Kniffen v. East Wenatchee Water District

— 1 — FILED IN THE 2 EASTER U N . S D . I S D T I R S I T C R T I C O T F C W O A U S R H T I NGTON Oct 07, 2025 — 3 — SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK — 4 — 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON — 6 — 7 BRIAN KNIFFEN, NO. 2:23-CV-0344-TOR 8 Plaintiff, ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S 9 v. MOTION FOR REMITTITUR, AMENDMENT OF THE 10 EAST WENATCHEE WATER JUDGMENT, OR IN THE DISTRICT, ALTERNATIVE A NEW TRIAL — 11 — Defendant. — 12 — 13 BEFORE THE COURT is Defendant’s Motion for Remittitur, Amendment 14 of the Judgment, or in the Alternative a New Trial (ECF No. 125). This matter was 15 submitted for consideration without oral argument. The Court has reviewed the 16 record and files herein and is fully informed. For the reasons discussed below, 17 Defendant’s Motion for Remittitur, Amendment of the Judgment, or in the 18 Alternative a New Trial (ECF No. 125) is GRANTED IN PART. — 19 — — 20 — 1 BACKGROUND 2 This case arises out of claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public 3 policy, failure to accommodate, and disability discrimination resulting in disparate 4 impact under the American Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12212 5 and Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”), RCW 49.60.010-.540. 6 ECF No. 1 at 19-22. Defendant moved for summary judgment which resulted in 7 the Court ordering the dismissal of Plaintiff’s wrongful termination in violation of 8 public policy claim. ECF Nos. 34; 74. This left only the state and federal claims 9 for failure to accommodate and disability discrimination resulting in disparate 10 impact. ECF No. 74. After a three-day jury trial, the jury awarded Plaintiff 11 $5,000,000 in emotional harm damages. ECF No. 115. 12 Defendant requests the Court to remit the awarded emotional damages “to an 13 amount no greater than one year of Plaintiff’s requested number of $500,000 a year 14 for his pain and suffering” or in the alternative a new trial. ECF No. 125 at 12. 15 The Court provides a detailed background of the case in its previous order. ECF 16 No. 74. 17 DISCUSSION 18 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 59, after a jury trial, the 19 Court may grant a new trial “for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore 20 been granted in an action at law in federal court.” FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1). Rule 1 59 does not set forth grounds for ordering a new trial, however, the Ninth Circuit 2 Court stated the necessity that the basis is “‘historically recognized.’” Molski v. 3 M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Zhang v. Am. Gem 4 Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003). “Historically recognized 5 grounds include, but are not limited to, claims ‘that the verdict is against the 6 weight of the evidence, that the damages are excessive, or that, for other reasons, 7 the trial was not fair to the party moving.’” Molski, 481 F.3d at 729 (quoting 8 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251 (1940)). 9 The district court has the discretion to grant a new trial. Allied Chem. Corp. 10 v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980). The Court may not grant a new trial 11 unless “‘the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, is based upon 12 false or perjurious evidence, or to prevent a miscarriage of justice.’” Molski, 481 13 F.3d at 729 (quoting Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., 212 F.3d 14 493 , 510 n.15 (9th Cir. 2000). To effectuate this, the district court weighs the 15 evidence “as the court saw it” and may, despite evidence, in its own “conscientious 16 opinion”, set aside the jury’s verdict if it “is contrary to the clear weight of the 17 evidence.’” Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d at 729 (quoting Moist Cold 18 Refrigerator Co. v. Lou Johnson Co., 249 F.2d 246, 256 (9th Cir. 1957)). 