State of Louisiana v. Gerard Hill

STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2025-K-0316 VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL GERARD HILL * FOURTH CIRCUIT * STATE OF LOUISIANA ******* APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH NO. 562-764, SECTION “L” Judge Angel Harris ****** Judge Dale N. Atkins ****** (Court composed of Judge Daniel L. Dysart, Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge Dale N. Atkins) Jason R. Williams, District Attorney Brad Scott, Chief of Appeals Thomas Frederick, Assistant District Attorney PARISH OF ORLEANS 619 S. White Street New Orleans, LA 70119 COUNSEL FOR RELATOR, the State of Louisiana WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED IN PART AUGUST 19, 2025 [1] DNA DLD RML 2 This is a criminal case. Relator, the State of Louisiana (“State”), seeks 3 review of the district court’s April 7, 2025 judgment, which granted in part and 4 denied in part the “Motion for Suppression of Statements” (“Motion to Suppress”) 5 filed by Respondent, Gerard Hill (“Mr. Hill”). For the following reasons, we grant 6 the State’s writ application and reverse the district court’s judgment insofar as it 7 granted Mr. Hill’s Motion to Suppress in part and suppressed some of his 8 statements. 9 RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 10 On July 25, 2024, the State charged Mr. Hill by grand jury indictment with 11 second degree murder with a firearm in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. When Mr. 12 Hill appeared for arraignment on August 5, 2024, he pled not guilty to the charge. 13 Then, on August 22, 2024, Mr. Hill filed his Motion to Suppress1 wherein he 14 sought “[s]uppression . . . of all involuntary statements obtained in violation of 15 [his] Fifth Amendment rights as well as his rights under Article 1, Sections 13 and 16 16 of the Louisiana Constitution and La. R.S. 15:451.” In terms of the United 17 States Constitution, Mr. Hill also requested suppression pursuant to the Due 1 Mr. Hill filed his Motion to Suppress as part of an “Omnibus Motion for Discovery; Motion to Preserve Evidence; Motion for Suppression of Statements, Evidence and Identifications; and Motion for a Preliminary Examination.” 1 Process Clause, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the Fourth 2 Amendment, as well as “all other applicable constitutional and statutory 3 provisions.” Mr. Hill further requested suppression “pursuant to [Miranda v. 4 Arizona], 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and its progeny under both the state and federal 5 constitutions.” Thereafter, the district court held a hearing on Mr. Hill’s Motion to 6 Suppress on February 13 and 14, 2025. 7 Hearing 8 Detective James Fyfe Testimony 9 Detective James Fyfe (“Det. Fyfe”) testified that in April 2024 he was 10 assigned to the New Orleans Police Department’s (“NOPD”) Homicide Section 11 and was assigned as lead homicide investigator for the subject murder. Det. Fyfe 12 testified that the NOPD became aware of a homicide at 500 St. Maurice Avenue in 13 New Orleans, Louisiana, because of a 911 call made by Mr. Hill wherein he stated 14 that he had shot someone inside his apartment. Det. Fyfe explained that in response 15 to the 911 call, some initial officers were dispatched to the scene to make sure it 16 was safe and to investigate the reason for the call. During Det. Fyfe’s testimony, 17 the State introduced Exhibits 1 and 2, the body-worn camera footage of Sergeant 18 James Doaty, Jr. (“Sgt. Doaty”) and the body-worn camera footage of another 19 officer who responded as backup on the scene, respectively.2 [20] 2 Det. Fyfe stated in his testimony that he did not recall the name of the officer from whom the Exhibit 2 body-worm camera footage came. [2] 1 Sergeant James Doaty, Jr. Testimony and Exhibit 1 2 Sgt. Doaty3 testified that on April 4, 2024, he was working for the Fifth 3 Police District of the NOPD, on which date he arrested Mr. Hill inside of Mr. 4 Hill’s residence. Sgt. Doaty explained that, prior to the arrest, he arrived at Mr. 5 Hill’s apartment on the limited information that “a person [had been] shot at that 6 location.” Sgt. Doaty clarified that upon his arrival, he “[did not] have any 7 additional information from the [911] dispatcher,” including who shot the victim 8 and the status of the victim. While Sgt. Doaty testified, the State played footage 9 from his body-worn camera footage from the subject incident, and Sgt. Doaty 10 described what was happening. 