Juarez, E. v. Wang, J.

J-S27044-25 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 ELIZETH JUAREZ, OSCAR PEREZ, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF KEVIN PORQUILLO, JOAQUIN : PENNSYLVANIA PORQUILLO, SHELLEY ROJAS, ANGEL : ROMAN, JULIO JOYA, JANE ROE, : JANET ROE AND JOHN DOE : : Appellants : : : No. 417 EDA 2025 v. : : : JINJING WANG : Appeal from the Order Entered January 29, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 230303594 BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.* MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 3, 2025 Elizeth Juarez, Oscar Perez, Kevin Porquillo, Joaquin Porquillo, Shelley Rojas, Angel Roman, Julio Joya, Jane Roe, Janet Roe, and John Doe (collectively “Appellants”) appeal from the January 29, 2025 order granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Appellee, Jinjing Wang, and dismissing Appellants’ amended complaint. After careful review, we affirm. The trial court summarized the relevant facts of this case as follows: On or around 4:00 AM on March 19, 2023, a fire broke out in the row home in which [Appellants] reside — a property owned by [Appellee]. At all relevant times, ten (10) people were present in the premises — a ____________________________________________ • Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S27044-25 three (3) bedroom, two (2) story row home in South Philadelphia. No lease establishing a landlord-tenant relationship has been produced for the record, though a lease is referenced in [Appellant] Elizeth Juarez’s supplemental answers to [Appellee’s] interrogatories of September 14, 2023. [Appellants] aver “severe and horrific physical, emotional, and psychological harm” stemming from the fire. In support of their claims, [Appellants] state that a firefighter made statements to [Appellants] after the fire suggesting that the fire started in the basement from the fuse box and spread to the rest of the premises. In further support of their claims, [Appellants] have put forth a report of fire alarm produced by the Philadelphia Fire Department. Additionally, and in further support of their claims, [Appellants] state that prior to the fire, on February 26, 2023, [Appellant] Elizeth Juarez notified [Appellee] or her agents via text messaging that the premises required electrical repairs. [Appellants] also cite to various interrogatories in support of their claims. The record reveals that [Appellants] have not put forth a liability expert…[.] Trial court memorandum opinion, 1/29/25 at 1-2 (citations and extraneous capitalization omitted). The procedural history of this case, as gleaned from the trial court opinion, is as follows: On August 21, 2023, [Appellants] filed the operative amended complaint, alleging negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium claims. On January 25, 2024, [Appellee] filed an answer with new matter to [Appellants’] amended complaint. On March 15, 2024, [Appellants] filed a reply to new matter. -2- J-S27044-25 On August 13, 2024, the parties stipulated to the withdrawal of [Appellants’] claim for loss of consortium. On December 2, 2024, [Appellee] filed the instant motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of all of [Appellants’] claims. On December 9, 2024, [Appellants] filed their reply in opposition to [Appellee’s] motion for summary judgment. On December 18, 2024, [Appellee] fled a reply brief in support of [his] motion for summary judgment. On December 27, 2024, [Appellants] filed a reply in opposition to [Appellee’s] December 18, 2024 reply brief. Id. at 2-3 (extraneous capitalization omitted). As noted, on January 29, 2025, the trial court filed an opinion and order granting Appellee’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing Appellants’ amended complaint. On February 4, 2025, Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal. That same day, Appellants filed a 14-page Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The trial court filed a comprehensive Rule 1925(a) opinion on March 4, 2025. Appellants raise the following issues for our review: 1. Did the [trial court] mistake the law improperly finding that the [Appellants] did not establish factual disputes on their prima facie case of landlording (sic) negligence? 2. Did the [trial court] mistake the law improperly finding that the [Appellants’] notice to [Appellee] did not establish negligence? -3- J-S27044-25 3. Did the [trial court] apply mistaken authority, Marrazzo[1], to analyze the causation of the [Appellants’] injury? 