not have,” 23 see Cal. Civ. Code § 1770 , and provides a civil remedy to consumers “who suffer[ ] any 24 damage as a result of the use . . . of a method, act, or practice declared to be unlawful 25 [therein],” see Cal. Civ. Code § 1780 . “[C]laims under the California consumer protection 26 statutes,” including the CLRA, “are governed by the ‘reasonable consumer’ test,” under 27 which plaintiffs “must show that members of the public are likely to be deceived. See 1 pleading stage on [a claim] under California’s . . . Consumer Legal Remedies Act, [a] 2 plaintiff[ ] must plausibly allege that reasonable consumers are likely to be deceived” by 3 the defendant’s representations. See Kang v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 844 Fed. 4 App’x 969, 970 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 5 The phrase “likely to be deceived” requires “more than a mere possibility that [the] 6 label might conceivably be misunderstood by some few consumers viewing it in an 7 unreasonable manner.” See Ebner, 838 F.3d at 965 (internal quotation and citation 8 omitted). Rather, the representation must be “such that it is probable that a significant 9 portion of the general consuming public or of targeted customers, acting reasonably in 10 the circumstances, could be misled." See Lavie v. Procter & Gamble Co., 105 Cal. App. 11 4th 496, 508 (2003). "[A] plaintiff's unreasonable assumptions about a product's label will 12 not suffice." Moore v. Trader Joe’s Co., 4 F.4th 874 , 882 (9th Cir. 2021). 13 Here, plaintiffs argue the labels’ use of phrases incorporating the word “natural” 14 and versions thereof along with depictions of fresh fruit suffice to meet the above test. 15 The Court, however, in granting defendants’ earlier motions to dismiss, conducted 16 lengthy hearings in which it set forth in detail on the record its determination that such 17 language and depictions do not suffice to support a finding that reasonable consumers 18 are likely to be deceived, i.e., are likely to believe the Products contain exclusively natural 19 flavors. For those same reasons, the Court once again reaches such conclusion.2 20 Relying on a federal regulation, see 21 C.F.R. § 101.22 (i)(2), plaintiffs next argue 21 the labels’ omission of the words “artificially flavored” is likely to mislead reasonable 22 consumers. At the hearing on defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ First Amended [23] 2 Although, in the SAC, plaintiffs have added allegations regarding the results of [24] surveys plaintiffs have reviewed, plaintiffs’ reliance thereon is unavailing. As defendants point out, “[c]ourts in this district . . . hold that consumer deception claims that are [25] otherwise facially implausible cannot be redeemed merely by surveys.” (See Mot. at 18:11-14) (quoting Nacarino v. Chobani, LLC, No. 20-CV-07437-EMC, 2021 WL 26 3487117, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2021)). Here, for example, the surveys to which plaintiffs cite lack relevance in that, as described in the SAC (see SAC ¶¶ 83-87), they do [27] not concern phrases like those used in the labels here at issue, but, rather, the use of the 1 Complaint, the Court found the absence of an “artificially flavored” disclosure is not, 2 standing alone, sufficient to plausibly plead a claim under the CLRA. See, e.g., Victor v. 3 R.C. Bigelow, Inc., No. 13-CV-02976-WHO, 2014 WL 1028881 , at *17 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 4 2014) (finding a “statement may technically violate some law and yet a reasonable 5 consumer may have no . . . expectation about it”). The Court did, however, afford 6 plaintiffs leave to amend to include, if they could, factual allegations demonstrating that 7 reasonable consumers are either aware of the regulation requiring such disclosure or, in 8 some manner, have become accustomed to seeing the words “artificially flavored” 9 whenever a product contains artificial flavors. 10 Although plaintiffs elected to amend, the only allegations in the SAC pertaining to 11 the above are conclusory in nature and lack any factual allegations in support thereof. 12 (See SAC ¶ 80 (alleging “consumers . . . reasonably expect that the use of artificial 13 flavors in a food would be affirmatively disclosed on the Products’ labels”); SAC ¶ 82 14 (alleging “the majority of reasonable consumers would interpret the flavoring statements 15 and omissions of affirmative disclosures on the Products’ labels” to mean “that the 16 Products contained only natural flavors and not any artificial flavors”)). 17 Accordingly, plaintiffs’ CLRA claim is subject to dismissal. 18 B. Unjust Enrichment and Breach of Express Warranty 19 Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim is based on the allegation that “[d]efendant, 20 through its marketing and labeling of the Products, misrepresented and deceived 21 consumers regarding the flavoring in the Products.” (See SAC ¶ 124). Similarly, 22 plaintiffs’ express warranty claim is based on the allegation that defendant “expressly 23 warranted that the Products contained only ‘Natural Flavors’ and ‘Natural Fruit Flavors.’” 24 (See SAC ¶ 132). As noted above, plaintiffs have failed to plead an actionable 25 representation as to flavoring. 26 Accordingly, like plaintiffs’ CLRA claim, plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment and breach of 27 warranty claims are subject to dismissal. See Kim v. Bluetrition Brands, Inc., No. 221 implied warranties” claims and “unjust enrichment” claims fail where underlying 2 || “consumer deception and fraud claims” fail). 3 C. Leave to Amend 4 As the Court has twice afforded plaintiffs leave to amend to cure the above5 || discussed deficiencies, and plaintiffs have been unable to do so, it does not appear that 6 || further leave to amend would be other than futile. 7 Accordingly, dismissal will be without further leave to amend. See Alexander v. 8 || Citigroup Glob. Markets Inc., 607 Fed. App’x 696, 697 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming 9 || dismissal; holding “[l]Jeave to amend is not required where granting leave would be 10 || futile”). [11] 12 CONCLUSION 13 For the reasons stated above, defendant's motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED 14 || and the SAC is hereby DISMISSED. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. a 16 17 || Dated: August 1, 2025 fale lld hate INE M. CHESNEY 18 United States District Judge