11 At the outset, the footage revealed Sgt. Doaty knocking on a door and 12 identifying himself as a police officer before Mr. Hill opened the door. Sgt. Doaty 13 then asked Mr. Hill, what was “going on,” and he responded “[she is] laying down 14 on the side of the bed.” Then, Sgt. Doaty asked Mr. Hill if he had shot somebody, 15 to which Mr. Hill responded, “yes, sir.” Sgt. Doaty next asked Mr. Hill where the 16 weapon was, and Mr. Hill stated it was on the dresser as Sgt. Doaty crossed the 17 threshold of the front door into the residence. Subsequently, Sgt. Doaty asked Mr. 18 Hill “what happened,” and he stated that the victim “was smoking crack, which I 19 [do not] . . . I picked up the . . .” Sgt. Doaty interrupted Mr. Hill to ask where the 20 victim was shot, and he responded, “In her side.” Thereafter, Sgt. Doaty instructed 21 Mr. Hill to have a seat on the couch. When counsel for the State asked Sgt. Doaty 22 what his “primary concern” was when “asking those [preliminary] questions,” he 23 responded, “A couple of things. My primary concern was to ascertain were there 3 The index of the hearing transcript lists Sgt. Doaty’s full name as “James Doaty Oakes, Jr.,” but Sgt. Doaty introduced himself as “Sergeant James Doaty, Jr.” [3] 1 still armed perpetrators at the location, ascertain the facts as to what exactly 2 happened, and kind of protect the scene, if need be.” Counsel for the State then 3 asked Sgt. Doaty what his “next concern” was “after getting the information” from 4 Mr. Hill, and he responded, “My next concern was to check on the victim to see 5 exactly what her status was. And I noticed that Mr. Hill was handicapped, so I 6 wanted him to sit down on the couch so that he [would not] fall.” 7 Thereafter, the State played more of the body-worn camera footage, which 8 depicted Sgt. Doaty walk into a bedroom; check on the victim; radio to dispatch 9 that an unresponsive female was suffering from a gunshot wound on her left side; 10 ask for EMS personnel; and advise that he had the suspect in the residence with 11 him. When counsel for the State asked Sgt. Doaty whether he had, at that point, 12 “made a decision as to whether or not [he was] going to arrest [Mr. Hill],” Sgt. 13 Doaty responded, “no, sir, not at this time” because he did not have “all of the 14 facts” and was “still unclear what was going on.” Sgt. Doaty further testified he 15 “just wanted to check on the victim and then to find out exactly what happened at 16 that point” and “[did not] have any reasonable suspicion to make an arrest at that 17 time.” Counsel for the State then asked Sgt. Doaty for “some of the factors [he 18 was] trying to determine before [he] made an arrest,” and he responded that he 19 “was trying to ascertain the facts to see if this was some type of self-defense type 20 [of] situation, if this was justifiable, all that type of stuff.” 21 Subsequently, the State resumed playing the footage, and it depicted Sgt. 22 Doaty exit the bedroom, enter the living room where Mr. Hill remained seated on 23 the couch, and again ask Mr. Hill what happened. During the footage, Mr. Hill then 24 explained that he encountered the victim earlier that day while out picking up 25 another bottle of alcohol, noting that he and the victim “knew each other [4] 1 previously”; they went to his residence; they had a “sexual encounter”; and then 2 the victim “pulled out crack and started smoking.” Mr. Hill continued explaining to 3 Sgt. Doaty that he had been “twenty-five years clean. I take a little hit of ‘that s---.’ 4 She turned around and wanted to take the money and not wanted [to do] nothing, 5 and . . . I really [do not] know, man . . .” During the footage, Sgt. Doaty can be 6 heard interrupting Mr. Hill and then seen placing Mr. Hill in handcuffs. 7 The footage revealed Mr. Hill became agitated while Sgt. Doaty placed the 8 handcuffs on him, to which Sgt. Doaty responded: “Dude, you just shot somebody, 9 calm down.” While continuing to try to place the handcuffs on Mr. Hill, Sgt. Doaty 10 then repeatedly told Mr. Hill to calm down and to relax, and Mr. Hill ultimately 11 stated, “I knew I did it.” The footage then showed Sgt. Doaty walk to the door to 12 await backup and Sgt. Doaty can be heard explaining to Mr. Hill that he would be 13 advised of his rights. Regarding this section of the footage, Sgt. Doaty testified that 14 he could not ask any further questions of Mr. Hill because he did not have a 15 “Miranda card” with him to Mirandize Mr. Hill. Sgt. Doaty stated that he knew 16 other officers were on their way and that once they arrived, he ordered an officer to 17 Mirandize Mr. Hill. 18 Exhibit 2 – Body-Worn Camera Footage of Another Officer 19 In addition to Sgt. Doaty’s body-worn camera footage, the State also 20 introduced into evidence the body-worn camera footage of another office.4 As 21 depicted therein, backup officers entered Mr. Hill’s residence where he sat on the 22 couch and in handcuffs. The footage revealed the officer wearing the body-worn 23 camera advise Mr. Hill of his rights after being informed by Sgt. Doaty that Mr. 24 Hill had not yet been so advised. Thereafter, Mr. Hill stated that he understood his 4 The name of the backup, responding officer is unclear from the State’s writ application. [5] 1 rights, and he provided his name to the officer when asked. When the officer 2 subsequently asked who the victim was to Mr. Hill, he responded that the victim 3 was a “trickster to me” whose name was “a mystery to” him. Thereafter, another 4 officer can be seen waving to get the attention of the officer wearing the body- 5 worn camera and heard saying, “just stop.” Thereafter, the officer wearing the 6 body-worn camera walked away from Mr. Hill and other officers can be seen in the 7 background speaking with Mr. Hill though the conversation is not audible on the 8 footage. 