4. Did the [trial court] mistake the law shifting a defense-side burden of proof onto the [Appellants]? 5. Did the [trial court] mistake the law linking the cause or origin of the fire to the [Appellants’] injuries? 6. Did the [trial court] mistake the law on expert opinion testimony versus lay opinion testimony, and lay eyewitness testimony that does not leave the jury guessing? 7. Did the [trial court] mistake the law by drawing inferences of spoliation against the non-moving [Appellants], and in terms of precluding evidence of that spoliation? 8. Did the [trial court] mistake the law as it drew inferences against the non-moving [Appellants] and in the moving-[Appellee’s] favor[?] Appellants’ brief at 1-3 (extraneous capitalization omitted; footnote citation added). Our standard of review of a trial court’s order granting summary judgment is well settled: In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court’s standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. A trial court should grant summary judgment only in cases where the record contains no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of ____________________________________________ 1 Marrazzo v. Scranton Nehi Bottling Co., 223 A.2d 17 (Pa. 1966). -4- J-S27044-25 law. The moving party has the burden to demonstrate the absence of any issue of material fact, and the trial court must evaluate all the facts and make reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. The trial court is further required to resolve any doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving party and may grant summary judgment only where the right to such a judgment is clear and free from doubt. This Court has held that the summary judgment standard that a trial court must view the facts, and all reasonable inferences, in a light most favorable to the non- moving party clearly includes all expert testimony and reports submitted by the non-moving party or provided during discovery; and, so long as the conclusions contained within those reports are sufficiently supported, the trial judge cannot sua sponte assail them in an order and opinion granting summary judgment. An appellate court may reverse a grant of summary judgment only if the trial court erred in its application of the law or abused its discretion. Bourgeois v. Snow Time, Inc., 242 A.3d 637, 649–650 (Pa. 2020) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2 governs motions for summary judgment and provides, in relevant part, as follows: After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to unreasonably delay trial, any party may move for summary judgment in whole or in part as a matter of law (1) whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the cause of action or defense which could be established by additional discovery or expert report, or (2) if, after the completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will bear the burden of proof at -5- J-S27044-25 trial has failed to produce evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted to a jury. Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2. It is well settled in this Commonwealth that “[a] tenant seeking to recover damages stemming from the condition of a rental property may pursue claims sounding in ordinary negligence or a breach of the implied warranty of habitability.” Echeverria v. Holley, 142 A.3d 29, 34 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 169 A.3d 17 (Pa. 2017). To establish a prima facie cause of action for negligence, the following elements must be proven: “(1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty or obligation recognized by law; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) a causal connection existed between the defendant’s conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual damages occurred.” Grove v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 218 A.3d 877, 889 (Pa. 2019) (citation omitted). Following a thorough review of the record, including the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned analysis of the trial court, it is our determination that Appellants’ plethora of interrelated claims on appeal warrant no relief. The trial court’s January 29, 2025 memorandum opinion and March 4, 2025 Rule 1925(a) opinion comprehensively discussed each of Appellant’s issues and concluded