19 Following closely to the federal rules, Washington strongly presumes the 20 jury is correct in their verdict and views the evidence in the light to the non1 moving party. Bunch v. King Cnty. Dep't of Youth Servs., 155 Wash. 2d 165, 179 , 2 182 (2005). Similarly, the Court will consider a new award if “it is outside the 3 range of substantial evidence in the record, or shocks the conscience of the court, 4 or appears to have been arrived at as the result of passion or prejudice.’” Bunch, — 5 — 155 Wash. 2d at 179 (quoting Bingaman v. Grays Harbor Cmty. Hosp., 103 Wash. 6 2d 831, 835 (1985)). Shocks the conscience means it is “flagrantly outrageous and 7 extravagant.” Bunch, 155 Wash. 2d at 179 (quoting Bingaman, 103 Wash.2d at 8 836–37). “Passion and prejudice must be ‘unmistakable’ before they affect the 9 jury’s award.” Bunch, 155 Wash. 2d at 179 (quoting Bingaman, 103 Wash. 2d at 10 836); RCW 4.76.030. 11 A remittitur may be appropriate to reduce an award when there is not an 12 indication that the finding of liability was influenced by passion and prejudice. 13 Snyder v. Freight, Const., Gen. Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers, Loc. No. 287, — 14 — 175 F.3d 680 , 689 (9th Cir. 1999), amended, (9th Cir. June 3, 1999). In other 15 words, a remittitur is appropriate to correct an excessive award. Bell v. Williams, — 16 — 108 F.4th 809, 831 (9th Cir. 2024). Determining the remittitur amount is the duty 17 of the district court. Bell, 108 F.4th at 835 . “Previously, the courts have set the 18 remittitur amount where objective evidence clearly identified the correct damages 19 amount.” Id. Typically, the Court will provide the plaintiff with an option of 20 remittitur or new trial. Id. at 831 . 1 I. Attorney Misconduct 2 The Court may grant a new trial if trial “‘misconduct sufficiently 3 permeate[s] an entire proceeding to provide conviction that the jury was influenced 4 by passion and prejudice in reaching its verdict.’” Hemmings v. Tidyman's Inc., — 5 — 285 F.3d 1174 , 1192 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Kehr v. Smith Barney, 736 F.2d 6 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1994)) (negative treatment on other grounds). However, this 7 remedy is not applied lightly and is only applied in extreme cases. Hemmings, 285 8 F.3d at 1193–94. The burden of proof is on the proponent to prove prejudice from 9 the alleged attorney misconduct. Id. at 1193 . The Court considers the totality of 10 the circumstances. Hemmings, 285 F.3d at 1193 (citation omitted). 11 Defendant argues that comments referring to accountability, “to stand up as 12 the conscience of the community” inflamed the jury and they returned a punitive 13 damages award with the compensatory emotional distress damages award. ECF 14 No. 125 at 10. Essentially, Plaintiff’s counsel’s statements improperly influenced 15 the jury, resulting in an impermissible award of punitive damages driven by 16 passion or prejudice. Id. Defendant continues that every award has its upper limit. 17 ECF No. 125 at 9. 18 As both sides have noted, these types of arguments are not permitted. ECF 19 Nos. 125 at 10; 136 at 11. While these comments may be inappropriate, it is 20 unlikely that they resulted in prejudice. Courts have considered the frequency, 1 nature, and context of the comments. Hemmings, 285 F.3d at 1193. Here, the few 2 comments were infrequent and suggested that the jury should hold Defendant 3 accountable for their alleged wrongdoing. ECF No. 120 at 589, 602. The 4 comments did not rise to the level of likely causing the jury to decide based on 5 prejudice or passion. 6 In Hemmings, defendant complained of comments from plaintiffs’ counsel 7 during closing arguments, similarly to the present case, but it was only a short 8 comment. Hemmings v. Tidyman's Inc., 285 F.3d 1174 , 1193–94 (9th Cir. 2002). 9 The Ninth Circuit decided that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying a 10 new trial on that ground. Id. at 1195. The Court did not find support that the 11 misconduct was prejudicial or fundamentally unfair. Id. Also, there were no 12 comments that included racial overtones or inflammatory terms and stereotypes. 13 Hemmings, 285 F.3d at 1193–94 (citing Bird v. Glacier Electric Coop. Inc., 255 14 F.3d 1136, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009). Again, this is used in extreme cases, which is not 15 the case here. As a result, Defendant has not met their burden to show prejudice 16 resulting from Plaintiff’s Counsel’s comments. 17 II. Excessive Damages Award 18 Federal procedure applies to cases proceeding in federal court. Gasperini v. 19 Ctr. for Humans., Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996). Whether the damage 20 determination applies federal or state law is dependent on whether the claim is 1 under federal or state law. Id. Here, we have state law and federal law claims, so 2 the excessive determination will use both. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, 3 Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 , 278–79 (1989) (stating state law applies 4 when it provides the cause of action such as factors to determine award amount, 5 however, federal law “will control on those issues involving the proper review of 6 the jury award by a federal [court]”). 7 When a question of excessive damages is at issue, the Court must view the 8 evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Seymour v. Summa 9 Vista Cinema, Inc., 809 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir.), amended, 817 F.2d 609 (9th 10 Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). Typically, the Court will not disrupt the jury’s 11 damages award unless the amount is “‘grossly excessive or monstrous.’” Zhang v. 12 Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003). On that note, 13 damage awards can be excessive so, “‘[t]here ‘must be an upper limit’ to every 14 damages award.” Bell v. Williams, 108 F.4th 809, 831 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting 15 Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 435 , (1996)). 16 To determine whether an award is grossly excessive takes a two-step approach. 17 Bell v. Williams, 108 F.4th 809, 832 (9th Cir. 2024). First, the Court must examine 18 the trial evidence, as awards for emotional distress and similar damages must be 19 supported by the facts. Id. These facts do not need to be supported with objective 20 evidentiary support to uphold an emotional damages award. Passantino v. Johnson 1 & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493 , 513 (9th Cir. 2000); Harper v. 2 City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1029 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating a plaintiff’s 3 testimony alone can provide evidentiary support for a jury’s award of emotional 4 distress damages). However, the Ninth Circuit recognized that “exceptional 5 damages awards require substantial evidence, whether it comes in the form of 6 detailed testimony or other supporting documentation.” Bell v. Williams, 108 F.4th 7 809, 834 (9th Cir. 2024). The substantial evidence test is a “‘a case-by-case 8 analysis requiring review of the whole record’” to find “‘more than a mere scintilla 9 and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 10 support a conclusion.’” Kyung Park v. Holder, 572 F.3d 619, 624 (9th Cir. 2009) 11 (quoting Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1987)). In step two, the 12 Court considers awards in comparable cases, however, with caution because of the 13 subjective and complex nature of limiting emotional damages to numbers. Bell v. 14 Williams, 108 F.4th 809, 832 (9th Cir. 2024). However, if the evidence supports 15 the award, then step two is unnecessary. Bell, 108 F.4th at 832 . 16 Washington also uses the sufficient evidence test to support the verdict. Bunch 17 v. King Cnty. Dep't of Youth Servs., 155 Wash. 2d 165, 179 (2005). Washington 18 clarifies this is present when the evidence “would convince ‘an unprejudiced, 19 thinking mind.’” Id. 20 Defendant argues the verdict was grossly excessive and unsupported with 1 evidence and the verdict is incomparable to other similar cases. ECF No. 125 at 52 12. Defendant continues that the emotional damages award is not supported by 3 sufficient evidence. ECF No. 125 at 6. Furthermore, Defendant states that a 4 Plaintiff should not be put in a better position than the Defendant. ECF No. 125 at 5 5-9. Plaintiff responds that the emotional damages award was not excessive and 6 supported by the testimonies of the witnesses proving lasting emotional damage. 7 ECF No. 136 at 4-5. Defendant contends that this award is massively larger than 8 awards in similar cases. ECF No. 125 at 11. 