9 As the footage continued, the officer wearing the body-worn camera 10 ultimately returned to Mr. Hill and, for approximately forty-five minutes, the 11 officers can be heard discussing various topics with him, including his health, 12 people he knew at the police department, and the shooting itself. At one point, the 13 officer wearing the body-worn camera asked Mr. Hill, “What happened tonight?” 14 and “What made you shoot this woman?”. Mr. Hill responded, “she reneged on the 15 situation involving sexual acts.” When asked if the victim was a prostitute, Mr. 16 Hill responded that he did not know but that this was his “second time having an 17 encounter with her.” Mr. Hill explained that when the victim reneged on the sexual 18 arrangement, he reached in a drawer, told her to give his money back, and “from 19 there [he did not] know” what happened. Rather, according to Mr. Hill, the next 20 thing he remembered was seeing blood and dialing 911. 21 Judgment 22 On April 7, 2025, the district court issued its judgment and written reasons,5 23 The judgment denied Mr. Hill’s Motion to Suppress in part and granted it in part. 5 The district court labeled the judgment as “Opinion and Order.” [6] 1 The district court broke down the statements at issue into three sets, deeming the 2 first set admissible and the second and third sets suppressed. 3 Specifically, in terms of the first set of statements, the district court denied 4 Mr. Hill’s Motion to Suppress regarding the following statements he made in 5 response to Sgt. Doaty’s initial questions at the door. 6 Sgt. Doaty: “What do you got going on, brother?” [7] 8 Mr. Hill: “She layin’ down on her side over there.” [9] 10 Sgt. Doaty: “You shot somebody?” [11] 12 Mr. Hill; “Yes sir.” [13] 14 Sgt. Doaty: “Where’s the weapon?” [15] 16 Mr. Hill: “It’s sitting on the dresser.” [17] 18 (Excerpted from the district court’s judgment.) The district court reasoned that Mr. 19 Hill “was not in police custody when Sgt. Doaty was questioning him at his door.” 20 The district court further reasoned that “Sgt. Doaty’s first three questions [were] 21 investigatory in nature and aimed to ensure officer safety,” such that “Mr. Hill’s 22 answers in response [were] admissible.” 23 However, the district court granted Mr. Hill’s Motion to Suppress with 24 respect to the second set of statements made by Mr. Hill. The second set included 25 the subsequent statements Mr. Hill made to Sgt. Doaty at the door, specifically his 26 answers during the following colloquy: 27 Sgt. Doaty: “What happened?” [28] 29 Mr. Hill: “We were smoking crack . . .” [30] 31 Sgt. Doaty: “Where did you shoot at?” [32] 33 Mr. Hill: “In her side.” [7] 1 Sgt. Doaty: “Alright. Have a seat on that couch right there. Sit down 2 right there, sit down. Just sit down.” [3] 4 (Excerpted from the district court’s judgment.) As reasoned by the district court, 5 “Sgt. Doaty’s continued questioning violate[d] the Due Process Clause, shifting 6 from a preliminary investigation to an improper interrogation.” 7 Additionally, the second set of statements, as designated by the district 8 court, included those Mr. Hill made after Sgt. Doaty instructed him to sit on the 9 couch, checked on the victim, and again asked what happened but prior to Sgt. 10 Doaty placing him under arrest. The district court found that “Mr. Hill was in 11 custody at the time the . . . statements were made” because “the combination of 12 Sgt. Doaty’s actions, following Mr. Hill’s admissions, would cause any reasonable 13 person in his position to discern they were not free to move, much less free to leave 14 the premises of their home.” As explained by the district court, “[d]espite this 15 custodial setting, Sgt. Doaty failed to advise Mr. Hill of his Miranda rights and 16 continue[d] to question Mr. Hill” even though there was “no immediate threat to 17 the investigation nor to officer safety” because “once Mr. Hill was ordered to sit on 18 the couch, he appeared calm, compliant, unarmed, and physically vulnerable (Mr. 19 Hill was barely clothed and speaking with slurred speech).” 20 Further, as part of the second set of statements that the district court 21 suppressed, the district court included the conversation between Sgt. Doaty and 22 Mr. Hill as Sgt. Doaty placed him in handcuffs. The district court ruled “[t]he 23 nature of this custodial interrogation became more evident when Sgt. Doaty 24 place[d] Mr. Hill in handcuffs,” such that the following statements also had to be 25 suppressed: 26 Sgt. Doaty: “I’m going to have to detain you. Put your hands—” [8] 1 Mr. Hill: “I understand. I’m not moving.” [2] 3 Sgt. Doaty: “Put your hands right here, have a seat right there.” [4] 5 Mr. Hill says something inaudible. [6] 7 Sgt. Doaty: “Dude, you just shot somebody, calm down.” [8] 9 Mr. Hill: “I’m asking you—” [10] 11 Sgt. Doaty: I am. Calm down. [12] 13 Mr. Hill: I’m asking you to make sure— [14] 15 Sgt. Doaty: I am. Calm down. Just relax. [16] 17 Mr. Hill: Alright. I’m not going to get up to tell you anything. I knew 18 I did it; but I’m not going to let nobody take nothing. [19] 20 Sgt. Doaty: Turn your head this way. [21] 22 (Excerpted from the district court’s judgment.) The district court reasoned that 23 because “Sgt. Doaty fail[ed] to advise Mr. Hill of his Miranda rights when 24 detaining him and simultaneously reinforce[d] his alleged culpability by saying, 25 ‘You shot somebody,’” the “incriminating response [to] that statement—‘I knew I 26 did it’—was elicited in violation of his constitutional rights.” 