that they were without merit. We find that the conclusions of the trial court are supported by competent evidence and are clearly free of legal error. -6- J-S27044-25 Specifically, we agree with the trial court that Appellants failed to establish a prima facie cause of action for negligence by failing to introduce expert testimony to establish the cause and origin of the fire. The trial court properly found that, contrary to Appellants’ contention, the fire report does not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate the cause and origin of the fire. We also agree with the trial court that Appellant Julio Joya’s claim that an unidentified Philadelphia Fire Department firefighter told him that the cause of the fire was electrical is inadmissible hearsay, and thus cannot be introduced to support Appellants’ negligence claims. We also discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in finding that a spoliation sanction was not necessary because the record clearly demonstrates that Appellants had ample opportunity to conduct a site inspection of fire-damaged premises before repairs. We further agree with the trial court that it was Appellants’ burden to prove what duty Appellee breached, the cause and origin of the fire, and whether the fire was caused by Appellee’s alleged breach of her duty. We find that the trial court properly concluded that because Appellants failed to adduce evidence in support of a prima facie cause of action for negligence, summary judgment in Appellee’s favor was entirely warranted. See trial court memorandum opinion, 1/29/25 at 3-9; trial court Rule 1925(a) opinion, 3/4/25 at 2-7. Accordingly, we adopt the comprehensive January 25 and March 4, 2025 opinions of the Honorable Edward Wright as our own for purposes of this -7- J-S27044-25 appellate review. The parties are instructed to attach the opinions of the trial court in any filings referencing this Court’s decision. Order affirmed. Date: 10/3/2025 -8- Circulated 09/25/2025 08:42 PM g;'··-· [2 g:····12 IN THE IN IN THE COURT THE COURT OF COURT OF COMMON OF COMMON PLEAS COMMON PLEAS PLEAS CiV;L CIVL ', • -- &ION cit., ...- ..i.•,;;Ibi• ciow FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA TRIAL DIVISION TRIAL TRIAL DIVISION--- CIVIL DIVISION CIVIL CIVIL Ms. Elizeth Ms. Ms. Elizeth Elizeth Juarez, Juarez, et Juarez, et al., et at., al., MARCH TERM, MARCH TERM, 2023 2023 Plaintiffs Plaintiffs Plaintiffs No. 03594 No. No. 03594 v. V. v. Control No. Control Control No. 24120484 No. 24120484 24120484 Jinjing Jinjing Wang, Jinjing Wang, Wang, Defendant Defendant MEMORANDUM OPINION MEMORANDUM OPINION IN SUPPORT OPINION IN IN SUPPORT SUPPORT OF OF JANUARY .JANUARY 29, 29, 2025 2025 ORDER ORDER Before the Before Before the Court the Court is Court is Defendant is Defendant Jinjing Defendant Jinjing Wang's Jinjing Wang's Wang's (hereinafter (hereinafter "Wang") Motion for "Wang") Motion (hereinafter "Wang") Motion for Summary for Summary Judgment seeking Judgment Judgment seeking dismissal seeking dismissal with prejudice dismissal with with prejudice of prejudice of all of all of all ofPlaintiffs' of Plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs' claims. For claims. For the For the following the following reasons, following reasons, reasons, Wang's Motion for Wang's Motion Wang's Motion for Summary for Summary Judgment is Summary Judgment Judgment is granted, and is granted, granted, and Plaintiffs' claims and Plaintiffs' Plaintiffs' claims claims against against Wang Wang are Wang are are dismissed. dismissed. FACTS FACTS aa fire broke On or around 4:00 AM on March 19, 2023, a broke out in the out in the row row home row in which home in home in which which Plaintiffs reside reside---a —aa property owned by Wang. Amended CompI. Wang, See Amended CompL at [1, Compl. at at ¶1, attached as Exhibit attached as as Exhibit A. Exhibit A. A. ten ((10) At all relevant times, ten ten present in the premises 10) people were present present premises --a premises —a -- three a three (3) three (3) bedroom, two (3) bedroom, bedroom, two (2) two (2) story story row row home home in in South Philadelphia. Philadelphia. Id. at 730. ¶30. No at y30. No lease lease establishing aa landlord-tenant establishing a landlord-tenant relationship has been produced for the record, though a produced for aa lease is referenced in Plaintiff Elizeth lease is Eli.zeth Juarez's Supplemental Answers