Ramos v. Thompson

[1] 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA [3] 4 Misael Ramos, Case No. 2:24-cv-02128-CDS-NJK 5 Plaintiff Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 6 v. 7 Steven Thompson, et al., [ECF No. 4] 8 Defendants [9] 10 Plaintiff Misael Ramos brings this action against Las Vegas Metro Police Department 11 (LVMPD) and officers Steven Thompson and Caroline Beck1 for injuries related to an arrest. See 12 Compl., ECF No. 1-1. After removing this action, the defendants move to dismiss under Federal 13 Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that discretionary-act immunity and qualified 14 immunity apply, Ramos inadequately established duty, and punitive damages is not a standalone 15 claim. See Mot., ECF No. 4.2 Because the defendants are entitled to discretionary-act and 16 qualified immunity, I grant their motion. However, Ramos is granted leave to amend his 17 complaint as set out below. 18 I. Background3 19 In his complaint, Ramos alleges that on October 8, 2022, Officers Thompson and Beck 20 responded to a domestic disturbance in his hotel room. ECF No. 1-1 at ¶¶ 11–13. The officers 21 “conducted an investigation into the facts and circumstances which led to the call for domestic 22 disturbance” and arrested Ramos, placing him in handcuffs. Id. at ¶¶ 14–15. During the arrest, 23 Ramos stated that he was “feeling lightheaded” and could not maintain his balance and was [24] 25 1 Officer Beck is referred to as “C. Beck” in the complaint, see ECF No. 1-1, but defendants acknowledge that the “C.” stands for Caroline, see ECF No. 4 at 1. 26 2 This motion is fully briefed. See Opp’n, ECF No. 15; Reply, ECF No. 18. 3 Unless otherwise noted, the court only cites to Ramos’s original complaint (ECF No. 1-1) to provide context to this action, not to indicate a finding of fact. 1 “swaying and stumbling.” Id. at ¶¶ 16–17. The officers placed Ramos in a chair and then left 2 Ramos unsupervised “to continue their investigation.” Id. at ¶¶ 18–19. Ramos fell off the chair 3 and hit his head on the floor, requiring that he be taken to the hospital. Id. at ¶¶ 20–21. 4 Ramos filed this case against officers Thompson and Beck, as well as LVMPD, claiming 5 (1) negligence against the officers for the on-scene conduct and against LVMPD for failure to 6 adequately train and supervise its officers; (2) infringement on his Fourth and Fourteenth 7 Amendment rights in violation of 42 United States Code § 1983 ; and (3) punitive damages. Id. at 8 ¶¶ 25–56. 9 II. Legal standard 10 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a plaintiff to plead “a short and plain 11 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 12 Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) when a pleader fails to state a claim upon which 13 relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A 14 pleading must give fair notice of a legally cognizable claim and the grounds on which it rests, 15 and although a court must take all factual allegations as true, legal conclusions couched as 16 factual allegations are insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 . Accordingly, Rule 12(b)(6) requires 17 “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 18 will not do.” Id. To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual 19 matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, [20] 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 ). “A claim has facial plausibility 21 when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 22 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. This standard “asks for more than a 23 sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. 24 If the court grants a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, leave to amend should 25 be granted unless it is clear that the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by 26 amendment. DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992). Under Rule 15(a), a 1 court should “freely” give leave to amend “when justice so requires,” and in the absence of a 2 reason such as “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive of the part of the movant, repeated 3 failure to cure deficiencies by amendment previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing 4 party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc.” Foman v. Davis, [5] 371 U.S. 178 (1962). 