27 Turning to the third set of statements, the district court categorized these as 28 the statements made by Mr. Hill after the unidentified officer wearing the body- 29 worn camera in the footage admitted as State’s Exhibit 2 administered the Miranda 30 warning to Mr. Hill. The district court suppressed these statements, in part, on the 31 basis that “officers must cease questioning once another officer instructs them to 32 stop or if there is ambiguity regarding whether the defendant understood their 33 rights.” As described by the district court, Mr. Hill stated he understood his 34 Miranda rights, but an officer subsequently told the questioning officer to “stop 35 talking,” such that the questioning officer should have stopped. The district court [9] 1 stated it was also suppressing Mr. Hill’s post-Miranda statements on the basis that 2 “a subsequent officer, whose body-worn camera footage [was] not available to [the 3 district court] is observed questioning Mr. Hill.” According to the district court, 4 “without this footage, [the district court was] unable to ascertain the content of the 5 exchange or determine whether Mr. Hill invoked his constitutional rights.” The 6 district court further reasoned the entire exchange in State’s Exhibit 2 had to “be 7 suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree” because of the “improper questioning of 8 Mr. Hill in State’s Ex[hibit] 1” (Sgt. Doaty’s body-worn camera footage). 9 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 10 In its writ application to this Court, the State asserts one assignment of error, 11 contending “[t]he [district] court abused its discretion by suppressing statements 12 made by [Mr. Hill] on the scene.” This Court ordered Mr. Hill to file a response to 13 the State’s writ application but did not receive one from him. Before resolving the 14 issues raised by the State’s writ application, we begin with the standard of review 15 applicable to motions to suppress. 16 STANDARD OF REVIEW 17 The district courts are afforded great discretion when ruling on motions to 18 suppress, such that an appellate court will not disturb a district court’s ruling on a 19 motion to suppress absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Debose, 2024-0217, 20 p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/13/24), 390 So.3d 971 , 977 (citing State v. Willis, 2022- 21 0452, pp. 6-7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/1/22), 348 So.3d 167 , 172). An appellate court 22 affords “great weight” to the district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress 23 “because the [district] court ha[d] the opportunity to observe the witnesses and 24 weigh the credibility of their testimony.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Willis, 25 2022-0452, p. 7, 348 So.3d at 172. However, as this Court has further explained, “a [10] 1 motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.” Id. at p. 7, 390 2 So.3d at 977. As such, “the appellate court reviews the underlying facts for an 3 abuse of discretion ‘but reviews conclusions to be drawn from those facts de 4 novo.’” Id. Conversely, when the facts are not in dispute, “the appellate court need 5 only ‘consider whether the trial court came to the proper legal determination under 6 the undisputed facts.’” Id. In the matter sub judice, the underlying facts are not in 7 dispute. Accordingly, we will conduct a de novo review of the district court’s 8 judgment. 9 DISCUSSION 10 As stated previously, the State contends that the district court erred in 11 granting Mr. Hill’s Motion to Suppress in part. Regarding motions to suppress, La. 12 C.Cr.P. art. 703(B) provides that “[a] defendant may move on any constitutional 13 ground to suppress a confession or statement of any nature made by the 14 defendant.” In pertinent part, La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(D) states that “[o]n the trial of a 15 motion to suppress filed under the provisions of this Article, the burden of proof is 16 on the defendant to prove the ground of his motion, except that the state shall have 17 the burden of proving the admissibility of a purported confession or statement by 18 the defendant.” See also State v. Willis, 2022-0452, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/1/22), [19] 348 So.3d 167 , 173 (citing La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(D)). Additionally, La. R.S. 15:451 20 explains that “[b]efore what purports to be a confession can be introduced in 21 evidence, it must be affirmatively shown that it was free and voluntary, and not 22 made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, 23 inducements or promises.” Thus, at the hearing on Mr. Hill’s Motion to Suppress, 24 the State bore the burden of proving the admissibility of his statements. 