to Defendant Wang's Interrogatories of 14, 2023. of September 14, See 2023. See 2023. Juarez's Supplemental Answers to Defendant Wang's Interrogatories of September 14, 2023 at P. 7, attached as Exhibit C. — 2 — Plaintiffs aver han" aver "severe and horrific physical, emotional, and psychological harm" hann" fom the fire. See Exhibit A stemming fiom A at x{48. In support of 148, In o£ their claims, Plaintiffs state that a a firefighter made statements to Plaintiffs after the fire suggesting that the fire started in the y55-56; ¶55-56; Juarez Dep. at basement from the fuse box and spread to the rest of the premises. Id. at \y55-56; a 85:3-16, attached as Exhibit D. In further support of their claims, Plaintiffs have put forth a Report of Fire Alarm produced by the Philadelphia Fire Department. See Report of Fire Alarm, attached as Exhibit E. Additionally, and in further support of their claims, Plaintiffs state that prior to the fire, on February 26, 2023, Plaintiff Elizeth Juarez notified Wang or her agents via text messaging that the premises required electrical repairs. See Exhibit A at y57. 'j[S7. ¶57. Plaintiffs also claims. See Exhibit C; See Wang's Response to of their claims. cite to various interrogatories in support o£ (Second Set), attached as Interrogatories (Second Interrogatories as Exhibit F; See Rojas Supplemental Answer to to Defendant Wang's Interrogatories of September 14, 2023, attached as Exhibit G. that Plaintiffs have not put forth The record reveals that forth a a liability expert, and Discovery has now ended. See August 30, 2024 Revised Case Management Order, attached as Exhibit B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On August 21, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the operative operative Amended Complaint, Complaint, alleging Infliction of Negligent Infliction Negligence, Negligent ofEmotional Emotional Distress, Distress, and and Loss Loss of of Consortium Consortium claims. claims. On On 25, 2024, January 25, January 2024, Wang filed an Wang filed an Answer New Matter with New Answer with Matter to to Plaintiffs' Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. Amended Complaint. On March On March 15, 15, 2024, 2024, Plaintiffs Plaintiffs filed filed a a Reply New Matter. to New Reply to Matter. On August On August 13, 13, 2024, 2024, the the parties parties stipulated the withdrawal to the stipulated to withdrawal of Plaintiffs' claim ofPlaintiffs' claim for for Loss Loss of Consortium. of Consortium. On. On December December 2, 2, 2024, 2024, Wang Wang filed the instant filed the instant Motion Motion for for Summary Judgment Summary Judgment seeking dismissal seeking dismissal of al ofall all of of Plaintiffs' Plaintiffs' claims. claims. On On December December 9, 9, 2024, Plaintiffs filed 2024, Plaintiffs filed their Reply in their Reply in — 2 — — 3 — Opposition to Wang's Motion for Summary Judgment. On December 18, 2024, Wang filed fled aa Reply Brief in Support of Wang's Motion for Summary Judgment. On December 27, 2024, aReply in Opposition to Wang's December 18, 2024 Reply Brief. Plaintiffs filed a DISCUSSION Wang argues that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment, alleging that the Plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence offacts essential to their causes of action. See Defs. Mot. Summ. ¶15, attached as Exhibit H. Specifically, Wang alleges that summary judgment is J. at [15, appropriate, where: (7) Plaintiffs have produced no liability expert report establishing breach of where: (i) duty and causation; causation; (ii) a a one one (1) page Report of Fire Alarm purported by Plaintiffs to identify the cause and origin of the fire is inadmissible hearsay which cannot be used to establish breach of duty and causation; and, and, (iii) the testimony of Plaintiff Julio Joya (hereinafter "Joya") as to Joya (hereinafter what aafirefighter said to him regarding the cause and origin of the fire is inadmissible hearsay which cannot be used to establish breach of duty and causation. Under Pa. R.C.P. 1035.2, aaproper grant of summary judgment depends upon an evidentiary record that either either (1) shows the material facts are undisputed or or (2) contains aprimafacie cause of action or defense. Rauch v. insufficient evidence of facts to make out a Mike Mayer, 783 A.2d 815, 823 Mike-Mayer, (Pa. Super. 