6 III. Discussion 7 A. Negligence claim 8 Defendants first argue that Ramos’s negligence claims are barred by discretionary-act 9 immunity. Nev. Rev. Stat. (NRS) § 41.032(2) states that a plaintiff cannot maintain an action 10 based on “the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary 11 function or duty on the part of the state or any of its agencies or political subdivisions or of any 12 officer, employee or immune contractor of any of these, whether or not the discretion involved is 13 abused.” Discretionary-act immunity applies when (1) the conduct involves individual judgment 14 or choice and (2) that judgment is based on considerations of social, economic, or political 15 policy. Martinez v. Maruszczak, 168 P.3d 720 , 727–29 (Nev. 2007). [16] 17 Defendants first argue that the officers are protected by discretionary-act immunity 18 because whether to arrest a person, and how to conduct that arrest, are discretionary decisions 19 for police officers. ECF No. 4 at 3–5 (citing Napouk v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 669 F. Supp. 3d 20 1031, 1047 (D. Nev. 2023) (“Whether to detain or arrest a suspect and how to do so are 21 discretionary functions of the police department.”) and Newton v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 2014 22 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61851 , at *19 (D. Nev. May 5, 2014)). In response, Ramos argues that the 23 defendants mischaracterize his negligence claim, which is not based on the officers’ decision to 24 arrest him but on their failure to provide appropriate care and supervision “after he was already 25 in custody and experiencing a medical emergency.” ECF No. 15 at 5. He states that once he was 26 in custody, the officers had a ministerial duty to execute basic safety protocols, especially once 1 they were aware of his medical condition. Id. (citing Butler ex rel. Biller v. Bayer, 168 P.3d 1055 , 1065 2 (Nev. 2007)). He also states that there was no active crime scene to secure or threat to officer 3 safety that required the officers to make policy-based decisions about crime scene management. [4] Id. at 6–7. In their reply, the defendants assert that Butler is inapposite because it did not deal 5 with a situation where the at-issue actions occurred during an ongoing investigation, and on6 scene decisions are policy-decisions within the contours of NRS 41.032(2). 7 Nevada law sets out that acts by officers can be either ministerial or discretionary—the 8 latter of which entitles the officers to immunity. See Pittman v. Lower Ct. Counseling, 871 P.2d 953 , 9 956 (Nev. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Nunez v. City of N. Las Vegas, 1 P.3d 959 (Nev. 2000). “A 10 ministerial act is an act performed by an individual in a prescribed legal manner in accordance 11 with the law, without regard to, or the exercise of, the judgment of the individual.” Id. (citing 12 Trout v. Bennett, 830 P.2d 81, 87 (Mont. 1992)). As mentioned, an act is discretionary if (1) the 13 conduct involves individual judgment or choice and (2) that judgment is based on 14 considerations of social, economic, or political policy. Martinez, 168 P.3d at 727–29. However, 15 “certain acts, although discretionary, do not fall within the ambit of discretionary-act immunity 16 because they involve negligence unrelated to any plausible policy objectives.” Butler, 168 P.3d at 17 1066 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[C]ourts must assess cases on their facts, keeping in 18 mind the purposes of the exception: to prevent judicial second guessing of legislative and 19 administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium 20 of an action in tort.” Id. at 1066–67 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Thus, if the injury21 producing conduct is an integral part of governmental policy-making or planning, if the 22 imposition of liability might jeopardize the quality of the governmental process, or if the 23 legislative or executive branch’s power or responsibility would be usurped, immunity will likely 24 attach under the second criterion.” Martinez, 168 P.3d at 729 . 25 Police officers “exercise[ ] discretion and [are] thus generally immune from suit where 26 the act at issue required ‘personal deliberation, decision, and judgment,’ rather than ‘obedience 1 to orders, or the performance of a duty in which the officer is left no choice of his own.’” Davis v. 2 City of Las Vegas, 478 F.3d 1048, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Maturi v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, [3] 871 P.2d 932 (1994)). Officers’ decisions “as to how to accomplish a particular seizure or search 4 [are] generally considered . . . discretionary determination[s] under Nevada law, and officers are 5 therefore immune from suit as to state law claims arising therefrom in most cases.” Id. 6 I find that Ramos’s claims against the individual defendants are barred by discretionary7 act immunity because according to Ramos’s complaint, the officers were still conducting 8 discretionary functions by investigating the reported crime when Ramos was injured. Ramos 9 states in his complaint that the officers “left [him] . . . to continue their investigation.” ECF No. 10 1-1 at ¶ 19 (emphasis added). Thus, sitting Ramos down in the chair was a discretionary policy 11 decision of the officers as they worked to resolve the domestic dispute they were called to 12 manage. As alleged, the officers did respond to Ramos’s medical needs, providing him a chair 13 after he stated he was unbalanced and swayed and stumbled on his feet. See id. at ¶¶ 16–18. All of 14 this was a policy decision as the investigation was ongoing. In Butler, the Supreme Court of 15 Nevada held that prison officials have a duty of reasonable care toward incarcerated inmates to 16 protect from known threats of attack by other inmates and “a duty to exercise reasonable care to 17 avoid foreseeable harm to [a released inmate] in effectuating his post-release placement.” See 18 Butler, 168 P.3d at 1063–65. This is distinctly different than Ramos’s interpretation of the case, 19 which he states as: “once the immediate law enforcement objectives have been achieved, 20 subsequent duties to protect those in custody are ministerial rather than discretionary.” ECF 21 No. 15 at 7. The circumstances of arrest—especially during an ongoing investigation—and 22 release from prison could not be more different. With a prison release, the prison officials have 23 significant time and latitude to consider whether an inmate is being released to a known 24 dangerous environment, and to consider alternative courses of action. By contrast, at the time of 25 arrest with an ongoing investigation, even if there is no more immediate threat of physical harm, 26 the officers are still making policy decisions about how best to secure witness statements and 1 manage the scene. The purpose of the discretionary act exception is to prevent the judiciary 2 from second guessing the in-the-moment decisions of officers, and that is clearly applicable here. 3 Therefore, I find that discretionary-act immunity applies to the officers and Ramos’s negligence 4 claim against them is dismissed. Because I do not find that amendment would be futile, I dismiss 5 the claim without prejudice. [6] 7 Defendants next argue that Ramos’s negligent training and supervision claim against 8 LVMPD is barred by discretionary-act immunity under Paulos, which held that this legal theory 9 is barred as to “LVMPD’s implementation of policies, training, and supervision of officers as to 10 the use of force, detention methods, and ‘securing of medical treatment for injured/ill’ detainees.” 11 ECF No. 4 at 5 (quoting Paulos v. FCH1, LLC, 456 P.3d 589 , 596 (Nev. 2020)). Ramos does not 12 address this issue in his response.4 “The failure of an opposing party to file points and 13 authorities in response to any motion, except a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 or a motion for 14 attorney's fees, constitutes a consent to the granting of the motion.” LR 7-2(d). “LR 7-2(d) 15 applies when a party fails to address a portion of the moving party’s motion.” La Mojarra Loca, Inc. 16 v. Wells Fargo Merch. Servs. LLC, 2019 WL 6499108 , at *2 (D. Nev. Dec. 3, 2019) (citing Moore v. 17 Ditech Fin., LLC, 2017 WL 2464437 , at *2 (D. Nev. June 7, 2017), aff’d, 710 F. App’x 312 (9th Cir. 18 2018)). Thus, I grant defendants’ motion as to LVMPD without prejudice.5 19 B. 42 U.S.C § 1983 claim 20 Defendants next argue that Ramos’s § 1983 claim against the officers is barred by 21 qualified immunity and that he does not sufficiently state a claim against LVMPD. ECF No. 4 at 22 8–12. [24] 4 Ramos has a subsection discussing discretionary-act immunity as to the individual defendants (see ECF 25 No. 15 at 5–7 (labeled with a “1.”)) but there is no subsequent subsection addressing the defendants’ argument about the failure to train and/or supervise. 26 5 Because I dismiss Ramos’s claims based on the defendants’ discretionary-act immunity theory, I do not address the defendants’ “regulatory or statutory duty” or “duty of care” theories. [1] 2 “In § 1983 actions, qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil 3 damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 4 rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Sampson v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 974 F.3d 5 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). “Clearly 6 established” means that the statutory or constitutional question was “beyond debate,” such that 7 every reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is unlawful. See District of 8 Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62 (2018); Vos v. City of Newport Beach, 892 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 9 2018). Relevant case law “does not require a case directly on point for a right to be clearly 10 established, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question 11 beyond debate.