25 Accordingly, we must determine whether the State met this burden. We separate [11] 1 our analysis into Mr. Hill’s second and third sets of statements (as defined by the 2 district court) so as to focus in each section on the law applicable to the 3 admissibility of those statements. 4 Second Set of Statements 5 As summarized previously, Mr. Hill’s second set of statements occurred 6 before he received a Miranda warning and included Mr. Hill’s responses to Sgt. 7 Doaty asking Mr. Hill what happened at the front door; Sgt. Doaty again asking 8 Mr. Hill what happened after having instructed Mr. Hill to sit on the couch while 9 he checked on the victim; and Sgt. Doaty’s conversation with Mr. Hill while the 10 former placed the latter in handcuffs. The district court suppressed these statements 11 on the basis that this situation was a custodial interrogation, such that Mr. Hill 12 should have received his Miranda rights before these conversations occurred. 13 Thus, we turn to the laws on custodial interrogations and Miranda warnings. 14 As to “the free and voluntary nature of confessions and statements, both the 15 Louisiana and United States Constitutions provide ‘procedural safeguards effective 16 to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.’” Willis, 2022-0452, p. 8, 348 17 So.3d at 173 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 , 86 S.Ct. at 1612 ). In this regard, 18 the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that no person “shall 19 be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .” In 20 interpreting the Fifth Amendment in Miranda, the United States Supreme Court 21 held “that [it] is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to 22 protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any 23 significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves.” 384 U.S. at 467 , [24] 86 S.Ct. at 1624 . Additionally, in Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held 25 that “[p]rior to any questioning, [a person who has been taken into custody or [12] 1 otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way] must be 2 warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be 3 used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, 4 either retained or appointed.” 384 U.S. at 444 , 86 S.Ct. at 1612 . 5 Turning to the Louisiana Constitution, La. Const. art. I, § 13 (1974) pertains 6 to the “[r]ights of the [a]ccused” and states that “[w]hen any person has been 7 arrested or detained in connection with the investigation or commission of any 8 offense, he [or she] shall be advised fully of the reason for his [or her] arrest or 9 detention, his [or her] right to remain silent, his [or her] right against self[- 10 ]incrimination, his [or her] right to the assistance of counsel and, if indigent, his [or 11 her] right to court appointed counsel.” See also La. C.Cr.P. art. 218.1 (explaining 12 that if someone is “arrested or detained in connection with the investigation or 13 commission of any offense,” then “he shall be advised fully of the reason for his 14 arrest or detention, his right to remain silent, his right against self incrimination, 15 his right to the assistance of counsel and, if indigent, his right to court appointed 16 counsel”). In previously discussing these provisions from the United States and 17 Louisiana Constitutions, this Court quoted the following excerpt from an opinion 18 issued by the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal: 19 Before an inculpatory statement made during a custodial 20 interrogation[6] may be introduced into evidence, the State must prove, 21 beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was first advised of his 22 Miranda rights, that he voluntarily and intelligently waived them, and 23 that the statement was made freely and voluntarily and not under the 24 influence of fear, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements, or 25 promises. [26] 6 This Court has defined “custodial interrogation” as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Willis, 2022-0452, p. 10, 345 So.3d at 173-74 (quoting State v. Marzett, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/9/10), 40 So.3d 1204, 1211 ). [13] 1 Willis, 2022-0452, p. 9, 348 So.3d at 173 (quoting State v. Chester, 2019-0363, pp. 2 30-31 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/3/21), 314 So.3d 914 , 944). 3 In State v. Bernard, the Louisiana Supreme Court delineated the three 4 factors that must be present so as to mandate the advisement of Miranda rights: 5 “(1) the defendant is in ‘custody’ or significantly deprived of freedom, (2) there is 6 an ‘interrogation,’ and (3) the interrogation is conducted by a ‘law enforcement 7 officer’ or someone acting as their agent.” 