Mescall v. New York City Supreme Criminal Court

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK SEAN F. MESCALL, Plaintiff, -against25-CV-4790 (LLS) NEW YORK CITY SUPREME CRIMINAL COURT; JUDGE ALTHEA DRYSDALE; ORDER OF DISMISSAL MICHAEL FINEMAN, ESQ.; UNAUTHORIZED REPRESENTATION, Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who currently is detained at the Eric M. Taylor Center on Rikers Island, brings this action, pro se, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , alleging Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights and his rights under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).1 He sues the “New York City Supreme Criminal Court,” which the Court understands to be the New York County Supreme Criminal Court; New York County Supreme Criminal Court Judge Althea Drysdale; Michael Fineman, Esq.; and “Unauthorized Representation.” By order dated August 16, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.2 The Court dismisses this action for the reasons set forth below. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a 1 Plaintiff filed the complaint without a prisoner authorization. By order dated June 10, 2025, the Court directed Plaintiff to cure that deficiency. (ECF 4.) The court received Plaintiff’s prisoner authorization on July 14, 2025. 2 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (b)(1). governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 (e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 . After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND The following facts are drawn from the complaint.3 On March 5, 2025, Plaintiff was arrested, and Defendant Michael Fineman was assigned to represent him at his arraignment on the same date. Plaintiff alleges Fineman was “forced” on him, and that the judge did not explain to him that he could represent himself or “get counsel of choice.” (ECF 1, at 4.) Plaintiff also was not provided a copy of the indictment or “any papers from judge.” (Id.) On March 18, 2025, Plaintiff went to court with his wife, waited an hour, and went home. On March 19, 2025, Plaintiff emailed Fineman, and Fineman stated that he was no longer Plaintiff’s lawyer. On May 12, 2025, at an “involuntary appearance” at the court, the judge, presumably Judge Drysdale, would not let Plaintiff “speak at all.” (Id.) The judge told Fineman “to enter an appearance even though she did not expressly do a hearing to see if [Plaintiff] qualified for appointed counsel.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that he was “not allowed” to waive his right to counsel and that that Fineman was “force[d]” on him without his consent. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff brings claims under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteen Amendments, as well as the APA. Plaintiff asks the Court to “dismiss all indictments” against him and to “release [him] immediately.” (Id.) 3 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless noted otherwise. DISCUSSION A. Claims under the Administrative Procedure Act The APA allows for judicial review of a federal agency’s final administrative action. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702 , 704. Plaintiff does not state a claim under the APA because he does not seek judicial review of a federal agency’s final administrative action. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s APA claims for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii). B. Judicial immunity The Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Drysdale. Judges are absolutely immune from suit for damages for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Generally, “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). “Even allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity.” Id. (citations omitted). This is because, “[w]ithout insulation from liability, judges would be subject to harassment and intimidation . . . .” Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994). Judicial immunity does not apply when the judge takes action “outside” of her judicial capacity, or when the judge takes action that, although judicial in nature, is taken “in absence of jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9-10 ; see also Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209-10 (describing actions that are judicial in nature). But “the scope of [a] judge’s jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). In addition to being immune from actions for damages, federal judges are also immune from any civil action seeking injunctive or declaratory relief. Although judicial immunity does not absolutely bar a claim for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief, Shtrauch v. Dowd, 651 F. App’x 72, 73 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order), a court’s ability to award injunctive relief against a judicial officer under Section 1983 is strictly limited. Under Section 1983, “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that Judge Drysdale acted beyond the scope of her judicial responsibilities or outside her jurisdiction. Plaintiff instead sues Judge Drysdale for actions taken in the course of Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings. Judicial immunity therefore applies. Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief against Judge Drysdale because Plaintiff has not alleged either the violation of a declaratory decree, or the unavailability of declaratory relief. See Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam). Declaratory relief against a judge for actions taken within her judicial capacity is ordinarily available by appealing the judge’s order. See Berlin v. Meijia, No. 15-CV-5308, 2017 WL 4402457 , at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2017) (“Here, no declaratory decree was violated and declaratory relief is available to plaintiffs through an appeal of the state court judges’ decisions in state court.”), appeal dismissed, No. 17-3589 (2d Cir. May 22, 2018); Davis v. Campbell, No. 13-CV-0693, 2014 WL 234722 , at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2014). The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Drysdale based on absolute judicial and for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii). C. Eleventh Amendment immunity To the extent Plaintiff seeks to name the New York County Supreme Criminal Court as a separate defendant, his claims against it must be dismissed. “[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity . . . .” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009). “The immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Id. Furthermore, “the New York State Unified Court System is unquestionably an ‘arm of the State,’ and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.” Id. at 368 (citation omitted); see Brown v. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 444 F. App’x 504 n.1 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order) (claims against New York Supreme Court barred by the Eleventh Amendment (citing Gollomp, 568 F.3d at 368 )). This immunity shields states from claims for money damages, injunctive relief, and retrospective declaratory relief. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 72-74 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1984). New York has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court, and Congress did not abrogate the states’ immunity in enacting Section 1983. See Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm’n, 557 F.2d 35 , 40 (2d Cir. 1977). The New York County Supreme Criminal Court – a part of the New York State Unified Court System – is therefore entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against the New York County Criminal Court as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. D. Claims against Fineman A claim for relief under Section 1983 must allege facts showing that each defendant acted under the color of a state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . Private parties therefore generally are not liable under the statute. Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)); see also Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties.”). Absent special circumstances suggesting concerted action between an attorney and a state representative, see Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652 , 656 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970)), the representation of a defendant by private counsel in state criminal proceedings does not constitute the degree of state involvement or interference necessary to establish a claim under section 1983, regardless of whether that attorney is privately retained, court-appointed, or employed as a public defender. See Bourdon v. Loughren, 386 F.3d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981)); see also Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that legal aid organization ordinarily is not a state actor for purposes of Section1983). As Defendant Michael Fineman is a private party who is not alleged to work for any state or other government body, Plaintiff cannot assert a Section 1983 claim against him. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against Fineman for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii). E. Younger abstention The Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief in which she asks the Court to intervene in his pending state-court criminal proceedings. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held that a federal court may not enjoin a pending statecourt criminal proceeding in the absence of special circumstances suggesting bad faith, harassment, or irreparable injury that is both serious and immediate. See Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013) (“Younger exemplifies one class of cases in which federal-court abstention is required: When there is a parallel, pending state criminal proceeding, federal courts must refrain from enjoining the state prosecution.”); Gristina v. Merchan, 131 F.4th 82, 86-87 (2d Cir. 2025) (discussing Younger). “[B]ad faith or harassment” exists when the party bringing the state court action has “no reasonable expectation of obtaining a favorable outcome.’” Homere v. Incorp. Vill. of Hempstead, 322 F. Supp. 3d 353, 368 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting Cullen v. Fliegner, 18 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 1994)); see also Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117 , 126 n.6 (1975) (noting that bad faith under Younger “generally means a prosecution has been brought without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid conviction”); Anilao v. Spota, 27 F.4th 855, 866 (2d Cir. 2022) (holding that the plaintiff’s claim that “his neighbors’ complaints which led to the charges were false” were “insufficient” to show bad faith or harassment, and did not “overcome the presumption that federal courts should not interfere in ongoing state court matters”); DeMartino v. New York State Dep’t of Labor, 167 F. Supp. 3d 342, 355-56 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding that the plaintiff’s allegations that the criminal charges pending against him were based “on the false statements” of the defendant did not “serve as the factual predicate for a plausible finding of bad faith”). Here, Plaintiff has alleged no facts showing bad faith, harassment, or irreparable injury with respect to his pending state-court criminal proceeding. The Court will therefore not intervene in that proceeding and dismisses his claims for injunctive relief. F. Request for release from custody Plaintiff also seeks release from custody. However, he may not obtain release from custody through a Section 1983 action; instead, he can only obtain such relief by bringing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or § 2241. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78-82 (2005) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (noting that writ of habeas corpus is sole remedy for prisoner seeking to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement)); Clemente v. Conn., No. 3:21-CV-0408, 2022 WL 527757 , at *1 (D. Conn. Jan. 27, 2022) (stating that a habeas petition under Section 2241 is the appropriate vehicle for a pretrial detainee to seek release from custody). Although Section 2241 does not contain a statutory exhaustion requirement, the statute has been interpreted as requiring a petitioner to exhaust available state court remedies prior to seeking any relief thereunder in federal court. See United States ex rel. Scranton v. State of New York, 532 F.2d 292, 294 (2d Cir. 1976) (“[D]ecisional law has superimposed [an exhaustion] requirement in order to accommodate principles of federalism.”). A state prisoner may not circumvent the exhaustion requirement for habeas corpus relief by requesting release from custody in a civil action. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489-90 . Because Plaintiff alleges no facts suggesting that he exhausted his available state court remedies, the Court declines to construe his submission as a petition under Section 2241. Should Plaintiff wish to seek release from his present custody, he may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus once he has exhausted all of his available state-court remedies. G. State law claims A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of state law claims when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3). Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (footnote omitted). Having dismissed the federal claims of which the Court has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction of any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting. See Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118 , 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Subsection (c) of § 1367 ‘confirms the discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction by enumerating the circumstances in which district courts can refuse its exercise.’” (quoting City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997))). H. Leave to amend is denied District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Because the defects in Plaintiff's complaint cannot be cured with an amendment, the Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. CONCLUSION The Court dismisses the complaint under the doctrines of judicial immunity, Eleventh Amendment immunity, and Younger abstention, and for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(i1). Plaintiff's request for release from custody is denied without prejudice to his filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus once he has exhausted all of his available state-court remedies. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3). The Court directs the Clerk of Court to enter judgment dismissing this action. SO ORDERED. Dated: August 26, 2025 New York, New York LOUIS L. STANTON U.S.D.J. — 10 —