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (cleaned up). The court may evaluate the 12 qualified immunity prongs in any order. Felarca v. Birgeneau, 891 F.3d 809 , 815–16 (9th Cir. 2018). 13 Further, the Supreme Court has “repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly 14 established law at a high level of generality,” City and Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600 , 15 613 (2015) (quotation marks omitted), because such immunity “is effectively lost if a case is 16 erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 . In other words, “immunity protects 17 ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Id. (quoting Mullenix v. 18 Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)). In the Ninth Circuit, if a defendant affirmatively raises qualified 19 immunity as a defense, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that both prongs are met. 20 Isayeva v. Sacramento Sheriff’s Dep’t, 872 F.3d 938, 946 (9th Cir. 2017). 21 Defendants argue that “Plaintiff’s allegations are that officers listened to his reports of 22 lightheadedness and took responsive action by sitting him in a chair as they continued their 23 investigation[,]” which does not demonstrate that the officers ignored him in distress and has no 24 precedent in law. ECF No. 4 at 10. In response, Ramos argues that the constitutional violation 25 stemmed from the infringement on his Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate medical care 26 while in custody. ECF No. 15 at 11 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 , 832–33 (1994) and City of 1 Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239 (1983)). He states that his stumbling and lightheadedness 2 presented an obvious risk of falling, and the officers failed to take proper precautions by placing 3 him in the chair with his hands cuffed behind his back. Id. He argues next that the right was 4 clearly established by the many cases stating that it is a constitutional violation to be 5 deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s medical needs and it is considered deliberate indifference 6 when an officer is aware of, but disregards, a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. (citing Estelle v. 7 Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) and Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 8 2016)). He asserts that the “constitutional violation stems not from allowing him to sit, but from 9 failing to summon medical help, leaving him unattended and handcuffed despite knowing he 10 was experiencing symptoms that created an obvious risk of falling.” Id. at 12. In their reply, the 11 defendants argue that Ramos’s case law is far too generic, and his claims that he was 12 experiencing a “serious” medical need are not reflected in his complaint. ECF No. 18 at 6–7. 13 First, I note that the defendants’ conception of qualified immunity, especially at the 14 dismissal stage, is far too narrow. They state that Ramos 15 did not come forward with any case—from any jurisdiction, let alone a consensus of authorities or binding authority as required to get past qualified immunity— [16] where a court held that officers violate the Fourth Amendment despite providing 17 a chair to a detainee who complains of “lightheadedness” and was swaying while standing in handcuffs but did not ask for medical treatment at that moment. [18] 19 ECF No. 18 at 6. If the requirements to bypass qualified immunity were so exacting, then there 20 would, in effect, be no exception to qualified immunity whatsoever. Under such a reading, if 21 there were a case with the exact same fact pattern except the complainant instead complained 22 of “grogginess” instead of lightheadedness or was placed onto a stool instead of a chair, their 23 claim would be barred by qualified immunity. As explained, relevant case law “does not require a 24 case directly on point for a right to be clearly established, existing precedent must have placed 25 the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” White, 580 U.S. at 79 (cleaned up). [26] 1 Nonetheless, I find that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity here because 2 Ramos has not come forward with sufficient allegations to demonstrate that the officers’ actions 3 amounted to a constitutional violation. Although he was injured, his placement in the chair, or 4 the failure to provide him more substantial medical attention, was not constitutionally 5 inadequate. Him feeling lightheaded and allegedly swaying is not a serious medical issue as 6 Ramos continues to insist. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Examples of 7 serious medical needs include ‘[t]he existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient 8 would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition 9 that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and 10 substantial pain.’”); Madlock v. Shannon, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48530 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 15, 2021) 11 (“[A] single incident of vomiting and feeling “a little light headed” . . . does not rise to the level of 12 a constitutional harm (citing Lord v. Beahm, 952 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 2020) (holding that 13 “minor” physical injuries are insufficient to support violation under the Eighth Amendment)); 14 Killens v. Sheffield, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136693 (S.D. Ga. June 30, 2020) (holding that plaintiff 15 failed to state a claim of medical indifference where he felt lightheaded and dizzy and was 16 denied any assistance). As previously discussed, the officers were continuing to investigate the 17 scene after his arrest; Ramos was not bleeding out, experiencing chronic and/or substantial pain, 18 experiencing something that would affect his daily activities, and the officers did not place him 19 in a dangerous position. In fact, the officers took steps to better protect his safety, placing him 20 into a chair. I can find no interpretation of these actions—placing a lightheaded person into a 21 chair and turning attention elsewhere—to be in violation of Ramos’s Fourteenth Amendment 22 rights. Thus, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity, and the defendants’ motion is 23 granted as to the officers. [24] 25 For a plaintiff to maintain a § 1983 claim against a municipality, there must be a violation 26 of a plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1994) (“While 1 the liability of municipalities doesn’t turn on the liability of individual officers, it is contingent 2 on a violation of constitutional rights. Here, the municipal defendants cannot be held liable 3 because no constitutional violation occurred.”). Because I find that there was no violation of 4 Ramos’s constitutional rights, I grant the defendants’ motion as to LVMPD.6 5 C. Punitive damages 6 Defendants argue that punitive damages cannot be a standalone claim (citing Agha-Khan 7 v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 2017 WL 3749578 , at *2 (D. Nev. Aug. 30, 2017), aff’d sub nom. Agha-Khan v. 8 Wells Fargo Fin. Nat’l Bank, 2019 WL 1379590 (9th Cir. Mar. 1, 2019) (“A few . . . claims fail because 9 they are not proper causes of action: . . . punitive damages are not stand-alone claims, but forms 10 of relief . . . .”)), and that punitive damages are not permitted against LVMPD or its officers 11 anyway (citing Beckwith v. Pool, 2013 WL 3049070 , at *7 (D. Nev. June 17, 2013) (“NRS 41.035(1) 12 states that an award for a tort against a municipality or one of its officer [sic] ‘may not include 13 any amount as exemplary or punitive damages.’ Plaintiffs may not recover any punitive damages 14 against the city defendants for any liability on any of the state law claims.”). ECF No. 4 at 12–13. 15 Because Ramos concedes that the punitive damages claim should not have been a 16 standalone claim for relief but instead a request for relief, and because I dismiss all of Ramos’s 17 claims, I dismiss his punitive damages claim. However, I do so without prejudice. 18 D. Ramos’s proposed first amended complaint 19 Ramos requests leave to amend his complaint if it is dismissed, and attaches his 20 proposed first amended complaint to his response. ECF No. 15 at 16–17; Proposed first am. 21 compl., ECF No. 15-1. In their reply, the defendants argue that the court should reject the 22 proposed first amended complaint because it improperly seeks to add four new claims and point 23 to additional facts that they allege demonstrate that it should be dismissed, too. ECF No. 18 at 24 10–12. [25] 26 6 I do not address Ramos’s various arguments on this issue because they are ultimately premised on the same claim that there was a constitutional violation. There was not. 1 Ramos need not have attached the proposed first amended complaint; Federal Rule of 2}| Civil Procedure 15(a) has a “policy favoring liberal amendment.” Verizon Del, Inc. v. Covad Comme’ns 3]| Co., 377 F.3d 1081 , 1091 (9th Cir. 2004). Because I grant defendants’ motion without prejudice, 4|| Ramos is granted the opportunity to file a first amended complaint. Conclusion 6 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants’ motion to dismiss [ECF No. 4] is 7|| GRANTED without prejudice. Ramos is granted leave to amend his complaint. He has until 8|| September 3, 2025, to file an amended complaint, which must be titled “First Amended Complaint.” 10 Dated: August 20, 2025 /, / LZ D B my States District Judge / [26] ll