2009-1178, p. 5 (La. 3/16/10), 31 So.3d 8 1025, 1029. For purposes of Miranda, a suspect is considered to be in custody if “a 9 reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood the situation to 10 constitute a restraint of freedom of movement of the degree associated with formal 11 arrest.” Willis, 2022-0452, p. 10, 345 So.3d at 174 (quoting State v. Barabin, 2013- 12 0334, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/11/13), 124 So.3d 1121, 1124 ). As such, “[c]ustodial 13 interrogation includes situations which fall short of an actual arrest but where the 14 accused is questioned by the police in a setting which indicated that [the accused] 15 has been deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way.” Id. (second 16 alteration in original) (quoting State v. Alford, 29,343, p. 6 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/9/97), [17] 694 So.2d 1162, 1166 ). 18 In terms of the custody factor, this Court recently explained that 19 [c]ustody is decided by two distinct inquiries: an objective assessment 20 of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation to determine 21 whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of the degree 22 associated with formal arrest; and second, an evaluation of how a 23 reasonable person in the position of the interviewee would gauge the 24 breadth of his freedom of action. [25] 26 State v. Atkins, 2025-0186, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/21/25), ___ So.3d ___, ____, [27] 2025 WL 1462073 , at *4 (quoting State v. Hankton, 2012-0466, p. 13 (La. App. 4 28 Cir. 4/20/14), 140 So.3d 398, 407 ). Further, as recently explained by this Court, [14] 1 “[t]o evaluate how a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would ‘gauge 2 the breadth of his freedom of action,’ courts review the totality of the 3 circumstances surrounding the interrogation.” Id. (quoting State v. Robertson, 4 2017-0398 p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/12/17), 219 So.3d 1125, 1127-28 ). This totality 5 of the circumstances review includes consideration of “any circumstance that 6 would have affected how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would 7 perceive his or her freedom to leave, but ignoring the subjective views harbored by 8 either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.” Id. Relevant 9 factors include the location of the questioning; the duration of the questioning; 10 statements made during the interview; the presence or absence of physical 11 restraints during the questioning; and the release of the interviewee at the end of 12 the questioning. Id., 2025-0186, p. 9, ___ So.3d at ___, 2025 WL 1462073 , at *4 13 (quoting Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509 , 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1189 , 182 L.Ed.2d 14 17 (2012)). Further, “pointed or accusatory questioning may indicate to a 15 reasonable person that he or she is not free to leave.” State v. Noehl, 2024-01224, 16 p. 13 (La. 6/27/25), ___ So.3d ___, ___, 2025 WL 1788036 , at *7. 17 “[T]temporary detentions that fall short of circumstances associated with a 18 formal arrest are not considered ‘custody’ for Miranda purposes, and statements 19 made during such a temporary detention are not rendered inadmissible based on 20 the absence of Miranda warnings.” Atkins, 2025-0186, p. 12, ___ So.3d at ___, [21] 2025 WL 1462073 , at *6. This is true even in instances when officers instruct 22 someone to sit down in a particular spot while they handle the situation at hand. Id. 23 (wherein this Court held that a custodial interrogation for Miranda purposes had 24 not occurred even though the officers asked the defendant to have a seat to prevent 25 him from potentially accessing a hidden firearm and to prevent his continued [15] 1 harassment of the victim). Even “the use of handcuffs does not necessarily escalate 2 a detention into a state of being ‘in custody’ for Miranda purposes,” particularly if 3 the officer has “reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant while . . . 4 question[ing] him.” Barabin, 2013-0334, p. 6, 124 So.3d at 1124 . Moreover, 5 “[e]ven when a defendant is in custody, his spontaneous statements need not be 6 suppressed if they are not the product of [the] custodial interrogation.” Id. at p. 11, [7] 124 So.3d at 1127 (citing State v. Smith, 2000–1838, pp. 3-4 (La.5/25/01), 785 8 So.2d 815, 817 ). 9 Turning to the matter sub judice, the questions Sgt. Doaty asked at Mr. 10 Hill’s front door and after he entered Mr. Hill’s apartment were not part of a 11 custodial detention. Nor did Sgt. Doaty’s instruction to Mr. Hill to sit down on the 12 sofa result in this being a custodial detention just as this Court recently found in 13 Atkins. Rather, in the totality of the circumstances, Sgt. Doaty’s intent in entering 14 the apartment and asking Mr. Hill to have a seat was not “to affect an extended or 15 significant restraint on [Mr. Hill]’s freedom,” but for Mr. Hill’s health and well- 16 being (given his handicapped condition) to allow Sgt. Doaty the opportunity to 17 check on the victim and determine the location of the weapon to make sure it was 18 secure. Atkins, 2025-0186, p. 12, ___ So.3d at ___, 2025 WL 1462073 , at *6. 