Earley v. Zimmerman

— 2 — 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5 * * * 6 MARC A. EARLEY, Case No. 3:25-cv-00032-MMD-CSD 7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. — 8 — A. ZIMMERMAN, et al., — 9 — Defendants. — 10 — — 11 — 12 Plaintiff Marc Earley brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress 13 constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at Northern Nevada 14 Correctional Center. (ECF No. 6 at 1.) On July 25, 2025, the Court screened Plaintiff’s 15 complaint and ordered him to file an amended complaint within 30 days from the entry 16 date of the screening order. (ECF No. 5 at 7.) The Court warned Plaintiff that the action 17 could be dismissed if he failed to file an amended complaint by that deadline. (Id.) That 18 deadline expired, and Plaintiff neither filed an amended complaint, moved for an 19 extension, nor otherwise responded. 20 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets, and “[i]n the 21 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 22 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of L.A., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 23 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or 24 comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) 25 (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep 26 court apprised of address); see also Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th 27 Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 28 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s 2 (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 3 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 4 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 5 Malone, 833 F.2d at 130 ). 6 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 7 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Plaintiff’s 8 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to Defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal 9 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing 10 a pleading ordered by a court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 11 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of 12 cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 13 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 14 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 15 dismissal in the first place. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983 , 992 (9th Cir. 16 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed 17 a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639 , 18 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit 19 cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of 20 the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to 21 amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” 22 by Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally 23 dismissing a case but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. 24 Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421 , 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically 25 proceed until and unless Plaintiff files an amended complaint, the only alternative is to 26 enter a second order setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored 27 order is that it often only delays the inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. 28 The circumstances here do not indicate that this case will be an exception. There is no 1 || hint that Plaintiff requires additional time nor is there evidence that he did not receive the 2 || Court’s screening order. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given 3 || these circumstances. Therefore, the fifth factor favors dismissal. 4 Having thoroughly considered these factors, the Court finds that they weigh in 5 || favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice 6 || based on Plaintiff's failure to file an amended complaint in compliance with the Court’s 7 || July 25, 2025 screening order and for failure to state a claim. The Clerk of Court is directed 8 || to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents may be filed in 9 || this now-closed case. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in 10 || anew case. 11 It is further ordered that the application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF Nos. 1, 12 || 4) is granted. Plaintiff shall not be required to pay an initial installment of the filing fee. 13 || Even though this action is dismissed and is otherwise unsuccessful, the full filing fee will 14 || still be due under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 . 15 It is further ordered that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 , the NDOC will forward payments 16 || from the account of Marc Earley, 1190247 to the Clerk of the United States District Court, 17 || District of Nevada, 20% of the preceding month's deposits (in months that the account 18 || exceeds $10.00) until the full $350 filing fee has been paid for this action. The Clerk of 19 || the Court will send a copy of this Order to the Finance Division of the Clerk’s Office. The 20 || Clerk will send a copy of this Order to the attention of Chief of Inmate Services for the 21 || Nevada Department of Corrections at formapauperis @ doc.nv.gov. 22 DATED THIS 3" Day of September 2025. — 23 — — 24 — 25 □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE — 26 — — 27 — — 28 —