Bell v. Arnold

— 1 — — 2 — — 3 — — 4 — — 5 — — 6 — — 7 — UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT — 8 — WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA — 9 — 10 JUSTIN DOMONIC BELL, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-01320-BHS-GJL 11 Petitioner, v. ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 12 COUNSEL KAREN ARNOLD, — 13 — Respondent. — 14 — 15 This 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas action has been referred to United States Magistrate Judge 16 Grady J. Leupold. Currently before the Court is Petitioner Justin Bell’s Motion to Appoint 17 Counsel. Dkt. 11. Because Petitioner has not shown the appointment of counsel is warranted at 18 this time, his Motion is DENIED without prejudice. 19 I. LEGAL STANDARD 20 There is no right to have counsel appointed in cases brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 , 21 unless (1) counsel is required to prevent a due process violation, (2) an evidentiary hearing is 22 required, or (3) such appointment is necessary for the effective utilization of discovery 23 procedures. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1991); Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191 , 1196 24 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 68 F.3d 369, 370 (9th Cir. 1995); United 1 States v. Angelone, 894 F.2d 1129, 1130 (9th Cir. 1990); Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952 , 954 2 (9th Cir. 1983); Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts 6(a) 3 and 8(c). 4 Even where habeas counsel is not required as a matter of right, the Court may appoint 5 counsel for financially eligible petitioners “when it determines ‘that the interests of justice so 6 require.’” Chaney, 801 F.2d at 1196 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3006A); see also Dillon v. United 7 States, 307 F.2d 445, 447 (9th Cir. 1962) (in circumstances where appointment of counsel is not 8 mandated, the decision to appoint counsel falls within the “sound discretion of the court”). In 9 deciding whether to appoint counsel, the Court evaluates “the likelihood of success on the merits 10 as well as the ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of 11 the legal issues involved.” Weygandt, 718 F.2d at 954 ; see also Stokes v. Roe, 18 F. App’x 478 , 12 479 (9th Cir. 2001). 13 II. DISCUSSION 14 In his Motion, Petitioner requests counsel to assist him in this case because he is currently 15 incarcerated and lacks legal training. Dkt. 11. The circumstances Petitioner describes in his 16 Motion are common to most incarcerated litigants and do not per se entitle him to court17 appointed counsel in this case. See Siglar v. Hopkins, 822 F. App’x 610 , 612 (9th Cir. 2020) 18 (denying appointment of counsel because the plaintiff had not shown his “circumstances were 19 not exceptionally different from the majority of the challenges faced by pro se litigants”) 20 (citations omitted). 21 Moreover, these proceedings are still in the early stages as Respondent has not yet filed 22 an answer to the Petition, and Petitioner has not demonstrated he is likely to succeed on the 23 merits of his case or that an evidentiary hearing will be necessary. — 24 — 1 Finally, Petitioner’s filings in the case thus far have been clear and understandable. As 2 such, the Court does not find his ability to articulate his claims to be so lacking as to warrant the 3 appointment of counsel at this juncture. 4 Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner has not shown the appointment of 5 counsel is required at this time. 6 III. CONCLUSION 7 For the reasons above, Petitioner’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (Dkt. 11) is DENIED 8 without prejudice. — 9 — 10 Dated this 29th day of September, 2025. — 11 — A — 12 — 13 Grady J. Leupold United States Magistrate Judge — 14 — — 15 — — 16 — — 17 — — 18 — — 19 — — 20 — — 21 — — 22 — — 23 — — 24 —