2001). Under Rule 1035.202), 823 (Pa. 1035.2(2), if a adefendant is the moving party, they may make the showing necessary to support the entrance of summary judgment by pointing to materials which indicate that the plaintiff is unable to satisfy an element of the cause of action. Id. at 824. — 4 — tenant seeking A tenant A seeking to to recover recover damages damages stemming stemming fiom the condition from the condition of of a rental property a rental property pursue claims sounding in ordinary negligence may pursue or a negligence or of the a breach of the implied implied warranty of warranty of habitability. L+cheverria ». Holley, 142 A.3d 29, 34 Echeverria v. • 34 (Pa. (Pa. Super. 2016). To establish To establish a viable cause a viable cause of of action action of ofnegligence negligence against against Wang, Wang, Plaintiffs Plaintiffs must must adduce adduce a duty; 2) Wang failed to conform with said evidence suggesting that: 1) Wang owed Plaintiffs a 3) that duty; 3) duty; that there there is is a a close close causal connection between causal connection between Wang's failure and Wang's failure and the the resulting resulting injuries; injuries; that Plaintiffs 4) that and, 4) and, sustained actual Plaintiffs sustained actual loss loss or or damage. damage. See See Ivey Ney v.v. Axelrod, 723 A.2d Axelrod, 723 A.2d 719, 719, 721 721 (Pa. Super. (Pa. Super. 1999). "The mere 1999). "The The mere happening happening of ofan an accident accident does does not entitle the not entitle injured person the injured person to to a a [a] plaintiff verdict; [a] verdict; [a] plaintiff must show that defendant owed him him a a duty and and that that duty was.breached." duty was. breached." Engel v.• Parkway Engel Parlway Co., Parkway Co., 266 266 A.2d 685, 687 A.2d 685, 687 (Pa. 1970). (Pa. 1970). I. I. Lack of Lack Expert Testimony ofExpert Testimony Wang contends Wang contends that that Plaintiffs' Plaintiffs' failure failure to to produce a liability produce a liability expert expert to to establish establish breach breach of of duty and duty and causation are fatal causation are to Plaintiffs' fatal to claims sounding Plaintiffs' claims sounding in negligence. innegligence. It isis well-established It well-establishedthat "expeit opinion that "expert "expert opiniontestimony testimony is proper only is proper where formation only where ofan formation of an opinion on opinion on a a subject subject requires requires knowledge, knowledge, information, information, or or skill beyondwhat skillbeyond possessed by what isispossessed the by the ordinaryjuror." ordinary juror." Commonwealth Carter, 589 Commonwealth v.v. Carter, 589 A.2d 1133, 1134 ( A.2d 1133,1134 (Pa. Super. 1991). Pa. Super. 1991). In negligence In negligence i actions, "[c]xpert actions, testimony isis not "[e]xperttestimony notrequired required`where 'wherethe matterunder the matter under investigation investigation isis so so simple, simple, and the and thelack lack of ofskill skill or orwant wantof ofcare careso so obvious, obvious, as to be asto be within therange within the range of ofthe the ordinary ordinary experience and experience comprehensionof andcomprehension ofeven evennonprofessional nonprofessionalpersons."' Welshv.• persons." Welsh v. Bulger, 698 A.2d Bulger, 698 A.2d 581, 586 581, 586n. 111 (Pa. n. I (Pa. 1997) 1997)(quoting Chandlerv.• Coop (quoting Chandler 265 A.2d Cook, 265 A.2d 794, 794, 796 796 n. 1( n. 1 (Pa. Norisis 1970)). Nor Pa. 1970)). experttestimony expert asto testimony as causationrequired to causation required"where thereisisan "wherethere obvious causal anobvious causalrelationship" relationship" — 5 — between the injury complained of and the alleged negligent act. Lattanze v. • Silverstrini, 448 A.2d 608 (Pa. Super. 1982). 605, 608 An obvious causal relationship exists when the injuries are either an an "immediate and direct" or the "natural and probable citing Tabuteau v. probable" result of the alleged negligent act. Id. (citing ( G. & London G. & A., Ltd., 40 A.2d 396 (Pa. 1945)). "The two must be 396 (Pa. be `'so so closely connected and so readily apparent that a a layman could diagnose diagnose (except (except by guessing) the causal connection' ..." connection'..." 608 (quoting Smith ». Lattanze, 448 A.2d at 608 v. German, 253 A.2d 107, 109 109 (Pa. 1969)). 