Stephenson v. Bisignano

[1] FILED IN THE 2 EASTER U N . S D . I S D T I R S I T C R T I C O T F C W O A U S R H T I NGTON Aug 18, 2025 [3] SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK [4] 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 PAMELA S.,1 No. 1:24-CV-03112-MKD 8 Plaintiff, ORDER REVERSING AND REMANDING DECISION OF 9 v. COMMISSIONER 10 FRANK BISIGNANO, ECF Nos. 10, 21 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 11 SECURITY,2 12 Defendant. [14] 15 1 To protect the privacy of plaintiffs in social security cases, the Court identifies 16 them by only their first names and the initial of their last names. See LCivR 5.2(c). 17 2 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May 7, 18 2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Frank 19 Bisignano is substituted for Michelle King as the defendant in this suit. No further 20 action need be taken to continue this suit. See 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). [21] 1 Before the Court are the parties’ briefs. ECF Nos. 10, 21. The Court, 2 having reviewed the administrative record and the parties’ briefing, is fully 3 informed. For the reasons discussed below, the Court reverses the Commissioner’s 4 decision and remands the case for the immediate calculation and award of benefits. 5 JURISDICTION 6 On July 9, 2019, Plaintiff applied for Title XVI supplemental security 7 income benefits alleging a disability onset date of July 1, 2019. Tr. 213-22. The 8 application was denied initially and on reconsideration. Tr. 134-42, 113-29. 9 Plaintiff appeared before an administrative law judge (ALJ) on April 13, 2021. Tr. 10 77-96. On May 20, 2021, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim. Tr. 27-51. This Court 11 subsequently remanded the matter on February 6, 2023. Tr. 1227-35. The ALJ 12 held a second hearing on March 7, 2024. Tr. 1198-1223. On May 22, 2024, the 13 ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim. Tr. 1163-97. Per 20 C.F.R. § 416.1484 , the ALJ’s 14 decision following this Court’s remand became the Commissioner’s final decision 15 for purposes of judicial review. 16 The Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383 (c)(3). 17 STANDARD OF REVIEW 18 A district court’s review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social 19 Security is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). The scope of review under § 405(g) is 20 limited; the Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed “only if it is not supported [21] 1 by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153 , 2 1158 (9th Cir. 2012). “Substantial evidence” means “relevant evidence that a 3 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 1159 4 (quotation and citation omitted). Stated differently, substantial evidence equates to 5 “more than a mere scintilla[,] but less than a preponderance.” Id. (quotation and 6 citation omitted). In determining whether the standard has been satisfied, a 7 reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole rather than searching 8 for supporting evidence in isolation. Id. 9 In reviewing a denial of benefits, a district court may not substitute its 10 judgment for that of the Commissioner. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152 , 11 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). If the evidence in the record “is susceptible to more than one 12 rational interpretation, [the court] must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are 13 supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 14 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded on other grounds by 20 C.F.R. §§ 15 404.1502(a), 416.902(a). Further, a district court “may not reverse an ALJ’s 16 decision on account of an error that is harmless.” Id. An error is harmless “where 17 it is inconsequential to the [ALJ’s] ultimate nondisability determination.” Id. at 18 1115 (quotation and citation omitted). The party appealing the ALJ’s decision 19 generally bears the burden of establishing that it was harmed. Shinseki v. Sanders, [20] 556 U.S. 396, 409-10 (2009). [21] 1 FIVE-STEP EVALUATION PROCESS 2 A claimant must satisfy two conditions to be considered “disabled” within 3 the meaning of the Social Security Act. First, the claimant must be “unable to 4 engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 5 physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which 6 has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve 7 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). Second, the claimant’s impairment must be 8 “of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work[,] but cannot, 9 considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of 10 substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 11 1382c(a)(3)(B). 