9 First, the Court determines if there is sufficient evidence to support the 10 award. Three witnesses testified to Plaintiff’s emotional distress. ECF Nos. 119 at 11 101, 108; 120 at 15. Plaintiff’s mother testified that he was “really hurt”, “he 12 became withdrawn” and “wasn’t himself.” ECF No. 119 at 111. Additionally, she 13 stated “he always has a scowl on his face, and he was always letting out big sighs, 14 and he would sit and just stare out the window.” ECF No. 119 at 113. Plaintiff’s 15 brother claimed Plaintiff was “very down, depressed, angry, not as bubbly” and he 16 had “shame” around the termination. ECF Nos. 119 at 104, 106. Plaintiff’s friend 17 testified Plaintiff became “depressed and worried about his future” and how this 18 termination became “very, very stressful for him.” ECF No. 120 at 20. Plaintiff 19 expressed his worries about his family including his daughter who “feels a sense of 20 abandonment. ECF No. 199 at 185. Plaintiff expressed concern of being “three 1 hours away” from family and losing “moments in time” including his inability to 2 fish. ECF No. 199 at 186. Plaintiff claimed he was hurt from being fired from 3 people he considered family and stated it hurt worse than his divorce. ECF No. 4 199 at 185, 174-75. 5 Plaintiff did not provide detailed testimonies or documentation to show 6 physical or emotional impact. Bell, 108 F.4th at 834 (requiring detailed testimony 7 or other documentation for high emotional distress awards). Similarly, in Bell, the 8 Court found that an award of half a million required “much more evidence of pain 9 and/or greater emotional anguish to be sustainable.” Bell, 108 F.4th at 834 . Here, 10 the witnesses testify to their own observations, thoughts, and feelings but none of 11 this provides evidence of emotional or physical impacts and what little evidence 12 was provided does not rise to the level of emotional distress. None of these 13 testimonies show “lasting physical or emotional damage” or suffering “long term 14 consequences.” Bell, 108 F.4th at 834 . In other words, the evidence does not 15 substantiate the award. 16 Additionally, emotional distress damages are compensatory, to redress a 17 loss, but here, there is a lack of evidence to show a loss at all to compensate 18 Plaintiff. Bell v. Williams, 108 F.4th 809, 833 (9th Cir. 2024) (emotional distress 19 awards are a type of compensatory damage); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 20 Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 408 (2003). Furthermore, as a result, the evidence 1 presented is insufficient to uphold this award. 2 This is true even under Washington’s standards and rules. Under 3 Washington law, the plaintiff’s testimony must be “’reasonabl[e] and sufficient[]’” 4 to explain the emotional distress and support the award of damages. Tafoya v. 5 State Hum. Rts. Comm'n, 177 Wash. App. 216, 230 , 311 P.3d 70 , 78–79 (2013), as 6 amended (Nov. 13, 2013) (quoting Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916 , 931–32) (internal 7 quotation marks omitted). For example, in Tafoya, the plaintiff testified to her 8 fears for her and her cat’s safety, that she was in therapy, and was gaining weight 9 and could not sleep. Id. at 231. Here, the testimonies are lacking details or 10 evidence beyond personal observations and therefore, do not sufficiently explain 11 the emotional distress of Plaintiff. What was not shown was how these feelings 12 affected him and the impact they had. Even more, his family’s feelings and their 13 effect on his own family does not result in emotional distress to award damages. 14 The evidence is insufficient to uphold this award because the testimonies are not 15 detailed enough to provide such a high award for emotional distress damages. 16 Step two requires the Court to compare other similar cases to determine if 17 this award is outrageous. Other cases do not come near the amount awarded in this 18 case. Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039 , 1047 (2002) (awarding plaintiffs 19 $10,192.22 and $1,053.21, respectively for compensatory damages for unlawful 20 discrimination under the ADA); Goldstine v. FedEx Freight Inc., No. C18-1164 1 MJP, 2021 WL 952354 , at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 11, 2021) (emotional distress 2 award of $1,750,000 for WLAD and ADA disability discrimination claim where 3 plaintiff faced a cancer diagnosis after termination and was concerned about 4 payment for care without insurance); Carlson v. City of Spokane, No. 13-CV-03205 TOR, 2015 WL 11112412 , at *2 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2015) (jury awarded $4,000 6 in emotional distress damages for discrimination violations of the ADA and 7 WLAD). The only award that comes remotely comparable to the award here is in 8 Goldstine, where plaintiff was facing cancer and attempting to treat it without 9 insurance or wages. Goldstine v. FedEx Freight Inc., No. C18-1164 MJP, 2021 10 WL 952354 , at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 11, 2021). Even then, the emotional distress 11 damages did not even raise to half of the amount of this award. 