1909)). However, the fact-finder, be it the jury or the court, may not be permitted to reach its verdict or decision merely on the basis of guess or conjecture but that there must be evidence, direct or circumstantial, upon which logically its conclusion may be based. Marrazzo • v. Scranton Nehi.bottling Nehi 1966) (citing Smith v. Bell Telephone Co. of Bottling Co., 223 A.2d 17, 21 (Pa. 1966) Penna, 153 ofPenna, A.2d 477 477 (Pa. 1959)). While testimony from the laymen Plaintiffs in this action is relevant to the issues presented, the cause of the fire and its causal connection to the "severe "severe and horrific physical, emotional, and psychological harm" alleged in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint are not so closely connected and so readily apparent as to allow a alayman to diagnose the causal connection. To allow the case to proceed in the absence of an expert witness to opine on the cause of the fire and its ramifications upon the Plaintiffs' wellbeing would result in the fact-finder relying upon guess or conjecture to make their findings. Id. Such reliance is impermissible in this Commonwealth. Plaintiffs respond that Wang knew that the house contained evidence of negligent repairs to the electrical system, and destroyed said evidence. See Plaintiffs?' Plaintiffs' Reply in Opp. to. Defs. Mot. Summ. J. at 17, attached as Exhibit I. Summ.1. 1. As aaresult of the alleged spoliation, claimed for the first I — 6 — time in time time inPlaintiffs' in Plaintiffs' Reply Plaintiffs' Reply in Opposition Reply in in Opposition to Wang's Oppositionto to Wang's Motion Wang's Motion for Motion for Summary for Summary Judgment, Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs Judgment, Plaintiffs Plaintiffs arguethat argue argue that "there that "therewas "there was no was no possibility no possibility to retain possibility to to retain an retain an expert an expert who expert who would who would have would have seen have seenthe seen thefuse the fuse box, fuse box, in box, inits in its its original state, original state, original as state, as the as the Philadelphia the Philadelphia Fire PhiladelphiaFire Department Fire Department officers Department officers sawit..." officers saw ·.."Id. sawitit ...." Id, at 16. at Id. at 16. 16. However, the However, However, therecord the record reveals record revealsthat reveals thatPlaintiffs that Plaintiffs had Plaintiffs had ample had ample opportunity ample opportunity to inspect opportunity to to inspect thepremises. inspectthe the premises. premises. By letter By By letter dated letter dated July dated July 17, July 17, 2023, 17, 2023, Wang 2023, Wang gave Plaintiffs' Wang gave gave Plaintiffs' counsel Plaintiffs' counsel the counsel the theopportunity to conduct opportunity to opportunity to conducta conduct aasite site site inspection of inspection inspection ofthe of theunaltered the unaltered property unaltered property before repairs. propertybefore before repairs. See Exh. repairs. See See Exh. A Exh. A to A to Defs. to Defs. Reply Defs. Reply Briefin ReplyBrief Brief in Support in Support of of Support of Mot. Summ. Mot. Mot. Summ. J., Summ. J., attached J., attached as attached as Exhibit as ExhibitJ.J.J. Indeed, Exhibit Jndeed, PIaffiffis' Indeed, Plaintiffs' counsel Plaintiffs' counsel did counsel did inspect did inspect theproperty inspectthe the on on property on property August24, August August 24, 2023. 2023. See Defs. 2023. See See Defs. Reply Defs. Reply Brief Reply Briefin Brief in Support in Supportof Support ofMot. of Mot. Summ. J.J.J. at Summ. Mot. Summ. at 8, at 8, attached 8, attached as attached asExhibit as ExhibitK. Exhibit KK. Plaintiffs' choice Plaintiffs' Plaintiffs' choiceto choice tovisit to visitthe visit theproperty the property five property five(5) five (5)months (5) months after months afterthe after theMarch the March2023 March 2023 fire, 2023 fire,without fire, withoutan without an an was of expert, was expert, oftheir their own own making making and and cannot cannot amount amount to spoliationby to spoliation spoliation Wang.Plaintiffs by Wang. Wang. Plaintiffs seek Plaintiffs seekto seek touse to use use spoliation as spoliation as a a reason reason they they have have failed failed to to produce produce an an expert expert on onthe the issues ofbreach issues of of breach of ofduty and duty and causation, rather causation, rather than than as aabasis as a basisfor basis for discovery sanctions. discovery sanctions. sanctions. Notably, in Notably, Baliotis, the in Baliotis, the trial trial court court found found that that a aperiod period of ofapproximately