12 The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential analysis to 13 determine whether a claimant satisfies the above criteria. See 20 C.F.R. § 14 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v). At step one, the Commissioner considers the claimant’s work 15 activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (a)(4)(i). If the claimant is engaged in “substantial 16 gainful activity,” the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 17 C.F.R. § 416.920 (b). 18 If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the analysis 19 proceeds to step two. At this step, the Commissioner considers the severity of the 20 claimant’s impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (a)(4)(ii). If the claimant suffers from [21] 1 “any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [his or 2 her] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities,” the analysis proceeds to 3 step three. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (c). If the claimant’s impairment does not satisfy 4 this severity threshold, however, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is 5 not disabled. Id. 6 At step three, the Commissioner compares the claimant’s impairment to 7 severe impairments recognized by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude 8 a person from engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 9 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the impairment is as severe or more severe than one of the 10 enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must find the claimant disabled and 11 award benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (d). 12 If the severity of the claimant’s impairment does not meet or exceed the 13 severity of the enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must pause to assess 14 the claimant’s “residual functional capacity.” Residual functional capacity (RFC), 15 defined generally as the claimant’s ability to perform physical and mental work 16 activities on a sustained basis despite his or her limitations, 20 C.F.R. § 17 416.945(a)(1), is relevant to both the fourth and fifth steps of the analysis. 18 At step four, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant’s 19 RFC, the claimant is capable of performing work that he or she has performed in 20 the past (past relevant work). 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (a)(4)(iv). If the claimant is [21] 1 capable of performing past relevant work, the Commissioner must find that the 2 claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (f). If the claimant is incapable of 3 performing such work, the analysis proceeds to step five. 4 At step five, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant’s 5 RFC, the claimant is capable of performing other work in the national economy. [6] 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (a)(4)(v). In making this determination, the Commissioner 7 must also consider vocational factors such as the claimant’s age, education and 8 past work experience. Id. If the claimant is capable of adjusting to other work, the 9 Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 10 416.920(g)(1). If the claimant is not capable of adjusting to other work, the 11 analysis concludes with a finding that the claimant is disabled and is therefore 12 entitled to benefits. Id. 13 The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four above. 14 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). If the analysis proceeds to 15 step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that (1) the claimant is 16 capable of performing other work; and (2) such work “exists in significant 17 numbers in the national economy.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.960 (c)(2); Beltran v. Astrue, [18] 700 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 2012). [21] 1 ALJ’S FINDINGS 2 At step one of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found Plaintiff has 3 not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 9, 2019. Tr. 1168. 4 At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe 5 impairments: hypermobility syndrome/Ehlers’s Danlos syndrome, asthma, 6 obstructive sleep apnea, morbid obesity, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 7 (ADHD), posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), bipolar disorder, dependent 8 personality disorder, mood disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and panic 9 disorder with agoraphobia. Tr. 1169. 10 At step three, the ALJ found Plaintiff does not have an impairment or 11 combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of a listed 12 impairment. Tr. 1170. 13 The ALJ then concluded that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform light work 14 with the following limitations: 15 [S]he can stand and/or walk for 4 hours in an 8-hour workday, and sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, 16 crawl, and climb ramps and/or stairs; never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasionally push/pull with the bilateral upper and lower 17 extremities; frequently but not constantly reach in front, laterally, and overhead with the bilateral upper extremities; frequently but not constantly 18 handle and/or finger with the bilateral upper extremities; can tolerate occasional exposure to fumes, odors, dusts, gases, poor ventilation and other 19 pulmonary irritants; can never be exposed to vibration and never work at unprotected heights or around moving mechanical parts or heavy machinery. 