19 Further, Sgt. Doaty’s questions were of a general nature in response to Mr. Hill’s 20 initial statement that he had shot someone (e.g., “Where’s the weapon?” and “What 21 happened?”), not pointed or accusatory.7 See Noehl, 2024-01224, p. 13, ___ So.3d 22 at ___, 2025 WL 1788036 , at *7. In our objective assessment of the circumstances 7 As outlined previously, Mr. Hill answered affirmatively that he had shot someone in his first set of statements (as categorized by the district court) to Sgt. Doaty when he answered the knock at his door. The district court denied Mr. Hill’s Motion to Suppress with regard to his first set of statements. [16] 1 surrounding the interrogation, we find there was no formal arrest or restraint on 2 freedom of the degree associated with a formal arrest. The record shows that a 3 reasonable person in Mr. Hill’s position would not believe he or she was deprived 4 of their freedom in any significant way or otherwise detained during this time. 5 When Sgt. Doaty thereafter placed Mr. Hill in handcuffs, he did so because 6 Mr. Hill had already stated that he shot the victim, such that Sgt. Doaty had 7 reasonable suspicion to detain him at that point. See Barabin, 2013-0334, p. 6, 124 8 So.3d at 1124. Though the district court ruled that Mr. Hill’s statement during the 9 handcuffing—“I knew I did it.”—was in response to Sgt. Doaty stating, “Dude, 10 you just shot somebody, calm down,” we disagree with this characterization that 11 Sgt. Doaty’s comment elicited Mr. Hill’s statement. Rather, Mr. Hill made that 12 statement after Sgt. Doaty merely asked him two more times to calm down and 13 relax so that Sgt. Doaty could secure the handcuffs. Mr. Hill’s statement of “I 14 knew I did it.” was a spontaneous statement he made, not the product of a custodial 15 interrogation. See Barbin, p. 11, 124 So.3d at 1127 (citing Smith, 2000-1838, pp. 3- 16 4, 785 So.2d at 817). Therefore, suppression of that statement was not warranted 17 because “spontaneous statements need not be suppressed if they are not the product 18 of a custodial interrogation.” Barabin, 2013-0334, p. 11, 124 So.3d at 1127 (citing 19 Smith, 2000 -1838, pp. 3-4, 785 So.2d at 817). Id. In light of the foregoing, we find 20 the district court erred in suppressing Mr. Hill’s second set of statements. 21 Admissibility of the Third Set of Statements 22 The third set of statements, as categorized by the district court, were those 23 Mr. Hill made after receiving his Miranda rights from the officer wearing the 24 body-worn camera whose footage constituted State’s Exhibit 2. The district court 25 suppressed this set of statements on the basis that although “the initial questions in [17] 1 State’s Ex. 2 [the unknown officer’s body-worn camera footage] were proper, due 2 to the improper questioning of Mr. Hill in State’s Ex. 1 [Sgt. Doaty’s body-worn 3 camera footage], Mr. Hill’s entire [third set of] statement[s] should be suppressed 4 as fruit of the poisonous tree.” In support of this finding, the district court cited to 5 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) and Wong Sun 6 v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). 7 In discussing Mr. Hill’s third set of statements, the district court listed two 8 additional reasons it found these statements to be problematic. First, the district 9 court noted that after the officer gave Mr. Hill his Miranda rights, another officer 10 told that questioning officer to stop. Citing to Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 11 370 , 130 S.Ct. 2250 , 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010), the district court stated the 12 questioning officer needed to cease questioning after being instructed to stop. 13 Second, the district court noted that during State’s Exhibit 2, 14 “a subsequent officer, whose body-worn camera footage [wa]s not available to this 15 [c]ourt, is observed questioning Mr. Hill.” The district court found that “[t]he 16 absence of direct documentation of the second officer’s interaction with Mr. Hill 17 raises material concerns” because it was “unable to ascertain the content of the 18 exchange or determine whether Mr. Hill invoked his constitutional rights.” 19 We begin with the district court’s finding that Mr. Hill’s third set of 20 statements had to be suppressed under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. As 21 this Court has explained, “the [fruit of the poisonous tree] doctrine serves to 22 exclude from evidence the direct and indirect products of illegal violations of the 23 Fourth Amendment” to the United States Constitution.8 State v. Nicholas, 2010- 8 The Fourth Amendment provides: [18] 1 1188, p. 15 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/20/10), 51 So.3d 98, 107-08 . Also known as “[t]he 2 exclusionary rule,” it “bars, as illegal ‘fruit of the poisonous tree,’ any physical and 3 verbal evidence obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful 4 invasion.” State v. Williams, 2020-46, p. 43 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/30/20), 308 So.3d 5 791, 825 n.61 (citing State v. Salinas, 17-485 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/6/18), 251 So.3d 6 1166, 1174). Not only does “[t]he rule extend[] to . . . primary evidence obtained 