two (2) approximately two (2) months months wasample was timewithin ampletime withinwhich whichtotoprovide providenotice noticeand and an anopportunity forinspection. opportunityfor BaliotisV.v. inspection.Baliotis 870F.Supp. McNeil, 870 McNeil, F.Supp. 1285, 1285, 1293 1293 ( (M.D. Pa. 1990. M.D. Pa. 1994). The Baliotiscourt, TheBaliotis court,while whilefinding findingthat thata a "spoliation inferencewas "spoliation inference" inference" was appropriate given the appropriate given the facts facts of ofthat that case, case, noted noted that thatrequiring a requiring a ownerto property owner property to maintain maintainthe the scene scene of ofaafire indefinitely would fireindefinitely would be be "inefficient "inefficient and and wasteful," wasteful," and would and would create create a apotential potential for forharm harmto to others othersby bymaintaining maintaining a a safety safety hazard. hazard.Id, Id. atat 1292. 1292. II. H. Use of Use ofReport ofFire Report of FireAlarin Alarm Wangcontends Wang contendsininthe the instant instantMotion Motionthat thatthe theReport Reportof ofFire FireAlarm Alarmisisinadmissible inadmissible andtherefore hearsay and hearsay therefore cannot cannotbe beused usedtoto support supportPlaintiffs' Plaintiffs' claims. claims. — 6 — In support of their claims, Plaintiffs point to the Report of Fire Alarm dated June 14, 2023, produced by the Philadelphia Fire Department's Fire Marshal's Office. See Exhibit E. The one (1) page document prepared by Lieutenant Terrence Jackson identifies the cause of the fire one Equipment," and identifies the origin of the fire as "basement." Id. as "Electrical Wiring and Bquipment," Plaintiffs claim that the report is "an "an official, expert finding of the fire's factual cause and origin," but do not otherwise argue that the document falls within an exception to the hearsay rule. See Exhibit IIat 3. The Report of Fire Alarm, as an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein, constitutes hearsay. Pa. R. E. 801. The predicate supporting the rejection of hearsay evidence is its assumed unreliability because the declarant from which the statement originates is not before the trier of fact and therefore cannot be challenged as to the accuracy of the information sought to be conveyed. Gunter v. Const. State Ser. Serv. Co., 638 A.2d 235 (Pa. 233, 235 (Pa. Super. 1994). Plaintiffs do not argue that the Report of Fire Alarm falls within an exception to the rule against hearsay enumerated in Pa. R. E. 803. Regarding the public records exception to the rule against hearsay, the brevity of the responses found in the Report of Fire Alarm renders them ambiguous and, thus, unreliable as proofof here. See Jennings v. Com., of the critical facts at issue here, Dept ofDriver Licensing, 715 A.2d 552, 555 of Dwnsp., Bureau of Dep't ofTransp., 555 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Ct, 1998). Without the testimony of the investigating firefighter to provide context for the report, it cannot the cause be trusted that the Report of Fire Alarm alone provides reliable information as to both the fie. Id. As such, the Report of Fire Alarm does not fall within the official and the origin of the fire. records exception to the hearsay rule, and as such constitutes inadmissible hearsay evidence that may not be presented to the fact-finder on the issues of breach of duty and causation. 7 7 .\ — 88 — III. III. Hearsay Testimony Hearsay Testimony of ofJulio Julio Joya Joya Wang contends in the instant Motion that the testimony of Plaintiff Joya as to what a Wang contends Wang contends in inthe the instant instant Motion Motion that that the thetestimony testimony of ofPlaintiff PlaintiffJoya Joya as as to to what what a a firefighter told him regarding the cause and origin of the fire is inadmissible hearsay, and thus firefightertold firefighter toldhim himregarding regardingthe the cause cause and andorigin originof ofthe thefire fire isisinadmissible inadmissible hearsay, hearsay, and andthus thus i cannot be admitted in support of Plaintiffs' claims sounding in negligence. Plaintiffs do not cannotbe cannot beadmitted admittedin insupport supportof ofPlaintiffs' Plaintiffs' claims claims sounding soundingininnegligence. negligence. Plaintiffs Plaintiffs do do not not arguethat argue thatsuch suchtestimony testimonyfalls fallswithin withinan exceptiontotothe anexception therule ruleagainst againsthearsay. hearsay. I I An out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein, Anout-of-court An out-of-courtstatement statementoffered offeredtotoprove provethe thetruth truthof ofthe thematters mattersasserted assertedtherein, therein, I constituteshearsay. constitutes hearsay.Pa. Pa.R. R.E.E.801. 801.Such Suchevidence evidenceisisinadmissible inadmissibleunless unlessititfalls fallswithin withinan an i i exceptiontotothe exception therule ruleagainst againsthearsay. hearsay.Pa. Pa.R.R.E.E.802, 802. II 1 I I I The record shows that on the evening of the fire, an unidentified Philadelphia Fire Therecord The recordshows showsthat thaton onthe theevening eveningofthe of thefire, anunidentified fire,an unidentifiedPhiladelphia.Fire Philadelphia Fire I I I I firefighterinformed Departmentfirefighter Department informedJoya Joyathat "thecause that"the ''the causeof ofthe thefire firewas waselectricity." electricity."See ExhibitDDatat SeeExhibit I 1 85:3-16. I I 85:3-16. I i Suchtestimony Such constitutesout-of-court testimonyconstitutes out-of-courtstatements statementsoffered offeredtotoprove truthofofthe thetruth provethe the I mattersasserted matters therein-that assertedtherein therein—--that thatis,is,totoprove proveWang's breachofofduty Wang'sbreach dutyand andcausation causationregarding regardingthe the March2023, March firethat 2023,fire thatforced forcedPlaintiffs Plaintiffsout theirhomes. outofoftheir homes.As such,the Assuch, thestatements statementsare are inadmissibleand inadmissible andmay maynot notbebepresented presentedtotothe thefact-finder fact-findertotoaid aidtheir fact.finding. theirfactfnding. factfinding. IV. IV. RemainingEvidence Remaining EvidenceofofRecord Record InInaddition additiontotothe aforementionedevidence, theaforementioned evidence,Plaintiffs Plaintiffshave haveadduced adducedthe thefollowing following evidenceofof evidence recordininsupport record supportofof theirnegligence them negligenceand andNIED NIEDclaims: claims:(i)(i)text textmessages messagespurportedly purportedly sent sent betweenWang between Wangand andPlaintiffs; Plaintiffs;(ii)(ii)Plaintiff Plaintiff ShelleyRojas Shelley RojasSupplemental Supplemental Answertoto Answer Defendant Defendant Wang's Inten· ogatoriesofof Wang'sInterrogatories Interrogatories September14,14,2023; September 2023; (i) (ii) (iii) Defendant Defendant Wang'sResponse Wang's Response toto Plaintiffs'Interrogatories; Plaintiffs' Interrogatories;and, and, (iv) (iv) Plaintiff Plaintiff Elizeth Eliazet Elizeth Juarez'sSupplemental Juarez's Supplemental Answers Answers to to Defendant Defendant Wang's Wang's Interrogatories. Interrogatories. — 9 — The issues The issues of ofbreach breach of ofduty duty and and causation, causation, in in this this case case concerning concerning an an electrical electrical fire fire and and subsequent physical, subsequent physical, emotional, emotional, and and psychological psychological injuries, not such injuries, isis not such where where the the matter matter under under investigation isis so investigation so supple, and the simple, and the lack ofskill lack of skill or or want ofcare want of so obvious, care so obvious, as as to to be be within the within the range of range the ordinary of the experience and ordinary experience and comprehension comprehension of ofeven even nonprofessional nonprofessional persons. See persons. See 698 A.2d Welsh, 698 Welsh, at 586 A.2d at 586 n. 11. As n, 11. such, the As such, the remaining remaining evidence evidence of ofrecord record isis insufficient insufficient to to allow allow the fact-finder the fact-finder to to establish establish a a breach breach of ofduty duty and and causation causation without without the the production production of ofan an expert expert witness. If witness. If the the case case is is allowed allowed to to proceed proceed to to trial, trial, this would result this would result in the fact-finder in the reaching its fact-finder reaching its verdict merely verdict merely on on the the basis basis of of guess guess or or conjecture. See Marrazzo, conjecture. See Marrazzo, 223 223 A.2d at 21. A.2d at 21. CONCLUSION CONCLUSION For the For the foregoing foregoing reasons, reasons, Defendant Defendant Wang's Wang's Motion Motion for for Summary Summary Judgment Judgment is is granted, granted, whereby the Amended Complaint is is dismissed. .-. -.-. -- . BY.THE ) BY- COURT: THE COURT: i #4 �'---� J. J. J. I