20 [Plaintiff] can understand, remember, and carry out simple, routine, and repetitive tasks involving only simple work-related decisions and occasional [21] 1 decision[]making and changes in the work setting; can tolerate occasional brief and superficial interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the public. [2] Tr. 1172. [3] At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant [4] work. Tr. 1185. At step five, the ALJ found that, considering Plaintiff’s age, [5] education, work experience, RFC, and testimony from the vocational expert, there [6] were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff [7] could perform, such as electrical accessories assembler, marker, and small parts [8] assembler. Tr. 1185-86. Therefore, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not under a [9] disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from the date of the application [10] through the date of the decision. Tr. 1187. [11] ISSUES [12] Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision denying [13] her supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security [14] Act. Plaintiff raises the following issues for review: [15] 1. Whether the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s testimony; [16] 2. Whether the ALJ properly evaluated the Listings; [17] 3. Whether the ALJ properly evaluated the medical opinion evidence; [18] 4. Whether the ALJ properly evaluated lay witness evidence; and [19] 5. Whether the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s tremors. [20] ECF No. 10 at 2. [21] 1 In response, Defendant concedes error with respect to the ALJ’s evaluation 2 of the medical opinion evidence and Plaintiff’s testimony and agrees remand is 3 appropriate, but seeks further proceedings. ECF No. 21. 4 DISCUSSION 5 The parties agree the ALJ harmfully erred but disagree as to the appropriate 6 remedy. Plaintiff seeks a remand for calculation and award of benefits. Defendant 7 agrees remand is appropriate, but only for further proceedings. For the reasons 8 discussed below, the Court exercises its discretion to remand this matter for the 9 immediate calculation and award of benefits. 10 A. Legal Standards Governing Scope of Remand 11 When the ALJ commits legal error in denying a claim for benefits, the 12 district court “ordinarily must remand to the agency for further proceedings before 13 directing an award of benefits.” Leon v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 14 2017). The Social Security Act, however, grants district courts flexibility in 15 certain circumstances to reverse the ALJ’s decision and remand for an immediate 16 award of benefits rather than further administrative proceedings. Treichler v. 17 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014). 18 Remand for an immediate award of benefits is allowed only when three 19 requirements (collectively referred to as the “credit-as-true” rule) are satisfied: (1) 20 the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether [21] 1 that evidence is claimant testimony or a medical opinion; (2) there are no 2 outstanding issues that must be resolved before a disability determination can be 3 made, the record is fully developed, and further administrative proceedings would 4 serve no useful purpose; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were 5 credited as true, the record as a whole would require the ALJ to find the claimant 6 disabled on remand. Leon, 880 F.3d at 1045 ; Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995 , 7 1020 (9th Cir. 2014). 8 Even if all three requirements are met, the decision whether to remand a case 9 for further proceedings or simply award benefits is in the Court’s discretion. 10 Washington v. Kijakazi, 72 F.4th 1029, 1041 (9th Cir. 2023). The Court may still 11 remand for further proceedings “when the record as a whole creates serious doubt 12 as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1021 . 