12 Comparing additional cases under WLAD, this award still vastly outweighs 13 comparable cases, or any cases under this type of claim for emotional distress 14 damages. Martini v. Boeing Co., 137 Wash. 2d 357, 362 (1999) (jury awarded the 15 plaintiff pain, suffering, and emotional distress damages of $75,000); Stewart v. 16 Snohomish Cnty. PUD No. 1, 262 F. Supp. 3d 1089, 1113 (W.D. Wash. 2017), 17 aff'd sub nom. Stewart v. Snohomish Cnty. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 752 F. App'x 444 18 (9th Cir. 2018) (the court awarded $10,000 in emotional damages on disability 19 discrimination WLAD claims); Goldstine v. FedEx Freight Inc., No. C18-1164 20 MJP, 2021 WL 952354 , at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 11, 2021). The awards of similar 1 cases under Washington and federal law are drastically lower than the case here. 2 Accordingly, this award is excessive and outrageous. 3 Plaintiff’s use Bunch to support their claim of substantial evidence. ECF 4 No. 136 at 4. However, this case is different. In Bunch, the evidence included 5 discrimination for over six years, including multiple accounts of disciplinary 6 actions for petty offenses that others did not receive. Bunch v. King Cnty. Dep't of 7 Youth Servs., 155 Wash. 2d 165, 180 (2005). Bunch faced harassment, less pay 8 and minimal benefits and had to explain to his family that he was fired because 9 other inmates testified that he showed them an R-rated video. Id. at 169 . Even 10 more, the Washington Supreme Court still deemed this evidence as “limited” while 11 upholding part of the award. Id. Here, Plaintiff did not face harassment or 12 discrimination for years of outright disparate disciplinary treatment. These cases 13 are vastly different. 14 Additionally, Plaintiff argues that this verdict aligns with modern 15 employment discrimination verdicts and evolution of “society’s understanding of 16 injury” but does not support this with any closely similar case. ECF No. 136 at 8. 17 Even then, one of the closest cases still does not come to even half of the present 18 case’s award. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s argument that Washington law bars caps on 19 damage is irrelevant because requiring sufficient evidence to uphold an award is 20 not a cap on damages. ECF No. 136 at 3. Additionally, the claims at issue are 1 under state law and federal law. 2 As was previously discussed, there is a lack of sufficient evidence to support 3 this award of emotional distress. The testimonies do not show emotional distress 4 beyond personal observations and general feelings. It is unclear whether any 5 evidence supports the award, or where such support might exist. For these same 6 reasons, a remittitur is inappropriate because the issue lies with determining where 7 the evidence clearly identifies the damage amount. 8 As a result, there is not sufficient evidence to support this award of 9 emotional distress. This insufficiency of evidence to support the emotional distress 10 awards leads the Court to consider whether there is sufficient evidence for the 11 claims. 12 III. Judgment as a Matter of Law 13 Under Rule 50(b)(3), the Court may “direct the entry of judgment as a matter of 14 law” “‘only if there is no legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find for 15 that party on that issue.’” Morris v. W. Hayden Ests. First Addition Homeowners 16 Ass'n, Inc., 104 F.4th 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1127 , 220 17 L. Ed. 2d 423 (2025) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); FED. R. CIV. 18 P. 50 (b)(3). However, “[a] jury’s verdict must be upheld if it is supported by 19 substantial evidence that is adequate to support the jury’s findings, even if contrary — 20 — 1 findings are also possible.” Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236 , 2 1242–43 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 3 Under the ADA and WLAD, an employer must not discriminate against an 4 employee based on a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a); RCW 60.180(3). “To 5 prevail on [his] discrimination claims under both the ADA and WLAD, the 6 Plaintiff is required to establish: (1) that [he] was disabled under the ADA and 7 WLAD; ‘(2) that [he] was a qualified individual with a disability; and (3) that [he] 8 was discriminated against by [his] employer because of that disability.’” Poe v. 9 Waste Connections US, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 3d 901, 909 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (citing 10 Dunlap v. Liberty Nat. Products, Inc., 878 F.3d 794 , 798–99 (9th Cir. 2017); 11 Mikkelsen v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Kittitas County, 189 Wash. 2d 516 , 12 526-527 (2017) (citations omitted). Because the WLAD looks to the federal 13 statutes for interpretation and the similarity in the statutes, they are analyzed 14 together unless they differ. Poe, 371 F. Supp. 3d at 909 . 15 “A qualified individual with a disability is defined as ‘an individual with a 16 disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the 17 essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or 18 desires.’” Smith v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 727 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2013) 19 (quoting Nunes v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1999)) 20 (internal quotations omitted). 1 Discrimination under the ADA and WLAD includes failure to reasonably 2 accommodate and disparate treatment of a qualified disabled individual. 42 U.S.C. 3 § 12112; RCW 49.60.180. The request for an accommodation is “’an interactive 4 process with the employee to determine the appropriate reasonable 5 accommodation.’” U.S. E.E.O.C. v. UPS Supply Chain Sols., 620 F.3d 1103 , 1110 6 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th 7 Cir. 2002)). The process must include “‘(1) direct communication between the 8 employer and employee to explore in good faith the possible accommodations; (2) 9 consideration of the employee’s request; and (3) offering an accommodation that is 10 reasonable and effective.’” Id. However, an employer is not required to provide 11 an accommodation that the employee prefers but only needs to provide a 12 reasonable accommodation. Id. at 1110–11. 13 The Court is concerned with whether under the ADA and WLAD, the 14 Defendant was a “qualified individual” as required for all of Plaintiff’s ADA and 15 WLAD claims. Specifically, whether Defendant could perform the essential duties 16 of the role with reasonable accommodations or whether a reasonable 17 accommodation was available. The Ninth Circuit states the district court’s right 18 and duty “to prevent, in the sound discretion of the trial judge, a miscarriage of 19 justice.” Murphy v. City of Long Beach, 914 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1990). 20 Following, the Court may express a concern of deficiency in the evidence to the 1 parties to provide a chance to “correct the deficit.” Murphy, 914 F.2d at 186 (9th 2 Cir. 1990). 3 In the interest of the Court’s duties and justice, the Court respectfully requests 4 the parties to file briefings within 30 days of this order, arguing whether the court 5 should order a judgment as a matter of law. The issue is whether Plaintiff was a 6 qualified individual, as described under the ADA and WLAD, meaning he could 7 perform the essential duties of the job with a reasonable accommodation. Briefing 8 on these issues should not exceed twenty (20) pages total, exclusive of attachments 9 and supporting materials. Simultaneous briefing shall be filed within 30 days of 10 this order. 11 / 12 / 13 / 14 / 15 / 16 / 17 / 18 / 19 / — 20 — ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 2 1. Defendant’s Motion (ECF No. 125) is GRANTED in part. 3 2. The Judgment (ECF No. 117) and Jury Verdict (ECF No. 115) award of 4 $5,000,000 million is VACATED. 5 3. The Court requests the parties to file briefs regarding a Judgment as a 6 Matter Law within 30 days of this order, following the guidelines under 7 the Local Rules. 8 The District Court Executive is directed to enter this Order and furnish 9|| copies to counsel. 10 DATED October 7, 2025. <> United States District Judge — 13 — — 14 — — 15 — — 16 — — 17 — — 18 — — 19 — — 20 — ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR REMITTITUR, AMENDMENT