7 during or as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure,” but also to “evidence 8 later discovered and found to be a derivative of illegality.” Id. However, as this 9 Court has further explained, “[w]hen there is no primary illegality, the ‘fruit of the 10 poisonous tree theory’ does not apply.” State v. Cavalier, 2014-0579, p. 19 (La. 11 App. 4 Cir. 6/19/15), 171 So.3d 1117, 1129 (citing State v. St. Hill, 433 So.2d 395 , 12 398 (La. App. 4th Cir.1983)). Accordingly, a trial court should not suppress 13 evidence or statements subsequently obtained if the initial interaction with the 14 defendant was not illegal. Id. Thus, to resolve whether the district court correctly 15 suppressed Mr. Hill’s third set of statements under the fruit of the poisonous tree 16 doctrine, we must first determine whether there was an initial illegality during 17 State’s Exhibit 1 (Sgt. Doaty’s body-worn camera footage) so as to render the 18 doctrine applicable to the statements made in State’s Exhibit 2 (the unknown 19 officer’s body-worn camera footage). 20 The district court found that Mr. Hill’s first set of statements in State’s 21 Exhibit 1—his responses to the three questions initially asked by Sgt. Doaty at the 22 front door—were admissible because Mr. Hill was not in police custody and The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. [19] 1 because Sgt. Doaty’s questions were “investigatory in nature and aimed to ensure 2 officer safety.” The first set of statements include Mr. Hill’s answers to Sgt. Doaty 3 asking him “What do you got going on, brother?”; “You shot somebody?”; and 4 “Where’s the weapon?”. We agree with the district court and thus find no reason to 5 disturb this holding. See State v. Estes, 2014-781, p. 21 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/25/15), [6] 168 So.3d 847, 860 (explaining that “[t]he Louisiana Supreme Court has 7 consistently held that ‘Miranda warnings are not a pre-requisite to admissibility of 8 statements taken by officers during noncustodial, general, on-the-scene 9 investigations, conducted to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding a 10 possible crime’”). As determined in the previous section, Mr. Hill was not in 11 custody when his second set of statements occurred (after Sgt. Doaty entered the 12 residence and asked Mr. Hill to sit on the couch). Finding no primary illegality 13 during Mr. Hill’s interaction with Sgt. Doaty in State’s Exhibit 1, the fruit of the 14 poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to Mr. Hill’s statements made during State’s 15 Exhibit 2. 16 The district court’s alternate bases for suppressing Mr. Hill’s third set of 17 statements were also in error. Although the State introduced the body camera 18 footage from only one of the other officers who questioned Mr. Hill after he 19 received his Miranda rights and another officer told him to stop at one point, our 20 review of that footage reveals that Mr. Hill acknowledged he understood his 21 Miranda rights and answered questions voluntarily and without coercion. Though 22 the district court questioned whether Mr. Hill may have invoked his constitutional 23 rights during the brief period of time when the officer stepped away and other 24 officers spoke to Mr. Hill and found the absence of additional body-worn camera 25 footage to be problematic, we disagree. Mr. Hill’s subsequent conversation with [20] 1 the officers demonstrate “that he engaged in a course of conduct indicating waiver” 2 of his rights. Berguis, 560 U.S. at 386, 130 S.Ct. at 2263. If Mr. Hill wanted to 3 remain silent, he could have said nothing in response to the subsequent questioning 4 or ended the interrogation but did not do so. See id. Instead, the footage reveals Mr. 5 Hill freely speaking with the officers and continuing the conversation for 6 approximately forty-five minutes. 7 In addition, we note that Mr. Hill admitted that he had been drinking earlier 8 that day and may have engaged in drug use, but the footage establishes Mr. Hill did 9 not exhibit difficulty comprehending and answering questions, such that this did 10 not render his statements involuntary. State v. Manning, 2003-1982 p. 26 (La. 11 10/19/04), 885 So.2d 1044, 1074 (holding “the mere fact of drug or alcohol 12 intoxication is insufficient standing alone to render a confession involuntary” 13 because intoxication only “render[s] a confession involuntary if it negates a 14 defendant’s comprehension and renders him unconscious of the consequences of 15 what he is saying”). Therefore, we find that the district court erred in suppressing 16 Mr. Hill’s third set of statements which were made after an officer advised him of 17 his Miranda rights, which he acknowledged he understood, and which statements 18 were not “fruit of the poisonous tree.” 19 DECREE 20 For the foregoing reasons, we grant the State’s writ application and reverse 21 the district court’s April 7, 2025 judgment, insofar as it granted Mr. Hill’s Motion 22 to Suppress in part and suppressed his second and third sets of statements. 23 WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED IN PART