13 B. Proper Remedy 14 All three steps of the credit-as-true rule are satisfied here. The first 15 requirement is satisfied for multiple reasons. As an initial matter, Defendant 16 concedes harmful legal error. Defendant explicitly concedes error on two of the 17 five issues raised by Plaintiff. ECF No. 21. Further, Defendant entirely failed to 18 address Plaintiff’s remaining assignments of error. If a party fails to counter an 19 argument that the opposing party makes, the Court may treat that argument as 20 conceded. The Court has no obligation to research or manufacture arguments on [21] 1 behalf of litigants. Defendant’s strategic choice not to substantively respond to 2 these arguments constitutes concession of these issues. See Hunt v. Colvin, 954 F. 3 Supp. 2d 1181, 1196 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (construing defendant’s failure to 4 respond to an argument as a concession that the plaintiff’s argument has merit and 5 finding the “Court will not manufacture a defense on the Commissioner’s behalf 6 where Plaintiff has identified an at least plausible error”); Johnny T. v. Berryhill, [7] 2019 WL 2866841 , at *2 (D. Or. July 2, 2019) (finding “the Commissioner’s 8 failure to substantively respond to Plaintiff's arguments regarding his symptom 9 testimony, medical opinion evidence, and lay witness testimony constitutes a 10 concession of those issues”). As such, the Court concludes that the ALJ erred by: 11 (1) failing to properly assess Plaintiff’s testimony; (2) failing to properly assess the 12 Listings; (3) failing to properly assess the medical opinion evidence; (4) failing to 13 properly assess the lay witness testimony; and (5) failing to assess Plaintiff’s 14 tremors. 15 As for the second requirement, the Court finds further administrative 16 proceedings would serve no useful purpose in light of the unusual posture of this 17 case. Two administrative hearings have already been held since Plaintiff first 18 applied for benefits in July 2019. The administrative record spans 3299 pages. 19 Defendant identifies normal findings in the record as inconsistent with Plaintiff’s 20 allegations yet fails to connect this evidence to relevant issues that remain which [21] 1 would require rehearing on matters already considered at the administrative level. 2 Defendant seeks not to develop unaddressed issues but rather rehash the very same 3 ones ALJs have now had multiple opportunities to consider. The Ninth Circuit has 4 stressed that precedent “foreclose[s] the argument that a remand for the purpose of 5 allowing the ALJ to have a mulligan [to revisit the medical opinions and testimony 6 that were improperly rejected] qualifies as a remand for a ‘useful purpose’ under 7 the ... credit-as-true analysis.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1021-22 (citations omitted); 8 see also Knorr v. Berryhill, 254 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1220 (C.D. Cal. 2017) 9 (“[R]emanding for the ALJ to reconsider this evidence, which the ALJ already had 10 an opportunity to review, would simply be allowing the ALJ to have a second bite 11 at the apple.”). The record does not require further proceedings. 12 Third, if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ 13 would be required to find Plaintiff disabled on remand. As noted above, Defendant 14 failed to defend the ALJ’s step three finding and, as noted by Plaintiff, see ECF 15 No. 22 at 4-6, improperly discredited evidence credited as true would compel a 16 finding of disability at step three, see, e.g., Tr. 1239. 17 Finally, the record as a whole does not create serious doubt as to whether 18 Plaintiff was disabled during the relevant period within the meaning of the Social 19 Security Act. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1021 . Defendant has not pointed to any [21] 1 particular aspect of this case that raises serious doubt, where the ALJ has already 2 been afforded multiple opportunities to assess the evidence and Plaintiff has 3 offered consistent testimony at each hearing. Moreover, the credit-as-true rule is a 4 “prophylactic measure” designed to motivate Defendant to ensure that the record 5 will be carefully assessed and to justify “equitable concerns” about the length of 6 time which has elapsed since a claimant has filed their application. Treichler, 775 7 F.3d at 1100. Despite prior attempts, the administrative decisions continue to not 8 be properly supported, causing extreme delay. 9 The Court has no serious doubts as to whether Plaintiff is disabled, and finds 10 that the significant delay since Plaintiff applied for disability in 2019 also weighs 11 in favor of a finding of disability. Under these circumstances, the Court exercises 12 its discretion to remand this matter for a finding of disability. 13 CONCLUSION 14 Having reviewed the record and the ALJ’s findings, the Court concludes the 15 ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence and free of harmful legal 16 error. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 17 1. The District Court Executive is directed to substitute Frank Bisignano as 18 Defendant and update the docket sheet. 19 2. Plaintiff’s Brief, ECF No. 10, is GRANTED. 20 3. Defendant’s Brief, ECF No. 21, is DENIED. [21] 1 4. The Clerk’s Office shall enter JUDGMENT in favor of Plaintiff 2 REVERSING and REMANDING the matter to the Commissioner of Social 3 Security for immediate calculation and award of benefits. 4 The District Court Executive is directed to file this Order, provide copies to 5 counsel, and CLOSE THE FILE. 6 DATED August 18, 2025. 7 s/Mary K. Dimke MARY K. DIMKE 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE