People v. Williams (Nehemiah)

People v Williams (2020 NY Slip Op 50804(U)) [*1] People v Williams (Nehemiah) 2020 NY Slip Op 50804(U) [67 Misc 3d 145(A)] Decided on July 10, 2020 Appellate Term, First Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. Decided on July 10, 2020 SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, FIRST DEPARTMENT PRESENT: Shulman, P.J., Cooper, Torres, JJ. 570163/19 The People of the State of New York, Respondent, against Nehemiah Williams, Defendant-Appellant. Defendant appeals from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County (Michael Gaffey, J.), rendered February 19, 2019, convicting him, upon his plea of guilty, of disorderly conduct, and imposing sentence. Per Curiam. Judgment of conviction (Michael Gaffey, J.), rendered February 19, 2019, affirmed. Since defendant waived prosecution by information, the accusatory instrument had to satisfy the "much lower" (Matter of Jahron S., 79 NY2d 632, 640 [1992]) or "more lenient" reasonable cause standard applicable to a misdemeanor complaint (People v Thiam, 34 NY3d 1040, 1044 [2019, DiFiore, Ch. J., concurring; see People v Dumay, 23 NY3d 518, 524 [2014]). So viewed, the accusatory instrument, although not a model of specificity, was jurisdictionally valid, since it provided reasonable cause to believe that defendant engaged in aggressive solicitation in violation of section 10-136(b) of the New York City Administrative Code. The instrument set forth the date, time and location of the occurrence, and described the words and actions of defendant that "support[ed] or tend[ed] to support" (CPL 100.15[3]) the deponent police officer's conclusion that defendant was begging for money within ten feet of the entrance to a specified bank (see Administrative Code § 10-136[b][2]). The factual allegations were sufficient for pleading purposes since they provided adequate notice to enable defendant to prepare a defense and invoke his protection against double jeopardy (see People v Kasse, 22 NY3d 1142, 1143 [2014]). The misnomer in describing the offense in the accusatory instrument as aggressive begging in a public place pursuant to Administrative Code § 10-136(b)(1), rather than aggressive solicitation pursuant to section 10-136(b)(2), is a non-jurisdictional and readily amendable defect (see CPL 170.35[1][a]; People v Husain, 56 Misc 3d 73 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 950 [2017]), since the instrument sufficiently advised [*2]defendant of the facts relied upon to constitute the alleged violation (see People v Love, 306 NY 18, 23 [1953]) and defendant waived any objection to this defect by pleading guilty (see People v Rodriguez, 97 AD3d 246 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 1028 [2012] [the failure to set forth a correct recital of the name of the crime is an irregularity which was waived by the defendant when he pleaded guilty]; see also People v Konieczny, 2 NY3d 569, 572 [2004] [a defendant who elects to plead guilty forfeits the right to appellate review of any non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings]). If a defendant can appeal a knowing and voluntary plea "by resuming the same sufficiency argument the defendant had forsaken in the trial court, it would undermine the finality of the conviction" (People v Dumay, 23 NY3d at 524). "The unintended result could be prosecutors who are no longer willing to broker plea bargains in misdemeanor cases for fear of endless litigation over the accusatory instrument" (id.). All concur. THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT. Clerk of the Court Decision Date: July 10, 2020